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A Study of Soviet Foreign Policy



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ВНЕШНЯЯ ПОЛИТИКА СССР

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CHAPTER ONE

THE PRESENT EPOCH AND SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

1. Basic Orientations of Soviet Foreign Policy

The Socialist Character of Soviet Foreign Policy

Having given the world a model of a just social order with new human relations that rule out exploitation of man by man, socialism has moulded its own foreign policy that expresses the interests of peoples blazing the road to a better future for all mankind.

The workers, the poorest sections of the peasants, the soldiers and sailors of Russia were the first to embark on that road. In October 1917, led by the Communist Party, they accomplished a revolution that raised on high a banner calling for society's socialist reorganisation. Within hours of the victory of the armed uprising in Petrograd, the Communist Party and the newly-formed Soviet Government launched a new domestic and foreign policy that differed fundamentally from the policies pursued by the bourgeoisie. Its scientific foundations had been worked out by Lenin and the Communist Party long before the October Revolution.

Bourgeois ideologists vainly try to make people believe that it is possible to pursue a "supra-class" policy with no clearly defined social character of its own. Their purpose is to conceal from the people the incontrovertible fact that the policies of every capitalist state are determined by the mercenary interests of the ruling class, the bourgeoisie. Naturally, these interests are inconsistent with the aspirations of the working people. In a socialist society, on the other hand, the state power is in the hands of the working class and all the other working people allied with it. That gives a different class orientation to domestic and foreign policies. These policies are determined by the socialist character of the given society, by the leading role of the Communist Party. "Our foreign policy," Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, said, "has always been and will

be a class policy, a socialist policy in content and aim."* One of the cardinal features of that policy is that it is profoundly and genuinely democratic and serves the working people.

The principal objective of socialist foreign policy is to secure the most favourable external conditions for the building of socialism and communism. As was underscored at a plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU in May 1972, depending on the situation this policy has recourse to various forms and methods for achieving its aims, organically linking the fulfilment of immediate tasks with the long-term prospects and tasks of the struggle for world peace, freedom, security, social progress and socialism. This policy is unreservedly internationalist because by their labour the builders of socialism contribute immensely to the world revolutionary process, while their interests harmonise with those of the working people of all countries.

The Soviet Union has become the material, political and ideological mainstay of the international working-class, communist and national liberation movements. Its foreign policy is permeated with a spirit of solidarity with all revolutionary, progressive forces and constitutes an active factor of the class struggle on the world scene.

Socialist foreign policy is intrinsically scientific, in other words, it is founded on a knowledge of the objective laws governing the development of society and international relations. Underlying it is a creative Marxist analysis of the balance of strength in the world and of the obtaining situation. This knowledge of the laws of social development allows Soviet foreign policy to look confidently to the future and gives it the strength of scientific prevision.

The Leninist Principles of Soviet Foreign Policy

The Decree on Peace, adopted by the 2nd Congress of Soviets, was the first foreign policy document of the Soviet state. It directed attention to the settlement of the world's most crucial problem, the problem of war and peace. Stigmatising imperialist war as the most heinous crime against mankind, it called upon all peoples to spare no effort to achieve lasting peace. It propounded Lenin's principles of

* L. I. Brezhnev, *The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, Moscow, 1972, p. 41.

proletarian internationalism and peaceful coexistence of states with different systems. These principles have become the guidelines of Soviet foreign policy.

The Decree on Peace proclaimed genuinely democratic norms of international relations, namely, respect for the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of all countries, recognition of the right of all nations to independent statehood, non-interference in the internal affairs of countries and peoples, the equality of all states, big and small, renunciation of aggression and territorial annexations, and broad and mutually beneficial co-operation.

The adoption of this decree signified that the Soviet Republic had assumed the leadership of the struggle of all peoples against imperialism and its policy of aggression and colonial oppression. Lenin defined Soviet policy on the world scene as follows: "The chief task facing us is to fight imperialism, and this fight we must win."*

Support for peoples giving battle to imperialism, fighting for liberation or defending their revolutionary gains has always been one of the cornerstones of the Leninist foreign policy. Immense historic significance was acquired by the Declaration of Rights of the Peoples of Russia (November 15, 1917) and the appeal To All the Working Moslems of Russia and the East (December 3, 1917), in which was embodied Lenin's programme on the nationalities and colonial questions. This was the first time that a Great Power had formally condemned colonialism and declared an uncompromising struggle against it. This was the first-ever political programme for implementing the right of nations to self-determination.

As soon as it was set up the Soviet Government declared its support for the liberation struggle of the oppressed peoples. Since then it has given tangible assistance to many peoples fighting for national independence. In line with the principle of the self-determination of nations the Soviet Government granted independence to Finland.

Fraternal relations were shaped between the Soviet republics in the course of the common struggle for freedom, for the preservation and consolidation of the great gains of the October Revolution, for socialism. In 1922 they united to form a multinational socialist state, the Union of Soviet So-

* V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 28, p. 125.

cialist Republics. The unity and bonds of friendship between the free peoples of the Soviet Union constituted one of socialism's greatest achievements. This has had enormous international repercussions and formed a major milestone of social progress.

To the extent of its resources at the time Soviet Russia helped the Soviet republics that were set up by the peoples of Hungary, Bavaria and Slovakia. It supported the liberation struggle of the peoples of Iran, Afghanistan, Turkey and China against imperialism and reaction, and helped Mongolia, where the people had seized power in 1921.

Lenin foresaw that the time would come when there would be many socialist countries in the world and he scientifically formulated the principles for the relations between them. He made it quite plain that these principles would have nothing in common with the class-antagonistic relations between countries with different social systems or the contradiction-fraught relations between capitalist countries. Proletarian, socialist internationalism was the only foundation for relations between socialist countries.

Prior to socialism's emergence from the boundaries of one country, the proletarian internationalism of Soviet foreign policy was expressed in unity with the working people of the capitalist states and support for national liberation, democratic and socialist movement. After the Second World War, when a large group of socialist countries appeared on the map, proletarian internationalism became, as Lenin had foreseen, the factor determining the relations between them. Proletarian internationalism spells out fraternal friendship, unity, mutual assistance, co-operation and help in the building of socialism.

Proletarian internationalism not only permeates Soviet domestic and foreign policies. It influences the interdependence between the changes that have taken place in the USSR and the world revolutionary process.

The growth of the Soviet Union's economic and defence potential is part of the world revolutionary process, which is leading towards mankind's transition to socialism and communism. Every achievement of the Soviet Union strengthens it as the backbone of the revolutionary and liberation movements, provides further irrepressible inspiration for millions of people, enhances the might of the socialist system as a whole and smooths the way to communism for the coun-

tries of that system. Developments have fully borne out Lenin's conclusion that a strong Soviet state is needed "for the world communist proletariat in its struggle against the world bourgeoisie and its defence against bourgeois intrigues".*

The character of the Soviet social system determines the profound humanism of Soviet foreign policy, whose prime objectives are to deliver mankind from the threat of another world war, put an end to imperialist aggression and eradicate all existing flashpoints.

The idea of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems had been comprehensively substantiated by Lenin, who drew attention to the fact that due to the non-simultaneous transition of different countries to the new social system, socialist and capitalist states would exist in parallel for a relatively long time. Therefore, despite their different state and social systems they would inevitably enter into commercial contact. International economic relations and trade, Lenin stressed, were wanted not only by the socialist but also by the capitalist countries. That gave peaceful coexistence its real foundation. In one of its documents the Soviet Government had proclaimed: "Our motto remains unchanged: peaceful coexistence with other governments, whoever they may be."**

Peaceful coexistence does not rule out but presupposes determined opposition to imperialist aggression and support for peoples defending their revolutionary gains or fighting foreign oppression. The Soviet Union considers that lasting peace cannot be achieved unless the sovereign rights of every nation are respected. Peaceful coexistence does not involve any relaxation of the ideological struggle.

Soviet foreign policy is directed towards ensuring the most favourable peaceful conditions for the building of communism in the USSR, strengthening the unity and cohesion of the socialist countries, supporting the liberation and revolutionary movements, promoting solidarity and co-operation with the independent states of Asia, Africa and Latin America, and consolidating peaceful coexistence in international relations. The Soviet Government continues, as it has always done, to make every effort to prevent the imperialist aggressors from carrying out their designs, to deliver mankind from the menace of another world war.

* V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 36, p. 609.

** *Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, p. 639.

The CPSU as the Leading and Guiding Force of Soviet Foreign Policy

Soviet foreign policy was brought into being by the socialist revolution. It has been and remains one of the vehicles of society's revolutionary reorganisation. That is what makes foreign policy and diplomacy a major sphere of the work of the Communist Party and the Government of the Soviet Union. The principles underlying this work are part of the programme, strategy and tactics of the CPSU.

Lenin had underscored that Party leadership of foreign policy was imperative and insisted that this should be day-to-day, systematic leadership. "Does not the Political Bureau," he wrote, "discuss from the Party point of view many questions, both minor and important, concerning the 'moves' we should make in reply to the 'moves' of foreign powers in order to forestall their, say, cunning, if we are not to use a less respectable term? Is not this flexible amalgamation of a Soviet institution with a Party institution a source of great strength in our politics?"* This flexible combination of Government and Party leadership is a salient feature of the socialist state's foreign policy and the inexhaustible source of that policy's foresight and efficacy.

The practice of discussing foreign policy issues and the international situation at Party congresses, plenary meetings of the Central Committee and in the local Party organisations had been introduced by Lenin. Soviet foreign policy is charted collectively by the Party, which generalises the experience of the Soviet Union and of the entire world communist and working-class movement.

In foreign policy the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government are steadfastly guided by the theoretical propositions and basic principles worked out by Lenin, creatively enlarging upon and applying them in the new conditions. Soviet foreign policy is thus Leninist.

A minute Marxist analysis of international developments, durable principles, revolutionary firmness in upholding the state interests of the USSR and the great cause of communism and in supporting allies and friends, an irreconcilable attitude towards imperialist aggressors and, at the same time, flexibility, realism and willingness to accept reasonable com-

* V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, pp. 495-96.

promises are what make Soviet foreign policy highly effective, enable it to carry out its tasks and exert a growing influence on international developments.

Through its foreign policy the Soviet Union makes an inestimable contribution to the world revolutionary movement and ensures an active defence of peace and of the freedom and independence of nations.

Character of the Present Epoch

Each epoch has its own specifics, which depend on what social system plays the leading role and facilitates progress, and on what class is the central factor of the epoch, plays a progressive role and exerts the decisive influence. To understand the character of an epoch means to disclose the laws of that epoch, the meaning and significance of developments, the direction of these developments and their prospects. For Communists it is particularly vital to know the character of the epoch because their revolutionary, transformative work is founded on their study of the objective laws of historical development.

Lenin defined the character of our epoch as an epoch of transition on a global scale, as an epoch ushering in the end of capitalism and the establishment of socialism and communism. In the Programme of the CPSU it is stated: "Our epoch, whose main content is the transition from capitalism to socialism, is an epoch of struggle between the two opposing social systems, an epoch of socialist and national liberation revolutions, of the breakdown of imperialism and the abolition of the colonial system, an epoch of the transition of more and more peoples to the socialist path, of the triumph of socialism and communism on a world-wide scale. The central factor of the present epoch is the international working class and its main creation, the world socialist system."*

The modern epoch was rung in by the October Socialist Revolution in Russia in 1917. If the entire post-1917 period is assessed from the standpoint of the growth and consolidation of the forces of world socialism, it clearly falls into two stages. The first, beginning with the October Revolution, witnessed the consolidation of the proletarian dictatorship in

* *The Road to Communism*, Moscow, 1962, p. 449.

one country, which was encircled by hostile capitalist states. Owing to this circumstance the threat that the bourgeois system would be restored could not be ruled out. That was why the victory of socialism could not be regarded as complete.

The Soviet people built a socialist society in face of enormous difficulties and showed the world the great advantages of the new system. In the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 they safeguarded the gains of socialism against the most sinister forces of imperialist reaction and brought many peoples of Europe and Asia liberation from nazi tyranny. While the October Revolution broke one link of the chain of the imperialism, this chain was finally sundered at the close of the war and during the initial post-war years by the efforts of the peoples of a number of countries. The USSR helped the working people of the new socialist countries to advance along the road they had chosen.

Socialism became a world system. Its formation, the greatest achievement of the international working class, of all the revolutionary forces, marked the commencement of the second stage of our epoch.

The cardinal feature of the second stage is that the world socialist community has firmly grasped the historical initiative. It determines the content and direction of social development, securing a further change in the balance of strength and continuing to crowd capitalism. True, the imperialists are still endeavouring to reverse the course of world history with the aid of military gambles, subversion and neocolonialism. However, as Leonid Brezhnev pointed out at the 1969 International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, imperialism has to adapt itself to the new conditions, to the conditions of the struggle between the two systems. Nevertheless, its position in the world is growing inexorably weaker.

In carrying out the plans mapped out by the Communist Party the Soviet people have, by their inspired, creative labour, built a developed socialist society and started the building of communism. The new social system has been firmly established also in the other socialist countries that have begun building a developed socialist society. Under the impact of socialism, which is rapidly gaining strength, showing its inexhaustible advantages more and more fully and setting an attractive example, favourable conditions have

taken shape in the world for the further unfolding of the revolutionary and liberation struggle, for all the democratic movements.

World Socialism's Growing Influence on Social Development

The world socialist system consists of a number of elements. The successes of the system and its impact on world history depend largely on the extent to which these elements are interrelated, on the unity of the entire system. For that reason the questions of further strengthening the unity of the world socialist community and the relations with fraternal countries and their Communist and Workers' parties receive the closest attention of the CPSU Central Committee.

The economic achievements of the socialist countries mirror not only the creative efforts of the peoples of these countries but also the efficacy of their mutual assistance and co-operation. The high economic growth rate is eloquent testimony of these achievements. In the period 1966 through 1970 the annual increment of industrial output was 8.3 per cent in the CMEA member states and 4-5 per cent in the capitalist countries. In the socialist countries the standard of living and cultural level of the people are rising rapidly as a result of the measures that are being taken to direct the scientific and technological revolution towards stepping up the efficiency of social production, achieving a high level of labour productivity and improving the structure and management of production.

It is only under socialism that the finest achievements of science and technology can be used most fully for the good of man. The 24th Congress of the CPSU re-emphasised the importance of combining socialism's advantages with these achievements.

Moreover, the economic advancement of the world socialist community multiplies the material and political factors ensuring the possibility of preserving and consolidating peace. In the Central Committee report to the 24th Congress of the CPSU it is stated: "It is safe to say that many of the imperialist aggressors' plans were frustrated thanks to the existence of the world socialist system and its firm actions."* Thanks

* 24th Congress of the CPSU, Moscow, 1972, p. 9.

to world socialism, the cold war policy has failed entirely and the conditions have been created for peaceful coexistence and mutually beneficial co-operation as the foundation for the relations between socialist and capitalist countries. One of the main factors giving the world socialist system itself and the foreign policy of the socialist countries a tremendous influence on international developments is that they facilitate the struggle of the peoples for national and social liberation, for progressive changes.

Lenin's inspired forecast has come true: socialism has become a factor "capable of exercising a decisive influence upon world politics as a whole".* As Lenin had foretold, the most diverse forces and trends have merged into a single torrent in the struggle against imperialism. Together with and led by the working class the fifteen hundred million people of the former colonies and semi-colonies have appeared on the scene of active political struggle. This has immensely broadened the world revolutionary movement and accelerated social progress.

The ideals of peace and unbreakable unity are strikingly reflected in the joint diplomatic documents of the socialist countries. The treaties of friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance, which give an international legal basis to the principles of Marxism-Leninism in the relations between socialist countries, are genuine charters of friendship. These treaties embody the experience of many years, the warm relations between fraternal peoples and other keen international awareness of their common interests. In foreign policy the socialist countries have evolved many forms of co-operation: joint analysis of major events and development trends, collective study of experience, the charting, on the basis of Leninist principles, of a common guideline and constructive proposals on pressing problems, mutual support at international conferences and in international organisations, and joint action in emergencies precipitated by the imperialists.

On the international scene the socialist countries are distinguished by their militant spirit, their uncompromising stand in the ideological struggle and their firmness in curbing the imperialist aggressors. Their constructive proposals, which

* V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 148.

comprehensively take the actual situation and the possibilities for international co-operation into account, have acquired outstanding significance in world politics.

Downfall of the Colonial System

Whereas the first feature of the post-war period is the formation of the world socialist community, its second feature is the disintegration of capitalism's colonial system. The rise and development of that system is inseparable from the history of capitalism. At the dawn of the capitalist era, when the initial accumulation of capital took place, the subjugation and pillaging of India, Indonesia, Indochina and many other countries were an essential condition of the enrichment of Europe and the USA.

Under imperialism the struggle of the capitalist countries for markets and raw materials led to the world's territorial partition by a handful of Great Powers. By force of arms they brought the majority of the Asian and African countries under their rule. The few Eastern states that retained political independence found themselves reduced to the status of semi-colonies. The imperialists controlled their economy, finances and external and domestic policies. "Capitalism," Lenin wrote, "has grown into a world system of colonial oppression and of the financial strangulation of the overwhelming majority of the population of the world by a handful of 'advanced' countries."*

Exploitation of the colonies brought the monopolies fabulous profits. For the imperialist powers the material and manpower resources of the subjugated countries were a major reserve in their struggle to halt the revolutionary movement and for the continuation of their policy of aggrandisement. Colonialism inflicted incalculable distress on the oppressed peoples: denial of political rights, economic backwardness, the destruction of national culture, poverty and extinction. In the past the colonial peoples had risen time and again against their enslavers, but these risings were usually abortive.

The situation changed only after the October Socialist Revolution, which ushered in the downfall of colonial domination by undermining the foundations of imperialism. It

* V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, p. 191.

awakened the oppressed nations and fortified their striving for independence and their faith in victory over imperialism. These nations now knew that they had a friend upon whom they could depend.

The Soviet Union's victory in the Great Patriotic War and the Soviet Army's large contribution to the defeat of the Japanese militarists were of immense and, in many ways, decisive significance to the struggle of the peoples of the East. The resultant new situation in the world allowed the Chinese, Vietnamese and Korean peoples to shake off imperialist oppression and take the road of socialism: the People's Republic of China, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Korean People's Democratic Republic were formed. Many other nations in Asia and also in Africa won liberation from colonial rule and began to develop independently.

Opposition to colonial oppression was now no longer confined to individual political leaders and the most progressive sections of society. Entire nations rose to give battle, and the anti-imperialist forces became more organised and united. In some countries the national bourgeoisie sided with the people. As a class the national bourgeoisie is, of course, unstable and inclined to seek conciliation. The extent of its participation in the liberation revolution depends on the alignment of class forces and on the depth of its own contradictions with the imperialists and the feudal lords.

The peoples of the colonies are eager to win independence with the least material and human losses. But when imperialism refuses to satisfy their just demands they have recourse to other means of struggle, including armed uprisings and wars of liberation. During the first decade after the Second World War the colonial regime was removed by agreement in only a few countries; in most cases independence was achieved forcibly. The fact that in 1956 through 1972 liberation was won without an armed struggle by 52 of the 55 new countries is by no means an indication that the colonialists have become tractable or desire to restore justice. Imperialism and colonialism do not retreat of their own free will. The point is that they are no longer in a position to win an open battle with the national liberation forces, who rely on support from the socialist countries.

The disintegration of the colonial system has entered its final stage. Roughly 40 million people or somewhat above 1 per cent of the world's population were under foreign rule in 1973. It will be recalled that in 1939 colonial rule embraced nearly 700 million people. The Soviet Union is pressing for the abolition of the last remnants of colonialism.

The acquisition of national independence is only the first step. The next and no less important step is the choice of the way of development. The struggle for national liberation grows into a struggle against the very foundations of the exploiting system and hits the positions of the capitalist system as a whole. In the present-day liberation movement the main thing *"is that the struggle for national liberation in many countries has in practical terms begun to grow into a struggle against exploitative relations, both feudal and capitalist"*.^{*} The countries steering towards the building of a socialist society in future are putting into effect far-reaching reforms that further the interests of the people and help to strengthen national independence. With the world socialist system in existence, even small and weak states can successfully advance along the road of social progress with assistance from socialist countries.

There are, of course, certain distinctions in the specific pattern of the changes in socialist-oriented countries. However, there is a common feature expressed by the sum of the socio-economic reforms. Usually, they include an agrarian reform with the gratuitous transfer of the land to the peasants, the uprooting of feudal and semi-feudal exploitation and the abolition of landowner domination; the restriction of the activities of foreign companies and the nationalisation of their property; the building of a national industry, chiefly in the public sector with restrictions on the activities of the local bourgeoisie; the promotion of agriculture through the formation of peasant co-operatives and the state-subsidised application of the achievements of modern science and technology; the promotion of the national culture and the training of own specialists in science, technology, production and management; the adoption of an anti-imperialist foreign policy; the attainment of unity among the population as a whole and the various nationalities inhabiting one and the same country and the encour-

^{*} 24th Congress of the CPSU, p. 23.

agement of their revolutionary activity as a vital condition for suppressing the resistance of internal reaction and preventing imperialist interference.

The formation of the socialist community and the appearance of new countries on the international political scene have fundamentally changed the balance of strength in the world. The possibilities of the imperialists for pursuing an aggressive policy have narrowed substantially. They are finding that they have to withdraw their troops and military bases from many of the liberated states. They cannot, as had been the case formerly, plunder the national wealth of the former colonies with impunity. All this makes it difficult for the imperialists to prepare and start military adventures. Further, although the monopolies still retain strong positions in the new states, they have lost the possibility of determining the economic development of these states. Their positions, too, will shrink with the building and growth of the national industry.

In other words, with the abolition of direct Western political control the Asian and African countries cease to play the role of a reserve and supply base of imperialism. Objectively, the consolidation of their political and economic independence furthers the weakening of imperialism.

The Soviet Union sees its internationalist duty in continuing its support for the struggle of the peoples for total liberation from colonial and neocolonial oppression.

Deepening of the General Crisis of Capitalism

The momentous changes taking place in the world and the internal processes in the bourgeois countries have called forth the further deepening and aggravation of the crisis of capitalism.

This crisis is an all-embracing and irreversible process affecting all aspects of the life of bourgeois society: production, finance, internal and external policy, ideology and morals.

It was sparked by the First World War and the October Socialist Revolution in Russia. The principal factor behind it is the existence of the new, socialist system, which is developing swiftly and demonstrating its advantages. The second stage of the crisis was ushered in by the Second World War and the socialist revolutions in European and

Asian countries. The main factor of that stage was the formation and consolidation of the world socialist system in opposition to the capitalist system. The third stage commenced in the mid-1950s.

One of the salient features of the third stage is that it was inaugurated not by a world war but by the competition and political struggle between the two world socio-economic systems, by the steadily changing balance of strength in favour of socialism and by the activation of the struggle of the peoples for democracy, national liberation and socialism. The triumph of the people's revolution in Cuba was an expression of all these changes.

The economic and defence potential of the USSR and the entire socialist community and the growth of the peace forces are preventing imperialist reaction from pushing the peaceful competition between the two systems into a world nuclear conflict. This is one of the major indications of the crisis of imperialist policy.

In the economic sphere capitalism's crisis is manifested by the fact that the leading imperialist powers are losing their supremacy. In the socialist countries the economy is developing at a much faster rate.

Capitalism's economic instability and the uneven development of the various capitalist countries have become sharply pronounced. The USA, the leading and strongest imperialist power, has become the epicentre of economic crises and upheavals. The American economy suffered yet another decline in 1970-1971. There have been extremely violent currency crises. Only recently the main currency of the capitalist world, the dollar has been steadily losing its purchasing power and value. Inflation has gripped other capitalist countries, where it is somewhat masked with a higher currency parity relative to the dollar. As was pointed out at the 24th Congress of the CPSU, the economic situation in the capitalist countries is characterised by inflation and the growth of unemployment.

The character of the US economy has become undisguisedly militarist. Scientific and technological achievements are used mainly for the creation of destructive weapons, for the arms race.

The sharply accentuated uneven development of the capitalist countries is leading to a further aggravation of imperialist contradictions and to an intensification of the

competitive struggle, in which the USA's chief rivals are the Common Market and Japan. Whereas in 1966 the USA accounted for nearly 47 per cent of the capitalist world's industrial product, in 1971 its share of that product dropped to 40.3 per cent. During the same period Japan, on the other hand, increased her share of the capitalist world's industrial product from 6 to 9.3 per cent. The Federal Republic of Germany, France, and Italy have forged far ahead. Western Europe's share of the capitalist world's industrial product amounted to 32.1 per cent in 1971. Old inter-imperialist contradictions were revitalised and new contradictions arose on this economic foundation. The US monopolies, which claim supremacy in the capitalist world, encounter growing resistance from their rivals.

In the imperialist countries themselves the general crisis of capitalism manifests itself in the sharp aggravation of the contradictions between the handful of monopolists and all the other strata of the population. Developments have exploded the fabrications of the bourgeoisie and its ideologists about a "class peace". This is most strikingly borne out by the massive upswing of the strike struggle in the capitalist countries.

Imperialism's political leaders set their hopes on state-monopoly capitalism, which fuses the strength of the monopolies with the power of the state in a single mechanism designed to enrich the monopolists and save the capitalist system. State intervention in the economy has helped to achieve a certain growth of production and to renew fixed capital. Nonetheless, state-monopoly capitalism is unable to eradicate anarchy of production, the competitive struggle and the other vices of the moribund social system. It cannot avert that system's doom, which has been predetermined by history.

The US monopoly bourgeoisie serves as the bulwark of international reaction. For many years US imperialism fought a war of aggression in Vietnam. It continues to support the Israeli aggressors. It strangles the patriotic forces in Latin America. And always and everywhere it acts against the aspiration of the peoples for freedom and democracy, for socialism. As was noted at the 24th Congress of the CPSU, US imperialism seeks to play the role of guarantor and protector of the international system of exploitation and oppression.

Underlying the policies of the imperialist states is the dictatorship of the monopolies, which use all the means available to them to deprive the people of the possibility of stating their will and using even the curtailed rights granted by the bourgeois constitutions. In some Western countries the Communist parties are banned and Communists are subjected to persecution and terror. The most reactionary section of the monopoly bourgeoisie backs neofascist and dictatorial regimes. Ultra-reactionary organisations have been vitalised in the USA, Italy and other Western countries.

Despite the intrigues of the reactionaries, the terror and the repressions, the social forces determined to ensure the triumph of socialism are growing and becoming tempered. They are headed by the working class, which directs the main blow at the monopolies. In every nation all the healthy forces are vitally interested in the eradication of monopoly rule. This creates the objective conditions for uniting the democratic movements against the domination of the financial oligarchy.

The international revolutionary movement now has vast experience of fighting imperialism. It is growing more mature, is well organised and is spurred by a militant spirit.

The world capitalist system is being rent by deep-rooted and acute contradictions: between labour and capital, between the new national states and the old colonial powers, and between the capitalist countries themselves. But the central contradiction is between socialism and imperialism.

The moribund capitalist system is unable to change the course of history. It has become ripe for a social revolution of the proletariat. We live in a great epoch, which witnesses mankind's transition from capitalism to socialism.

The Way for Promoting Relations Between States of the Two Systems as Proposed by the USSR and Other Socialist Countries

Contrary to the imperialist policy of aggression, violence, diktat and blackmail, the socialist countries suggest that the relations between countries of the two systems should be founded on the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. This principle is

enormously significant today when the alternative to peaceful coexistence is thermonuclear war.

A special form of the class struggle on the international scene, peaceful coexistence is not easy to translate into life. It requires the mobilisation of the people for effective resistance to any act of aggression by the imperialists and to their attempts to infringe upon the legitimate right of every nation to choose its own social and state system.

Peaceful coexistence spells out relations founded on a mutual renunciation of the use of armed force as a means of settling issues between countries. The implication is that countries with different social systems should not simply exist side by side but maintain relations of trust and good-neighbourliness and that they should co-operate to their mutual benefit.

More and more countries are founding their relations with the socialist states on these principles. This is yet further evidence of their viability. The relations between the Soviet Union and Finland may be cited as an example. These principles are taking precedence in the relations between the USSR and France. In Soviet-FRG relations, too, the spirit of peaceful coexistence is prevailing over the cold war that had been waged against the USSR for over two decades by the governments of Adenauer and his successors.

It may be asked whether peaceful coexistence signifies a certain conciliation between socialism and capitalism? Does it mean recognition of the stability of the capitalist order? Does it represent the curtailment of the struggle against imperialism?

On no account!

Peaceful coexistence is one of the principal forms of the struggle against imperialism and the wars it is planning, against the arms race and the colonialist ambitions of the monopolies. It represents a struggle in the interests of the working class and all working people for the creation of the most favourable situation for social progress and for the attainment of the aims of the national liberation movement. Socialism's overwhelming advantages over the bourgeois system assure it of ultimate victory in the peaceful competition with capitalism.

No contradiction exists between the Marxist-Leninist teaching of the inevitable triumph of communism through-

out the world and the policy of peaceful coexistence. This policy concerns the relations between countries and does not affect the revolutionary struggle of the working class for society's reorganisation.

The contradiction between socialism and capitalism has been and remains the principal contradiction of our epoch. A political, economic and ideological struggle has been and will continue to be waged between them.

Communism is certain to win, but this victory will be achieved not as a result of any "export of revolution". Capitalist rule, Lenin had pointed out, is undermined not because somebody wants to seize power. No power would have destroyed capitalism if it had not been eroded and enervated by history. Capitalism will be deposed by the peoples themselves whom it exploits inhumanly. The theory of the "export of revolution" was invented by the bourgeoisie and it has nothing in common with Marxism-Leninism.

Peaceful coexistence does not betoken conciliation between communist and bourgeois ideology. On the contrary, ideology becomes a major area of the class struggle in the course of which socialism demonstrates its superiority over decaying capitalism. The CPSU has made it plain that there can be no question of concessions in ideology.

Peaceful coexistence requires a reasonable and realistic approach to the relations between countries. The views of the Communists differ from those of the ruling circles of the imperialist states. The Communists regard social development as law-governed progress and act on the assumption that the world-wide triumph of the new social system is inevitable. They are convinced that this contention is correct, uphold and propagate it, using the achievements of the socialist countries and the experience accumulated by human society to substantiate their arguments. The dispute between philosophies can and must be settled by experience and practice, not by force.

Far from fettering the communist and national liberation movements, peaceful coexistence gives them wide scope and unites large sections of the people round the Communists. The achievements of the socialist countries spur the revolutionary struggle of the peoples and win new supporters for that struggle. The easing of tension and the successes of the policy of peaceful coexistence paralyse the most bellicose

elements of imperialism and hinder the export of counter-revolution and the actions taken by these elements to counter the national liberation movement.

The USSR is outspoken in its opposition to imperialism's acts of aggression and consistently advocates united action by all peace-loving states in order to ensure international security and take effective steps to remove the threat of another world war.

But is it possible to preserve and consolidate peace today when imperialism still exists?

This question has been answered by the 20th through 24th congresses of the CPSU and by the meetings of Communist and Workers' parties.

Inasmuch as a part of the world is still ruled by imperialism, the basis for wars of aggression remains. Imperialism has shed none of its rapacity. The most adventurist elements among Western political and military leaders continue to regard world wars as the only means of saving and strengthening imperialism's positions. But the situation and balance of strength in the world have undergone a drastic change. World socialism has become a powerful factor of the preservation of peace on our planet.

Fear of retaliation is compelling the imperialist politicians to consider the consequences of a world thermonuclear war. They have to reckon with the fact that the capitalist system will not survive such a war.

Soviet foreign policy paralyses the aggressive actions of the imperialists. The Soviet Union's immense military and economic potential serves the cause of peace. In defending peace, the Soviet people have not only their own security in mind. They discharge their internationalist duty through a policy meeting with the vital interests of all nations.

Many of the liberated countries actively contribute towards averting war, for they have to eradicate the heritage of colonialism as quickly as possible, build up a modern industry and put an end to poverty and backwardness. They support the USSR and the other socialist countries in the struggle for peace, against colonialism and imperialist blocs, for the consolidation of the principles of peaceful coexistence in international relations.

The working-class movement is the most powerful peace factor in the capitalist countries. During the Second World War the working class headed the struggle of the peoples

against fascism. After the war the working class and its vanguard, the Communist and Workers' parties, headed the movement for peace and democracy, rallying large sections of the peasants, intellectuals and middle strata of the urban population. A united front of millions of people of good will is forming in the course of the massive campaigns for lasting peace.

The post-war peace movement is a powerful anti-war force. Organised, massive and effective, this movement has traversed a long and tortuous road. In the ceaseless struggle for peace there have been successes and setbacks, but the incontrovertible fact is that the peace champions have done much to prevent another world war.

The experience of the past few decades has demonstrated the viability of the Leninist principles of Soviet foreign policy, namely, proletarian internationalism and peaceful coexistence. An invaluable contribution to the creative development of these principles was made by the 24th Congress of the CPSU.

2. The 24th Congress of the CPSU on the International Situation and the Aims of Soviet Foreign Policy

Highroad of World Development

The significance of the 24th Congress of the CPSU was epochal. Its documents and decisions, which are being successfully carried out, are exercising a tremendous influence on international relations and on the world revolutionary process. It adopted a Peace Programme, which harmonises immediate tasks with long-term objectives. These tasks are regarded by the CPSU as a link of the integral, carefully considered policy pursued in the world by the Soviet Union jointly with its friends and allies.

The Central Committee report, delivered by Leonid Brezhnev, characterised the main world developments. The substance of these developments is that major social and political changes are taking place in the world in a situation witnessing a sharp struggle between the forces of peace, freedom and progress and the forces of oppression, reaction and aggression. The Soviet Union's international position has grown firmer and the role played by the world socialist

system has been enhanced. The great alliance of the three main revolutionary forces of the modern age—world socialism, the international communist and working-class movement and the national liberation movement—is growing stronger and deeper.

The highroad of world development is thus that of the growth and consolidation of world socialism and of the further change of the balance of strength in its favour. In parallel, the general crisis and all the contradictions of capitalism continue to heighten and capitalism's inimicality to the basic interests of the peoples grows more pronounced.

The unity of the revolutionary forces is the key to successful action. The efforts of the leadership of the Communist Party of China to break this unity are prejudicing the cause of socialism and the liberation movement and encouraging the aggressive elements of imperialism.

The call for closer unity among the revolutionary forces was the keynote of the proceedings and decisions of the 24th Congress of the CPSU. The Congress became a veritable forum of the international communist movement and eloquently demonstrated the unity of the Communist and Workers' parties.

In the contemporary revolutionary movement the leading role is played by the world socialist system. At the Congress it was noted that the further cohesion of the movement and the relations with fraternal countries and their Communist parties had always had the closest attention of the CPSU Central Committee, which steadfastly promoted economic, political, ideological and defence co-operation with these countries.

The Congress decisions gave vivid expression to the Leninist policy of further strengthening the positions, unity and might of the world socialist system and consolidating the cohesion of the international communist and working-class movement, of all the forces of peace and progress.

The international working-class movement is the tested militant vanguard of the revolutionary forces. The working class is firming up its resistance to the policies of the monopolies, to their efforts to shift to the shoulders of the working people the entire burden of the economic and monetary crises that are shaking some of the capitalist countries. The Congress reaffirmed the conclusion of the 1969 International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties

that the great battles the working class was now fighting were the forerunners of new class battles that could lead to fundamental social changes and the establishment of the power of the working class in alliance with other strata of the working people.

Imperialism has been and remains a dangerous and strong enemy of the liberation movement. It does not shrink from any crime. The 24th Congress of the CPSU reaffirmed the Soviet people's solidarity with the heroic patriots of Indochina and unreservedly denounced the imperialist aggression in the Middle East. At the Congress Leonid Brezhnev said: "... we have no doubt at all that the attempts of imperialism to turn the tide of history, to make it flow in its favour, are bound to fail. However, we Communists are well aware that there is no room for passivity or self-complacency. The fighters against capitalist oppression are confronted by the last but the most powerful of the exploiting systems that have ever existed. That is why a long and hard struggle still lies ahead."^{*}

This struggle is mounting in scale and intensity.

The Peace Programme Adopted by the 24th Congress of the CPSU

The Congress defined the objectives of Soviet foreign policy on the basis of a scientific analysis of the international situation and of the principal trends of social development. The constructive Peace Programme adopted by the Congress charts the ways and means of settling the crucial problems on which depend the efforts to prevent a world war, promote co-operation between countries with different social systems and remove tension from the relations between them. It is an all-embracing programme for it envisages a wide range of measures vital to the attainment of the noble foreign policy objectives of the USSR and the entire socialist community. It is a composite programme for it not only calls for a sum of measures but also links up these measures. Its clarity of purpose is expressed by the fact that everything in it is subordinated to the main task of ensuring peace, international co-operation and the

^{*} 24th Congress of the CPSU, p. 22.

freedom and independence of nations. Moreover, it is a realistic programme for it represents a sum of feasible measures, some of which can be put into effect today and others in the foreseeable future. Many of the points of this programme have been or are being carried out.

The programme gives prominence to the task of abolishing the flashpoints created by the imperialists in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. The local wars in these regions not only take a toll of human life and destroy the national wealth of the peoples but also harbour the threat of a major war. The 24th Congress suggested helping to attain a political settlement in Southeast Asia and the Middle East instead of the military settlement that the imperialists were trying to impose despite the fact that the entire course of events was showing that such a settlement was untenable.

The agreements on the termination of hostilities in Vietnam and Laos, signed in 1973, strikingly bore out the viability and effectiveness of the CPSU's programme for strengthening international peace.

It is important not only to extinguish the existing flashpoints but to prevent new centres of tension from appearing. To this end the Peace Programme calls for immediate and determined opposition to any acts of aggression and international lawlessness, with the United Nations Organisation as the medium for such opposition.

It proposes that the renunciation of the threat or use of force for the settlement of outstanding issues should be made a law of international life. This point, it says, must be included in the appropriate bi-lateral or regional treaties. The USSR is prepared to sign such treaties.

Understandably, the problem of peace and security in Europe is dealt with at length in the programme. It should not be forgotten that two world wars, the most destructive in history, were started in Europe, where two social systems now confront each other. The huge armed forces of the North Atlantic bloc and of the Warsaw Treaty countries are in Europe. The Peace Programme proposes that the settlement of every European problem should be based on the recognition of the final territorial changes that took place as a result of the Second World War, on the recognition of the inviolability of the existing frontiers. Recognition of European realities includes the attitude to the GDR as a sover-

eign and equal European state. On this basis a radical turn can and must be made towards detente and peace in Europe.

The Peace Programme reaffirms the proposal of the socialist countries for a system of collective security in Europe, and following the creation of such a system, for the simultaneous disbandment of the defensive Warsaw Treaty and the North Atlantic bloc or, as a first step, the disbandment of the military organisations of these alliances.

The Soviet Union has always advocated good relations with Asian countries. The establishment of such relations with neighbouring countries, the steady strengthening of friendship between the USSR and India and the marked turn for the better in the Soviet Union's relations with Japan have considerably improved the situation in Asia. The Soviet Union's proposal for a system of collective security in that continent has had a favourable response in many Asian countries. Soviet policy is helping to strengthen peace in Asia and to unite the peoples of that continent in their anti-imperialist struggle.

The Peace Programme envisages realistic steps towards disarmament: the conclusion of treaties banning nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons; the cessation of all, including underground, nuclear tests; the creation of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world; a conference of the five nuclear powers—the Soviet Union, the USA, China, France and Britain—to work out the ways and means of achieving nuclear disarmament; an activation of the struggle for an end to the arms race; and a world conference to consider disarmament in its entire volume.

The danger of the arms race is that it may lead to war. To rule this out the Peace Programme suggests working out measures that would reduce the probability of an accidental or deliberate kindling of military incidents and the growth of these incidents into international crises and war. This purpose could also be served by an armaments cutback. The Soviet Union is prepared to reach agreement on a reduction of the military expenditures of, primarily, the major powers.

In the programme it is stated that the Soviet Union urges, as it has always done, the complete abolition of colonialism and the implementation of the UN decisions on this question. The Soviet Union insists on a world-wide

condemnation and boycott of all manifestations of racialism and apartheid.

An important point of the programme is that it calls for mutually beneficial co-operation between states not only in areas affecting them directly but also in the settlement of major problems affecting the interests of many countries, of all mankind. These are: protecting the environment, harnessing power and other natural resources, developing transport and communications, eradicating the most dangerous, widespread diseases, and exploring and harnessing outer space and seas and oceans.

An historic link and successiveness exist between the Decree on Peace and the Peace Programme of the 24th Congress of the CPSU. The kinship between these documents of Soviet foreign policy lies in their vividly expressed concern for world peace and their call for the settlement of international issues in the interests of the peoples. Today Soviet foreign policy has immeasurably greater scope and possibilities for the realisation of its peace proposals. This is shown by developments on the international scene after the Congress. "Only a little over eighteen months have passed since the 24th Congress," Leonid Brezhnev said on the 50th anniversary of the USSR, "but we can safely say that our Party and the Soviet state have gone a long way in implementing the most important propositions of the Peace Programme."*

The Soviet Union's political interests are represented abroad by nearly 150 embassies and consulates. The USSR is a member of over 400 international organisations. Its signature is on more than 7,000 operating international treaties and agreements.

Its economic relations are steadily expanding. In the period 1958 through 1970 its trade with socialist countries increased from 5,700 million to 14,400 million rubles, and with other countries from 2,000 million to 7,700 million rubles. Trade is growing at a particularly rapid rate with developing countries striving for economic independence.

The Soviet Union is steadily broadening its cultural and scientific links with foreign countries. In 1971 it had cul-

* L. I. Brezhnev, *The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, p. 51.

tural exchanges with 126 countries. With 66 of these countries the cultural exchanges were based on agreements and co-operation programmes. Only within the framework of agreements and programmes for cultural and scientific exchanges 40,000 foreign scientists, artists, actors, teachers and athletes visited the Soviet Union in 1970.

Soviet foreign policy embraces global problems, affecting the destiny of all mankind, problems of various regions of the world and bi-lateral links. The success of this Leninist foreign policy of peace and friendship among peoples is assured by the Soviet Government's Marxist-Leninist analysis of the state and trends of the obtaining situation, its realistic approach to the problems of international life in all their diversity and complexity, its fidelity to its pledges and its readiness to render the utmost assistance and support to the peoples defending their freedom and revolutionary gains.

* * *

Leonid Brezhnev gave the following assessment of Soviet foreign policy throughout the period since the October Revolution: "In the first years after the October Revolution our correct course in international affairs helped us to frustrate the plans of the enemies who strove to crush the young and the then still weak Soviet state. It helped the Soviet people to build socialism in conditions when our country was encircled by a hostile capitalist world. It enabled us to foil attempts to establish against us a united front of world imperialism in the Second World War and in this way helped the Soviet people to achieve their historic victory. The fact that for the third decade the Soviet people are living in peace and are dedicating their efforts to the construction of communism means that our country's defences are reliable and that the Communist Party and the Soviet Government are, as before, successfully effectuating their foreign policy."*

The CPSU's international policy rests on the steady growth of the Soviet Union's political, economic and military might and on the colossal achievements of the Soviet people. At its plenary meeting in May 1972 the CPSU Cen-

* L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course*, Moscow, 1972, pp. 62-63.

tral Committee put it on record that the "Leninist foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet Government has the unanimous support of the Party and the Soviet people. This principled and consistent foreign policy meets with the basic interests of the Soviet Union, of world socialism and the national liberation movement. It actively helps to consolidate the principles of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems and to counter imperialism's policy of aggression."

CHAPTER TWO

FRIENDSHIP AND CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE USSR AND OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES

1. International Relations of a New Type

The break-up of international relations founded on inequality, oppression and hostility is a vital part of the revolutionary renewal of the world initiated in 1917. The abolition of exploitation of man by man in the course of the socialist revolutions and the uprooting of class antagonism in the countries where these revolutions have been accomplished have created the conditions for establishing totally new relations between these countries.

One of the objectives that Marx, Engels and the International Workingmen's Association (First International) headed by them placed before the working-class movement was that the simple laws of morals and justice which ought to govern the relations between individuals should be made the predominant rules of international relations.* This great objective is now being achieved. Our revolutionary epoch has given birth to a new type of relations—socialist international relations founded on proletarian internationalism, a principle that is making it possible to turn the simple laws of morals and justice into the paramount norms of the relations between peoples and countries. These relations are characterised by complete equality, respect for independence and sovereignty, fraternal mutual assistance, all-embracing co-operation, reciprocal support, and consolidation and defence of the revolutionary gains achieved by labour of the people of each socialist country.

The experience of fraternal relations and joint development of the Soviet republics, formed as a result of the October Revolution, remains of immense significance to the moulding of socialist international relations. This experience is summed up in the Declaration on the Formation of the

* K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works* (in 3 volumes), Vol. II, Moscow, 1969, p. 18.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in which it is noted that the bourgeoisie had been unable to organise co-operation between peoples. There, in the camp of capitalism, they had national enmity and inequality, colonial slavery and chauvinism, national oppression and pogroms, imperialist brutality and war.

"Here, in the camp of socialism, we have mutual trust and peace, national freedom and equality, peaceful cohabitation and fraternal co-operation between peoples."*

Lenin had pointed out that the Soviet republics had to unite in the USSR in order to repulse imperialism's military onslaught, defend the gains of the revolution and carry out the peaceful task of building socialism more successfully. Recalling these words L. I. Brezhnev said that "in principle, the same applies to the fraternal community of sovereign socialist states".**

Needless to say, in creatively studying the considerable experience of co-operation accumulated by the Soviet socialist republics, the Communist parties of other countries are taking into account that this experience was gained at the time when the Soviet Union was the only socialist state. The beginning for co-operation between free peoples (of Soviet Russia and Mongolia) was laid in the 1920s. That was an important period in the history of the moulding of the new type of international relations, especially after 1940 when the Mongolian People's Republic entered the socialist stage of its development. Significant as that experience was, Soviet-Mongolian co-operation could not bring out the entire diversity of socialist international relations. This became possible only after socialism had developed into a world system and bi-lateral and multi-lateral relations began to take shape between the socialist countries.

Today the world socialist system embraces 14 countries with an aggregate population of 1,200 million, i.e., over one-third of mankind.

Experience has shown that the establishment and development of fraternal relations between socialist countries are a complex and many-faceted process. Present-day world socialism "is still a young and growing social organism, where

not everything has settled and where much still bears the marks of earlier historical epochs".*

From the past the socialist countries inherited distinctions in the level of economic and social development, in the class structure and in national traditions. In the socialist community this has given and may still give rise to objective and subjective difficulties, to a different understanding of various problems of internal and external policy and to a dissimilar approach to the solution of these problems.

Naturally, socialist development involves a struggle between the new and the old and the settlement of internal contradictions. The experience that has been accumulated shows that in the relations between socialist countries all difficulties can be successfully resolved on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. Provided the Marxist-Leninist parties pursue a correct policy the common social system and the concurrence of the fundamental interests of the peoples of the socialist countries make it possible to move forward the development of world socialism.

The CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government firmly abide by that conclusion. Whenever difficulties arise they make every effort to surmount them and promote friendship between fraternal countries. In this connection there have been a number of major milestones in the USSR's struggle to consolidate the principles of proletarian internationalism and strengthen the solidarity and unity of the socialist countries.

Much attention was devoted to the problems of the world socialist system at the 20th Congress of the CPSU (February 1956). It was noted that the far-reaching changes that were taking place on the international scene in favour of socialism were opening new prospects for the transition of countries from capitalism to socialism.

At the Congress it was stressed that the more favourable conditions for the victory of socialism in other countries were due solely to the fact that socialism had triumphed in the Soviet Union and was winning in the People's Democracies. The indispensable conditions for this victory were the triumph of revolutionary Marxism-Leninism and a con-

* *Dokumenty vnesheinei politiki SSSR*, Vol. VI, Moscow, 1962, p. 117.

** L. I. Brezhnev, *The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, p. 43.

* 24th Congress of the CPSU, pp. 18-19.

sistent and determined struggle against reformism and opportunism.

The Congress prescribed the utmost strengthening of fraternal relations with all socialist countries "bearing in mind that the more united and powerful the socialist states are the more reliable will peace become".

The Communists of all countries underlined the immense international importance of the measures that were taken by the CPSU to restore the Leninist principles of Party and Government activity and promote socialist democracy.

The peoples gave their whole-hearted support to the CPSU's policy of furthering the unity of socialist countries and of fraternal parties and uniting all anti-imperialist forces.

In its Declaration of October 30, 1956 the Soviet Government stressed that it was firmly conforming to the guidelines charted by the 20th Congress calling for the utmost development of fraternal relations with socialist countries and for the strict observance of the Leninist principles in its relations with them.

In the CPSU Programme, adopted by the 22nd Congress, it is noted that "in the world community of socialist countries none have, nor can have, any special rights or privileges". This attitude of the CPSU has been and will always be of fundamental significance to the shaping of socialist international relations.

In its analysis of the ways and means of strengthening the world socialist system, the 23rd Congress of the CPSU (1966) noted that the regular contacts and political consultations of the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government with the fraternal parties and governments were a large contribution to the development of relations between socialist countries. These contacts and consultations had become one of the norms of the relations between countries building the new society. They were vital as a means of exchanging views and experience of revolutionary reorganisation.

More than a century ago Marx wrote: "One nation can and should learn from others."* Today this is a bedrock principle of the new type of international relations for the continual exchange of political, economic, scientific, tech-

* K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works* (in 3 volumes), Vol. II, p. 88.

nological and cultural experience and knowledge has become a major factor of the world socialist system's progress. At this point it would be appropriate to note that the collective experience and co-operation of the revolutionary forces of different countries is giving shape to what Lenin called "complete socialism",* which serves as the ideal of the struggle and work of new contingents of revolutionaries.

A hard and fast guideline of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and the other fraternal countries is that it takes into account the entire socialist community's experience of building the new society and uses all the finest achievements in the common treasure-store of revolutionary practice.

An inestimable contribution was made by the 24th Congress of the CPSU (March-April 1971) to the further growth of the unity and might of the world socialist community.

The Congress underscored that a further diversification and deepening of the co-operation between fraternal countries were essential and that they had to study each other's experience at all levels of government, social, economic and cultural life. "We," Leonid Brezhnev said at the Congress, "want the world socialist system to be a well-knit family of nations, building and defending the new society together, and mutually enriching each other with experience and knowledge, a family, strong and united, which the people of the world would regard as the prototype of the future world community of free nations."**

The Congress summed up the results achieved by the socialist system during the quarter-century of its existence. The experience gained by the socialist world is invaluable to the entire communist and working-class movement. As formulated by the Congress, the distinctive points of this experience are:

firmly established in the countries forming the world socialist community, the socialist social system has proved its great vitality in the historic competition with capitalism;

the world socialist system has become a powerful accelerator of the progress started by the October Revolution and the decisive force in the anti-imperialist struggle;

* V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, p. 346.

** 24th Congress of the CPSU, pp. 18-19.

by countering the plans of the imperialist aggressors the world socialist system makes a huge contribution towards averting another world war;

to a large extent success in the building of socialism depends on whether the common and the national specific are correctly combined in social development.

The CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government focus unremitting attention on the question of further uniting and developing the world socialist system. At its plenary meeting in November 1971, when it worked out the practical ways of putting the decisions of the 24th Congress into effect, the CPSU Central Committee re-emphasised that "the community of socialist countries has been and remains the principal force opposing world capitalism and a mighty bastion of the present-day liberation movements. The CPSU sees its internationalist duty and one of the main objectives of its international policy in achieving the utmost strengthening of world socialism's positions, securing the further consolidation of the socialist countries and furthering friendship and co-operation with them".*

The CPSU has always attached special importance to co-operation with the Communist parties of the fraternal countries. This co-operation provides the possibility for working collectively on fundamental problems of the building of socialism and communism and effectively repulsing the forces of reaction and war. In these questions an historic role was played by the international meetings of Communist and Workers' parties in Moscow in 1957, 1960 and 1969.

The Declaration adopted by the 1957 Meeting spoke of the importance of fraternal co-operation and mutual assistance between socialist countries, noting that "this aid is a striking expression of socialist internationalism".**

This proposition was enlarged on and specified in the 1960 Meeting's Statement, which underscored that it was important to improve all aspects of the economic, political and cultural co-operation between the socialist countries. All the norms of the relations that take shape as the socialist community develops must pursue the aim of ensuring the unity and solidarity of the members of that community.

* *Pravda*, November 24, 1971.

** *The Struggle for Peace, Democracy and Socialism*, Moscow, 1964, p. 12.

The well-known Marxist-Leninist tenet that the antagonism between nations passes away together with the antagonism between classes was mentioned at the 1960 Meeting. But mention was also made of the indisputable fact that manifestations of nationalism and national narrowness do not disappear automatically with the establishment of the socialist system. Consequently, an unflagging, consistent struggle has to be waged in all socialist countries to eliminate the survivals of bourgeois nationalism and chauvinism.*

The 1969 Meeting, which was a major forum of the Communists of the whole world, considered the development of the world socialist system from the angle of united action by all the anti-imperialist forces. History has devolved the responsibility for the destiny of mankind on the socialist countries and their Communist parties. Socialism's influence on world developments, it was stated at the Meeting, depended largely on the unity of the socialist countries, and it was therefore incumbent upon the Communist parties of these countries to do their utmost to strengthen that unity.

The Meeting again drew attention to the fact that the shaping of the new type of international relations was a complex process. The successful development of that process required that all parties should strictly adhere to the principle of proletarian internationalism. If differences caused by distinctions in economic development, the social structure, the international situation or national specifics arose between socialist countries they could and should be successfully settled on the basis of proletarian internationalism, by comradely discussion and fraternal co-operation.**

In the building of the new society the CPSU and the fraternal parties have always given unflagging attention to the question of combining the common and the national specific, i.e., correctly combining the laws of development common to all socialist countries with the specific national conditions under which these laws operate. Marxism-Leninism requires the creative application of common principles. The historical conditions and national features and traditions of each country must be taken into account, otherwise

* *The Struggle for Peace, Democracy and Socialism*, p. 12.

** *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties*, Moscow 1969, Prague, 1969, p. 23.

dogmatic and sectarian errors and isolation from real life are inevitable. Moreover, any exaggeration of the role of national specifics likewise inescapably leads to a departure from Marxism-Leninism that may enormously prejudice socialist development.

At the 24th Congress of the CPSU Leonid Brezhnev said: "Not only are we now theoretically aware but also have been convinced in practice that the way to socialism and its main features are determined by the general regularities, which are inherent in the development of all the socialist countries. We are also aware that the effect of the general regularities is manifested in different forms consistent with concrete historical conditions and national specifics."* Socialism cannot be built without the common laws of the development of socialist revolutions and socialist reforms as the foundation and without taking the specifics of each country into account. If these factors are ignored it is impossible to build up the proper foundation for the relations between socialist countries.

To allow all these relations to burgeon it is vital to take into account the national specifics and foreign policy interests of each socialist country within the context of the interests of the world socialist system as a whole. In other words, while ensuring the overall progress of each country in the community the relations between the socialist countries must serve as a vehicle of advancement and as a means of strengthening the might of the entire world socialist system. Needless to say, the efforts of all the fraternal countries must be mobilised to this end.

Because of its great importance, the task of correctly combining internationalism with patriotism, internationalist duty with national interests in the foreign policy of the socialist countries receives the closest attention not only at the congresses of the fraternal parties of the socialist countries but also at international forums of the Communist and Workers' parties of the whole world. The unity of the socialist community depends on how successfully this task is carried out in the day-to-day practice of inter-state relations, and on the unity of the world socialist system depends the efficacy of that system's influence on the world revolutionary process.

* 24th Congress of the CPSU, p. 9.

The whole course of the world socialist system's development demonstrates that it is essential for each socialist country to be mindful of the common interests of the revolutionary movement. "We are proud," Lenin wrote, "that we settle the great problems of the workers' struggle for their emancipation by submitting to the international discipline of the revolutionary proletariat, with due account of the experience of the workers in different countries, reckoning with their knowledge and their will."** These lines were written when the Communist International was functioning as the organisational centre of the world communist movement. Today, when no organisational centre exists in the communist movement or in the socialist community, international proletarian discipline is of supreme importance. Above all, this discipline means fidelity to one's own pledges, fulfilment of decisions adopted collectively and the prevention of any action that may undermine the unity of the world socialist system.

"Each Communist Party," states the Main Document of the 1969 International Meeting, "is responsible for its activity to its own working class and people and, at the same time, to the international working class. The national and international responsibilities of each Communist or Workers' Party are indivisible."*** Nothing can justify anti-socialist divisive activities, a refusal to abide by the coordinated foreign policy line of the fraternal parties and countries or a renunciation of joint action on the world scene.

Yet this is exactly the dangerous line that has been adopted by the leaders of the Communist Party of China. They have scrapped many joint decisions and agreements that had been signed by their representatives. The Maoists are trying to compel the socialist countries to accept their anti-Leninist, adventurist prescriptions in internal and foreign policy. The guidelines of the Peking leaders are impregnated with hegemonistic ambitions and Great-Power chauvinism. This has given rise to serious complications in the relations between the People's Republic of China and other socialist countries.

On basic issues of international life and the world com-

* V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 269.

** *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties*, Moscow 1969, p. 37.

munist movement the Peking leaders preach an ideological and political programme that is incompatible with Leninism. True to the Leninist traditions, the CPSU determinedly counters the attempts to distort Marxism-Leninism and split the international communist movement, the ranks of the fighters against imperialism. Marxism-Leninism is an integral international teaching and any attempt to revise it from the Right or the Left inevitably divests it of its revolutionary substance and clears the way for undermining the power of the people.

The 24th Congress of the CPSU reiterated that it was of the utmost importance to promote co-operation between the Communist parties of fraternal countries. The Communist parties play the leading role in socialist society and map out the main orientations of the internal and foreign policies of their countries. They are the guiding force behind the coordination of the foreign policies of the socialist states. Close co-operation enables them to draw upon each other's experience, to act jointly in resolving the problems of socialist and communist construction, evolve the most rational forms of economic relations, pursue a common line on the international scene and exchange views on ideological and cultural work.

"As a result of collective efforts and hard-fought battles against the class enemy," Leonid Brezhnev said, "we forged a lasting alliance of socialist states and a dependable system of all-round fraternal co-operation, which has become, as it were, the natural form of life for each of our countries. We have learned to perform our day-to-day job successfully, to work patiently for just solutions of issues that have proved insoluble in capitalist conditions. And in doing this, we have learned to harmonise the interests of each with the common interest, and to co-operate, removing from our path everything that may hinder or complicate the common advance."^{*}

The moulding of socialist international relations continues. But it would be hard to overestimate the significance of what has been achieved by the world socialist system. The socialist community rests on a solid foundation. The socialist countries have evolved and are successfully promoting diverse

^{*} L. I. Brezhnev, *The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, p. 42.

forms of political, economic, cultural and military co-operation. The Soviet Union's bi-lateral and multi-lateral relations with other socialist countries are moving from strength to strength.

2. Co-operation Between the USSR and the European Socialist Countries

The Soviet Union's treaties of friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance with other socialist countries are one of the principal factors helping to build up bi-lateral relations. In the 1960s such treaties were signed or renewed with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, the Korean People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Poland and Rumania. The CPSU has put on record its high estimation of these treaties, noting that they "are real charters of friendship that embody the experience accumulated in the course of many years, the maturity and warmth of the relations of fraternal peoples, their lofty internationalist spirit. They are doing excellent service to our common revolutionary cause and will continue to do so".^{*}

The relations based on these treaties help to further the socialist changes in the fraternal countries and the building of communism in the USSR. Along with other bi-lateral treaties between the fraternal countries they form a comprehensive system of mutual allied commitments that ensure the reliable defence of revolutionary changes against the intrigues of the imperialists.

The internationalist character of Soviet foreign policy is mirrored in the USSR's relations with each socialist country. The following are some of the major areas of Soviet co-operation with other European socialist countries.

The Soviet Union and the People's Republic of Bulgaria

"For the Bulgarian people," Georgi Dimitrov said, "friendship with the Soviet Union is as vital as the sun and air are to any living being."^{**} These words expressed the natural,

^{*} 23rd Congress of the CPSU, Moscow, 1966, p. 10.

^{**} Georgi Dimitrov, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1957, p. 315 (in Russian).

experience-backed need for close co-operation between the peoples of Bulgaria and the USSR.

A 20-year Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance was signed by the two countries on March 18, 1948. Very similar in character and content to the treaties of friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance signed by the USSR with other European socialist countries, it provided for joint measures in the event of imperialist aggression, in particular by West German militarism and revanchism. Under the treaty the USSR and Bulgaria pledged to act in a spirit of co-operation and friendship with the purpose of strengthening and promoting economic and cultural relations.

At the signing of the treaty Georgi Dimitrov, who headed the Bulgarian Government at the time, said it would help to expedite Bulgaria's socialist development.* Soon after the treaty came into force the Bulgarian Communist Party drew up a programme for the building of socialism in Bulgaria. In December 1948 the 5th Congress of the BCP drew up a programme for Bulgaria's industrialisation and electrification and for the mechanisation of her agriculture with the objective of reaching a development level within 15-20 years that had taken other countries a century to achieve.

This programme turned Bulgaria into an industrial-agrarian country. In 1966, her industrial output, compared with pre-war, was 21 times greater and agricultural production doubled. Since the establishment of the people's power her national wealth has quadrupled.

Friendship with the USSR and other socialist countries enabled the Bulgarian people to put far-reaching socio-economic changes into effect. A large role in creating the conditions for these changes was played by the 1948 Treaty. In the light of the experience of socialist and communist construction in the USSR and Bulgaria and also of the changes that had taken place in Europe and the rest of the world, a new Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance was signed on May 12, 1967.

The expanding co-operation between the Soviet Union and Bulgaria helped the Bulgarian people to make further headway in building a developed socialist society.

With Soviet assistance Bulgaria has built over 180 large

* *Uneshnaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza. Dokumenty i materialy, 1948, Part I, p. 162.*

industrial enterprises, which today account for 95 per cent of her iron and steel, 85 per cent of her non-ferrous metals, 55 per cent of her chemical products and 60 per cent of her electric power. Under her sixth, current, five-year plan many major industrial projects have been started with Soviet assistance. One of them is the USSR-Bulgaria gas pipe-line, which will be giving Bulgaria roughly 3,000 million cubic metres of natural gas annually by the end of the five-year period. "Our country's successes in the building of socialism," Todor Zhivkov, First Secretary of the BCP Central Committee, declared, "are in large measure due to the fraternal co-operation with the Soviet Union."

The Central Committees of the CPSU and the BCP and the governments of the two countries maintain constant contact on questions of their internal and foreign policies. Of major significance was the participation of a BCP delegation in the work of the 24th Congress of the CPSU and of a CPSU delegation in the work of the 10th Congress of the BCP in 1971. At the BCP Congress Leonid Brezhnev spoke highly of the Bulgarian Communist Party's new Programme, noting that it underscored the decisive significance of the laws governing development common to all socialist countries. "It is therefore by no means fortuitous," he said, "that there is, for instance, a deep-rooted link between the questions being examined by the 10th Congress of the BCP and the tasks that were considered by the 24th Congress of the CPSU."

The leaders of the two fraternal parties spoke of their experience and discussed various aspects of Soviet-Bulgarian relations during Leonid Brezhnev's friendly visit to Sofia at the close of September 1971. In the talks with Bulgarian leaders the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee informed them of what was being done in the USSR to carry out the tasks set by the 24th Congress of the CPSU and of the plans for furthering the building of communism. For their part the leaders of the BCP spoke of the work that had been started in Bulgaria to fulfil the decisions of the 10th Congress of the BCP. At these talks much attention was given to the ways and means of achieving closer political, economic and cultural co-operation between the two countries.

Soviet and Bulgarian Party leaders and statesmen held friendly talks in Moscow in 1971 and 1972. Such talks, which allow matters relating to co-operation between the two coun-

tries to be settled quickly, have become a regular feature of Soviet-Bulgarian relations.

During a visit to Bulgaria on September 18-21, 1973 Leonid Brezhnev had talks with Todor Zhivkov, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party and Chairman of the State Council of Bulgaria. At these talks the two leaders noted that co-operation between the Soviet Union and Bulgaria was proceeding successfully and declared that "the close, steadily growing links, complete unity of views and fraternal solidarity between the Marxist-Leninist parties of the two countries, the CPSU and the BCP, are the cementing element of the political alliance between the USSR and the People's Republic of Bulgaria".

The Soviet Union and the Hungarian People's Republic

The building of the new life in Hungary is indivisibly linked with fraternal support from the Soviet Union. A Soviet-Hungarian Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance was signed on February 18, 1948.

Thanks to the favourable external conditions created by that treaty, the Hungarian people have put revolutionary reforms into effect in their country. By the mid-1950s Hungary had been turned from an agrarian-industrial into an industrial-agrarian country. But at the close of 1956 internal counter-revolutionary elements, aided and abetted by international imperialist reaction, used the errors made by the former leaders of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party in political issues and in economic and cultural development to provoke a reactionary uprising.

The putsch was engineered by a revisionist nationalistic bloc, which had the backing of international imperialism. The putschists aimed to depose the power of the workers and peasants and restore the bourgeois-landowner dictatorship. Together with fascist elements, the revisionists and nationalists started a frantic anti-Soviet campaign in order to split the socialist community, whip up tension to bursting point in Europe and divert attention from the aggression that had been launched against Egypt by the imperialists of Britain, France and Israel. The socialist gains of the Hungarian people were seriously jeopardised.

However, the reactionaries miscalculated. A Provisional

Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government was formed on November 4, 1956 and, invoking the Warsaw Treaty, it requested the Command of the Soviet forces in Hungary to help the Hungarian people crush the counter-revolution. In fulfilment of its internationalist duty, the USSR went to the assistance of the fraternal Hungarian people.

"All patriotic, honourable Hungarians," Janos Kadar, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, said, "will always remember with gratitude the assistance that was rendered the Hungarian people by the Soviet Union at the request of the Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government in 1956, when a counter-revolution broke out and there was the threat of imperialist intervention. This assistance made it possible to cut short the attempts of the imperialists to reimpose capitalism and fascism on the Hungarian people and turn our country into a military springboard, into a battlefield."

The counter-revolutionary putsch inflicted considerable damage on the Hungarian economy. Fraternal assistance from socialist countries helped the Hungarian people to remove the consequences of the rising and forge ahead in socialist construction.

A new Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance, in which the Soviet Union and Hungary recorded their determination to strengthen the unity and solidarity of the socialist community and to adhere unswervingly to the fine traditions of the 1948 Treaty, was signed on September 7, 1967.

In the new phase of co-operation ushered in by that Treaty the USSR continues to help the fraternal Hungarian people in their peaceful constructive labour. At the 10th Congress of the HSWP in 1970 it was noted that socialist Hungary had become an industrial country with a developed agriculture and a high level of science and culture. In starting on the fulfilment of their fourth five-year plan (1971-1975) the Hungarian working people had every reason to count on the fraternal friendship with the USSR and other socialist countries continuing to be a powerful accelerator of their country's development.

The tireless concern shown by the CPSU and the HSWP to strengthen Soviet-Hungarian friendship finds expression in the systematic consultations and exchanges of experience between them. Further co-operation between the two parties

and countries was discussed in the light of the pressing problems of the building of developed socialism in Hungary and of communism in the USSR when Leonid Brezhnev attended the 10th Congress of the HSWP and Janos Kadar attended the 24th Congress of the CPSU. This question was examined also during the friendly reciprocal visits of the Soviet and Hungarian leaders to Budapest and Moscow.

Soviet-Hungarian relations, Janos Kadar said, "do not depend on the weather. They are not seasonal. They have been shaped by history and are durable and lasting." He condemned those who, while calling themselves "real" Marxists-Leninists, try to stir up anti-Soviet feeling. On behalf of the Hungarian Communists he declared that for them "principled, comradely relations with the Soviet Union have been and remain the touchstone of internationalism. There has never been nor will there ever be anti-Soviet communism."

The Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic

Soviet policy towards the German Democratic Republic is permeated with a spirit of brotherhood, friendship and internationalism. The proclamation of a workers' and peasants' state on German soil on October 7, 1949 marked a turning-point in the destiny of the German people. The historic decision to begin the planned building of the foundations of socialism in the GDR was passed in 1952 at the 2nd Conference of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany.

From the very first days of its existence the GDR has relied on support from the Soviet Union. As soon as the Government of the GDR was formed the Soviet Military Administration turned over to it all the functions of administration. The GDR established formal diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union on October 15, 1949 and shortly afterwards with the other socialist countries.

In August 1953 the USSR and the GDR signed a protocol on the cessation of reparations from the GDR, on the gratuitous transfer of Soviet-owned enterprises and on the GDR's release from the payment of its debts to the Soviet Union. Moreover, an agreement was signed on additional exports of goods and on credits to the GDR. The diplomatic missions in Moscow and Berlin were raised to the status of embassies.

Friendly relations were further strengthened by the Soviet Government Statement of March 25, 1954 on the establishment of similar relations with the GDR as with other sovereign states. The Soviet High Commissioner's function of controlling the Government organs of the GDR was abolished.

Socialist changes were carried out in the republic under these favourable external political conditions, which were further improved with the signing on September 20, 1955 of the Treaty on the Relations Between the Soviet Union and the GDR. Article 1 stated that the GDR exercised complete sovereignty in all questions concerning its domestic and foreign policy, including its relations with the Federal Republic of Germany. Under this treaty the Soviet Union and the GDR committed themselves to make every effort to settle the German problem by peaceful means.

The security of the GDR was strengthened with the assistance of the USSR and other socialist countries. The building of a socialist society on German soil made increasingly rapid headway. At the 6th Congress of the SUPG in 1963 it was noted that socialist relations of production had been firmly established in the GDR. The Congress adopted a programme for the full-scale building of socialism. At that new stage of the GDR's development its friendship with the USSR was further consolidated. On June 12, 1964 the two countries signed a Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Co-operation, providing for immediate aid in the event one of them was subjected to armed attack in Europe by one country or a group of countries. Further, the Treaty envisaged an expansion of economic, scientific and technological relations on the basis of disinterested fraternal co-operation and mutual benefit.

At the talks that preceded the signing of this Treaty the sides stressed that co-operation between the USSR and the GDR was speeding up the rate of their economic development, bringing nearer the triumph of socialism and communism in the two countries and helping to enhance the might of the world socialist community.

Today the GDR is one of the world's ten leading industrial countries, while in Europe it occupies fifth place in most of the leading industries. Relying on support from the Soviet Union and other fraternal countries, the working people of the GDR have made gigantic progress. The republic's national income has quadrupled and its industrial product has

increased more than five-fold. The GDR now has a larger industrial product than Germany had on the eve of the Second World War.

The successful fulfilment of the programme for the full-scale building of socialism was noted at the 8th Congress of the SUPG in 1971. The Congress' directives for the 1971-1975 five-year plan called for a higher rate of growth of industrial production and of the national income. "The uninterruptedly widening and deepening relations with the Soviet Union are the decisive factor of the GDR's development. We are co-operating fraternally in all areas." These words, spoken by the First Secretary of the SUPG Central Committee, Erich Honecker, express the desire of the working people of the GDR to continue fostering friendship with the USSR.

The GDR is winning steadily stronger positions on the world scene. By the beginning of 1973 it had diplomatic relations with 96 countries. It maintains trade and economic relations with over 100 countries. In 1972 the GDR joined UNESCO, and in September 1973 it became a member of the United Nations. This act finally consolidated its international standing as an independent and sovereign socialist state.

During Leonid Brezhnev's visit to the GDR on October 30-November 1, 1971 the leaders of the CPSU and the SUPG noted the total failure of the imperialist attempts to prevent the consolidation of the GDR's position in world affairs.

A new landmark in the development of friendship between the USSR and the GDR was Leonid Brezhnev's visit to Berlin in May 1973. During that visit the two sides reiterated that the "close fraternal co-operation between the CPSU and the Socialist Unity Party of Germany is the foundation for the comprehensive development of relations between the USSR and the GDR".

The Soviet Union and the Polish People's Republic

The Polish people have effectuated far-reaching changes in their country in a situation marked by unbreakable friendship and fraternity with the Soviet people. The Soviet Union's internationalist policy towards Poland is strikingly expressed, above all, by the Soviet-Polish Treaty of Friend-

ship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance. The first such Treaty was signed during the Second World War (April 21, 1945) in Moscow for a period of 20 years. In Warsaw, on April 8, 1965 Poland and the USSR signed a new Treaty which took into account the experience of promoting fraternal relations and also the changes that were taking place in the world.

The Soviet-Polish alliance has been put to a serious test time and again. The imperialists and their accomplices went to all lengths to undermine this alliance, but these attempts to divide the two peoples came to nothing. Post-war development has convincingly borne out that the vital interests of the Polish people cannot be safeguarded without fraternal co-operation with the Soviet Union.

The fruits of this co-operation are self-evident to every unbiased person. Under bourgeois rule Poland was only an agrarian appendage of the capitalist countries. Under the people's Government and as a member of the socialist community she became a developed industrial-agrarian state within a relatively short period. In 1969, only a quarter of a century after the Polish People's Republic was proclaimed, industrial output exceeded the pre-war level 14-fold. The number of factory and office workers increased 4.5-fold. Engineering, tractor, car, chemical, ship-building and many other modern industries were built.

In promoting her economic advancement Poland has always had all-sided support from the Soviet Union. The Lenin Iron and Steel Works at Cracow, which in 1972 produced 40 per cent of Poland's steel, was built with Soviet assistance. Poland used Soviet aid to build the Iron and Steel Works at Katowice. Over one-third of Poland's foreign trade is with the Soviet Union. In the period from 1950 to 1972 Polish shipyards sold the Soviet Union 569 ships with a total displacement of over 3 million tons; nearly 94,000 Polish-made carriages are used on Soviet railways.

Naturally, a difficult task like the building of the new society has not proceeded without problems in Poland. These problems are being successfully surmounted by the Polish people under the leadership of the Polish United Workers' Party.

The 6th Congress of the PUWP, held in December 1971, adopted a programme for Poland's further socialist development. The keynote of this programme is the attainment of

higher rates of industrial development and a substantial rise of the living standard. With these targets as their guide the Polish people have begun working on the new five-year plan (1971-1975).

"The prospects for Poland's further development," Edward Gierek, First Secretary of the PUWP Central Committee, declared at the 6th Congress, "and the possibility of achieving the basic aspirations of our people can be translated into life only in, and as a result of, co-operation with the Soviet Union. This is the central principle of our national policy."

The Soviet Union's fidelity to its fraternal alliance with Poland is evidenced by the development of relations between them. This was stressed also at the 24th Congress of the CPSU, where it was stated: "Our friendship with the Polish People's Republic is unshakable."

Meetings between Party leaders and statesmen have grown into a fine tradition. One of these meetings, at which the ways and means of deepening the co-operation between the two countries were charted, was held in Moscow on November 10, 1971.

In summing up the results of fraternal co-operation, Soviet and Polish leaders noted with satisfaction during Leonid Brezhnev's visit to Warsaw in May 1973 that "the all-sided friendly relations between the CPSU and the PUWP and between the Soviet Union and the Polish People's Republic are progressing successfully" and reiterated their determination to continue strengthening all-embracing co-operation.

The Soviet Union and the Socialist Republic of Rumania

In the relations between the USSR and Rumania a large constructive role is played by the treaties of friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance.

The first of these treaties was signed on February 4, 1948 and opened the door to Soviet-Rumanian co-operation in many areas of political, economic and cultural life. Relying on friendship and co-operation with the Soviet Union the Rumanian people have, by their dedicated labour, made considerable headway in the building of socialism under the leadership of their Communist Party.

Rumania, which had been backward and poverty-stricken, is today an industrial-agrarian country. She owes this

achievement to her socialist system and to her membership of the world socialist community. These are the main factors ensuring the successful fulfilment of her new tasks. At its 10th Congress in 1969 the Rumanian Communist Party endorsed a programme for the building of a developed socialist society.

A new Soviet-Rumanian Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance was signed in Bucharest on July 7, 1970. In it the two countries declared they would continue strengthening their unbreakable friendship and promoting co-operation "on the basis of fraternal assistance, mutual benefit, respect for sovereignty and national independence, equality and non-interference in each other's internal affairs".*

A Party and Government delegation led by Alexei Kosygin went to Rumania to sign the Treaty. The delegation had meetings with the working people of a number of cities and large industrial enterprises. The warm, friendly reception accorded to it strikingly demonstrated the spirit of brotherhood linking the peoples of the two countries.

In a speech of greeting at the 24th Congress of the CPSU the General Secretary of the RCP Central Committee Nicolae Ceausescu said that the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance "opens up new prospects for the overall development of Rumanian-Soviet co-operation". He stressed that the principal duty of a governing Communist Party was to build the new social system and that this spelled out the fulfilment by the Communists of their national and internationalist duty.

The question was brought up of the possibility of differences arising in the views of the governing Communist parties on problems of socialist construction and on the assessment of some international developments. Where such differences arose, it was declared, they had to be settled by discussion in a spirit of mutual trust and respect.

Soviet-Rumanian co-operation, which rests on proletarian internationalism, has all the prerequisites for steady expansion. This is consistent with the vital interests of the peoples of the two countries and of the world socialist community as

* *Uneshnaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza i mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya. Sbornik dokumentov, 1970, Moscow, 1971, p. 105.*

a whole. The CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government are doing everything in their power to promote the successful development of these relations.

The Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic

Klement Gottwald's ardent call, "With the Soviet Union for ever!", has become a national motto of the Czechs and Slovaks. This motto permeates the Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance signed on December 12, 1948 for a period of 20 years and prolonged for another 20 years on November 27, 1968.

This Treaty was instrumental in fostering relations of friendship and brotherhood between the peoples of the two countries and provided a sound foundation for all-sided co-operation between them.

Under the obtaining favourable international conditions the people of Czechoslovakia quickly enforced socialist reforms in their country. However, alongside the solid achievements in socialist construction there were serious shortcomings in the economy and errors in Party and Government leadership. As a result, problems that required an immediate solution had piled up by the close of the 1960s.

The new leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, elected at a plenary meeting of the Central Committee in January 1968, had the possibility of rectifying the errors and successfully resolving the pressing problems of socialist construction. However, this possibility was not used. This was utilised by anti-socialist and revisionist elements for active subversion designed to incapacitate the people's Government, undermine co-operation with the Soviet Union and secure Czechoslovakia's withdrawal from the Warsaw Treaty Organisation.

The fraternal Communist parties time and again drew the attention of the leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia headed by Alexander Dubček to the ominous activation of anti-socialist elements in Czechoslovakia. But the steps taken to curb the counter-revolutionary elements lacked firmness.

In their joint statement of August 3, 1968 representatives of the Communist and Workers' parties of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, the USSR and Czechoslovakia

stressed that it was the duty of all socialist countries to support, strengthen and safeguard the gains of socialism, which had been achieved by each people at the price of heroic effort and dedicated labour.

However, in Czechoslovakia the situation continued to deteriorate. The actions of the internal counter-revolution, which had the support of international reaction, were becoming increasingly dangerous not only to socialism in Czechoslovakia but to the socialist community as a whole. The anti-socialist elements were clearly out to restore the former order and tear Czechoslovakia away from the socialist community. Guided by the principles of socialist solidarity and in fulfilment of their internationalist duty the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR and Poland went to the assistance of the fraternal Czechoslovak people. This action, taken at the request of the Czechoslovak Communists and working people "saved the lives of thousands of people, ensured the internal and external conditions for peaceful labour, strengthened the Western frontiers of the socialist community and dissipated the hopes of the imperialist circles for a revision of the results of the Second World War".*

It took the healthy forces in Czechoslovakia some time to normalise the situation in their country. At its plenary meeting in April 1969 the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia elected a new Party leadership with Gustav Husák as the First Secretary.

The talks that were held during the official friendly visit of a Czechoslovak Party and Government delegation to the Soviet Union on October 20-28, 1969 were of exceptionally great importance in furthering fraternal co-operation between the USSR and Czechoslovakia.

In a situation that was returning to normal and with account of the principal lessons of the events in Czechoslovakia a new Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance was signed between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia in Prague on May 6, 1970. It recorded one of the cardinal principles underlying Soviet-Czechoslovak friendship, namely, that it was the common internationalist duty of socialist countries to support, strengthen and safeguard the

* *Lessons Drawn from the Crisis. Development in the Communist Party and Czechoslovak Society After the 13th Congress of the CPC*, Moscow, 1971, pp. 45-46 (in Russian).

socialist gains achieved by each people through heroic effort and selfless labour.* The signing of this Treaty was a notable landmark in the fraternal co-operation between the USSR and Czechoslovakia.

A further boost to this co-operation was given in February 1973 during the friendly visit to Prague by Leonid Brezhnev, who took part in the celebrations of the 25th anniversary of the Czechoslovak people's victory over the forces of reaction. Leonid Brezhnev and the Czechoslovak leaders informed each other of what their parties were doing to promote economic development and carry out the decisions of the 24th Congress of the CPSU and the 14th Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. The Soviet side stressed that the "experience of Czechoslovakia re-emphasises the significance of the leading role played by the working class in socialist society and of the build-up of its revolutionary traditions". A special point made by the Czechoslovak representatives was that "the CPSU and the Soviet Union are supporting Czechoslovakia at all the stages of her socialist development". Complete unity of views was expressed on all the questions that were discussed.

The Soviet Union and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

Soviet-Yugoslav friendship has its roots deep in the past. During the Second World War it was cemented by the blood shed in the struggle against the common enemy. On April 11, 1945 the USSR and Yugoslavia signed a Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Post-War Co-operation. The foundations of a people's state were being laid in Yugoslavia at the time. For a number of years political and economic relations were fostered with the USSR, but in 1948 this development was cut short. Relations were normalised only in 1955 as a result of talks held in Belgrade (May 26-June 2, 1955) on Soviet initiative.

The Belgrade Declaration, signed on June 2, 1955, recorded the sincere striving of the governments of the two countries to promote comprehensive co-operation.

The steps taken by the Soviet Government relative to

* *Uneshnaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza i mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya. Sbornik dokumentov*, 1970, Moscow, 1971, p. 44.

Yugoslavia were approved unreservedly by the 20th Congress of the CPSU. The other members of the world socialist community supported the Soviet initiative, stressing the international significance of solidarity of all the forces of socialism and of unity between all the fraternal parties.

In Moscow on June 20, 1956 the leaders of the USSR and Yugoslavia adopted a joint statement in which they reiterated their determination to expand friendly co-operation between the two countries. Also, they signed a Declaration on Relations Between the CPSU and the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, which stated that the appropriate contacts had to be promoted between the two parties.

The USSR made consistent efforts to enable inter-state relations with Yugoslavia to develop normally despite the distinctions in the approach to the problems of the theory and practice of socialist construction.

Much was done in the course of the 1960s to strengthen the relations between the two countries. Reciprocal visits by Soviet and Yugoslav statesmen became standing practice. The USSR welcomed the decision taken in 1963 to proclaim Yugoslavia a Socialist Federal Republic.

Important talks were held in the summer of 1965 between Party and Government delegations of the USSR and Yugoslavia in Moscow. At these talks it was accentuated that the friendly meetings, exchanges of views and experience and reciprocal visits by delegations were fostering better understanding and thereby deepening the relations between the two countries. Economic, scientific, technological, cultural and other co-operation was progressing successfully.

Expressing the sincere striving of the Soviet Union, the 24th Congress of the CPSU declared: "The Soviet people want to see socialism in Yugoslavia strengthened, and her ties with the socialist community growing stronger. We stand for Soviet-Yugoslav co-operation and for developing contacts between our parties."*

The conclusion that there was a sound basis for the further development of Soviet-Yugoslav relations and for deepening the co-operation between the CPSU and the LCY was drawn by the leaders of the two countries during Leonid Brezhnev's

* 24th Congress of the CPSU, p. 15.

visit to Yugoslavia in September 1971. This basis was provided by the affinity between the historical destinies of the USSR and Yugoslavia, the common foundations of their social system, the similarity of their approach to many international problems, their devotion to the principles of socialist internationalism, their common desire for peace, independence, equal international co-operation and their struggle against imperialism.

An important contribution to friendship between the two countries was made at the talks that were held during a visit to Moscow by Josip Broz Tito, President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Chairman of the LCY, in June 1972. The sides stressed the great importance of the trade agreement for 1972-1975, the verbal agreement on the possibilities and need for long-term co-operation, and the work of the Soviet-Yugoslav Inter-Government Committee for Economic Co-operation. With the aim of achieving the utmost strengthening of friendly relations measures were charted to expand contacts between the leaders of the two parties and governments and between public, scientific and cultural organisations.

In November 1973 when Leonid Brezhnev and Josip Broz Tito met in Kiev they informed each other of the progress of socialist and communist construction in their countries and noted with satisfaction that political, economic, scientific, technical and cultural relations were developing successfully. They spoke highly of the expanding co-operation between the CPSU and the LCY, stressing that improvement of relations on the party and government level and the enrichment of the co-operation between the two countries were consistent with the building of socialism and communism. "The prevailing trend in the relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, which are countries with the same social system," Leonid Brezhnev declared in Kiev, "is determined by what unites and draws us close together. It is determined by the immutable laws of the development of socialism formulated by Marx and Lenin and borne out by the experience of many Communist and Workers' parties."

In 1972 the USSR and Yugoslavia signed an agreement on economic and technical co-operation for 1973-1980, under which the Soviet Union is to help in the building and reconstruction of 38 industrial enterprises and extend a credit of 450 million rubles for that purpose.

The Soviet Union and the People's Republic of Albania

The Soviet military victories in the Second World War were the decisive factor of Albania's liberation from fascist oppression. After the war relations of friendship and co-operation took shape between the Soviet Union and Albania although no formal treaty on mutual assistance was signed. Consistent support from the Soviet Union, Albania's admittance to the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and co-operation with other socialist countries created favourable external political conditions for socialist reforms in Albania. With assistance from the Soviet Union Albania, which was a backward agrarian country, became an agrarian-industrial state. New industries—power engineering, woodworking and food—were built. Moreover, the existing mining enterprises were enlarged and reconstructed. Some large projects—among them the Lenin Power Station in Tirana, a hydropower station on the Mati River and an oil refinery—were designed by Soviet specialists, who also helped to build these projects and instal Soviet equipment in them. Acting on the principle of fraternal friendship the USSR gratuitously turned these enterprises over to the Albanian people. Moreover, Albania was freed from paying debts on credits amounting to 348 million rubles.

Soviet foreign policy and the fraternal co-operation between the two countries in the building of a socialist society in Albania exercised a beneficial influence. However, in 1960-1961 the leadership of the Albanian Party of Labour adopted a stand that was incompatible with proletarian internationalism. This led to a deterioration of relations between Albania and the Soviet Union. The USSR is seeking to normalise these relations on a principled, Marxist-Leninist foundation. In the Central Committee report to the 24th Congress of the CPSU it was stated: "As regards Albania, we are prepared, as in the past, to restore normal relations with her. This would be beneficial to both countries and to the common interests of the socialist states."* But this striving finds no response among the Albanian leaders.

* 24th Congress of the CPSU, p. 17.

3. The Soviet Union and the Socialist States of Asia. Soviet-Cuban Relations

The Soviet Union and the Mongolian People's Republic

"For half a century now," it was noted by the 24th Congress of the CPSU, "the CPSU and the Soviet state have had bonds of strong and time-tested friendship with the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party and the Mongolian People's Republic. The Soviet Union is a true friend and ally of socialist Mongolia, and actively supports the efforts of our Mongolian friends aimed at solving major economic problems and strengthening their country's international position."*

In 1946 the USSR and Mongolia signed a 10-year Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance. In it was reproduced the text of the 1936 Protocol, which provided for mutual assistance, including military aid, in the event of a military attack on the USSR or the MPR by a third country. Besides, agreements were signed on economic and cultural co-operation.

In 1956, at the end of the 10-year term, the Treaty and the agreements were prolonged for another 10 years. On their basis the MPR and the USSR signed a number of agreements on specific areas of co-operation.

One of these agreements, in the form of a joint statement, was signed on May 15, 1957. It recorded that during the first 10-year period of the operation of the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance the USSR had granted Mongolia long-term credits amounting to over 900 million rubles on favourable terms and had gratuitously transferred to it Soviet property worth over 100 million rubles. Further, the statement declared that the Soviet Government would turn over gratuitously to Mongolia the enterprises of the Mongolian Oil Trust on whose construction the USSR had spent over 300 million rubles. The installations and equipment at the airports in Ulan-Bator and Sain-Shande together with a number of aircraft were also turned over to Mongolia.

In addition, the Soviet Union extended financial and technical assistance to Mongolia to help her carry out her three-year (1958-1960) economic and cultural development plan. During those years Mongolia received from the Soviet Union

* 24th Congress of the CPSU, p. 15.

2,500 tractors, 550 grain combines, 200 diesel and locomobile power-plants and over 10,000 head of pedigree cattle.*

This aid was further evidence of the fraternal support that the Mongolian people received from the USSR at all stages of their independent existence.

Under these favourable conditions the Mongolian people built the foundations of a socialist society. This was the principal task at the stage of development that commenced in 1940 and ended, in the main, in 1960. The chief result of this stage, Yumzhagiin Tsedenbal, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, noted, was that with large-scale assistance from the USSR and then from other socialist countries Mongolia accomplished the transition from feudalism to socialism without passing through the capitalist stage of development.

The stage witnessing the completion of socialist construction in Mongolia began in 1961. With the help of fraternal countries Mongolia is building a large industrial complex at Darkhan, where Mongolian, Soviet, Czechoslovak and Polish builders are working shoulder to shoulder. As Yumzhagiin Tsedenbal put it, Darkhan "has become a symbol of the international friendship and fraternal co-operation among the peoples of the socialist community".

On January 15, 1966, in connection with the expiry of the 1946 Treaty and agreement, the USSR and the MPR signed a new Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance. In it were mirrored the marked economic and political changes that had taken place in the two countries and in the world at large. In view of the intrigues of the forces of aggression, the treaty stated that the two countries would reciprocally help to ensure their defence capability in accordance with the task of steadily increasing the defence potential of the socialist community.**

Soviet-Mongolian political, economic, cultural and technological co-operation is developing successfully on the basis of the 1966 treaty. During the official visit by Nikolai Podgorny, President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, to Mongolia in 1969 the Mongolian leaders spoke of the importance of the industrial projects that had been or

* Deklaratsii, zayavleniya i kommunique Sovetskogo pravitelstva s pravitelstvami inostrannikh gosudarstv, 1954-1957, Moscow, 1957, p. 217.

** Uneshnaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza i mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya. Sbornik dokumentov, 1966, Moscow, 1967, p. 35.

were being built with Soviet assistance in Ulan-Bator, Darkhan, Choibalsan and other towns.

Helped by Soviet foreign policy, the Mongolian People's Republic is expanding its international links. In 1961 it was admitted to the UN, which brought to a successful conclusion the long diplomatic struggle that had been waged by the USSR and other socialist countries for the settlement of this issue. Diplomatic relations have been established with Mongolia by India, Britain, France, Japan and many other countries.

The Soviet Union and the Korean People's Democratic Republic

August 15, 1945 is marked by the Korean people as the day on which the Soviet Armed Forces liberated Korea from Japanese colonial oppression. With the fraternal support of the USSR the working people of North Korea created their own state, the Korean People's Democratic Republic in 1948.

On March 17, 1949 the Soviet Union and the KPDR signed an agreement on economic and cultural co-operation.

Supported by the socialist community the KPDR withstood a stern test in 1950-1953 during the war unleashed by the US imperialists. Soviet assistance went a long way towards helping the Korean people restore their ravaged economy.

"History," Kim Il Sung, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party, said, speaking of Soviet assistance to the KPDR, "has no other example of an economically and technologically advanced country voluntarily and gratuitously helping economically backward countries restore their economies and build the foundation for their independent economic development. This example can only be seen in the large and friendly family of countries belonging to the socialist community."

A Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance was signed by the USSR and the KPDR on July 6, 1961. Article 1 states: "Should either of the Contracting Parties suffer armed attack by any State or coalition of States and thus find itself in a state of war, the other Contracting Party shall immediately extend military and other assistance with all the means at its disposal."^{*}

^{*} *Milestones of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1967*, Moscow, 1967, p. 212.

Utilising all its internal resources and closely co-operating with the Soviet Union and all other fraternal countries, the KPDR has made much headway in building the material and technical basis of socialism.

The Soviet Union supports the Korean People's Democratic Republic in its struggle for the peaceful unification of the whole of Korea.

A large contribution towards the strengthening of Soviet-Korean friendship is made by the reciprocal visits of Party and Government delegations of the USSR and the KPDR. Representatives of the KPDR and the Korean Workers' Party participated in the celebrations of the centenary of the birth of V. I. Lenin and in the work of the 24th Congress of the CPSU. Soviet statesmen and Party leaders visited the KPDR on the 20th anniversary of the agreement on economic and cultural co-operation and were guests at the 5th Congress of the Korean Workers' Party.

In early 1973 a delegation of the Korean Workers' Party visiting the Soviet Union was received by Leonid Brezhnev. A cordial atmosphere and a spirit of complete understanding reigned at this meeting. On behalf of the KWP Central Committee the delegation expressed "profound gratitude to the Soviet Communists and the whole Soviet people for their steadfast support for the Korean people". The Soviet side declared that the USSR "unswervingly supports the efforts of the KPDR to normalise the situation in Korea and to achieve the country's independent unification".

The Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam

Relations between the Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam were established on January 30, 1950. This event has been described by Bui Cong Trung, a veteran of the Vietnamese revolution, who wrote:

"It was January 1950. We were fighting a war against the French colonialists. The Government of Vietnam had its headquarters in the jungles, frequently changing its location. And to these jungles came the gladsome news that the Soviet Union had recognised the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. You can imagine the joy in the liberated regions in those days. . . .

"The Soviet Union's recognition of our Government consolidated the bonds of friendship and that firm support that has been rendered by the Communist Party, the Government and the peoples of the Soviet Union since 1930, since the birth of the Communist Party of Indochina, and, particularly, since 1945, when the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was created."

The Soviet Union furnished the DRV considerable assistance for its economic recovery and development programme. In the summer of 1955 a DRV Government delegation led by President Ho Chi Minh visited Moscow. In the Soviet-Vietnamese communique on this visit it was stated that the Soviet Government had granted the DRV 400 million rubles in gratuitous aid and that the USSR would train Vietnamese specialists and extend technical, medical and other aid.

The DRV signed agreements with other socialist countries on supplies of complete sets of equipment and other means of production. With the assistance of the socialist community the DRV successfully carried out its economic recovery and development plan.

In the years 1955 through 1965 the Soviet Union granted the DRV favourable and free credits amounting to nearly 320 million rubles. During those years 2,500 Soviet specialists worked in the DRV helping to train national cadres. Some 4,500 Vietnamese underwent training in the USSR. Many of the projects of those years in the DRV were paid for out of the credits and gratuitous aid from the USSR and other socialist countries.

Socialist enterprises began to occupy the leading place in the DRV's economy and the country made its first and exceedingly important step towards the building of the material and technical basis of socialism.

In 1964 the peaceful work of the Vietnamese people was interrupted by the US imperialist aggression. Many towns and villages in the DRV were bombed. The US military used its entire arsenal of weapons to terrorise the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and strangle the liberation movement in South Vietnam against the corrupt puppet Thieu regime.

The Soviet Union strongly denounced the US aggression and promptly extended massive diplomatic and material aid to the people of Vietnam. During the visit of a Soviet delegation led by Alexei Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, to Hanoi in February 1965 agreement

was reached on important measures to strengthen the DRV's defence capability. The necessary military equipment was sent by the Soviet Union. During talks with a delegation headed by Le Duan, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Working People's Party of Vietnam, in April 1965, the USSR pledged to increase its deliveries of military and other supplies to the DRV. Further agreements on additional Soviet technical and economic aid to the DRV were signed in Moscow in December 1965. The flow of arms and military equipment from the Soviet Union increased markedly with every month. These included aircraft, anti-aircraft guns and missiles, artillery, small arms and ammunition. Moreover, the DRV received sets of equipment, vehicles and also oil products and other supplies for its national economy.

A Party and Government delegation of the USSR led by Alexei Kosygin attended the funeral of DRV President Ho Chi Minh in September 1969. At the friendly talks with the DRV leaders the delegation reiterated that the Soviet Union was "determined to continue rendering the Vietnamese people the necessary assistance and support for their struggle, for the building of socialism in North Vietnam, for the liberation of the South and for the peaceful unification of the country".* A series of agreements on Soviet credits and gratuitous aid was signed in 1969, 1970 and 1971.

The support pledged by the 24th Congress of the CPSU for the struggle of the Vietnamese people against the US aggression was an act of powerful international assistance for the DRV. The Congress unanimously approved the policy of the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government of strengthening militant friendship with the DRV. "The Democratic Republic of Vietnam," stated the CPSU Central Committee report, "may be sure that in its armed struggle and its peaceful endeavour it can continue to rely on the Soviet Union's fraternal support."**

This mandate of the 24th Congress of the CPSU is being consistently implemented. During a visit to Hanoi in the autumn of 1971 a Soviet Party and Government delegation led by Nikolai Podgorny expressed admiration for the gallant struggle of the Vietnamese people against the US inter-

* *Uneshnaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza i mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya. Sbornik dokumentov, 1969*, p. 174.

** 24th Congress of the CPSU, p. 14.

vention. For their part, the Vietnamese noted that the assistance of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries was of the utmost significance to the successful building of socialism in the DRV and to strengthening the republic's defence capability.

At the talks in Hanoi in June 1972 with the DRV leaders, a Soviet delegation headed by Nikolai Podgorny made it clear that the Soviet Union would continue giving all the necessary assistance and support for the Vietnamese people's struggle for their country's freedom and independence.

The unbreakable friendship between the Soviet Union and the DRV was demonstrated in January 1973 when Le Duc Tho and Nguyen Duy Trinh, members of the Political Bureau of the WPPV Central Committee, stopped at Moscow on their way home after signing the agreement on a cease-fire in Vietnam. In the talks between Le Duc Tho and Leonid Brezhnev it was stressed that the Soviet Union was "determined to continue doing everything to strengthen fraternal friendship and co-operation between the CPSU and the WPPV and between the USSR and the DRV in the interests of the Soviet and Vietnamese peoples, the world socialist community and the further consolidation of the unity and cohesion of all the present-day revolutionary forces". At a luncheon in the Kremlin Leonid Brezhnev assured the Vietnamese guests on behalf of all Soviet people that "in the days of peace as in the days of war we shall be together with you in the same ranks".

Speaking in reply Nguyen Duy Trinh said that the "massive and effective assistance and support of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to the Vietnamese people was an immeasurably great contribution to our victory".

A WPPV delegation led by Le Duan, First Secretary of the WPPV Central Committee, and Prime Minister Pham Van Dong visited the USSR on July 9-16, 1973. At the talks it was noted with satisfaction that friendship between the Soviet Union and the DRV was developing fruitfully and agreement was reached on a further expansion of co-operation in order to restore and further develop the DRV's socialist economy, raise the living standard of its people and broaden the fraternal relations between the CPSU and the WPPV. The USSR agreed to restore the projects that were built in the DRV with its assistance and help build new enterprises. In keeping with its immutable internationalist

principles, the Soviet Union has decided to regard the previous credits extended to the DRV for economic development as gratuitous aid.

The Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China

The Soviet Armed Forces played a conspicuous role in defeating the Japanese militarists and creating favourable conditions for the victory of the people's revolution in China. A monument to Soviet soldiers was unveiled in Port Arthur in 1955. At the ceremony the Deputy Defence Minister of the PRC, Hsiao Ko, said: "The Soviet officers and men who laid down their lives for the just cause have won unfading glory and the profound esteem of the Chinese people."

A 30-year Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance was signed by the USSR and China in Moscow on February 14, 1950. In addition to provisions of a military and political nature aimed at safeguarding the security of the two countries against imperialist aggression, this Treaty provided for important economic measures. The two countries agreed to promote and strengthen their economic and cultural relations, help each other and foster economic co-operation.

The first five-year plan of 1953-1957 was a major stage of China's development. It envisaged the building of 1,600 large projects, of which 694 were industrial enterprises. Before this programme could be carried out the enormous difficulties arising from the extreme backwardness inherited from the old, semi-colonial China had to be surmounted. Fraternal assistance from the USSR and other socialist countries was the cardinal condition for successful socialist construction in the PRC. In those days this was repeatedly stressed by the leaders of the Communist Party of China. Under an agreement signed on February 14, 1950 the Soviet Union granted China a long-term credit of \$300 million on favourable terms. Another agreement on a Soviet long-term credit of 520 million rubles to China was signed in October 1954.

Within a short period the Soviet Union helped China to build over 200 large enterprises and to set up aircraft, power-engineering, automobile, tractor, radio, electronics and other industries. The favourable long-term credits granted

to China by the Soviet Union exceeded the sum of 1,816 million rubles. The factories that were reconstructed or built with Soviet assistance enabled China to produce annually 8,400,000 tons of steel, 8,700,000 tons of pig iron and 32,200,000 tons of coal and shale.

At the request of the Chinese Government over 10,000 Soviet specialists were sent to work in China in 1950 through 1960. Nearly 10,000 Chinese engineers, technicians and skilled workers and almost 1,000 scientists were trained in the Soviet Union in 1951 through 1960. During the same period over 11,000 Chinese undergraduate and post-graduate students completed their training at Soviet institutions of higher learning.

Such was the disinterested assistance of the Soviet people on which the people of China relied when they started building the new life.

The Soviet Union's constant readiness to fulfil its internationalist duty to China was always of immense significance for the destiny of the Chinese people's revolutionary gains.

At the close of the 1950s the leaders of the Communist Party of China began to display a tendency towards hegemonism and nationalism in the relations with the USSR and other socialist countries. On all issues of the international communist movement they propounded a special ideological and political platform that was incompatible with Leninism. Divergences on ideological questions were transferred to government-to-government relations. As early as 1962 the total volume of economic co-operation between China and the USSR (including trade and technical assistance) was reduced by Peking to 36.5 per cent of the 1959 level.

Consistently pursuing their principled Leninist policy the CPSU and the Soviet Government made every effort to preserve and promote friendship and co-operation with China. Major steps in this direction were taken by the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government after the plenary meeting of the Central Committee in October 1964 and the 23rd Congress of the CPSU.

But the Soviet Union's efforts found no response in Peking. Relations deteriorated seriously when China started her "cultural revolution" in 1966 in a situation marked by anti-Soviet hysteria. The trade union, youth and other organisations of the working people were broken up and the Communist Party, which embodied the glorious revolu-

tionary traditions of the Chinese people, was virtually dissolved. A Great-Power, hegemonistic line with anti-Sovietism as its keynote became predominant in foreign policy. Hungweiping gangs engaged in unbridled acts of hooliganism outside the Soviet Embassy in Peking, threatening and insulting members of the Embassy staff. The Maoists declared the USSR "Enemy No. 1". The 9th Congress of the CPC, held in 1969, endorsed anti-Sovietism as the prime foundation of China's policies. On the eve of and after that Congress the Chinese leaders provoked military incidents on the Soviet frontier on Damansky Island in the Ussuri River, in the vicinity of the Tasta River (Semipalatinsk Region) and elsewhere.

The Soviet Union denounced these provocations and resolutely repulsed them. In its statements of March 29 and June 13, 1969 the Soviet Government showed the total untenability of the Maoist claims to Soviet territory. It was accentuated that these actions were "enormously prejudicing the cause of socialism and peace, the common front of the anti-imperialist struggle and friendship between the Soviet and Chinese peoples". The Soviet Government proposed steps to normalise relations with China on the government level and achieve a peaceful settlement of outstanding issues. In making these proposals it was guided by its principled policy based on long-term perspectives and the harmony of the vital interests of the Soviet and Chinese peoples.

On Soviet initiative a meeting was held in Peking on September 11, 1969 between Alexei Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and Chou En-lai, Chairman of the State Council of the PRC. The issues discussed were the situation on the frontier, trade and economic relations and the normalisation of government-to-government relations. The constructive stand of the Soviet Union made it possible to resume at the end of the year the negotiations on frontier problems that had been suspended in 1964. In 1970 the USSR and the PRC exchanged Ambassadors and signed a trade protocol envisaging an expansion of trade.

In spite of these developments the Chinese leaders did not halt their attacks on the USSR and the entire socialist community, whom they continued to regard as the principal obstacle to their Great-Power ambitions. In order to justify their anti-Leninist policies they invented the "theories" of

an "intermediate zone" and of "struggle against the domination of the two super-Powers". These theories preach the formation of a bloc with so-called small and medium states on a non-class basis. Rejecting the contradiction between socialism and capitalism in favour of a non-existent contradiction between the "two super-Powers" and the rest of the world, the Maoists are trying to unite and head all the anti-Soviet forces. On this foundation they are prepared to align themselves with any, even the most reactionary, forces such as the anti-Sovietists among the British Conservatives, the revenge-seeking elements in the FRG and the South African racialists.

US President Richard M. Nixon visited Peking in 1972. Noting this fact, Leonid Brezhnev said that the USSR had always urged recognition of China's role on the world scene. He stressed that the reaffirmation of the principles of peaceful coexistence in the Sino-US statement could only be welcomed, but the actual results of the visit would have to be judged by tangible deeds.* Subsequent statements by the Maoist leaders approving the continued US military presence in Asia and the build-up of NATO military strength showed that in Peking the detente with the Western powers, including the USA, was regarded above all as a condition for an intensification of anti-Soviet policies.

The Chinese leaders continue to make absurd claims to Soviet territory and maliciously slander the Soviet Union's political and social system and its peaceful foreign policy. They openly sabotage the efforts to limit armaments and relax international tension and have not abandoned their attempts to split the socialist community and the communist movement. They hypocritically assert that China is threatened by the Soviet Union but, at the same time, they leave unanswered the Soviet proposals, made in 1969 and thereafter repeated, that the two countries undertake commitments to rule out an attack by any one of them against the other.

In January 1971 the Soviet Union sent China the draft of a treaty on the non-use of force. The draft stated that the two countries "shall not use against each other armed forces

* L. I. Brezhnev, *Leninskim kursom*, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1973, pp. 494, 495.

employing any type of arms, including: a) conventional, b) missile, or c) nuclear".* But the Maoist leaders left this proposal unanswered.

In June 1973 the Soviet Union initiated yet another step in order to normalise its relations with China. The Central Committee of the CPSU, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Soviet Government formally proposed a treaty of non-aggression with the commitment to refrain from attacking each other with any type of arms on land, at sea and in the air and also to refrain from threatening such an attack. This initiative eloquently showed the Soviet Union's good will and constructive approach to the promotion of relations with China. But the Peking leaders did not even take the trouble to reply.

The 24th Congress of the CPSU gave its unanimous approval to the principled Leninist policy of the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government in the relations with China: consistent championing of the principles of Marxism-Leninism, defence of the Soviet Union, exposure of the slander levelled at the policies pursued by the CPSU and the Soviet Union. "At the same time," stated a resolution adopted by the Congress, "our Party stands for normalisation of relations between the USSR and the PRC, and restoration of good-neighbourliness and friendship between the Soviet and Chinese peoples."***

This line is consistently followed by the Soviet Union, which has neither territorial nor economic claims on China. "We," Leonid Brezhnev said in December 1972, "want to see China a flourishing socialist power, and to work shoulder to shoulder with her for peace, against imperialism. But when this is to come about depends on China herself. And, of course, nothing will make us depart from our principled Marxist-Leninist line, from our firm defence of the state interests of the Soviet people and the inviolability of Soviet territory, from our determined struggle against the divisive activities of the PRC leadership in the socialist world and the liberation movement."****

* L. I. Brezhnev, *The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, p. 47.

** 24th Congress of the CPSU, pp. 212-13.

*** L. I. Brezhnev, *The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, p. 48.

The Soviet Union and the Republic of Cuba

Cuba joined the socialist community in the early 1960s, becoming the first socialist state in the American continent. The Soviet Union gave instant recognition to the revolutionary Government that was formed in Cuba upon the overthrow of the Batista dictatorship. The establishment of diplomatic relations was formalised in May 1960.

The relations between the USSR and Cuba are growing steadily stronger.

This was of vital significance because US reaction did not abandon its attempts to throttle Cuba with an economic blockade and to organise armed subversion against her. For many years the USA was the principal consumer of Cuban sugar, but in 1960 it reduced and then completely halted its imports of sugar from Cuba. However, this hostile act of the US monopolies failed to achieve its purpose.

Important economic and financial agreements were signed by the Soviet Union and Cuba in February 1960. The trade agreement provided for the purchase by the Soviet Union of 425,000 tons of Cuban sugar in 1960 and one million tons annually during the next four years and for the payment for this sugar with deliveries of goods. At the same time, the USSR granted Cuba a credit of \$100 million for the purchase of machinery and materials. The 1960 agreement on supplies of Soviet crude oil and oil products enabled Cuba to end her economy's dependence on imports of oil from the USA.

Parallel with extending economic and financial aid the Soviet Government declared time and again that it would use all the means available to it to prevent US armed intervention against the Cuban Republic.

On April 16, 1961 the Government headed by Fidel Castro announced that the national liberation and agrarian phase of the revolution had been completed and that Cuba had entered the phase of socialist reforms. This prompted the US imperialists to intensify their threat of aggressive action. In early 1962 the US Government engineered Cuba's expulsion from the Organisation of American States. It soon became known that an armed invasion of Cuba was being prepared.

In an extremely complex and dangerous situation Cuba withstood the test of the Caribbean crisis in the autumn of 1962 with the support of the USSR and the other socialist

countries belonging to the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. A spirit of solidarity, brotherhood and friendship helped to preserve Cuba as an island of freedom in the Western Hemisphere.

The 24th Congress of the CPSU noted that "the peoples of the Soviet Union and Cuba are comrades-in-arms in a common struggle and the friendship between them is unbreakable".

Led by Osvaldo Dorticos Torrado, a delegation of the Communist Party of Cuba attended the CPSU's 24th Congress. In the autumn of 1971 Alexei Kosygin had talks with Cuban leaders in Havana. In the joint communique it was stated that the USSR was prepared to continue extending every possible assistance to help the Cuban people consolidate their socialist achievements and safeguard their country against imperialist provocations.

The year 1972 saw a further strengthening of friendly relations. The entire spectrum of questions concerning the relations between the two countries was discussed by the Cuban and Soviet leaders in the summer of that year, when Fidel Castro visited the Soviet Union. On the basis of a principled understanding agreements on comprehensive scientific and technical co-operation were signed in Moscow on December 23, 1972 by Leonid Brezhnev and Fidel Castro. These agreements provided for Soviet assistance in the development of some basic branches of Cuba's industry, transport and agriculture and stated the terms for the use and further extension of Soviet credits and for reciprocal goods deliveries.

Upon his return to Cuba Fidel Castro spoke of the Moscow agreements in a televised speech, in which he stressed the USSR's truly fraternal, disinterested approach to assistance for Cuba. "The relations between Cuba and the USSR," he said, "will enter history as a model of revolutionary relations, of genuinely revolutionary and internationalist relations."

4. The Soviet Union and the Collective Organisations of Socialist Countries

Immense international influence is exercised by the collective organisations of socialist countries—the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and the Warsaw Treaty Or-

ganisation. Membership of these organisations broadens the possibilities at the disposal of the builders of socialism and communism, speeds economic development, ensures security and strengthens the positions of the socialist countries on the world scene.

The USSR and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance

The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance was set up in 1949 by Albania,* Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. In 1950 it was joined by the German Democratic Republic and in 1962 by the Mongolian People's Republic. Its principal aims are to organise exchanges of know-how in economic development, reciprocal scientific and technical aid, and assistance in the receipt of raw materials, fuel, machinery and equipment; improve and deepen the international socialist division of labour; and coordinate the economic development plans of the member states.

Here the Soviet Union's guide-line is that the very nature of the socialist system requires close, all-embracing co-operation among all the fraternal countries, and the coordination of policy in, among other areas, economic development. The world socialist economy can be speedily expanded only by combining efforts to strengthen the national economy of each country with the concerted efforts to promote economic mutual assistance. It was not accidental, therefore, that the 20th and the 21st congresses of the CPSU called upon the fraternal countries to act jointly in carrying out the tasks of socialist construction. The 23rd Congress noted that only an international socialist division of labour would make it possible for each socialist country to keep pace with the modern scientific and technological revolution.

The work of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance received considerable attention at the 24th Congress of the CPSU. In the Central Committee report it was stated that "the promotion of the organisational structure and technical basis of versatile economic co-operation has been actively continued in recent years". Further, the report noted that not all the possibilities of the socialist division of labour had been utilised.

* Albania has been inactive in CMEA since 1962.

The CPSU and the fraternal parties regularly discuss the problems of economic co-operation at international forums. Conferences of representatives of the Communist parties and governments of the CMEA countries have been held regularly since the latter half of the 1950s. The 1962 conference debated and approved the Basic Principles of the International Socialist Division of Labour and went on record as finding that the main orientation of CMEA activities was to coordinate the long-term and current economic development plans of the member states.

Each subsequent conference made a constructive contribution to the solution of the fundamental problem of the ways and means of improving economic co-operation with the objective of making it more effective. The special 23rd Session in April 1969 was an important milestone of the Council's activities. Attended by leaders of the Communist parties and governments of the CMEA countries, it initiated the elaboration of the basic orientations for long-term co-operation.

A Comprehensive Programme for the further extension and improvement of co-operation and the development of the socialist integration of the CMEA countries was drawn up jointly by the fraternal parties and governments with the participation of scientists and experts. This programme was unanimously approved at the 25th CMEA Session in Bucharest in July 1971. It envisages economic and organisational measures phased over a period of 15-20 years with account of the interests of each country and of the community as a whole.

These measures are designed to help enhance labour productivity in the CMEA countries and gradually level up their economic development.

The Comprehensive Programme rests on a solid foundation that had been built up in the course of long economic co-operation among the fraternal states. An important part of this foundation consists of jointly built and operated power grids, oil pipe-lines, transport services and other projects. CMEA activities in this sphere play a key role in shaping a new type of international relations. The fact that this activity is directed towards the creation of an integrated world economic organism that Lenin had spoken of* makes it all the more significant.

* See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 28, p. 333.

A symbol of this organism is, for example, the Friendship Oil Pipe-line, which became operational in 1964. A huge oil artery of the CMEA countries, it stretches from the Volga to the Danube and the Oder. Via this pipe-line Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland and the GDR (which built it jointly with the USSR) had received nearly 8,300,000 tons of Soviet oil by the beginning of 1965, approximately 18 million tons in 1967 and over 20 million tons annually in the early 1970s. By 1975 they will be getting almost 50 million tons of oil annually. Currently under construction is a giant gas pipe-line that will bring Siberian gas to the European part of the USSR. This will enable the Soviet Union to increase its gas exports to Czechoslovakia and Poland and begin exporting gas to the GDR, Bulgaria and Hungary.

The USSR, Rumania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, the GDR and Poland have built the integrated Peace Power Grid. The CMEA countries formed a common fleet of railway carriages which some of them use to transport approximately half of their export freight. Yet another international organisation, Intermetal, was set up by Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary on January 1, 1965, and soon afterwards it was joined by the GDR, Bulgaria and the USSR. The purpose of this organisation is to promote close co-operation and specialisation in the iron and steel industry. The CMEA Joint Investment Bank has begun to operate. Other forms of multilateral links are being strengthened.

The economic reforms enforced in the CMEA countries are helping to extend the international socialist division of labour and foster the economic development of these countries. Due to these processes there has been a marked acceleration of the economic advancement of each of the member states.

This induced Yugoslavia (in 1963) and Cuba (in 1964) to declare their desire to participate in the international socialist division of labour. Needless to say, this was welcomed by CMEA. Cuba's request for membership of CMEA was granted at the Council's 26th Session in Moscow in July 1972. Yugoslavia is increasing her participation in the work of the CMEA agencies.

CMEA's activities convincingly refute the Maoist call for "reliance on own resources". It is quite natural for every country to rely above all on its own resources and potentialities. However, there are no grounds for counterposing

this, as the Maoists are doing, to co-operation and mutual assistance between socialist countries. The Marxists-Leninists are aware that success cannot be achieved without combining own efforts with the support of friends and making the maximum use of the international socialist division of labour.

Democratic principles permeate the entire structure and work of CMEA. Not all of its members have representatives in its international agencies. This is quite natural because in CMEA co-operation is promoted on a multilateral basis and also between individual countries or groups of countries. The question of participation in any agency is decided upon independently by each CMEA member state. The international division of labour does not violate the sovereignty of the socialist countries and does not run counter to the interests of their individual national economies.

"Socialist economic integration," the Comprehensive Programme says, "is completely voluntary and does not involve the creation of supra-national bodies; it does not affect questions of internal planning and the financial and self-financing activities of organisations."*

The outlook for socialist integration is very promising indeed. There is no doubt that the Comprehensive Programme, whose main provisions are being translated into life, will greatly benefit the development of the CMEA countries and of the entire socialist community.

In 1971 the national income of the CMEA countries increased by 6.3 per cent, and their industrial product by 7.8 per cent (as against less than 1 per cent in the industrial capitalist states). The 26th CMEA Session in July 1972 gave a high appraisal of the work that had been done by the CMEA countries and agencies to carry out the Comprehensive Programme and underscored that this work was enhancing the socialist community's impact on world development.

The USSR and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation

At the 24th Congress of the CPSU note was made of the considerable successes that had been scored by the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, which is the main centre coordinating the foreign policy of the fraternal countries.

* *The Comprehensive Programme for the Further Extension and Improvement of Co-operation and the Development of Socialist Economic Integration of the CMEA Member-Countries*, Moscow, 1971, p. 15.

The defensive Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance was signed to counter the growing threat from the aggressive NATO imperialist bloc. Concluded on May 14, 1955 for a period of 20 years it will automatically remain in force for another 10 years if its signatories do not file with the Government of Poland a statement denouncing the treaty a year before it expires. The treaty was signed by Albania,* Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, Rumania, the USSR and Czechoslovakia.

As the highest organ of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, the Political Consultative Committee examines and passes decisions on all questions affecting the security of the socialist community.

At its meetings in Warsaw (1965), Bucharest (1966), Sofia (1968), Berlin (1970) and Prague (1972) the Political Consultative Committee denounced the US aggression in Vietnam and declared its support for the Vietnamese people and for the patriotic forces of the other countries of Indochina. On January 26, 1972 in Prague the Political Consultative Committee adopted a statement, in which it was underscored: "The participants in this meeting emphatically condemn the USA's adventurist policy in Indochina, its policy of 'Vietnamising' the war of aggression, the air raids and all other acts directed against the sovereignty and security of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and declare that they will continue giving all the assistance and support needed by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the patriotic forces of South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia to repulse the encroachments of the aggressor." By consistently carrying out this programme the Warsaw Treaty countries made an effective contribution towards the restoration of peace in Vietnam and Laos.

The Warsaw Treaty Organisation advanced a detailed programme for strengthening peace in Europe. The Political Consultative Committee's meetings in 1969, 1970 and 1972 were major milestones of the struggle of the progressive forces for a European conference on security and co-operation. Moreover, the steps taken by the Warsaw Treaty countries in the Middle East have helped to strengthen the progressive regimes formed in some Arab countries.

* Albania ceased her participation in the Organisation in 1962, and in 1968 she unilaterally denounced the treaty.

The Warsaw Treaty's military organisation is being constantly improved. "The armed forces of the allied powers," it is stated in the Central Committee report to the 24th Congress of the CPSU, "are in a state of high readiness and are capable of guaranteeing the peaceful endeavour of the fraternal peoples."*

The Warsaw Treaty Organisation has the most sophisticated armaments at its disposal. Co-operation between the armed forces of the allied states is perfected and modern weapons are tested at the joint exercises and manoeuvres, which have been a school of military brotherhood of the allied armies. They help to consolidate friendship between the peoples of all the countries in the socialist community.

The Leninist course steered by the CPSU is convincing evidence of the CPSU Central Committee's profoundly scientific approach to questions of Soviet foreign policy on the most complex issues. Despite the difficulties that arise in individual socialist countries and in the relations between them one cannot fail to see that the overall development of the socialist community is characterised by an intensification of the trend towards unity.

The Soviet Union steadfastly pursues a policy aimed at extending and promoting all-sided co-operation, unity and friendship with the other socialist countries. With these countries the USSR has a coordinated guideline on all basic issues of world politics. The Soviet Union and its allies coordinate their long-term plans of economic co-operation. Socialist economic integration is making steady headway. With the uninterrupted growth of its might and cohesion, the socialist community is winning ever stronger positions and exercising a growing influence on the course of world development. The balance of strength in the world is changing more and more in favour of socialism.

The friendly meetings in the Crimea of the leaders of the Communist and Workers' parties of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Mongolia, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the USSR in August 1971 and of the leaders of the same parties and the Rumanian Communist Party in July 1972 and in 1973 were important events in the life of the socialist community. At these meetings views were exchanged on the course of socialist and communist construction in these countries and on

* 24th Congress of the CPSU, p. 12.

the ways and means of furthering all-sided co-operation between them. The viability and efficacy of the foreign policy pursued by the socialist states and the vital importance of the Peace Programme adopted by the 24th Congress of the CPSU were unanimously reaffirmed.

At the 1973 meeting the participants noted that the positive changes in the international situation reflected the growing influence of the peaceful policy of the countries belonging to the socialist community, underlined that it was important to consolidate these changes and highly appraised the CPSU's Leninist foreign policy and the personal contribution of Leonid Brezhnev towards its implementation. In assessing the results of the meeting the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee placed it on record that "direct comradely contacts between the leaders of the fraternal parties are helping to strengthen the unity of the Communist and Workers' Parties of the fraternal countries".

The Crimea meetings are striking evidence that the socialist community continues to move towards closer unity. This process is the decisive condition of the successful building of socialism and communism in all the fraternal countries. Moreover, it is the key condition of successful action by the socialist countries on the international scene, of their struggle for peace and security in the world.

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE DEVELOPING STATES

1. Basic Features of the USSR's Relations With Asian, African and Latin American Countries

Foreign Policy of Developing States

When imperialism held unchallenged sway in the world the Asian, African and Latin American countries that had achieved political independence had no possibility of seriously influencing the settlement of world issues. Their foreign policy boiled down to jockeying between the colonial powers in furtherance of the mercenary interests of the feudal and comprador elite.

The October Revolution and support from Soviet Russia gave the Eastern countries their first-ever possibility of utilising foreign policy as an instrument for consolidating their independence and safeguarding their national rights. The radical change in the balance of strength resulting from the formation of the world socialist community enables the emergent countries to pursue an independent foreign policy and participate actively in international affairs.

This group of nearly 100 countries has an aggregate territory of almost 80 million square kilometres (58 per cent of the earth's land surface) and is inhabited by roughly 1,700 million people or 46 per cent of the world's population. However, they have only less than 10 per cent of the world's industrial product and their national income in terms of per head of the population averages 8.3 per cent of the per capita national income of the imperialist countries, which continue to pump wealth out of the former colonies. The export of profits, various payments and unequal trade annually cost the Asian, African and Latin American countries almost \$20,000 million, a sum far in excess of their revenues from the Western powers. As was noted at the 24th Congress of the CPSU, the result of this constant drain of millions of dollars is that 375 million people live on the borderline of starvation in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

The developing states can surmount their age-old backwardness, consolidate their independence, ensure economic and social progress and raise the standard of living only

if they put an end to neocolonialist exploitation. This inevitably gives their foreign policy an anti-imperialist orientation. The leaders of the developing states call their independent foreign policy a policy of neutrality or non-alignment. This policy gained ground in an acute struggle against attempts to compel the liberated states to submit to imperialist dictation. A prominent role in shaping this policy was played by the Republic of India. The foundations of the policy of non-alignment were formulated in the 1940s by the late Prime Minister of India and eminent statesman Jawaharlal Nehru. Following the victory of the anti-imperialist revolution in Egypt in 1952 the Government of that country, headed by the late Gamal Abdel Nasser, who was an outstanding leader of the Arab liberation movement, likewise championed neutralism as the foundation of the foreign policy of developing countries.

A large contribution to the shaping of this policy was made by the 1955 Bandung Conference of 29 Asian and African states. At that conference the representatives of countries whose ruling circles had close ties with the Western powers attacked the policy of non-alignment. They urged the new states to orient their foreign policy on the "struggle against the threat of world communism" and on co-operation with the "free world". But these attempts to impose a pro-imperialist orientation in world affairs met with a firm rebuff. The historic service rendered by the Bandung Conference was that it reaffirmed and substantiated the principles of a foreign policy furthering the national interests of the liberated states. The fear of total exposure in the eyes of the peoples of their countries compelled even the pro-Western leaders to accept these principles.

The conference recommended closer Afro-Asian solidarity and a struggle to eradicate all forms of colonialism, and called for general disarmament, the banning of nuclear weapons, complete equality in the relations between all countries and the peaceful settlement of outstanding international issues.

Despite the ambiguity of many of the provisions approved by it, the conference clearly counterposed the anti-imperialist line of the developing countries to the aggressive policies of the Western powers. With the further disintegration of the colonial system this line was adopted by countries

which had aligned themselves with the colonial powers at the time of the Bandung Conference (for example, Iraq and Ceylon) and also by most of the newly-emergent states.

At a conference in Belgrade in 1961, 25 non-aligned countries reiterated their fidelity to the foreign policy line laid down at Bandung. The Cairo Conference in 1964, which was attended by 45 Asian and African countries, Yugoslavia, Cuba, and observers from some Latin American states, approved a programme for ensuring peace and international co-operation. It envisaged coordinated action against colonialism, neocolonialism and imperialism, including military assistance to peoples fighting for independence.

The progressive features of the foreign policy of the developing countries are its defence of independence and national interests against imperialist expansion, its anti-colonialism, its struggle for the unity of the African, Asian and all other developing states, its promotion of peace and non-participation in military blocs, its recognition of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, and its co-operation with socialist countries.

To varying degrees these features are to be found in the foreign policy of most of the developing states. But its content and orientation are far from being identical and depend on the extent to which the forces in power are interested in resistance to imperialism. With the aggravation of the struggle over the ways and means of development, the differentiation between the foreign policies of these countries has become more marked.

The socialist-oriented countries, where revolutionary democrats are in power, are guided by the aspirations of their working people and use the policy of non-alignment to advance along the non-capitalist road of development. Their neutrality provides for firm opposition to aggression and to the subterfuges of the colonialists, close ties with the world revolutionary forces and friendship with socialist countries. Elements of internationalist solidarity against imperialism and in the defence of the socio-economic gains of the working people are gradually becoming the keynotes of their foreign policy.

The bourgeoisie that sweeps away feudal and colonial practices likewise adopts a neutralist policy, but its aim is to promote independent capitalist development. This policy is pursued also by feudal-monarchist governments in order

to safeguard the sovereignty of their countries. However, the exploiting classes are not consistent in enforcing an independent policy. Fearing the revolutionary activity of the people and the consolidation of socialism's position in the world they gamble on the contradictions between the socialist community and the Western powers and frequently make unprincipled concessions to the imperialists at the expense of the liberation movement and the interests of their own peoples. Some of them screen their virtual abandonment of an independent policy with assertions about their "neutral" attitude to both imperialism and socialism. They claim that there is a similarity between the aggressive Western blocs and the defensive alliances of the socialist countries.

The governments representing the feudal nobility, the big bourgeoisie and other pro-imperialist elements oppose progressive reforms, suppress the liberation movement and allow foreign monopolies to dominate the economy. On the international scene they frequently facilitate the manoeuvres of the imperialists, while some of the regimes set up by the colonialists play the role of direct accomplices. But this policy is inconsonant with national aspirations and encounters resistance from the people and all patriotic forces. Because of this resistance even openly pro-imperialist governments have to take steps to consolidate their countries' sovereignty and support the peace moves of the socialist and non-aligned countries. These trends bear out the fact that anti-imperialist policy is dictated by the development requirements of the new states. But in countries ruled by circles linked with the colonialists this objective law comes forward with great difficulty.

The link between the character of the class forces in power and foreign policy does not, of course, manifest itself automatically. Foreign policy, particularly any specific action of the liberated countries, is influenced by the economic development level, geographical location, traditions, economic relations, the volume and sources of foreign aid, the internal situation and other factors.

The anti-imperialist line of the developing countries is enormously prejudiced by the divisive policies pursued by China's leaders. They propagate the non-class, non-Marxist theories of "poor and rich nations", of the "struggle against the two super-Powers" and so on to make the liberated countries renounce co-operation with the socialist commu-

nity in resisting imperialism and accept Peking's anti-Soviet platform. The Maoist strategy is thus aimed at weeding out the progressive aspects of the non-alignment policy and fitting in with the neocolonialist intrigues.

Despite the divergences that have grown as a result of the aggravation of the class struggle, most of the developing countries continue to maintain an anti-imperialist stand on the international scene.

The 3rd Conference of Non-Aligned States, attended by 61 developing countries, was held in Lusaka, capital of Zambia, in 1970. It reaffirmed the determination of the non-aligned countries to persevere in their efforts to achieve peaceful coexistence, disarmament, economic independence and equal co-operation between all states and to continue their struggle against racism, colonialism and neocolonialism. The conference demanded independence for all oppressed peoples.

The Conference in Algiers* in 1973 attracted an even larger number of participants. It was attended by representatives of 76 countries and 16 national liberation movements. It noted with satisfaction that international tension was relaxing, stressed that the task of the movement for non-alignment was to help deepen that process and called for a further determined struggle against colonialism, racism and neocolonialism. Declaring that the decisions of that con-

* The conference of non-aligned states in Algiers was attended by: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Bahrein, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Botswana, Burma, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, People's Republic of Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Dahomey, Arab Republic of Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Malagasy Republic, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Qatar, Ruanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syria, Tanzania, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Upper Volta, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, Yemen Arab Republic, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia; there were observers and guests from Austria, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Finland, Mexico, Panama, Sweden, Uruguay, Venezuela, 14 African liberation movements, the Palestine Liberation Organisation, the Puerto Rican Socialist Party, the UN Secretary-General, the Organisation of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organisation of Afro-Asian Solidarity.

ference would help to promote the influence of the non-aligned countries in international affairs, Leonid Brezhnev said in a speech in Tashkent: "For our part we respect the anti-imperialist programme mapped out in Algiers and wish the participants in the movement of non-aligned countries success in carrying it out."

The adoption of an independent policy by the developing states has been instrumental in turning international relations into genuinely world-wide relations. Most of these countries form the Third World, which is not aligned with either the socialist community or with the imperialist groups. But their role is not reduced, as is frequently asserted in the West, to balancing between the socialist and imperialist countries. The new states, the Programme of the CPSU declares, "become ever more active as an independent force on the world scene; objectively, this force is in the main a *progressive, revolutionary and anti-imperialist force*".* Enlarging upon this assessment in the new conditions, the Central Committee report to the 24th Congress of the CPSU noted that "imperialism is being subjected to ever greater pressure by the forces which have sprung from the national liberation struggle, above all by the young independent and anti-imperialist-minded states of Asia and Africa".**

Abiding by Lenin's behests, the Soviet Union steadfastly supports the progressive policies of countries that have shaken off colonialist rule. Its point of departure is that today a policy is progressive if "it firmly repulses neocolonialism and works for the consolidation of the sovereignty and independence of the young states, for their economic liberation from imperialism, for peace, for social progress and closer solidarity with other progressive forces of our time, and, first and foremost, with the socialist countries".***

Leninist Principles of Soviet Policy Towards the Countries of the East

The first-ever Great Power to champion the freedom and political and economic independence of oppressed countries

* *The Road to Communism*, p. 496.

** 24th Congress of the CPSU, p. 23.

***L. I. Brezhnev, *The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, p. 48.

and peoples emerged with the victory of the October Revolution.

On Lenin's initiative the Soviet state declared "a complete break with the barbarous policy of bourgeois civilisation, which has built the prosperity of the exploiters belonging to a few chosen nations on the enslavement of hundreds of millions of working people in Asia, in the colonies in general, and in the small countries".*

Soviet Russia inaugurated a fundamentally new policy that recognised the full equality of the peoples of the East and provided for friendly support and the defence of these peoples against imperialist expansion.

Lenin showed that this was an objectively well-founded policy and drew attention to the distinction between oppressed and oppressor nations** and the close link between the struggle of the working class for socialism and the struggle of the oppressed peoples for independence. He explained that there were bound to be friendly relations with the countries of the East on account of the coincidence of the vital interests of all peoples oppressed by imperialism. Moreover, imperialism's policy of violence was strengthening "the alliance and the friendly relations between Russia and the oppressed nations of the East".***

The guide-lines formulated by Lenin for Soviet foreign policy were thus internationalism and solidarity in the common struggle against imperialism.

On the basis of these principles Lenin substantiated the specifics of socialist foreign policy towards countries oppressed by imperialism. He considered that it was of paramount importance to establish mutual trust founded on the conviction of peoples and governments that the Soviet state was pursuing a fundamentally different policy from that of the imperialists and was tirelessly working for peace and the independence of all nations. Steadfastly abiding by this precept, the Soviet Government categorically rejected the attempts of the imperialist powers to make their relations with the USSR dependent on the latter's renunciation of friendship with the countries of the East. In reply to the Curzon ultimatum of 1923 it pointed out that if the "defence and promotion of friendly relations with the peoples of the

* V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 26, p. 424.

** Ibid., Vol. 31, p. 240.

*** Ibid., p. 491.

East on the basis of sincere respect for their interests and rights" was regarded by the British Government as an anti-British policy "the misunderstanding arising on this soil can well be appreciated".*

Lenin held that one of the aims of the Soviet state was to draw the countries of the East into the settlement of world problems. In giving his approval in 1922 to the programme of the Soviet delegation at the Genoa Conference he placed special emphasis on the demand that the "black and all other colonial peoples should take part in conferences and commissions on an equal footing with the Europeans". This demand mirrored the new, socialist view of international relations, a view springing from the understanding that the oppressed peoples would inevitably achieve political and economic independence. The Soviet Government's unremitting efforts to pave the way for this independence was one of the chief factors that predetermined the failure of the imperialists to prevent the equal participation of the liberated countries in world affairs.

Lenin saw in economic co-operation between socialist and liberated states the guarantee of a successful common struggle against monopoly capital rule. He believed that aid from countries of the victorious proletariat to the working people of the East in surmounting backwardness was historically inevitable and justified, stressing that "the backward countries can emerge from their present stage of development when the victorious proletariat of the Soviet Republics extends a helping hand to these masses and is in a position to give them support".** These words were spoken at a time when the Soviet state had modest material resources and most of the countries of the East were colonies. Lenin raised aid for the advancement of these countries to the level of state policy, foreseeing that it would be socialism's historic mission to help turn the former colonies into developed countries and place this problem on the agenda of international relations.

He insisted on unqualified respect for the sovereignty and the national and historical specifics of the countries of the East, showing that "'offended' nationals are not sensitive to anything so much as to the feeling of equality and the vio-

* *Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR*, Vol. VI, Moscow, 1962, p. 292.

** V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 244.

lation of this equality, if only through negligence or jest—to the violation of that equality by their proletarian comrades".* But this had nothing in common with support for national prejudices or with the mercenary policies of the exploiters. A point he made time and again was that it was dangerous to counterpose national specifics to the liberation movement and use these specifics in the interests of the feudal lords and capitalists. He wrote that it was imperative to combat "influential reactionary and medieval elements in backward countries" and the "trends, which strive to combine the liberation movement against European and American imperialism with an attempt to strengthen the positions of the khans, landowners, mullahs, etc."**

The essence of the principles laid down by Lenin for the relations with the countries of the East was enunciated exhaustively in the instructions of June 3, 1921 to the Soviet Ambassador in Afghanistan. In these instructions the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs wrote that the Soviet Government was prepared "to facilitate the development and prosperity of the Afghan State as far as possible". The Ambassador was instructed to explain that despite their different social systems Soviet Russia and Afghanistan were linked by their "common aspirations for complete sovereignty and independence", that Soviet Russia did not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries and was ready to give its assistance "to all manifestations that play a progressive role in the development" of Afghanistan. Further, the Soviet Ambassador was instructed to take into account the reactionary aspirations of some groups among the Afghan ruling circles and counter the attempts of the imperialists to utilise these aspirations.***

The possibilities for strengthening relations with the developing countries widened immeasurably with the formation of the world socialist community and the attainment of independence by former colonies. In this new situation the CPSU enlarged upon and enriched the Leninist principles and the practice of relations with these countries, showing that the new countries were an anti-imperialist force, spotlighting the significance of their friendship with

* *Ibid.*, Vol. 36, pp. 608-09.

** *Ibid.*, Vol. 31, p. 149.

*** *Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR*, Vol. IV, Moscow, 1960, pp. 166, 167.

the socialist community and reiterating the Soviet Union's readiness for all-sided co-operation with them.

A large contribution to the development of Lenin's theory of the alliance between socialist countries and the peoples upholding their independence was the CPSU's substantiation of the vital importance of the Soviet Union's close links with countries that had embarked on non-capitalist development and comprised the vanguard contingent of the national liberation movement. The further these countries moved towards the objective they had chosen, it was noted at the 23rd Congress of the CPSU, "the more versatile, profound and stable our relations with them will become".* In addition to the common interests in repulsing imperialism, there was a certain community of ideals. The relations of the socialist states with this group of countries more and more frequently grow into a joint struggle to promote and consolidate the progressive social system and are characterised by reciprocal fraternal assistance. Alongside government-to-government relations contacts are expanding between the governing Communist and revolutionary-democratic parties, co-operation with whom, as Leonid Brezhnev had pointed out, "fully meets the interests of the anti-imperialist movement, the strengthening of national independence and the cause of social progress".** Delegations from ten of these parties attended the 24th Congress of the CPSU. In their messages of greeting on behalf of their parties and peoples they stressed their determination to continue, alongside the CPSU, "the great struggle against imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism, for the eradication of all forms of exploitation of man by man".

Guided by Leninist principles the Soviet Union's policy is directed towards consolidating the independence and furthering the advancement of the developing states. It helps to rally the internal patriotic forces, invigorate the independent foreign policy of the developing states and facilitate the formation of a united front of peace-loving countries opposed to imperialist aggression and the intrigues of international reaction. In charting the further course of this policy, the 24th Congress of the CPSU noted in its decisions: "The CPSU is invariably true to the Leninist principle of solidarity with the peoples fighting for national liberation

* 23rd Congress of the CPSU, p. 27.

** 24th Congress of the CPSU, p. 28.

and social emancipation. As in the past, the fighters against the remaining colonial regimes can count on our full support. The Congress attaches special importance to extending co-operation with countries taking the socialist orientation."*

Co-operation Between the USSR and the Developing States in Abolishing Colonialism

By liberating the oppressed peoples of tsarist Russia the October Revolution marked the beginning of the downfall of imperialism's colonial system. These peoples shook off exploitation and voluntarily united with the Russian people to form a multinational socialist state. The Soviet Government helped the former colonial regions to surmount their age-old backwardness within an unprecedentedly short period. The economic growth rate of these regions was invariably higher than the average rate in the USSR as a whole. The enormous effort and sacrifices made by the Russian working class and the Russian people in order to achieve this goal were in effect a glorious feat accomplished by an entire class, an entire nation in the name of internationalism. The conversion of the non-Russian regions into industrial socialist republics and their experience of economic and cultural development became an inspiring example for the solution of the problems facing all the liberated countries. In a speech welcoming the representatives of the Soviet Asian republics at the Asian Relations Conference in 1947, Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of the Government of India that had just been formed, said that these republics "have so many lessons to teach us". As was noted in the resolution of the CPSU Central Committee on the preparations for the 50th anniversary of the USSR, the "Soviet experience in creating a multinational socialist state, in building through the common effort of our peoples a developed socialist society and coping with the most complex nationalities question, has won world recognition, and gives invaluable assistance to all fighters for social and national liberation".

The development of the republics that had been outlying regions of tsarist Russia provided a practical example of the enforcement of the right of nations to self-determination, which the Soviet Government had proclaimed in its very

* Ibid., p. 215.

first international act, the Decree on Peace. For the colonial peoples the proclamation of this right by the country of the victorious proletariat was a powerful stimulant in their struggle for independence. The consistent and complete implementation of this right in the Soviet Union helped to proliferate the ideal of the self-determination of nations in countries oppressed by imperialism and to turn it into a material force that in many ways contributed to the collapse of the colonial empires.

The Soviet Army's victory over nazi Germany and militarist Japan and the overall weakening of imperialism's position as a result of the Second World War led to a new international situation that allowed the oppressed peoples to begin the final assault of the colonial fortresses. In their struggle they always had every possible support from the Soviet Union.

On Soviet insistence a provision on respect for the principle of equality and the self-determination of nations was included in the UN Charter. Further, the colonial powers had to pledge to keep the UN informed of the situation in their possessions and agree on the temporary nature of the UN trusteeship. This deprived them of the possibility of using this institution to perpetuate colonial rule. The conditions for using the UN for assistance to the liberation struggle were thus created on Soviet initiative.

During the very first years following the establishment of the United Nations Organisation, the USSR and other socialist countries, and also Asian and African states, were instrumental in getting the UN to examine the conflicts between the colonial powers and the colonies aspiring for independence (the Indonesian, Tunisian, Moroccan and other questions). The dismissal of the imperialist claims that questions of this kind should be recognised as being within the internal competence of the colonial powers was of fundamental significance and provided the legal basis for aid to the liberation struggle from progressive international forces.

Acting on a Soviet proposal that had the unanimous support of the developing states, the 15th General Assembly in 1960 adopted the Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. A year later the UN set up the Committee of 24 to study ways and means of implementing the Declaration. Despite sabotage by the Western powers, this Committee exposed the colonialists.

Following the adoption of the Declaration colonial regimes have been abolished in 45 territories, which became sovereign states or part of independent countries in Africa and Asia. But the shameful evil of colonialism has not been entirely eradicated. The imperialist powers still have over 50 colonies. These are small, sparsely inhabited territories, mainly islands. But situated as they are in different parts of the world they are convenient springboards for imperialist aggression and subversion against the liberated states. The racist regimes in South Africa represent a refined form of colonial rule.

The total abolition of colonial springboards remains one of the main objectives of the Soviet Union's joint actions with the developing states. In working for the earliest attainment of that objective the Soviet Union does not confine itself to rendering diplomatic and political support. It extends effective material assistance to the liberation struggle. In the battles for the overthrow of colonial rule the patriots of many countries have Soviet-manufactured weapons at their disposal. "The Soviet Union," Leonid Brezhnev said at the 1969 International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, "together with other socialist countries, holds active positions in the wide and seething front of the national liberation movement, and renders firm political support and moral and material help to the peoples fighting for liberation."*

In a decision specifying the tasks of the struggle that the Soviet Union is waging jointly with all peace-loving countries against the aggressive policies of the imperialists, the 24th Congress of the CPSU recorded: "The UN decisions on the abolition of the remaining colonial regimes must be fully carried out. Manifestations of racism and apartheid must be universally condemned and boycotted."**

Moves by the USSR and the Developing States for Peace and International Co-operation

The co-operation that the Asian, African and Latin American countries receive from the Soviet Union in consolidating their independence, repulsing imperialist aggression and

* *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow 1969*, p. 170.

** *24th Congress of the CPSU*, p. 38.

preserving peace acquires growing significance with the steady disintegration of the colonial system.

The Western powers took every possible step to prevent the former colonies from establishing relations with the world's first socialist state. But the liberated countries saw a reliable and disinterested friend in the Soviet Union and sought its support for their efforts to safeguard their national sovereignty and social progress. For its part, the Soviet Union considered that it was its internationalist duty to give this support. It welcomed the emergence of new liberated countries. Versatile relations with them facilitated the Soviet Union's foreign policy actions in the economic (offers of assistance in the building of a national industry) and political (moves in support of the independence and neutralist policy of the new states) spheres.

On January 1, 1974 the USSR had diplomatic relations with 79 developing states: 27 in Asia, 38 in Africa and 14 in Latin America. With some countries, despite the absence of official relations, it maintains trade and cultural contacts. Western diplomacy failed utterly to isolate the liberated countries from the Soviet Union.

Soviet support for the peaceful foreign policy of the new states substantially facilitated co-operation in many areas. Here a major role is played by personal contacts between statesmen. These contacts were started in 1955 by a visit of the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to the USSR and by visits of a Soviet Government delegation to Afghanistan, Burma and India. In the period 1966 through 1973 official visits (repeated, in the case of some countries, several times) were made to Moscow by the Presidents, Prime Ministers and Ministers of 17 Asian, 20 African and five Latin American countries. During the same period the President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR visited Algeria, Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Iraq, Iran, Morocco, Syria and Turkey. Government delegations and delegations of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR made official visits to these and many other developing states. Lately there has been a more intensive exchange of Party and Party-and-Government delegations with socialist-oriented countries.

Meetings of statesmen and Party leaders reinforce trust and understanding. At these friendly meetings they settle current problems, formulate a common stand on some issues,

ascertain the substance of divergences on other issues and map out the ways of removing these divergences. In joint documents they note the broad coincidence or approximation of their positions and views and declare their intention to work for a relaxation of international tension and the establishment of lasting peace.

They advocate the speediest and total abolition of survivals of colonialism, demand the unconditional fulfilment of the UN Declaration on this question and condemn all forms of racism and apartheid. The Soviet representatives note with satisfaction that the policy of non-alignment is helping to ease tension and promote peace, friendship and international co-operation. Their opposite numbers speak highly of the Soviet Union's peaceful foreign policy.

Particularly great importance attaches to the common assessments and recommendations on specific world problems, support for each other's peace initiatives and those of third countries and the joint condemnation of acts of imperialist aggression.

The leaders of the socialist states and of the countries oriented towards non-capitalist development inform each other of their efforts to promote economic, scientific and cultural progress, of their economic development plans and so forth. They underscore their readiness to consult with each other regularly on the Government and Party level. The USSR has welcomed the decision of a number of countries to pursue the socialist orientation in development and wished them success in enforcing progressive socio-economic reforms.

Soviet co-operation with Asian, African and Latin American states has benefited the atmosphere in the UN. Thanks, in particular, to Soviet diplomacy, a united front of socialist and developing countries is taking shape in the drive for peace and for the abolition of colonialism, the pro-Western "automatic majority" has dissolved and many steps to avert war and strengthen the independence of all countries have been approved.

Friendship with the Soviet Union has become also an important factor uniting the liberated countries in the struggle against imperialism. "The imperialists," Leonid Brezhnev said, "are seeking to sow discord among states which have won national independence. Soviet foreign policy opposes imperialist intrigues and facilitates a peaceful set-

tlement of the differences between these states.”* In its messages to statesmen and conferences of non-aligned African and Asian countries the Soviet Government invariably underscores the importance of unity against colonialism and aggression, in the struggle for peace, freedom and independence. The practical actions of the Soviet Union help to strengthen this unity.

Co-operation with the USSR has been instrumental in ending the Western monopoly of military links with the developing states, links which the imperialists had used for interference in their internal affairs. Relying on Soviet assistance, many Asian and African countries have built up strong national armies which safeguard their sovereignty and progress. With the support of the USSR imperialist aggression has been time and again successfully repulsed by the new states.

In the struggle for peace and security and for the settlement of outstanding international issues co-operation between the USSR and the developing states is growing stronger and expanding. The Soviet Peace Programme has opened up further scope for this co-operation.

The Soviet Union's Economic Relations With Developing Countries

One of the USSR's disinterested aims is to help the formerly oppressed peoples build a modern industrial foundation for their economies as quickly as possible, for this foundation is indispensable in ensuring genuine independence and a rising standard of living.

Prior to the Second World War, the USSR had, despite its limited resources, provided the financial assistance and technical aid to help build a number of industrial projects in Afghanistan.

In the early 1950s, when it had completed the post-war rehabilitation of its economy, the USSR reaffirmed in the UN, at sittings of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East and at the Moscow Economic Conference, that it was prepared to help the liberated countries with machines, equipment and credits. The governments of these coun-

* *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow 1969*, p. 170.

tries responded to this initiative despite the fabrications of Western propaganda and the local reactionaries, who dangled the bogey of “communist penetration” and alleged that the USSR was unable to fulfil its promises. Developments have borne out Lenin's prevision that the oppressed peoples would realise “the economic necessity of an alliance with Soviet Russia against international imperialism”.*

The Soviet Union considers that economic co-operation with the developing states should be mutually beneficial and take the interests of both sides into account. It regards this co-operation as a form of world socialism's alliance with the national liberation movement and uses this class-political assessment as the foundation for settling practical issues. As distinct from the economic subjugation of some countries to others, which is the hallmark of imperialism in world economic relations, the Soviet Union's economic relations with the Asian, African and Latin American countries are directed towards abolishing the international division of labour that had taken shape during the colonial period and was prejudicial to these countries. Notable features of these relations are that they help to build up and strengthen the public sector, tie in with the plans for national development and are, in many cases, of key significance to the fulfilment of these plans which are aimed at putting an end to one-sided economic development.

Trade plays a prominent role in the system of economic relations. In 1972 the Soviet Union had trade and payments agreements with 54 developing states. Trade with these countries is growing at a much faster rate than the Soviet Union's total foreign trade.

From the USSR the developing states receive machines, equipment and other industrial products in exchange for their traditional exports such as cotton, wool and non-ferrous metal ores, and also, in recent years, products of their newly-built industries.

Fruitful co-operation in ending the backwardness of the liberated countries was ushered in by the agreements on Soviet economic assistance to Afghanistan (1954) and on the building of a large iron and steel works in India (1955). At the beginning of 1973 the USSR had agreements on economic and technical co-operation with 44 countries in

* V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 477.

Asia, Africa and Latin America. Under these agreements factories, power stations, oil derricks and mines are being built in tropical forests and sun-baked deserts. The Aswan hydrotechnical engineering scheme built on the Nile with Soviet assistance serves as an imposing symbol of friendship between the USSR and Egypt. Each of these projects gives living and convincing proof of the significance of friendship with the USSR to countries that have started on independent development.

Of the 790 projects that the USSR had undertaken to help build in developing countries, 370 had been completed by the close of 1972 and 420 were still under construction. The completed projects annually produce 13 million tons of steel, more than 6 million kw of electric power, over 150,000 tons of metallurgical, mine, transport and heavy electrical equipment, nearly 7 million tons of iron ore, over 10 million tons of coal and over 11,500,000 tons of petroleum products.

Soviet credits to the developing countries under the agreements on economic co-operation reached nearly 6,000 million rubles in 1973. These are easy-term credits: 2.5 per cent interest, for 12 years, without any political or economic strings that infringe upon the sovereignty or national dignity of the recipient country. Credits are repaid with deliveries of raw materials, farm products, manufactured goods and, sometimes, in local currency that is used for the purchase of locally produced commodities. Soviet credits thus help to form stable markets for the developing states and to satisfy the USSR's requirements in the goods that may be purchased in these countries. Soviet economic and technical co-operation with the developing states is not an act of charity. It is founded on equal and mutual benefit.

The forms and methods of co-operation are being improved: long-term plans are being drawn up for economic links, contacts are maintained on the level of planning and economic agencies, and agreement has been reached with many countries on the formation of joint economic and technological commissions.

Further, the Soviet Union helps to train large numbers of specialists. During the building and operation of new enterprises Soviet specialists have trained over 200,000 skilled workers and technicians from among the local population. Patrice Lumumba University, opened in Moscow in 1960, trains specialists in all branches of technology. Today it has

students from 84 countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Thousands of undergraduate and post-graduate students from these countries receive training at other Soviet institutions of higher learning. All study free of charge and receive Soviet scholarship grants.

More than 100 institutions of higher learning, technical colleges, technical schools and educational centres have been or are being built in the developing states with the help of Soviet specialists. Over 70 of these institutions are already in operation and they include the technological institutes in India, Burma, Guinea, Ethiopia and Cambodia, and an oil and gas institute in Algeria.

Characterising Soviet economic co-operation with the developing states, Alexei Kosygin noted at the 24th Congress of the CPSU that it had entered "a stage where we may already speak of firmly established mutually advantageous economic ties" and "is acquiring the nature of a stable division of labour, as opposed in the sphere of international economic relations to the system of imperialist exploitation".*

The Western monopolies have to take into account the realistic prospects for the industrialisation of the new states despite imperialist sabotage. Today they find themselves in a position where they have to make concessions that formerly they would under no circumstances have made, namely to increase the size and lower the interest rate of loans, grant credits for the heavy industry, and so on. Needless to say, this does not change the onerous substance of imperialist economic policy. But it is a fact that as a result of co-operation with socialist countries the developing states are successfully resisting the importunities of the monopolies. The broader this co-operation becomes the more possibilities will these states have for an offensive against foreign capital.

Relations with socialist countries are one of the points at issue in the sharp struggle unfolding in many developing states between the forces of progress and the imperialist-backed internal reaction. We know from experience that a struggle between socio-political forces can produce various twists and turns in the policy of a country. But as Leonid Brezhnev pointed out, "the patriots of former colonies and semi-colonies have passed a thorough political school of na-

* 24th Congress of the CPSU, p. 200.

tional liberation revolutions. And the lessons they have drawn are evidence of the fact, among other things, that friendship with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries facilitates the success of the struggle against imperialism and the consolidation of the genuine independence of liberated countries."^{*}

In spite of the difficulties springing from the differences in the social system and from the intrigues of the local reactionaries, and despite pressure from the imperialist powers and the divisive manoeuvres of the Maoists, Soviet political, diplomatic and economic co-operation with the developing states is widening and improving. It has become a factor exercising a progressive influence on world development. On the international level it undermines the influence of imperialism, impedes aggressive action by it and facilitates the growth of the liberation struggle. In the context of the internal situation in the developing states it rallies the anti-imperialist and democratic forces, weakens the position of the reactionaries and creates favourable conditions for the adoption of the socialist orientation. In the final analysis, friendship and co-operation between the USSR and Asian, African and Latin American countries strengthen the position of the forces of peace, democracy and socialism in the world. In this lies their unfading significance.

2. Soviet Relations With Countries of South and Southeast Asia

Soviet Assistance for the Conquest and Consolidation of Independence

Prior to the war the Soviet Union had no direct contacts with South and Southeast Asian countries, which were colonies at the time. After the Soviet Army had defeated imperialist Japan's main forces, Thailand, the only sovereign country in that region, was liberated from Japanese occupation. In 1946 the Soviet Union resumed diplomatic relations with that country.

^{*} L. I. Brezhnev, *The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*. p. 51.

The further expansion of relations accompanied the Soviet Union's actions to abolish colonial regimes and champion the independence and sovereignty of the countries that were winning liberation. At the 1st United Nations General Assembly in 1946 the Soviet delegation called upon Britain to recognise India's independence forthwith. In 1947, in response to a message from the Indian Provisional Government, the USSR and India exchanged ambassadors before India's independence was formally proclaimed. This facilitated international recognition of that major Asian country and laid the foundations for friendship between the Soviet Union and India.

Throughout the Indonesian people's war for independence (1945-1949) the USSR unremittingly exposed the aggression and diplomatic subterfuges of the Dutch colonialists and their backers. The USSR's struggle in the United Nations, where the Indonesian question was raised on Soviet initiative, likewise contributed to the downfall of the colonial administration and then to the annulment of the unequal agreements that had been forced on Indonesia after she became independent. In 1950 the USSR and Indonesia exchanged diplomatic representatives. Formal relations with Pakistan and Burma had been established by the Soviet Union as early as 1948. Soviet support in the United Nations for Burma's demand for steps against the outrages that were being committed by the armed Kuomintang gangs that had invaded that country with imperialist backing contributed enormously towards consolidating that new country's independence.

The Soviet Union gave its support to the actions of the peoples of Southeast Asia against the aggressive SEATO bloc, that had been formed by the imperialists in 1954. In its Statement of September 15, 1954 the Soviet Foreign Ministry showed that this bloc was an instrument of imperialist policy against the interests of the Asian peoples. Relying on friendly support from the USSR most of the countries in that region refused to join SEATO despite the threats and promises of the imperialists. Only three Asian countries (Pakistan,* Thailand and the Philippines) acceded to that bloc, whose other members were the USA, Britain, France, Australia and New Zealand.

^{*} In 1972 Pakistan withdrew from SEATO.

In 1955 the US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles declared that in keeping with the defence requirements of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation the USA recognised Portuguese possessions in Asia, including territories of Goa, Daman and Diu in India as her "overseas provinces". The Soviet Union denounced this provocative action and expressed the confidence that the question of Goa would be settled in India's favour whether the colonialists liked it or not. With solid international support India drove the colonialists out of these territories by armed force in 1961. The Soviet Union's principled stand in the Security Council at the discussion of the "complaint" of the colonialists prevented Portugal's patrons from intervening in the conflict on the pretext of helping to find a settlement. This swept away a dangerous imperialist stronghold in the Hindustan sub-continent.

With similar consistence the Soviet Union supported the demand for the liberation of West Irian (the western part of New Guinea), which the Dutch colonialists had unlawfully retained under their control. In 1960 the Soviet Union warned the Netherlands that it was creating a dangerous situation by concentrating troops in West Irian and promptly responded to the request for the sale of special equipment needed by Indonesia's armed forces (the agreement on the sale of this equipment was signed in 1961). In 1962, as tension mounted, the USSR declared that peace-loving states could not remain indifferent observers of provocations against the Republic of Indonesia. As a result of talks that were held through the mediation of the United Nations, agreement was reached on the transfer of the administration of West Irian to Indonesia.

Soviet Opposition to Neocolonialist Manoeuvres in South and Southeast Asia. Soviet-Indian Treaty of 1971

In spite of the difficult situation, the Soviet Union's relations with countries in South and Southeast Asia expanded steadily in the 1960s and 1970s. The Ne Win Government, which proclaimed a socialist orientation, was formed in Burma in 1962. In India at the elections in 1971 the patriotic forces defeated the reactionary parties, which had attempted to depose the Government headed by Indira Gandhi that was pursuing an anti-imperialist policy. The nationalisation

of the large banks, the annulment of pensions for princes and the steps taken to enlarge the public sector were evidence of the consolidation of progressive trends in India's policies. In Ceylon, a United Anti-Imperialist Front Government, which likewise steered towards reforms in the interests of the people, came to power in 1970.

At the same time, the colonialists intensified their intrigues in this region. Here, too, the US imperialists were the principal force behind the assault on the independence and progress of the peoples of South and Southeast Asia. They unleashed a predatory war in Indochina* and activated the internal reaction everywhere else in the region. Their efforts were supported by Britain, under whose aegis another military bloc (Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore) was formed in 1971. Japan, which embarked on economic expansion in Southeast Asia, became active in the imperialist manoeuvres.

The Western powers made wide use of neocolonialist methods, declaring, in particular, that they were ready to reconcile themselves with the neutralist policy of the new states and enlarge credits to them. This new tactic was evidence of imperialism's weakening positions, but it was nonetheless pregnant with sinister danger, for its objective was to deceive the people, split the anti-imperialist forces and draw the local bourgeoisie into an alliance with imperialism. Subversion against the independent countries under the guise of anti-communism and anti-Sovietism remained part and parcel of that tactic.

The Soviet Union consistently opposed the manoeuvres of the Western powers. A further broadening of co-operation with the Soviet Union, particularly of economic co-operation, was vital in helping the countries of South and Southeast Asia to repulse the neocolonialist intrusions and consolidate their progressive orientation.

In 1951 when famine struck many regions of India the Soviet Union rushed the delivery of 100,000 tons of wheat in response to a request from the Indian Government. This friendly assistance wrecked the efforts of the US ruling circles to take advantage of a difficult situation to force onerous terms on an as yet weak country for the supply of food.

* This war is discussed at some length in Chapter Six.

The new states of Southeast Asia repeatedly asked the imperialist powers to help them build modern factories in their public sector, but the reply was always negative. Seeing the evaporation of her hopes of achieving industrialisation in co-operation with capitalist countries, India appealed to the USSR. The Soviet Government showed complete understanding for India's request for financial and technical assistance in the building of an iron and steel plant. Acting together with the Indian reactionaries, imperialist diplomacy tried to torpedo the talks that commenced in 1954. A representative of the US-controlled International Bank for Reconstruction and Development went post-haste to Delhi, where he promised to ensure the import of any quantity of metal India desired if she broke off the talks. Britain immediately offered the services of British firms, although earlier she had refrained from taking this step despite requests from India. Rejecting this pressure, the Indian leaders pursued their policy of co-operation with the USSR. The Bhilai Iron and Steel Works with an annual output capacity of 1,000,000 tons of steel became operational in 1959. The USSR and India then signed an agreement to increase the capacity of that plant to 2,500,000 tons and build a factory at Bokaro with an annual output capacity of 4,000,000 tons of steel. Agreements were signed on the construction of a heavy engineering works at Ranchi and on a number of other projects. Soviet specialists helped to prospect for oil and to build oil refineries, thereby refuting the fabrications of capitalist firms that no commercial oil deposits existed in India.

By joint effort over 60 large industrial enterprises that comprise a sizeable contribution to India's economy have been built or are under construction. The specialists trained with Soviet assistance are playing a notable role in India's economic life. Whereas at the Bhilai project India's contribution to the total volume of construction was roughly 10 per cent, at the Bokaro project it will exceed 65 per cent.

In 1971 the governments of the USSR and India noted that co-operation was progressing successfully and that there were favourable prospects for broadening it to cover areas such as space exploration, the peaceful uses of atomic energy and production co-operation between industrial enterprises.

In 1955 the USSR agreed to help Burma promote her agriculture and build a number of industrial projects. The irrigation system under construction in Chemoltau with Soviet assistance will water 11,000 hectares of arid land for cotton, which Burma is still importing. A gift from the Soviet people, the Rangoon Technological Institute has become a major educational centre. Over 230 young specialists graduated from that institute in 1970. At a reception given in honour of Nikolai Podgorny in 1971, Ne Win spoke highly of Soviet technical and economic assistance to his country and expressed the confidence that "there is a sound foundation for strengthening our bilateral relations". Nikolai Podgorny and Ne Win reaffirmed their countries' desire to continue expanding friendly relations.

Agreements on economic co-operation were signed by the Soviet Union also with Ceylon, Nepal, Cambodia and Laos (diplomatic relations with these countries had been established in 1956-1957). Built with Soviet assistance, Ceylon's first industrial enterprises—a tyre factory near Colombo and an iron and steel works at Oruvela—ushered in the building of an independent economy.

The Soviet Government has always advocated good-neighbourly relations with Pakistan. It granted that country credits for the building of an iron and steel works with an annual output capacity of 1,000,000 tons of steel and for organising prospecting for oil.

In the 1960s reactionary and colonialist elements inflicted a heavy blow on the gains of the people of Indonesia. The Government of President Sukarno had achieved notable successes in the anti-imperialist struggle. But these successes had not been reinforced, as the situation demanded, with social reforms (above all, with an agrarian reform) and with a rise of the living standard.

The Communist Party, which had made an enormous contribution to the liberation struggle, had considerable influence in Indonesia. However, its leaders failed to use the possibilities for uniting and organising the workers and all the working people. Some of these leaders abandoned the Marxist-Leninist teaching in favour of the "thought of Mao Tse-tung". This undermined the party's influence over the people and disorganised it in face of the onslaught of the reactionaries. The leadership of the Communist Party of Indonesia did nothing to curb the extremist feelings of a

group of officers, who on September 30, 1965 attempted a military coup. Regardless of its motives, this adventurist action enabled reactionary forces to start a reign of terror against the Communist Party and other democratic organisations. Hundreds of thousands of fighters for independence were massacred. The country's political development was retarded.

Soviet-Indonesian relations deteriorated rapidly after these changes had been put into effect in Indonesia's foreign policy. The Soviet Union denounced the persecution of democrats and Communists, who had fought heroically for Indonesia's independence and the interests of the working people. At the same time, steps were initiated by the Soviet Government to normalise relations and resume trade, economic and cultural contacts. During a visit to Moscow by the Indonesian Foreign Minister in 1970 an agreement was signed on the terms for the repayment of Soviet credits and the question of trade and economic relations was discussed.

The Soviet Union's co-operation with the countries in South and Southeast Asia is expanding in breadth and depth. In 1966-1971 the Soviet Union established diplomatic relations with Malaysia, Singapore and the Maldives Republic and, for the first time, exchanged civic delegations with the Philippines.

Indicative of the closer relations being established with the countries of that region was the signing of the Soviet-Indian Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation on August 9, 1971.

This treaty reaffirmed that there would be lasting peace and friendship between the two countries. The USSR and India undertook to combine their efforts towards maintaining and strengthening peace in Asia and throughout the world, ending the arms race, supporting the struggle against colonialism and racism, promoting contacts on international issues and co-operating in all spheres. They agreed that they would not join any military alliances directed against any one of them or aid a third country involved in an armed conflict with any one of them. In the event the USSR or India was attacked or threatened with attack they would consult each other with the object of taking the appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and security for their countries.

Representing the natural outcome of 25 years of friendly relations, the treaty provided a solid political and legal foundation for furthering these relations. It reaffirmed that India's "peaceable, independent line in international affairs, and the traditional feelings of friendship linking the peoples of the two countries have all helped to strengthen Soviet-Indian co-operation".*

This treaty strikingly shows the significance of the Soviet Union's relations with the countries of South and Southeast Asia as an important factor ensuring their independence, security and progress, and their successful resistance to neo-colonialist manipulations.

Soviet Efforts to Bring About a Just Peace in South Asia

It has always been the Soviet Union's contention that there had to be lasting peace in Asia, that the resources and endeavours of the countries of that area should not be squandered in conflicts with each other but directed towards the solution of economic and social problems. The USSR attaches great importance to the preservation of peace in South Asia, whose security is closely linked with its own security.

In the early 1960s the Soviet Union helped to end the armed conflict between China and India. Established during the years of British colonial rule, their mutual frontier had never been demarcated and the dispute between them was over the possession of an area of 125,000 square kilometres. However, in keeping with the principles of peaceful coexistence, both India and China avoided complications.

But the situation changed with the appearance of Great-Power tendencies in China's policies. Frontier clashes broke out.

In the autumn of 1959, when the first shots were fired on the frontier, the Soviet Union informed China through diplomatic channels that it was hoping to help achieve a peaceful settlement in order to prevent reactionary forces from taking advantage of the conflict. A TASS Statement of September 10, 1959 deeply regretted the collision and expressed the hope that China and India would not let the

* 24th Congress of the CPSU, p. 35.

elements interested in aggravating the international situation benefit by the frontier incidents and that they would settle the misunderstanding to their mutual satisfaction.

However, the exchanges of opinion that were soon started between Delhi and Peking proved to be abortive. In October 1962, when the Caribbean crisis was at its height, Chinese troops intruded 100 kilometres past the frontier that at the talks China had agreed to recognise.

This invasion was a severe blow to the national liberation movement, India's progressive forces and the entire anti-imperialist struggle. There was the threat that this local clash would grow into an international conflict.

The USSR and other socialist countries took every possible step to avert a dangerous situation. On October 25 and November 5 *Pravda* urged the cessation of hostilities and the inauguration of talks. The Soviet Union denounced the manoeuvres of the imperialists and the Indian reactionaries. Taking into account the stand adopted by the Soviet Union and the failure of their calculations that India would capitulate before a "policy of strength", the Chinese leaders declared a cease-fire on November 21 and withdrew their troops. Meanwhile, the Indian Government rejected the USA's solicitations for a military alliance and reaffirmed its policy of non-alignment.

But the imperialists went on fanning tension in South Asia. To this end they used the disagreements between India and Pakistan, notably over Kashmir, which had been divided between the two countries under the armistice that had terminated the military conflict of 1947-1948.

Britain and the USA had time and again used their links with the ruling circles of Pakistan, their ally in military blocs, to wreck talks when Pakistan and India asserted their independence and the prospect of an agreement came into sight. Their neocolonialist policies incited the nationalist elements in India and Pakistan to seek a settlement of outstanding issues by military means.

In the 1960s the Maoist leaders of China began to exploit the disagreements between India and Pakistan in an effort to achieve their Great-Power aims. They expanded their contacts with Pakistan and encouraged her leaders to take a "tough line" towards India, believing that that would make the latter country yield to Peking in the frontier dispute.

In August 1965, after several weeks of mounting tension, clashes which grew into hostilities involving tanks and aircraft broke out on the frontier between India and West Pakistan. On the pretext of helping to achieve a peaceful settlement, the imperialist diktat that Britain and the USA sought to impose only worsened the situation. For their part, the Peking leaders aggravated the conflict by massing troops on the Indian frontier and presenting India with an ultimatum regarding one of the frontier sectors.

The Soviet Government urged the cessation of hostilities, whose spread was only benefiting imperialism and reaction. It warned that a grave responsibility was being assumed by those who were inciting the spread of the conflict. As a result of the Security Council's Soviet-backed efforts, hostilities ceased on September 22.

The situation, however, remained tense. Both sides delayed the withdrawal of their forces. By urging them to link the further settlement with a solution of the Kashmir problem Britain and the USA were, in fact, provoking a resumption of hostilities.

The crisis was ended by a meeting held on Soviet initiative between the Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and the Pakistani President Mohammad Ayub Khan. The meeting took place in Tashkent on January 4-10, 1966 with the participation of A. N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. The talks made successful headway through the good offices of the Soviet Government. The Tashkent Declaration was signed on January 10. It stated that the sides would withdraw their troops to the positions they had occupied before the conflict broke out, that the two countries would not have recourse to armed force and that they would settle their disputes peacefully. The Soviet Union's constructive role in organising the talks was noted with gratitude by the leaders of the two governments.

But the settlement was not all-embracing. Indian-Pakistani relations deteriorated sharply again in 1971. At the close of the 1960s the democratic forces of East Pakistan had started a massive struggle for political and social reforms in the interests of the people. Brutally exploited by the landowners and the big bourgeoisie of the western part of the country, the 75-million Bengali population was demanding autonomy and elementary civil rights. The military

government, which in 1969 was headed by General Yahya Khan, found it had to lift its ban on political parties and set a date for elections to the National Assembly. The task before the National Assembly was to form a civilian government and adopt a new Constitution. At these elections, held in December 1970, the Awami League led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman emerged victorious in East Pakistan. It won almost all the seats in the provincial legislative assembly and 167 of the 313 seats in the National Assembly.

After the elections talks commenced between Yahya Khan and the Awami League leaders on the future state organisation under which autonomy would be enjoyed by East Pakistan. While these talks were proceeding the Government transferred troops from the Western regions. On March 25, 1971 it perfidiously broke off the talks and Mujibur Rahman and other Awami League leaders were thrown into prison. Savage repressions were started. Hundreds of thousands of Bengalis were massacred and millions had to flee for their lives to India. By the close of the year there were 10 million refugees.

With every justification the Indian Government insisted that in East Pakistan the conditions should be created to enable the refugees to return to their homes. But the Yahya Khan Government continued its reign of terror against the Bengali population, who were fighting for their rights, accused India of interfering in Pakistan's internal affairs and stepped up military preparations against her. The threat of another war became very real in the Hindustan subcontinent.

On April 2, when the crisis was only starting, Nikolai Podgorny, the President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, sent a message to the Pakistani President urging him to halt the repressions and look for a political settlement. But the Pakistani authorities ignored this message. On December 3, 1971 Pakistani aircraft bombed a number of Indian towns and war broke out. Indian troops went to the assistance of the East Pakistan population, who proclaimed their country the sovereign state of Bangladesh. The USA declared its neutrality but, in effect, sided with the Pakistani military against India and the liberation forces of Bangladesh. Units of the US 7th Fleet led by the aircraft carrier *Enterprise* sailed into the Bay of Bengal in a "show of force". In the Security Council, on the pretext of achiev-

ing a cease-fire, the USA sought to help crush the Bengali patriots and hinder the settlement of the refugee problem with the result that the situation was further aggravated. The Chinese leaders supported this attitude in furtherance of their own chauvinistic, anti-Soviet aims, levelling slander at the Soviet Union and India.

The Soviet Union strongly opposed the attempts to force a settlement that would ignore the rights of the people of Bangladesh. It pressed for an immediate termination of the military conflict and, simultaneously, for a political settlement in Bangladesh. These were the aims of the resolutions proposed by the Soviet representatives in the United Nations.

On December 16, after the surrender of the Pakistani garrisons in Bangladesh and the victory of the forces of liberation, the Government of India unilaterally adopted a decision to halt hostilities on all fronts. The Indian Government declared that India had no territorial claims and would withdraw all her troops from Bangladesh. On December 17, showing understanding of the realities, the Pakistani Government likewise agreed to order a cease-fire on all fronts. Welcoming these steps, the Soviet Government declared that the end of the war "meets with the vital interests of the peoples" of the Hindustan subcontinent, "creates the conditions for their national development and progress and removes a flashpoint of serious tension in the world".*

Following the termination of hostilities Yahya Khan and other military leaders of Pakistan had to resign from office. The new Government released Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who became the Prime Minister of Bangladesh. All the refugees returned from India, and the Indian troops were withdrawn from Bangladesh. These developments showed how effective were the efforts of the USSR and other peace-loving countries to restore peace and uphold the legitimate rights of all the peoples of the Hindustan subcontinent. More, they spelled out the failure of the plans of the US imperialists and the Maoist leaders, who had tried to fan the war in the subcontinent.

The Republic of Bangladesh was formed as a result of the successful liberation struggle of the people of East Ben-

* *Pravda*, December 18, 1971.

gal. The new state received powerful international support. The Soviet Union was one of the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with it. In March 1972 Sheikh Mujibur Rahman visited Moscow, where agreement was reached on the development of friendly relations. The USSR agreed to help the new republic build a power station and radio broadcasting centres, explore its oil and gas resources, and restore and enlarge its fishing industry and also its merchant marine and other means of transport. An agreement was signed on economic and technical co-operation. The USSR and Bangladesh were in accord in expressing the view that the situation in the Hindustan subcontinent had to be speedily settled with account of the legitimate interests of its peoples.

In his report on the 50th anniversary of the USSR, Leonid Brezhnev noted: "The friendship between the Soviet Union and India, one of the biggest peace-loving countries on our planet, is exercising a strong positive influence on the international situation as a whole. By now, the Soviet Union and India have gained considerable experience of fruitful co-operation. Now that our relations are based on the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation we feel that they will become closer still. This is borne out by the consolidation of the progressive, anti-imperialist forces in India. It is also borne out by the policy of the Indian Government headed by Indira Gandhi."^{*}

The official friendly visit to Delhi by the CPSU Central Committee's General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev on November 26-30, 1973 was a very important milestone in the consolidation of the relations between the Soviet Union and India. The distinguished visitor received an enthusiastic welcome from the people in the Indian capital. The festively decorated streets featured the flags of the two countries and placards acclaiming Soviet-Indian friendship.

Leonid Brezhnev had talks with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and other leaders of the Indian Government and the Indian National Congress. He addressed rallies and the Indian Parliament and had meetings with members of the Indo-Soviet Cultural Society and the leaders of the Com-

munist Party of India. The visit culminated in the signing of important documents.

The Soviet-Indian Declaration stated that there was a broad coincidence of views on international issues and profound satisfaction was expressed over the progress of friendly relations in all areas. The Indian Prime Minister spoke highly of the Soviet foreign policy actions aimed at strengthening international peace, while the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee highly appraised India's peaceful policy of non-alignment. The Soviet and Indian leaders welcomed the detente in Europe and the favourable changes in the situation in Asia. They reaffirmed that they "attach special significance to the broad development of mutually beneficial co-operation and the strengthening of peace and stability in Asia based on the concerted efforts of all the countries of that largest and most densely populated region of the world" and expressed their determination "consistently to pursue a policy of consolidating and promoting the friendship and co-operation between the two countries".^{*}

The 15-year agreement on the further development of economic co-operation and trade between the USSR and India provides, in particular, for the enlargement of the iron and steel plants at Bhilai and Bokaro to an annual capacity of 7 and 10 million tons of steel respectively, the building of a new oil refinery, a copper concentrating complex, and a subway in Calcutta. The agreement on co-operation between the State Planning Commission of the USSR and the Planning Commission of India envisages the formation of a mixed research group with the purpose of exchanging know-how in long-term and annual planning.

The Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Council of Ministers of the USSR considered the results of the visit and "unconditionally approved the work conducted by Leonid Brezhnev in promoting friendly relations between the Soviet Union and India", noting the special significance of the Joint Declaration as a document which "enlarges upon the basic principles of relations between the USSR and In-

^{*} L. I. Brezhnev, *The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, pp. 48-49.

^{*} *Visit by Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev to India*, Moscow, 1973, pp. 99, 102 (in Russian).

dia and defines the main orientation of co-operation between the two countries".*

The Soviet Union wants good relations with Pakistan, as well, a country with which it has no conflicts or contradictions. President Ali Zulfikar Bhutto's visit in Moscow in March 1972 showed that the conditions obtained for good-neighbourly relations. It was agreed to prolong the operation of the agreement on economic and technological co-operation and that the Soviet Union would continue to help in geological surveys and in the building of an iron and steel works at Karachi and of other projects.

The USSR consistently champions lasting peace and good-neighbourly relations between India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Such relations, the Soviet Government believes, would be a large contribution to the normalisation of the political climate throughout Asia.

3. Soviet Co-operation With Middle Eastern States

The Middle East adjoins the Soviet frontier. The imperialists persist in their attempts to use this region and its resources for purposes hostile to the USSR and the entire socialist community. The relations with the countries of this area are therefore of utmost significance to the Soviet Union.

Strictly in keeping with its Leninist foreign policy the USSR blunts imperialism's attempts to weaken and destroy the national liberation movement in the Middle East. Its consistent struggle in defence of peace and the sovereignty of all the countries of that area has led to firm friendship and close co-operation with these countries.

The USSR's Relations With Afghanistan, Turkey and Iran

The Soviet Union has always stood for good relations with its southern neighbours, with whom it has a land frontier of over 5,000 kilometres.

In a message to the Emir of Afghanistan soon after the

* Visit by Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev to India, p. 123.

Soviet Government was formed Lenin stressed that "there are no issues that could evoke disagreement or cast a shadow on Russo-Afghan friendship".* Developments have borne out these words. In 1969 the USSR and Afghanistan "noted with deep satisfaction that the founder of the Soviet state V. I. Lenin and the leaders of Afghanistan's struggle for independence displayed profound political wisdom when, despite the difference in the social and political systems of the two countries, they established friendly relations".** The 1921 Treaty of Friendship and the Treaty of Neutrality and Mutual Non-Aggression, signed in 1931 and prolonged for another ten years in 1966, to this day reliably serve the interests of both countries.

After World War II the traditional friendship between these countries became a model of fruitful co-operation between a socialist and a developing state. The USSR and Afghanistan have signed over 20 agreements on economic, technical and cultural co-operation. These agreements are being successfully implemented: the completed projects include the Kushka-Herat-Kandagar motor road, the Jelalabad Canal and a large hydropower station on the Kabul River. On the basis of an agreement signed in 1965 surveys are being conducted in preparation for the comprehensive utilisation of the Ab-i-Pandj and the Amu-Darya. In 1971 the Soviet Union declared it was prepared to help Afghanistan carry out her fourth five-year economic development plan. At meetings and talks that are usually held annually the leaders of the USSR and Afghanistan stress their determination to continue strengthening friendship between their countries.

In Afghanistan the monarchy was deposed on July 17, 1973. The Government that came to power announced its intention to put into effect a series of far-reaching political, economic and social reforms and continue the country's foreign policy of non-alignment. Guided by its steadfast friendship for the Afghan people the Soviet Union immediately recognised the newly-proclaimed Republic of Afghanistan.

Characterising the Soviet Union's relations with Iran and Turkey, Leonid Brezhnev said in 1970: "In the past, as you

* V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 52, p. 318 (in Russian).

** "Joint Soviet-Afghan Communiqué", *Pravda*, May 30, 1969.

all know, there have been many complications and difficulties in these relations. But by steadfastly carrying out the behests of Lenin, who attached great importance to the establishment of friendly relations between the Soviet state and the peoples of the East, particularly neighbouring countries, we have surmounted the obstacles and, with constructive co-operation from our partners, directed the Soviet Union's relations with Iran and Turkey to the highroad of good-neighbourly accord and equal, mutually beneficial co-operation."^{*}

Financial and frontier problems were settled with Iran in 1954 on the initiative of the Soviet Government. In 1957 an agreement was signed on the transit of goods for Iran and on the joint utilisation of the water and power resources of frontier rivers. In 1959, however, with the support of the USA, Iranian reactionary circles wrecked the talks that had been started on Teheran's initiative for a new treaty of friendship and non-aggression with the USSR. This coincided with the conclusion of the Iranian-US military alliance. But, contrary to the expectations of the imperialists, there was no deterioration of the relations between the USSR and Iran.

In 1962 the Iranian Government declared it would not permit any foreign power to use Iranian territory for missile bases or for any actions hostile to the USSR. This declaration was welcomed by the Soviet Government. In 1963 reciprocal visits by the Heads of State and Government were resumed and this facilitated understanding. In January 1966 the USSR and Iran reached agreement on Soviet technical assistance in the construction of an iron and steel plant and a heavy engineering works, and also of the trans-Iranian gas pipeline. Agreements were signed on the supply of gas to the Soviet Union via this pipeline and on deliveries of machinery to Iran for the period 1970 through 1985. At the talks conducted by Nikolai Podgorny in Teheran in 1970 the sides expressed their satisfaction with the operation of the Standing Soviet-Iranian Commission for Economic Co-operation and Planning and charted the further expansion of business contacts.

On October 12, 1972 the Soviet Union and Iran signed a Treaty on the Promotion of Economic and Technical Co-

^{*} L. I. Brezhnev, *Leninskim kursom*, Vol. 3, p. 147.

operation envisaging a fuller utilisation of the two countries' potentialities for expanding mutually beneficial co-operation in the development of the metallurgical, oil, gas and chemical industries, agriculture, fishing and irrigation, and also in planning, construction and the training of specialists. The USSR and Iran underscored that they were prepared, parallel with the development of bilateral relations, to promote regional economic co-operation, trade and transit transportation with account of the interests of all countries desiring to join in such co-operation. This treaty provides a firm legal foundation for a general expansion of the traditional economic relations between the USSR and Iran and for co-operation in this sphere with all interested states. During Alexei Kosygin's visit to Iran in March 1973 an agreement was signed on co-operation in enlarging the iron and steel plant at Isfahan.

There has been a steady improvement also of Soviet-Turkish relations. In 1953 the Soviet Union informed Turkey that it had no territorial claims and proposed reaching a mutually acceptable settlement of the question of the Black Sea straits. This Soviet initiative led to an activation of contacts between the two countries. Trade expanded and agreement was reached on Soviet assistance for the construction of a glass factory.

In the 1960s the situation favoured the further expansion of Soviet-Turkish relations. Visits were exchanged for the first time after World War II by the Foreign Ministers in 1964-1965 and by the Heads of Government in 1965-1966. During these visits it was stated that the two countries would continue their efforts to promote friendly relations and trust. This policy was reaffirmed in the agreement signed in 1967 on Soviet co-operation in the building of a number of large industrial projects in Turkey. Two years later, at the Moscow talks with Turkey's President Cevdet Sunay, it was agreed to expand contacts in science, technology, art, sports and tourism.

A firm foundation for the further development of co-operation was laid by the Declaration on the Principles of Good-Neighbourly Relations signed by the USSR and Turkey on April 17, 1972 during a visit to Turkey by the President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Nikolai Podgorny. This Declaration stated that the relations between the two countries would be developed "in

conformity with the traditions of peace, friendship and good-neighbourly accord founded by V. I. Lenin and Kemal Atatürk", and recorded the principles by which the two countries would be guided in bilateral and international relations. It stressed that the two countries desired co-operation based on implicit trust.

**Friendship Between the USSR and the Arab
Countries of the Middle East.
Treaties With Egypt and Iraq**

In the 1920s the Soviet Union established contacts with the few Arab states that had won liberation at the time and gave all-out support for their struggle against the colonialists. The Treaty of Friendship signed with Yemen in 1928 became a major factor strengthening that Arab country's independence.

The Soviet Government welcomed France's decision to relinquish her mandate over Syria and Lebanon, and in 1944 the USSR was one of the first states to establish diplomatic relations with these countries. In 1945 the Soviet Union urged France and Britain to comply with the request of these countries for the withdrawal of all troops from their territory. At the Security Council discussion of the Syrian-Lebanese charge that evacuation was being held up, the Soviet representative prevented the adoption of a United States resolution that would have made it possible to drag out the troops withdrawal indefinitely. This action helped the Syrian and Lebanese peoples to deliver their countries from military occupation. Similarly, the Soviet Union upheld Egypt's rights when in 1946-1947 the United Nations considered the question of annulling the unequal treaties with Britain, on which the Egyptian Government insisted.

In 1951 the Western powers invited the Middle Eastern Arab states to join the "Middle East Command". The USSR warned the bloc's initiators of the responsibility they were assuming in hotting up tension and welcomed the attitude of the Arab states that rejected the solicitations of the imperialists. These Soviet moves were instrumental in aborting the attempts to draw the Arab states into an aggressive bloc and in clearing the way for a further upsurge of the liberation movement. In 1952 an anti-imperialist national revo-

lution in Egypt led to the formation of a Government headed by Gamal Abdel Nasser which obtained from Britain the commitment to withdraw her troops from the Suez Canal zone, of which she had been in occupation since 1882. Soon afterwards, in Syria, too, a government came to power which adopted an independent policy.

Fear of the mounting liberation struggle induced the colonialists to new efforts to draw the Arab countries into military blocs. Yielding to this pressure, Turkey and Iraq signed the Bagdad Pact in 1955. It was then joined by Britain, Pakistan and Iran. The USA co-operated closely with them but did not formally accede to the pact.

In their resistance to the organisers of the aggressive alliance the independent Arab states invariably had the support of the Soviet Union, which denounced the Bagdad bloc as an attempt to sow discord among the Arab states and reduce them to colonial bondage. In 1955-1956, in order to prevent a further aggravation of the situation and ensure the independent development of the Middle Eastern peoples, the Soviet Union put before the Western powers a number of proposals designed to safeguard peace and security on the basis of respect for the independence of the countries of that region and non-interference in their internal affairs.

In the 1950s the joint struggle against imperialist manoeuvres brought the USSR and the Arab states closer together. The Soviet-Yemeni Treaty of Friendship was renewed in 1955. Two years later the USSR and Syria signed an agreement on economic and technical co-operation. In 1958 an analogous agreement was signed with Egypt. In the same year, in response to a request from the Egyptian Government, the Soviet Union undertook to help build the Aswan High Dam on the Nile.

In Iraq, which the imperialists regarded as their principal stronghold in the Arab world, the Government of King Faisal was deposed on July 14, 1958. The new republic declared it would pursue an independent domestic and foreign policy. Iraq withdrew from the Bagdad Pact, secured the evacuation of British troops and abrogated her agreement with the USA on military and economic aid.

Sincerely desiring to help the Iraqi people, the Soviet Union signed an agreement with the Government of the Iraqi Republic on economic and technical co-operation and on credits. During the acute internal struggle that unfolded

in Iraq in the 1960s the Soviet Union unchangeably supported the efforts of the Iraqi people to achieve true independence and social progress. Time and again the USSR drew attention to the incompatibility of these aims with the fratricidal war that was kindled by reactionary nationalistic forces between the Kurds and the Arabs in 1961.

The Government formed in 1968 by the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party enforced a number of reforms in the interests of the people. In 1970 it signed an agreement with the Kurd leaders on the termination of hostilities and co-operation within the framework of a single state with recognition for the autonomy and rights of the Kurd population. Welcoming this agreement, the Soviet Government noted that it would help to strengthen national unity and carry out socio-economic reforms.

Economic co-operation between the Soviet Union and Iraq is growing more diversified. With Soviet assistance Iraq is building a farm machinery and a tractor works. Soviet co-operation is of vital significance to Iraq in the building of an oil industry, which is the prime condition for ending that country's dependence on the Western monopolies. In April 1972 the Iraqi people marked the opening of their first national oil-field built in Northern Rumaila with Soviet assistance.

At the Government and Party-and-Government talks in 1970-1972 the Soviet Union and the Iraqi Republic noted that friendly relations and broad co-operation were consonant with the interests of their peoples and with the common struggle against imperialism and neocolonialism. The Iraqi representatives expressed their deep gratitude to the Soviet Union for its extensive assistance for their country's economic development, in the training of specialists and in strengthening the Iraqi Republic's defence capability.

In 1962, with the support of the population, patriotic Army officers overthrew the monarchy in Yemen. The USSR extended recognition to the new republic and helped it to repulse the intrusions of the imperialists and their agents. On Soviet initiative the United Nations condemned the bombing of the new republic's territory by British aircraft. Soviet-Yemeni relations were furthered in 1964 with the signing of a new Treaty of Friendship and an agreement on an enlargement of economic and technical assistance. When the Yemeni Prime Minister visited Moscow in 1971 the sides noted with

satisfaction that the traditional friendship between the two countries was growing stronger and mapped out measures for promoting close co-operation.

After a long struggle the people of South Arabia shook off British rule in 1967. Headed by the National Front, the new People's Democratic Republic of South Yemen that emerged in place of the former colony adopted a militant anti-imperialist policy and launched far-reaching social reforms. Warm, friendly relations have been established between the Soviet Union and the new republic. Agreements on trade, economic, scientific and cultural co-operation were signed in 1969 and 1971. At the talks with Party-and-Government and Government delegations from the republic in 1972 and 1973 note was taken of the successful development of relations between the USSR and South Yemen, new measures were charted to expand political, economic and cultural contacts, and the question of strengthening the republic's defence capability was considered.

The USSR consistently promotes its relations with Egypt and Syria,* whose peoples are putting deep-going social reforms into effect.

In the United Arab Republic, as Egypt was called until October 1971, the Nasser Government started an assault on the exploiting classes in the early 1960s. In Syria this assault was started in 1966 when the Left wing of the Baath Party formed a Government. Subsequently, the social reforms were extended.

In 1968 President Nasser proclaimed the Programme of March 30 for the country's development in the interests of the working people. Much attention was given to strengthening the Arab Socialist Union, which was enforcing progressive changes in Egypt. In Syria steps were taken to complete the agrarian reform, enlarge the public sector in industry and improve the condition of the people.

In their efforts to reshape life on progressive lines the peoples of these countries invariably had every possible assistance from the USSR. With Soviet co-operation Syria began the construction of a dam and a large power station on the Euphrates to bring life to many desert regions. The Soviet Union is helping Syria build the Latakia-Kamishli

* In 1958-1961 these two countries comprised the United Arab Republic.

Railway, an oil industry and other vital projects. Under an agreement reached in 1969 meetings and consultations are held regularly between the CPSU and the Baath Party with the purpose of achieving closer unity between the Soviet and Syrian peoples. At the talks in July 1972, when a Syrian Party-and-Government delegation led by President Hafez Assad visited the Soviet Union, note was made of the immense significance of the progress that had been achieved in strengthening democracy in Syria through the formation of the People's Council, the implementation of a system of local self-administration and the creation of the Progressive National Front consisting of the Baath Party, the Communist Party, the Arab Socialist Union and other parties. It was placed on record that on most of the pressing world problems the stand of the two countries coincided or was similar and that they would consult each other on major international issues and on questions concerning their bilateral relations.

In Egypt the Aswan High Dam with its irrigation system, that increased the country's crop area by 30 per cent, and the 2,100,000 kw hydropower station generating electricity for industry and agriculture, were placed in operation in 1971. In the Soviet-Egyptian Declaration on the completion of the project it was stated that the "Aswan hydropower scheme will stand as a lasting symbol of unbreakable Soviet-Arab friendship". The Soviet Union is helping to enlarge the capacity of the metallurgical centre in Helwan to 1,500,000 tons of steel, and to build engineering and radio-engineering factories, and two oil refineries with a capacity of 1,000,000 tons each. Of the 100 industrial and other projects for which Soviet assistance has been pledged, nearly 80 have been completed. Characterising the significance of Soviet assistance to progressive Arab states, the head of the delegation of Syria's governing party said at the 24th Congress of the CPSU that the Soviet Union was helping "to build the material and economic foundation of a new society" and "to effectuate socialist changes".

The treaties signed by the USSR with Egypt and Iraq marked a new step in the development of Soviet-Arab relations. In the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation signed with Egypt on May 27, 1971 in Cairo it is stated that the USSR, as a socialist state, and Egypt, which has set itself the aim of restructuring society along socialist lines, would

"co-operate closely and in all fields in ensuring conditions for preserving and further developing the social and economic gains of their peoples".

In the event peace was threatened or violated the USSR and Egypt "will contact each other without delay in order to agree their positions with a view to removing the threat that has arisen or re-establishing peace". To enhance Egypt's defence capability provision was made for continued military co-operation, particularly Soviet assistance in training to handle the armaments supplied to Egypt. The two countries declared that they would not enter into alliances or take part in any groupings of states, in actions or measures directed against any one of them, and that they would act in concert to secure a relaxation of world tension, the abolition of colonialism and the establishment of a just peace in the Middle East.

This Treaty provided the foundation for the long-term development of Soviet-Egyptian relations. While ensuring the effective defence of Egypt, the Treaty created favourable conditions for settling the conflict in the Middle East. It fully embodied the Leninist principle of rendering assistance to peoples upholding their independence, and the CPSU's policy, charted by the 24th Congress, of helping the liberated countries to advance along the road of social progress.

Subsequent to the signing of the Treaty there were several meetings between Soviet and Egyptian leaders. In the joint communique on the talks conducted by Alexei Kosygin and Nikolai Podgorny with the Egyptian Prime Minister Aziz Sidki in October 1972 it was stated that Soviet-Egyptian friendship was lasting, rested on the common aim of the Egyptian and Soviet peoples to achieve world peace, prosperity and social justice, and sprang from their fidelity to the principles of socialism, respect for international law, the Charter of the United Nations, the freedom of peoples and their legitimate rights to freedom and independence. During a visit to the USSR by the Egyptian War Minister in early 1973 there was a broad exchange of views on further co-operation between the Soviet and Egyptian armed forces. Egypt's War Minister expressed his country's gratitude for the Soviet Union's unwavering support and assistance for Egypt's just struggle against imperialist Israeli aggression.

A Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation was signed by the USSR and the Iraqi Republic in Bagdad on April 9, 1972. In content it is close to the treaties signed by the Soviet Union with India and Egypt. In it the two countries reaffirmed that they would continue to co-operate in all fields, including defence. This treaty, as Alexei Kosygin said at the signing ceremony, mirrors the vital interests of the Soviet and Iraqi peoples and is aimed at consolidating co-operation between socialist countries and progressive Arab states and attaining a durable and just peace in the Middle East.

On June 1, 1972 the Iraqi Government nationalised the Iraq Petroleum Company, which had for decades exploited the country's oil wealth. Iraqi public opinion supported this important step towards the consolidation of the country's independence and noted that the Soviet-Iraqi Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation was one of the factors that had made nationalisation possible. In September 1972 the Iraqi President Ahmed Hassan Bakr visited the USSR. At the talks that were held during that visit it was stated that the USSR and Iraq desired closer friendship and co-operation and that great importance attached to firmer unity and solidarity among Arab states and to broader co-operation with all friendly countries, including the socialist states, above all, the Soviet Union.

At a luncheon in honour of the Iraqi President, the President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR refuted the provocative assertions of the imperialist, Zionist and reactionary Arab circles that the Soviet Union had "special" interests in the Arab East and exposed their attempts to discredit Soviet assistance to the Arab peoples. "The only 'special' interest we have in the Arab East," Nikolai Podgorny said, "is to extend broad support to the national liberation movement in that region and help the progressive regimes repulse the manoeuvres of imperialism and Zionism. . . . This attitude is not dictated by situation considerations. It is predicated on the Soviet Union's principled foreign policy, which has been reiterated in the decisions of the 24th Congress of the CPSU."

The growing friendship between the Soviet Union and the Arab states has become a key condition for the successful struggle of the peoples against the intrigues of the imperialists and their puppets, for their sovereign rights, for a just peace in the Middle East.

Soviet Union's Defence of the Republic of Cyprus

Cyprus, an important strategic Mediterranean island inhabited by Greeks (80 per cent) and Turks (20 per cent), was ruled for many years by the British colonialists. The liberation struggle of the Cypriots had always had the support of the Soviet Union. At the discussions of the Cyprus question in the United Nations the Soviet representatives defeated the attempts to preserve colonial control under the guise of "constitutional reforms". In 1960 Britain had to recognise the independence of Cyprus. But onerous terms were imposed on the new republic. British military bases remained on the island and, moreover, Britain, Greece and Turkey became the "guarantors" of the Cypriot Constitution, thus opening wide possibilities for interference in the republic's internal affairs.

Nonetheless, the new republic, whose Government was headed by Archbishop Makarios, refused to join aggressive blocs and adopted a policy of non-alignment. In retaliation, the "guarantor" countries provoked clashes between the Turkish and Greek communities, brought troops into many regions on the pretext of safeguarding law and order and, with US backing, attempted to station NATO forces on the island.

The Soviet Union at once came out in defence of the Cypriot people, declaring that they alone could decide their internal affairs, and called upon the NATO countries to respect Cyprus' independence. In a Statement of August 16, 1964 the Soviet Government warned that "if matters reached the stage of an invasion of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus the Soviet Union would not remain indifferent". Relying on the support of the socialist countries the Cypriot Government annulled the 1960 treaty on "guarantees" and refused to allow NATO forces to be stationed permanently in Cyprus. However, it agreed to the temporary posting of UN troops for the maintenance of order on the island.

But the imperialists continued their pressure. After a military junta seized power in Athens in 1967 new clashes were provoked between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The USA immediately advanced the "enosis plan", i.e., the abolition of the republic through the island's accession to Greece. The USSR denounced this further attempt to turn Cyprus

into a NATO base and insisted on the implementation of the Security Council decisions for a peaceful settlement of the dispute between the national groups on the island.

These Soviet moves again compelled the enemies of Cyprus' independence to retreat and helped to improve the situation in that country. Direct talks between the Greek and Turkish communities were started in 1968. Both sides were eager to look for an agreement that would preserve the republic's independence and sovereignty, but many difficulties arose over specific issues. The imperialist forces utilised these difficulties to renew their attempts to settle the Cyprus problem in a manner favourable to themselves. Subversion mounted, especially with the activation of NATO military operations in the Eastern Mediterranean. At its sessions in 1970-1971 the NATO Council approved a plan for overthrowing the independent Cypriot Government, occupying Cyprus and turning it into a NATO springboard.

Terrorist groups directed from overseas and aiming at the removal of the Makarios Government again went into action. Encouraged by the USA, the Athens authorities presented an ultimatum in 1972 demanding that Cyprus abandon her independent policies and submit to NATO dictation.

The Makarios Government rejected this blackmail. In its resistance to imperialist interference it continued to have the support of all peace-loving states, above all of the Soviet Union. In 1970 the USSR again warned that those who were planning to destroy the sovereign Cypriot state and overthrow its lawful Government would bear a grave responsibility for the consequences of their actions.

In the talks with President Makarios, who visited Moscow in 1971, Soviet Government leaders expressed complete understanding for the Republic of Cyprus' policy of non-alignment with political and military blocs and of strengthening its independence as conforming to the task of maintaining peace and security in the Eastern Mediterranean and throughout the world. The sides called on all countries to respect the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. The Soviet Government reaffirmed that it was categorically opposed to any intervention, interference, use of force or the threat of force against Cyprus. It wished the successful consummation of the negotiations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

Friendly Soviet support remains a vital condition of the young republic's successful struggle against the intrusions of the imperialist powers.

4. The Soviet Union and the African Countries

Together with its islands Africa has a territory of 30,100,000 square kilometres and a population of roughly 350 millions. The continent is extremely rich in minerals, producing 99 per cent of the capitalist world's diamonds, 56 per cent of its gold and a large share of its oil, copper and uranium ore. The African countries grow staple crops. But for a long time this wealth did not belong and much of it still does not belong to the African peoples.

In the 19th century Africa was carved up by the imperialist powers. On the eve of World War I they were in possession of 96 per cent of its territory.

Russia did not take part in the slave trade or in the seizure of African lands. Russian democratic opinion sympathised with the struggle for independence and condemned the subjugation of the African peoples.

Sparked by the October Revolution in Russia, the liberation struggle gained momentum and laid the beginning for the abolition of colonial rule in the continent. In 1922 Britain had to recognise Egypt's independence. This stimulated the confidence of the African peoples in their own strength. Communist parties and other progressive organisations that began a struggle against the imperialists sprang up in a number of countries.

After World War II, when the world socialist community was formed and many Asian countries achieved independence, the liberation movement grew into an anti-imperialist revolution that spread throughout Africa. At all stages of their struggle for independence the African peoples enjoyed the support of the Soviet Union.

Soviet Assistance to the Freedom Struggle of the African Peoples

When the destiny of the former Italian colonies was considered after World War II, the Soviet Union insisted that they should be given the possibility of developing

independently. This attitude was of decisive significance also in exposing the attempts of the imperialists to use the UN for a repartition of these territories among the colonial powers.

Soviet diplomacy was instrumental in helping to resolve the question of granting Libya independence in 1951 and in strictly limiting the duration of the trusteeship over the former Italian colony of Somali. This expedited the recognition of that country's independence.

In all the UN agencies the Soviet representatives exposed imperialism's predatory policies in Africa and demanded the implementation of the UN Charter's provisions on the legitimate rights and self-determination of peoples. At the 1st General Assembly they sharply criticised the projects submitted by Britain, France and Belgium for turning Tanganyika, Togo, Cameroon and Ruanda-Urundi into trust territories, where the trustee country would exercise complete control. In full conformity with the UN Charter the USSR insisted on the enforcement of progressive reforms and on the naming of the exact dates on which independence would be proclaimed. When, against the will of the African population, Britain suggested uniting the mandated territory of Tanganyika with her colonies the Soviet Union condemned this manoeuvre and with the support of the developing states blocked its realisation.

In 1957 the USSR proposed that all trust territories should be granted immediate independence. To a large extent this action predetermined the failure of the attempts to use the system of UN trusteeship to maintain colonial rule. All the trust territories in Africa acquired independence in 1960-1962.

At discussions of information on non-self-governing African territories in the United Nations the Soviet representatives cited irrefutable evidence on the predatory policies of the colonial powers and brought to light the imperialist character of the measures taken by the colonial authorities in education and public health. At the 10th General Assembly the Soviet delegate produced facts to show that there was racial discrimination in British East and Central Africa. Despite the objections of the colonial powers, the USSR insisted that African representatives should be invited to the sittings of the UN committees which examined questions related to the non-self-governing territories.

At the General Assembly sessions in 1952-1955 the Soviet Union insisted on the satisfaction of the national aspirations of the peoples of Tunisia and Morocco. This helped these two countries to win independence in 1956. Not wishing to infringe on Morocco's sovereign rights, the Soviet Union never invoked its right to take part in the administration of the international zone of Tangier, which had been wrested from that country. Its moves in support of the demand for the return of Tangier to Morocco contributed to a positive settlement of that issue.

Soviet assistance played an enormous role in the Algerian people's victory in the war of liberation that they started in 1954 under the leadership of the National Liberation Front. Despite the NLF's repeated offers at negotiation, the French Government protracted the war in an effort to save the colonial regime. When the French Prime Minister visited Moscow in 1956 the Soviet Government expressed the wish that in the settlement in Algeria the legitimate rights of the people would be taken into account. At the 11th through 13th sessions of the General Assembly the USSR supported the recommendations that France and Algeria should sit down to negotiations with a view to reaching a peaceful, democratic settlement of the issue.

The Soviet people welcomed the proclamation of the Algerian Republic by the National Liberation Front. In 1960 the USSR accorded *de facto* recognition to the Algerian Government. Soviet political support and multiform assistance strengthened the international position of independent Algeria and enabled her to counter the colonialists. More, the Soviet stand contributed to the intensification of the actions taken by the working class and all other progressive forces of France to end the war and induced the French ruling circles to adopt a more realistic approach to the problem. In 1961 the de Gaulle Government put the Algerian problem to a referendum. Algerian self-determination was approved by 15 million votes against only 6 million. The talks that were started led to a cease-fire and to recognition of the Algerian people's independence. The sovereign People's Democratic Republic of Algeria was proclaimed in 1962.

The USSR consistently supported the liberation struggle of other African peoples as well. Its principled attitude substantially facilitated the victory of the African revolu-

tion, which swiftly swept away the colonial empires in a huge territory. Seventeen states appeared on that territory in 1960, which is known as Africa Year. Another 17 countries achieved independence in 1961-1968. At the beginning of 1973 there were 42 independent states in Africa. The colonial possessions of the imperialists now consist of individual but extremely dangerous bridgeheads. The territory of these possessions has dwindled to 3,200,000 square kilometres (about 10 per cent of the continent) and the population to 19 millions. The struggle of the African peoples for political independence has entered its concluding phase.

The USSR Establishes Diplomatic Relations With African States

The Soviet Union has always been ready to promote friendly relations with African countries. But for many years the colonialist powers prevented the establishment of these relations, even with the few countries that enjoyed sovereignty.

The absence of formal relations did not prevent the Soviet Union from championing Ethiopia when in 1935 she was invaded by fascist Italy. The USSR Government denounced the aggression and urged that no efforts and means should be spared to end the conflict that was menacing the territorial integrity and independence of a member of the League of Nations. The USSR took part in the sanctions recommended by the League of Nations against the aggressor and recommended the imposition of an oil sanction although this hit its own economic interests. In the situation obtaining in those years it did not prove to be possible to block the seizure of Ethiopia. However, the efforts of the USSR made it difficult for the imperialists to come together and created the conditions for a successful struggle by the Ethiopian people for the restoration of their country's independence. The establishment of diplomatic relations with the USSR in 1943 helped Ethiopia to secure the satisfaction of her legitimate demands at the signing of the peace treaty with Italy. Welcoming the formation of each new state as an important event in the final liberation of the whole African continent from colonial tyranny, the Soviet Union expressed its readi-

ness to establish diplomatic relations and promote fruitful co-operation.

There was an immediate response to this from the governments of many liberated countries. Some, yielding to pressure from the former metropolitan states and from the local reactionaries, declined to establish diplomatic relations. But regardless of formal contacts, the Soviet Union defended the new states against imperialist manoeuvres, promoted trade with them and countered the attempts of international reaction to hinder their rapprochement with socialist countries. This active foreign policy disrupted the efforts of the colonialist powers to isolate the African states from the socialist community.

In 1955 through 1973 the Soviet Union established diplomatic relations with 37 countries. Today only a few African countries have no official relations with the USSR.

Relations of sincere friendship have taken shape between the USSR and the socialist-oriented countries that are carrying out democratic reforms: Egypt, Algeria, Guinea, Congo (Brazzaville), Tanzania and Somalia. Understanding and co-operation underlie the Soviet Union's relations with Zambia, Morocco, Nigeria and other countries that are upholding their independence and pursuing an anti-imperialist policy.

Since 1958, when the first African leaders visited Moscow, the Soviet Government has received statesmen from 35 African countries. In their turn, Soviet leaders have visited six countries, and Government delegations have visited most of the African states that have diplomatic relations with the USSR. Each day brings new evidence of the immense significance of Soviet co-operation for the struggle of the African states against colonialism, racism and imperialist aggression, for the consolidation of independence and durable peace in the continent.

For Africa's Total Decolonisation

The colonies and racist regimes still in existence in Africa are a serious threat to the independence of the African peoples. With the support of some imperialist powers the rulers of the Republic of South Africa and Rhodesia looted and oppressed the population and turned their possessions into

springboards of military aggression against the liberated countries.

The African peoples regard the destruction of the preserves of colonialism as a matter of paramount importance. At their first meeting in 1958 the leaders of the independent African states demanded the continent's total decolonisation. In 1966 the sovereign governments set up a Committee for Liberation to render material, including military, assistance to patriots fighting for independence. The USSR is a reliable ally of the fighters for Africa's liberation. It regards all-out assistance to them as its internationalist duty.

The peoples of the Portuguese colonies fought valiantly for their rights and freedom, and achieved major results by 1973 in their armed struggle against the colonialists. In Guinea they controlled two-thirds of the territory, and in Angola approximately one-fourth of the territory and conducted operations in the other regions. In Mozambique the fighters for independence liberated two northern provinces (one-fifth of the country) and were advancing in the other seven provinces.

As early as 1961 the Soviet Government had declared in a special Statement that it was the duty of all countries and peoples to compel Portugal to end her piratical colonial war in Angola and grant independence to that country. The USSR, the Statement said, would not remain indifferent to Angola's destiny. Through the efforts of the Soviet Union the General Assembly passed a resolution calling on all states to give the peoples of the Portuguese colonies "the moral and material support necessary for the restoration of their inalienable rights" and to impose sanctions on Portugal by breaking off diplomatic relations, closing ports and aerodromes to her ships and aircraft, and cutting off trade. As a result, the legality of the armed struggle of the peoples of Guinea-Bissau, Angola and Mozambique received recognition and the legal foundations were created for rendering them broad assistance.

Expressing the feeling of all Soviet people, the delegates at the 24th Congress of the CPSU warmly welcomed the envoys of the organisations heading the liberation struggle of African peoples. Amilcar Cabral,* General Secretary of the African Party of Independence of Guinea and the Cape

* He was assassinated by the colonialists in 1973.

Verde Islands, said at the Congress: "We shall not be belittling the significance of African solidarity and the solidarity of other anti-colonial forces if we frankly say that we get the largest assistance for our struggle from the Soviet Union."

With similar consistence the USSR co-operates with the African peoples and countries in their struggle against racist regimes. As early as 1946 the USSR supported India's motion that the General Assembly should consider the question of racial discrimination in the Union of South Africa (from 1961—the Republic of South Africa).

The Soviet Union's principled stand was instrumental in procuring the condemnation of racist policies, which were incompatible with the UN Charter. In 1961 the General Assembly approved an Afro-Asian resolution, with amendments introduced by the USSR, on sanctions against the Republic of South Africa. In response to a Security Council appeal for economic pressure and a halt to the sale of armaments, most of the African states ruptured their diplomatic and trade links with the Republic of South Africa. The decision on sanctions was faithfully carried out by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. But the imperialist powers, notably the USA and Britain, subscribed to the UN decisions only verbally. In practice they continue to finance, supply and arm the racists. In 1971, in violation of the UN resolution, Britain's Conservative Government officially announced that it was resuming the sale of warplanes and naval vessels to the Republic of South Africa.

The Soviet Union is making a large contribution to the struggle against the racists' seizure of Southwest Africa, which after World War I had been turned over to the Union of South Africa as a mandated territory. At the General Assembly in 1961 the Soviet delegation voted for the resolution proclaiming the inalienable right of the people of Southwest Africa to independence and national sovereignty, and four years later for the resolution condemning the annexation of Southwest Africa as a crime against humanity and an action threatening peace and security. In 1967 the Soviet Union and the independent African states rejected as illegal the refusal of the International Court of Justice to recognise the invalidity of the RSA mandate over Southwest Africa. At the special General Assembly session convened to consider the situation, the Soviet delegation urged

the granting of state independence to Namibia, as the people of Southwest Africa call their country. The session passed a decision recommending the annulment of the RSA administration and the subsequent proclamation of Namibia's independence. In 1971 the Security Council condemned the Republic of South Africa for failing to carry out that recommendation and demanded that it discontinue its administration of Namibia.

Enjoying international support the people of Namibia, headed by the People's Organisation of Southwest Africa, began an armed struggle against colonial rule in 1968.

Steadfastly championing the rights of oppressed peoples, the Soviet Union urges the abolition of the racist regime in Rhodesia. In 1965 that British colony's white plantation owners and capitalists, who are closely associated with monopoly circles in Britain and the Republic of South Africa, proclaimed their "independence" and set up a reactionary government with Ian Smith as Prime Minister. This step was taken not without the consent of the British Government which, however, made out that it had been put before a *fait accompli*.

The USSR denounced this colonialist manoeuvre as a crime against the peoples of Africa, as an attempt to perpetuate the dominion of the 5 per cent white population over the five-million-strong people of Zimbabwe. It declared that it would not recognise a regime that had usurped power in Rhodesia. On the insistence of socialist and developing states the UN declared that the Smith regime was illegal and recommended that Britain should restore the rights of the indigenous population of Rhodesia, by force if necessary. In 1967 the General Assembly called on all countries to accord material and moral support to the liberation movement of the people of Zimbabwe. Britain's Labour Government had to refrain from recognising the Smith regime and even go so far as to declare that it would enforce economic sanctions against Rhodesia. Actually, it confined itself to measures that created no difficulties for the Rhodesian racists. In 1971 the British Conservative Government signed an agreement legalising the usurpation of power in Rhodesia. The USA, too, pursued the tactic of formally condemning but in fact supporting the racist regime.

Soviet Co-operation With African States in Repulsing Imperialist Aggression

The developing African states are waging a bitter struggle against military pressure and armed aggression by the imperialist powers. Here, too, support from the socialist community, notably from the Soviet Union, is enabling them to stand up against their powerful adversaries.

Soviet action in defence of the integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Congo (Kinshasa), which in 1971 became the Republic of Zaïre, prevented the imperialists from carrying out their plan of seizing control of that large African country. In June 1960 Belgium had to recognise the Congo's independence. The national Government, headed by Patrice Lumumba, demanded the evacuation of Belgian troops and declared that it would pursue an independent policy. It established diplomatic relations with the USSR and other socialist countries.

In reply to this the colonialists organised a conspiracy inspired by the Belgian monopolies, which had close connections with US, British and French monopolies. On the specious pretext of protecting the lives and property of Europeans Belgian troops occupied Leopoldville and other towns. Simultaneously, the Belgian puppet Moïse Tshombe proclaimed the "independence" of Katanga Province, where the Union Minière du Haut-Katanga had its main enterprises.

On July 13, 1960 the Soviet Government warned the inspirers of the aggression that they were assuming a grave responsibility. On July 14 the Security Council, to which the Republic of Congo had appealed, ruled that Belgium should withdraw her forces and that the Lumumba Government should be given military assistance. For this purpose UN troops were dispatched to the republic. Taking the wishes of the Congolese Government into account, the USSR voted for the Security Council resolution. The Soviet Union showed understanding for the new republic's appeal for transport means, including aircraft, for the troops dispatched to the Congo in accordance with the Security Council decision. The Soviet Ambassador informed Patrice Lumumba that the USSR was prepared to help the republic restore its economy, which had been dislocated by the Belgian colonialists, and give it immediate assistance in building up a national army and strengthening its defence potential.

Under the Security Council resolution the UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld had to consult with the lawful Government and take steps to expel the interventionists and reunite the country. However, he acted in the interests of the imperialists. The UN Command prevented the Lumumba Government from using the radio stations, airfields and transport means and disarmed loyal troops. In contravention of the UN Charter Hammarskjöld obstructed even non-military aid to the Congo from socialist and neutralist states, while the NATO countries freely supplied arms to the interventionists and Tshombe.

The Soviet Government insisted that the UN forces carry out the decision of the Security Council. But the Western diplomats, in the Security Council turned down the Soviet proposals.

In the meantime, the imperialists installed a puppet government in Leopoldville. Insurgents armed on American money took the Prime Minister Lumumba into custody and then turned him over to the Katanga regime. In February 1961 he was brutally murdered.

The exposure of Lumumba's murderers and the Soviet Union's demand that interference cease forthwith wrecked the plans of the imperialists. The 15th Assembly (April 1961) approved a resolution calling for the preservation of the republic's unity. Fearing that their policies would be completely discredited, the Western powers had to agree to the formation of a central government, the entry of the UN forces into Katanga Province and the disbandment of the Tshombe gangs. Here a certain role was played by the rivalry between the USA, which oriented itself on pro-Western elements in the capital, and Britain and Belgium, which relied on the Katanga secessionists. Soon, however, the imperialists engineered the expulsion of the Lumumba adherents from the central Government. They continued to use the UN forces to strengthen their positions.

The Soviet Government condemned these neocolonialist manoeuvres, which were being effected under the UN flag. In a letter of March 2, 1963 to the Secretary-General U Thant the Soviet representative in the UN pointed out that the retention of UN troops in the Congo could not be regarded as lawful. Under pressure from the peace forces the "UN operation" ended in 1964 with the recall of the troops dispatched to the Congo.

When intervention by the "UN Command" ended the Congolese patriots scored major successes in their armed struggle against the imperialist puppets. Finding its positions threatened, the USA came to terms with Belgium and Britain with the result that "strongman" Tshombe, faithful servant of the imperialists, was installed as Prime Minister of the central Government. Military aid began to pour in immediately from the colonialists. On November 24, 1964, US planes airlifted Belgian paratroopers to the Congo from the British island of Ascension. These forces captured Stanleyville, centre of the region liberated by the patriots, and together with the Tshombe gangs started a bloodbath. On November 25 the Soviet Government denounced the seizure of Stanleyville as a further flagrant act of armed interference, demanded the immediate cessation of the intervention and the evacuation of Belgian troops. This demand was supported by the African states. On the insistence of socialist and developing countries the Security Council likewise demanded an end to interference in Congolese affairs.

Imperialism found it had to evacuate the forces that had been dispatched to the Congo. It had failed in its endeavours to consolidate the Tshombe regime. As a result of turbulent anti-colonialist actions, this imperialist puppet was expelled from the Congo at the close of 1965.

In 1961 Tunisia demanded the restoration of her sovereign rights to the Bizerte naval base, which was still controlled by France.

At an emergency session of the General Assembly, convened on the initiative of Afro-Asian and socialist countries, the Soviet representatives laid bare the imperialist substance of the assertion that it was "legal" to maintain military bases on the territory of liberated countries. Notwithstanding the manoeuvres of the colonial powers, the General Assembly condemned the continued stationing of troops in Tunisia as an encroachment on that country's sovereignty and a threat to world peace. Pressured by world public opinion France at first withdrew her forces from seized territory and then completely evacuated Bizerte.

In 1970 the USA and Britain had to satisfy the Libyan Government's demand for the transfer to it of the military bases on its territory.

In the night of November 21, 1970 Portuguese warships landed a commando force near Conakry, capital of the Re-

public of Guinea. Its assignment was to seize Government buildings, kill the country's leaders and install in power a clique of traitors who had sold out to the imperialists. The Soviet Government qualified this criminal act as a challenge to the African states and to all peoples fighting for national independence, and a brazen contravention of the UN principles and international law. It demanded the immediate discontinuation of the intervention. Along with other peace-loving countries the USSR insisted that the Security Council approve a resolution condemning and proscribing further acts of Portuguese aggression against Guinea.

With fraternal support the Guinean people and their army crushed the invaders. At the talks in 1971 with a delegation of the CPSU, the leaders of the Democratic Party of Guinea expressed their gratitude to the CPSU and the Soviet Government for their support in repulsing aggression.

The Problem of African Unity and the Attitude of the Soviet Union

In Africa the progressive forces had coordinated their actions against imperialism as early as in the colonial period. With the achievement of sovereignty, this coordination was placed on an inter-state basis. At their conferences in 1958 through 1960 the heads of the independent African states recognised the need to act in concert in the struggle to liberate the continent, win peace and safeguard their independence. But it did not prove to be easy to achieve unity. At a conference in Casablanca in 1961 the countries with anti-imperialist governments demanded a halt to the intervention in the Congo and urged that every possible assistance, including the sending of volunteers, should be extended to the liberation struggle of the Algerian people. But soon afterwards, at a conference in Monrovia, another group of countries (whose nucleus consisted of regimes linked with the colonial powers) in effect approved the "UN operation" in the Congo, urged "non-interference" in the conflict between France and Algeria and called for a unilateral orientation towards the West.

Their expanding relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries helped the African states to surmount the threatening split. In 1963 the Heads of State and Gov-

ernment of 31 countries met in conference in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, where they adopted progressive principles for African co-operation: the abolition of colonies, support for wars of liberation, defence of peace, mutual assistance for the consolidation of independence, economic and cultural co-operation, and a peace policy of non-alignment. To attain these objectives they set up the Organisation of African Unity. When the OAU began functioning the African states found that immense possibilities were opening up before them through co-operation on an anti-imperialist basis.

The OAU helped to settle the territorial issues between Ethiopia and Somalia, between Somalia and Kenya, and between Algeria and Morocco. In 1970 the two latter countries reached full agreement on the frontier between them. The joint actions against colonialism became more purposeful. Important steps were taken towards co-operation in the building of an independent economy. However, on account of the pro-imperialist attitude of some of its members, the OAU still falls short of the principles proclaimed in the Charter of African Unity. In 1964-1965 some of its members advocated support for the Tshombe regime. Most of them failed to abide by the decision to cut off diplomatic relations with Britain in protest of her backing for the racists in Rhodesia.

The imperialists and their agents use every possible means to hinder co-operation among the African states. In pursuance of this aim the rulers of the Republic of South Africa have lately proposed a "dialogue with African countries". They believe that in return for economic and financial handouts they will be able to undermine African unity and get the new states to abandon their anti-racist policies. Some pro-Western feudal-bourgeois governments are in fact being led by the bridle by the colonialists. In contravention of the pertinent OAU decision the Malawi President H. Kamuzu Banda established diplomatic relations with the Republic of South Africa in 1968. While verbally denouncing apartheid, the bourgeois ruling elite of the Ivory Coast Republic declared that the "economic reality of the Republic of South Africa" cannot be ignored.

Under extremely complex conditions, most of the African countries, mainly those with a socialist orientation, champion co-operation on the basis of anti-imperialist principles. At its sessions in 1971 and 1972 the OAU reiterated the

need to abide by these principles. The majority of the OAU members rejected the "dialogue" proposed by the Republic of South Africa, condemned the imperialist practice of using mercenaries for provocations against the peoples of Africa and adopted decisions aimed at vitalising the struggle against colonialism and racism.

The Soviet Union shows complete understanding for African unity. Time and again it has called on the African countries not to yield to the divisive provocations of the imperialists. In 1964 its appeal to Ethiopia and Somalia had contributed towards the settlement of the frontier conflicts. It condemns imperialist interference in the affairs of the African states undertaken on the pretext of helping to settle discord between them, insists on non-intervention in the OAU's efforts to settle disputes between African countries and supports these efforts.

Moreover, the Soviet Union backs the OAU in its resistance to the imperialist policy of "Balkanising" Africa, i.e., of fragmenting the continent into tiny states. It will be recalled that during the 1967-1970 war in Nigeria, separatist elements proclaimed that country's oil-rich eastern region the state of Biafra. They had the assistance of the international oil monopolies. Relying on the imperialists, particularly on the USA, from which the rebels received their weapons, the Biafra leaders rejected the mediation of African countries for a settlement of the conflict on the basis of Nigeria's unity. When the war broke out the Soviet Union gave its support to the Nigerian Federal Government, signing with it an agreement on cultural, scientific and technical co-operation. In talks with a Nigerian delegation in 1968 Soviet representatives declared their complete understanding for the determination "to preserve the unity and territorial integrity of the Federation of Nigeria" and made it plain that the USSR was prepared to continue helping Nigeria to promote her free national development. After the separatists surrendered the Nigerian Head of State Yakubu Gowon sent a message to the Soviet Government in which he expressed gratitude for its assistance to the people of Nigeria in their struggle for national unity.

In the United Nations, too, Soviet support for the anti-colonialist policies of the African states is helping them to unite. Soviet diplomatic moves have been decisive in clearing the way for the adoption of many of the recommenda-

tions made by the OAU. In the UN Economic Commission for Africa the Soviet representatives have helped the independent African states to coordinate their efforts in economic development by speaking of the Soviet experience of economic development and exposing the neocolonialist manoeuvres of the Western powers.

In a message of greetings to the 1972 OAU Assembly the Soviet Government wrote highly of the role played by the OAU "in organising a new system of inter-African relations founded on mutual respect and equality". The message stated that the peoples of Africa could rest assured that the Soviet Union was entirely on their side and wholeheartedly supported their efforts in the struggle against imperialism and neocolonialism, for freedom, peace and social progress.

USSR Economic Relations With the African States

Economic development is a major area of the struggle of the African countries for true independence. This struggle is being waged most consistently by socialist-oriented countries. During the very first years after achieving independence Guinea had quit the franc zone, nationalised the foreign banks and instituted state control of foreign trade. An analogous policy is pursued by Algeria, the People's Republic of Congo, Somalia, Tanzania, Zambia and many other countries. Parallel with steps to restrict the foreign monopolies, measures are taken to build up national industries. In the socialist-oriented countries capitalist enterprise is curbed and considerable attention is given to enlarging the public sector.

The Soviet Union tirelessly supports the efforts of the African countries to regain possession of their natural wealth, put an end to backwardness and achieve economic and social emancipation. Mutually beneficial Soviet-African co-operation is directed towards the attainment of these goals.

In 1970 the Soviet Union had trade relations with 30 African countries. With 25 of them these relations were founded on trade agreements. In exchange for equipment and machines, which comprise nearly 60 per cent of the Soviet export, the USSR receives from the African countries all of its imported pineapples, 97 per cent of its imported

cocoa beans, nearly 70 per cent of its imported cotton and ground-nuts, and vital commodities such as iron ore, copper, bauxite and so on. Acting on the request of the African countries, the USSR has set up mixed firms in some of them (Nigeria, Ethiopia) for the sale of Soviet goods in the local markets. This benefits all the parties involved for it obviates the need for foreign middlemen.

The first agreement on economic and technical co-operation in Africa after the conclusion of the Soviet-Egyptian agreement was signed in 1959 with Ethiopia. The Soviet Union granted that country credits for research and supplied it with equipment for an oil refinery and a gold mine. That same year the Soviet Union and the Republic of Guinea agreed on co-operation in the building of a number of industrial enterprises, in the promotion of agriculture and in the building of roads. In 1960 through 1970 the USSR signed similar agreements with another 18 countries. Under these agreements the long-term credits granted by the Soviet Union amounted to over 1,500 million rubles. These credits were earmarked for the construction of 330 projects, of which nearly 150 were completed by the beginning of 1971. These included 13 power stations, 14 iron and steel plants, 15 engineering and metal-working factories, 7 chemical plants and oil refineries (with an annual capacity of 2,500,000 tons of oil), 34 light and food industry enterprises, and large agricultural projects.

Soviet assistance in the training of personnel is of especial importance to the African states, where on account of colonial rule nearly 85 per cent of the population is illiterate. As early as 1955 the Soviet Government had instituted scholarship grants for students from African trust territories. However, the trustee powers prevented young people from these countries from availing themselves of these grants. After the conquest of independence the situation changed. In 1967 there were over 5,000 students from 46 African countries at institutions of higher learning in the USSR. Soviet scientists and teachers now work in many African states, where skilled African workers and technicians are trained at enterprises being built with Soviet assistance.

At the request of the African countries the Soviet Union has agreed to help build some 80 educational institutions. Of these almost 50 are already in operation.

The USSR has agreements on cultural co-operation with a number of African states. Soviet actors have toured many regions of the African continent and reciprocal tours have been made in the Soviet Union by African actors. Contacts are expanding between Soviet and African public, scientific, sports and other organisations.

The Soviet Union's relations with African countries are steadily growing in significance as a factor helping to repulse imperialist intrigues, abolish the colonial springboards in Africa and foster the success of the struggle of the African peoples for independence, peace and social progress.

5. The Soviet Union and Latin American Countries

Faithfully abiding by the Leninist principles of its foreign policy, the Soviet Union has made considerable headway in its contacts with Latin American states. For their part, the countries of that vast region are expanding their relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist states in the knowledge that that safeguards their national sovereignty. This orientation in their policies mirrors the shifts in the entire system of international relations as a result of the growth of the forces of socialism and of the far-reaching changes that are taking place in Latin America.

Latin America: Time of Change

Latin America has entered a new phase of development ushered in by the Cuban revolution, which broke the chain of imperialist oppression in the American continent and gave a powerful impetus to the struggle of its peoples for complete national liberation.

Most of the Latin American states achieved political independence in the initial half of the 19th century, when the national liberation revolutions swept away Spanish and Portuguese colonial suzerainty. This first liberation of the Latin American peoples was won in the period of bourgeois revolutions. Since then the Central and South American states have gone through a long period of uneven capitalist development, which has left its imprint on the character and specifics of the national liberation revolutions. Alongside Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Chile and Uruguay, where indus-

try and culture have attained a high level, there are huge backward regions with strong survivals of feudalism and semi-feudalism. The pre-capitalist forms of exploitation in agriculture are one of the basic reasons for the overall backwardness of the Latin American states.

Another reason is the domination of foreign, chiefly US, capital, which has reduced the Latin American states to the status of dependent territories and turned them into sources of farm products and raw materials. The USA extracts fabulous super-profits from its uncurbed exploitation of the peoples and natural resources of Latin America. In only the period from 1946 to 1967 these profits amounted to nearly \$15,000 million.

West German, Japanese, British, French, Italian and Canadian monopolies are joining in the pillaging of Latin America's national wealth and bickering among themselves. However, international imperialism acts in a united front against the national liberation movement in Latin America.

The overlordship of the US monopolies and the local oligarchy has brought the Latin American peoples economic backwardness, an extremely low living standard, a deformed culture, reactionary dictatorships, brutal repressions against progressives, military coups and interventions.

Nonetheless, substantial changes have taken place in the socio-economic structure of the Latin American states. A purely agrarian region in the early 1950s, the continent is now becoming an agrarian-industrial area. More, national monopoly capital that is seeking a share of the profits from the exploitation of the people has emerged in Brazil, Argentina and some other countries.

The working class and the Communist parties are steadily expanding their participation in the anti-imperialist movement. A grandiose battle for "second liberation", for true national independence, democracy and social progress, is unfolding throughout the Latin American continent from the Rio Grande to Cape Horn. This battle is taking place in the epoch of the transition from capitalism to socialism that was opened by the October Revolution. The most prominent features of this liberation movement are its anti-imperialist orientation, the vanguard role played by the working class and the Communist parties, the involvement of new strata of the population—particularly the petty bourgeoisie and progressive intellectuals and students—in the struggle and

the aspiration towards unity of all the revolutionary, democratic and progressive forces.

The political map of Latin America has shed its monotony. Cuba is building socialism. Some other countries are ruled by bourgeois-democratic regimes. Still others continue to be tyrannised by reactionary military-police dictatorships. This diversity accounts for the distinctions in foreign policy.

The Cuban revolution was a shattering blow to the theory of "geographical fatalism" that for a long time had determined the policy of most of the Latin American countries. According to this theory the territorial proximity of the Latin American states to the USA doomed them to permanent dependence and to following in Washington's wake. Cuba's experience has demonstrated that a revolutionary people can shake off imperialist oppression and, with the support of the socialist community, successfully withstand intervention and economic embargoes, achieve economic and political sovereignty and pursue an independent foreign policy. Peru, Venezuela, Panama and Argentina are steering a course towards independent development.

Huge sections of public opinion insist on a new type of international policy founded on peaceful coexistence, non-interference and recognition of the right of nations to decide their own destiny and openly oppose dictation from the monopolies. Many governments can no longer ignore this demand.

An improvement of the political atmosphere in Latin America was fostered by the foreign policy of the Allende-led Government in Chile that came to power in September 1970 as a result of the election victory of the Popular Unity Front and ruled the country until September 1973. Of immense significance was Chile's restoration of trade and diplomatic relations with the Republic of Cuba, relations that the Latin American states, with the exception of Mexico, had severed in the early 1960s under pressure from the USA. Chile's example was followed by Peru. In 1972 relations with Cuba were established by Guyana, Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, four new states formed in the Western Hemisphere in the 1960s in place of former colonies.

New international relations characterised by fruitful co-operation on an anti-imperialist foundation began to take shape in Latin America with the appearance of socialist Cuba and of governments pursuing an independent policy.

The Latin American countries are more and more firmly enforcing a realistic foreign policy consonant with their national interests. This is enhancing Latin America's prestige in the world and giving it a new role in the United Nations, where for a long time the Latin American states had been unfailing yesmen of US imperialism. Today many of them are coming forward jointly with other peace-loving countries in favour of ending the arms race, banning nuclear weapons and turning the UN into an effective instrument of peace and security. At the 3rd session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, held in the Chilean capital in 1972, the representatives of many Latin American states sharply criticised the imperialist policy of pillaging developing countries.

In their attempts to slow down the revolutionary process in Central and South America the US imperialists continue to have recourse to undisguised interference in internal affairs, to threats and political pressure, to plots against "intractable" governments. These aggressive moves have their foundation in the Johnson Doctrine, which justifies armed intervention, and in the geopolitical theory of "ideological frontiers" inspired by the Pentagon following the US intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965. According to this theory, geographical frontiers are being superseded by ideological frontiers that in effect embrace the USA's entire "invisible empire". The purpose of the "ideological frontiers" doctrine is to vindicate interference in the internal affairs not only of countries regarded as "centres of communism" but also of any other country that refuses to pursue the policies required by Washington. This is plainly an attempt to isolate the Latin Americans from the socialist community and from the international working-class and national liberation movements.

In 1971 the USA helped to overthrow the Government of President Torres in Bolivia which had instituted steps to consolidate the country's independence. In Chile the US monopolies aided by the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency tried to engineer a coup to prevent the Popular Unity Front from coming to power. At the time the situation did not allow this plan to be carried out. But the USA pursued an openly hostile policy towards the Popular Unity Government. With foreign assistance the Chilean reactionaries flouted the country's laws and Constitution,

dislocated the economy and engaged in acts of terrorism. On September 11, 1973 power was seized by a military junta. The lawful Government was deposed, President Salvador Allende was murdered and a terrorist fascist dictatorship was set up. The USA at once granted the junta a loan of \$24 million, and the new regime adopted an attitude favourable to the US monopolies.

The "ideological frontiers" doctrine was accepted by the governments of many Central and South American states, and it remains the guideline of tyrannical regimes.

However, the changes taking place in the continent, the setbacks suffered by Pan-Americanism in its US interpretation and the expanding relations of the Latin American states with other, chiefly socialist, countries are undermining this doctrine.

Another important factor of present-day international relations in Latin America is the deep-going crisis of the entire Inter-American system, a crisis expressing the antagonism between the USA and its southern neighbours. This crisis manifests itself in various forms throughout the continent, above all in the Organisation of American States. Set up in 1948, this regional organisation—sometimes called the US "Department of State for Colonies"—has until recently been an instrument obediently taking its orders from Washington.

The contradictions between the USA and its "junior partners" came to the fore as early as at the inter-American conferences of 1965 through 1967. In 1969 five countries of the Andean group (Chile, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador and Colombia) concluded an agreement on pooling efforts with the aim of furthering their economic development. Most countries of the Andean group now pursue a policy of gradually instituting control over the activities of foreign capital. Venezuela's accession to this agreement in 1973 gave the group control of over 80 per cent of the Latin American continent's output of copper, tin and oil and of more than half of its iron ore output. Their resistance to the arbitrary rule of the foreign monopolies is exercising a growing influence on the whole of Latin America.

At the OAS session in April 1972 the delegates of the Latin American countries expressed dissatisfaction with Washington's policy of perpetuating the economic subjugation of their countries. US Secretary of State William

Rogers made it clear that the White House had no intention of abandoning its policy of dictation and threatened to apply sanctions against any country that ventured to encroach upon the property of the US monopolies. He insisted on the continuation of the abortive policy towards Cuba. However, the Latin American representatives rejected the attempts at dictation. The results of that session spelled out the failure of Washington's Latin American policy. Resistance to US dictation stiffened following the 8th session of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council in Bogota in early 1973. In a declaration, which the USA refused to sign, its participants noted the generally unsatisfactory relations with the USA, expressed themselves in favour of expanding economic links "without limiting themselves to the US market", and recorded their desire to normalise relations with Cuba. In 1969 the US Government had announced that it intended to implement the "principle of equal partnership" in its relations with its southern neighbours. This was the response of the US ruling circles to the socio-economic changes taking place in Latin America. Without modifying the substance of the former policy this doctrine pursued the aim of making the Latin American peoples believe that Washington would treat them as equal partners. Developments quickly dispersed the equal partnership myth.

Development of Relations Between the USSR and the Latin American States

The Latin American states stand in need of broad trade contacts and new markets, of a more effective participation in the international division of labour. Their striving to establish and expand relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries is an objective development and not a casual phenomenon springing from the political situation.

The Soviet Union's relations with the Latin American states have a history spanning half a century. They were inaugurated in 1924 when the Soviet Union and Mexico established diplomatic relations. In 1926 formal relations were established with Uruguay and in 1935 with Colombia. During the Second World War, when the Latin American peoples sided with the Soviet people's heroic struggle against fascism, relations were established with several other coun-

tries in that continent. However, the ensuing cold war seriously slowed down their development. Pressured by the USA, some countries broke off diplomatic relations with the USSR. The countries that did not sever their relations with the Soviet Union were nonetheless influenced by the cold war atmosphere to the detriment of their own interests.

In spite of the difficulties the USSR consistently endeavoured to expand trade, economic and other relations with the Latin American states.

During the latter half of the 1950s a movement for normal diplomatic and broad trade and economic relations with the USSR and other socialist countries was started in most of the Latin American states under the impact of the impressive achievements of the Soviet Union in the building of the new society, the growth of its international prestige and its unwavering, disinterested support for peoples fighting for independence.

By 1974 the USSR had diplomatic relations with 15 countries of that region (including Cuba).

Many countries attach great importance to normalising relations with the USSR, assessing such normalisation not only as a diplomatic act but as the establishment of friendship, mutual respect and business co-operation. This is fostered by the Soviet policy of supporting peoples in their just struggle against imperialist interference, for national and social liberation.

In the United Nations and other international organisations the USSR staunchly upholds the right of the Latin American peoples to decide their own destiny and insists that the USA abandon its policy of expansion. In 1954, in response to a request from the Government of Guatemala, the Soviet Union declared that it would bend every effort to secure the fulfilment of the Security Council resolution condemning interference in Guatemala's internal affairs. In 1965 the Soviet Government denounced the US armed intervention against the Dominican Republic and called upon the United Nations to put an end to tyranny and lawlessness. These moves were highly appreciated by public opinion in Latin America.

In the United Nations many Central and South American states helped to win approval for the Soviet proposals for measures to uproot colonialism and strengthen peace. Soviet diplomacy backed the initiative of the Latin American

states aimed at getting their continent proclaimed a nuclear-free zone. The USSR and other socialist countries are helping the Latin American states in all the vital issues of their struggle for national independence and sovereignty.

In the 1960s and early 1970s the strengthening of diplomatic relations led to the expansion of trade, economic, scientific, technical and cultural contacts between the USSR and the Latin American states. In those years trade and economic agreements were signed with more than ten of these states. On January 1, 1965 the Soviet Union abolished the tariffs on the import of traditional goods from these countries.

The Soviet-Colombian trade agreement and the Soviet-Brazilian trade and payments agreement were signed in 1963. In 1964 the USSR and Argentina concluded a trade agreement. In 1966 Brazil signed a protocol on imports of Soviet machinery and equipment. Trade agreements were signed by the USSR with Chile in 1967 and with Colombia and Uruguay in 1968. During the next two years similar agreements were signed with Ecuador, Peru and Costa Rica. In June 1970 a contract was signed on deliveries of Bolivian tin and tin concentrate to the Soviet Union.

Further, the Soviet Union imports from Latin America increasing quantities of vital commodities such as wool, hides, sugar, coffee, cocoa, cotton, rice and vegetable oil.

A useful role in promoting mutually beneficial trade has been played by Soviet trade and industrial exhibitions, for instance, the exhibition of metal-working lathes in Mexico in 1969, and by the Soviet Union's participation in the 7th International Fair in Bogota, capital of Colombia.

During the past decade there has been a broadening of scientific and technical co-operation as well. Between the Soviet Union and Brazil this co-operation was inaugurated in 1963 with an invitation to Soviet scientists to help in prospecting for oil. In 1967 a protocol was signed in Moscow on Soviet assistance for the building of an organic glass factory. For her hydropower projects Brazil uses Soviet know-how and purchases turbines and generators in the USSR.

Extensive assistance is received from the USSR by Peru, Bolivia and other countries. This assistance is contributing to the industrialisation of these countries and is highly

appreciated by Latin American business circles and public opinion.

With a growing number of countries cultural co-operation is being founded on formal agreements. Accords on cultural and scientific exchanges were signed with Mexico in 1968, with Colombia and Chile in 1970 and with Bolivia in 1971. Even before agreements of this kind were signed the peoples of Latin America had the opportunity to see Soviet films and hear leading Soviet musicians, composers and singers.

For their part, Soviet people warmly receive the exponents of the distinctive, profoundly folk art of the Latin American countries.

Contacts are also expanding in the field of sports.

Unquestionable headway has been made in the promotion of scientific links. These links are fostered by Soviet scientists who study the historical, socio-economic and political problems of the Latin American countries. The USSR is doing much to help these countries train their own specialists.

Public organisations such as the friendship associations and societies likewise play a large role in furthering cultural exchanges.

The links between the Soviet Union and Peru are indicative of the relations with the Latin American countries. Although there was increasing pressure from the most diverse sections of Peruvian public opinion, the Government of Belaúnde Terry, taking its cue from the USA, persisted in refusing to normalise relations with the USSR. A fundamental change took place in Peru's attitude in October 1968 following the formation of a Government headed by General Juan Velasco Alvarado. The new Government imposed restrictions on the operation of foreign monopolies and adopted an independent foreign policy. Diplomatic relations were established between the USSR and Peru on February 1, 1969. Assessing this step the Foreign Minister General Edgardo Mercado Jarrín said that his country was acting in its own interests and that this act would strengthen its independent foreign policy and ensure for it relations of equality with all countries.

A trade agreement and a protocol on the opening of trade missions in the USSR and Peru were signed at Lima on February 18, 1969. This was followed in August 1970 by the signing of an agreement on a Soviet credit of \$30

million to Peru and on the supply of Soviet machines and equipment. The Peruvian Government requested the Soviet Union to help build a fishing port and a power transmission line and expressed the desire to purchase Soviet power generators, turbines, oil-drilling, mining and geological survey equipment. Further, it requested assistance in the compilation of a geological map of Peru and of its coastal waters. In response to these requests an agreement on co-operation in the development of the fishing industry was signed on September 4, 1971. This agreement provided for Soviet technical assistance in designing and building a plant on the northern coast for the processing of nearly 180,000 tons of fish annually, for exchanges of information on research in the fishing industry and for the formation of a Soviet-Peruvian Commission. It was stressed that this agreement, founded on a mutual interest in close co-operation in fishing, was a contribution to the friendly relations between the two countries. The agreement was welcomed by public opinion in Peru.

A beginning has been laid for scientific and technical contacts as well. Soviet chemists attended the 9th Peruvian Congress of Chemists in 1971 at the invitation of the organising committee.

The Peruvian people are showing a keen interest in Soviet cultural achievements. Soviet films have become a regular feature of the film festivals in Peru. Tours of that country have been made by the Moiseyev and Zhok dance ensembles. Soviet athletes have taken part in contests in Peru. Contacts have been established between the Soviet and the Peruvian press.

There was a warm response in Peru to Soviet assistance in May 1970, when an earthquake brought havoc and destruction to many regions. The Soviet Government and public organisations sent medical supplies, food, prefabricated houses, equipment for several kindergartens, and road-building machines. A team of doctors with a field hospital for 200 beds and trained junior medical personnel were also sent. Later the hospital was presented to the people of Peru. An airlift carrying doctors and supplies was maintained by Soviet pilots. In less than two months the Soviet doctors treated over 30,000 people, made 10,000 vaccinations and conducted a prophylactic check of 10,000 schoolchildren.

In 1970 diplomatic relations were restored with Venezuela, where, as in many other Latin American countries, more and more people were demanding an independent foreign policy and mutually beneficial trade with foreign countries. Progressive public opinion, most of the political parties, the trade unions, the Federation of the Chambers of Commerce and Industry and other organisations pressed for the restoration of contacts with the USSR. In marking the second anniversary of the resumption of these contacts, leading representatives of political and business circles spoke of the need for their further development. It was emphasised that contacts with the Soviet Union, as a new type of cultural and economic relations, were beneficial to Venezuela.

For many years there have been firm relations between the USSR and Mexico. In 1968 the two countries signed an agreement on cultural and scientific exchanges. In April 1973 when the President of Mexico Luis Echevarría visited the Soviet Union it was noted that "friendly relations conforming to the interests of the Soviet and Mexican peoples and the cause of strengthening world peace and international co-operation" had taken shape between the USSR and Mexico. Agreement was reached on the formation of a mixed commission charged with drawing up a programme for cultural, scientific and technical co-operation between the two countries.

In Chile a drive for the normalisation of relations with the USSR was started at the close of the 1950s by democratic and business circles. The restoration of diplomatic relations in 1964 was followed by the signing of agreements on trade and the purchase of equipment in the Soviet Union, and also on technical assistance to Chile in the building of a number of industrial and other projects. There was a considerable expansion of relations between the USSR and Chile under the Popular Unity Government. Chilean President Salvador Allende visited Moscow in 1972. In 1971 agreement was reached on Soviet assistance for the construction of a house-building factory, the enlargement of Chile's fishing industry and the reconstruction of a number of ports.

In connection with the military coup in 1973 the Central Committee of the CPSU published a Statement in which it emphatically denounced the "actions of the reactionary forces in Chile, the flouting by them of democratic institutions and

Constitutional rights, and their sinister plans for repressions against progressive parties and organisations", and declared its complete solidarity with the Communist, Socialist and other parties of the Popular Unity Front, and with all the working people of Chile, who, "despite the assaults of the reactionaries remain true to the cause of struggle for independence, democracy and social progress". In this situation the Soviet Government had no alternative but to break off diplomatic relations with Chile.

Bolivia has taken the road of normalising relations with the USSR. In 1969 the Government that came to power declared its intention to establish friendly relations with all states prepared to respect Bolivia's sovereignty. On its initiative agreement was reached in November 1969 on the normalisation of relations and on an exchange of diplomatic representatives at the ambassadorial level. Trade, economic, cultural, scientific and technical relations began to expand on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.

There was a sharply unfavourable reaction in US imperialist circles to the normalisation of relations between Bolivia and the USSR. A boycott was enforced in the USA on Bolivian goods and assistance was given in August 1971 to the military coup that brought to power elements which, with external aid, started an anti-Soviet campaign. Earlier, in March 1971 some members of the staff of the Soviet Embassy and of a number of Soviet organisations had been declared *personae non gratae* by the Bolivian Foreign Ministry.

The Soviet Government rejected the accusations levelled at Soviet citizens as entirely unfounded and pointed out that the opponents of Soviet-Bolivian relations were pursuing the aim of creating artificial complications between the two countries. The hostile action that had been taken was a direct contravention of the assurances made by Bolivian officials that they wanted normal relations with the USSR.

Reactionary elements in the Latin American states and US agents are using the myth of "communist penetration" in the Western Hemisphere to wreck the contacts between the socialist states and countries in the Latin American continent.

Characteristic in this respect is the example of Costa Rica, a small Central American state. Its Government under President José Figueres had instituted steps to protect national interests. Despite the resistance of reactionary elements, who, with backing from Washington, launched a slander campaign

against President Figueres under the guise of fighting communism, the Costa Rican Government normalised diplomatic relations, which had been established as early as 1944, and exchanged ambassadors with the USSR. This move was preceded by the signing of a trade agreement and of a protocol setting up trade missions in Moscow and San Jose.

The normalisation of USSR-Costa Rican relations had repercussions in other Central American republics. A marked improvement took place in the relations between the USSR and some countries of that area in the early 1970s. However, with others (for instance, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua) contacts are still episodic despite the existence of formal relations.

The Soviet Union extended formal recognition to Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Barbados as soon as they became independent, thereby helping them to consolidate their position in the world.

Neither are there diplomatic relations with Honduras, Panama and Salvador although there is a marked trend in these countries towards shaking off US tutelage and pursuing an independent foreign policy. Paraguay remains the only South American country that has no contacts with the Soviet Union. The barrier to contacts is the US-backed puppet dictatorship of General Alfredo Stroessner. With their eyes on Washington, the reactionary regimes in Paraguay and some other states erect all sorts of barriers not only to political, trade and economic relations but also to cultural contacts with the Soviet Union.

However, despite the manoeuvres of the USA and its puppets the deep-going changes taking place in Latin America are opening wide the door to mutually beneficial relations and effective co-operation with the USSR.

When Panama appealed to the Security Council to consider the question of abolishing the US colonial enclave in its territory, the Soviet Union supported that country in line with its principled policy of championing the legitimate rights of the Latin American peoples. The USSR subscribed to the decision of the Security Council to hold a session in Panama. At the session, which was held in March 1973, the Soviet representative noted that the holding of the session was evidence of the striving of the Latin American states to play a more significant role in maintaining and consolidating peace and security and to strengthen their sovereignty and

independence. He underscored the importance of the question of Panama's sovereignty over the Panama Canal and backed the resolution tabled by Latin American countries demanding the annulment of the 1903 treaty, that had been imposed on Panama by the USA, and other principles for an equitable and just settlement of the issue. This resolution was supported by the overwhelming majority of the Council's members, but its passage was blocked by a US veto. The Soviet Union's foreign policy of peace is finding growing understanding in the Latin American countries, which are realising that an expansion of contacts with the USSR strengthens their economic and political independence, unmasks the neocolonialist manoeuvres and weakens imperialist domination.

"Our co-operation with many Latin American countries," Leonid Brezhnev said at the close of 1972, "has been making considerable headway of late. Beyond question, this is the result of a consolidation of their independence and of far-reaching anti-imperialist and democratic changes there."*

International developments convincingly demonstrate that the Soviet Union's growing contacts with Asian, African and Latin American countries on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence, mutually beneficial co-operation and anti-imperialist solidarity are helping to consolidate peace and foster the welfare and prosperity of all nations.

* L. I. Brezhnev, *The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, p. 50.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE INDUSTRIAL CAPITALIST COUNTRIES

Relations with capitalist countries is a key area of Soviet foreign policy. The importance of this question is due to the fact that the main contradiction of the present epoch, the contradiction between capitalism and socialism, and the global class struggle are mirrored most fully in the sphere of relations between the socialist countries and the capitalist world.

In its relations with the capitalist states the Soviet Union is guided by the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence, which is receiving increasing international recognition. The relaxation now being achieved in the world largely through Soviet foreign policy vividly illustrates the viability of these principles and their conformity to the interests of human progress.

After World War II the principal objective of the aggressive forces in the USA was to "roll back" socialism and dominate the world by means of a "policy of strength". Needless to say, this could not fail to affect the USSR's relations with the USA and the capitalist countries that were taking their cue from United States policy.

Together with the other socialist countries the Soviet Union has consistently directed its efforts to ease international tension, curb the aggressors and eradicate the flashpoints of cold and hot wars. It wants normal relations and mutually beneficial co-operation with the countries of the capitalist world.

1. Soviet-US Relations

The relations between the USSR and the USA are determined by a number of factors. A heavy imprint has been made on them by many issues, chiefly by the struggle between the two opposing social systems—socialism and capitalism.

Soviet-US relations are complex and contradictory by virtue of objective circumstances. Economically and militarily the USSR and the USA are the two most powerful representatives of the two opposing social systems. The struggle between the two world systems continues but it by no means signifies that the outstanding issues between them should be settled by war. Provided there is good will on both sides it is, as the Soviet Government has stated time and again, possible to improve Soviet-US relations.

Another point that must be noted is that in Soviet-US relations tension is frequently fanned by the cold war warriors in the USA with the express purpose of preventing any normalisation within the framework of possible co-operation in individual areas. Tension is whipped up even in cases where an improvement of relations is desired above all by the American people, who have grown tired of the arms race and of the foreign policy adventures launched by the post-war administrations.

The Soviet Union founds its policy towards the USA on the principles of peaceful coexistence, namely, on principles of equality and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. However, it firmly opposes the forces of aggression and imperialism's dangerous plans. On the basis of its Leninist, creative analysis of the policies pursued by the rulers of the capitalist states, the USSR realistically assesses the USA's actions in the world and the prospects for its relations with that country.

Relative to the USSR Washington's policy has been guided for many years by cold war principles. This short-sighted policy is mirrored in political concepts and doctrines such as "containing" and "rolling back" communism. These aggressive doctrines underlay the actions of the Truman Administration. In the 1950s John Foster Dulles proclaimed the sabre-rattling doctrine of "massive retaliation", which brought mankind to the brink of a nuclear war time and again. John F. Kennedy made much of the doctrine of "flexible response", which sparked a fresh round of the arms race and reinforced the US Government's belief that local wars were the means of crushing the national liberation movement.

In the early 1970s Washington's official guide-lines were expressed by the Guam Doctrine and the military-political doctrine of "realistic containment", in which the accent on

strength was again declared an essential attribute of the USA's global policies. True, at the same time, the top leaders of the USA began to speak of negotiations as the means of settling outstanding international issues. In the Soviet Union due attention was paid to statements of this kind.

A point unfailingly stressed by Lenin was that in foreign policy it was necessary to take into account both the designs of imperialist adventurers and the attitude of sober-minded representatives of the bourgeoisie. He held that agreements, treaties and, in individual cases, even compromises were possible and necessary between Soviet Russia and the capitalist countries, including the USA. On his instructions the draft of a trade agreement with the USA was drawn up in March-May 1918. In 1919 he received William C. Bullitt, who came to Moscow on a peace mission as the representative of the White House, and together with him wrote the draft of a Soviet-US peace agreement. The Soviet Government thereby demonstrated its readiness to enter into businesslike relations with the capitalist world provided foreign interference in Soviet Russia's internal affairs ceased.*

True, the talks with Bullitt were not successful, but this was due entirely to the attitude of the USA, which wanted Soviet Russia to surrender her sovereignty. The US imperialists refused to recognise the people's government in Russia, hoping to destroy it with the aid of the internal counter-revolution. They took part in the intervention and in the economic blockade of Soviet Russia. For many years official Washington denied her diplomatic recognition. But this unrealistic policy found its logical end in bankruptcy.

In 1933 Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Democratic Party candidate, became President of the USA. He reconsidered US policy towards the Soviet Union and in October 1933 exchanged messages with M. I. Kalinin, the President of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR. Roosevelt suggested initiating talks to end the abnormal situation and establish diplomatic relations between the two powers. Kalinin's reply stated in part: "...the abnormal situation, to which you rightly refer in your message, has an unfavourable effect not only on the interests of the two states concerned, but also on the general international situation." The

* *Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR*, Vol. II, pp. 91-95.

Soviet Government agreed to send a representative to the USA. On November 16, 1933 Roosevelt and Maxim Litvinov, the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, exchanged letters stating that the two countries had decided to establish diplomatic relations and exchange ambassadors, and expressing the hope that the two nations "henceforth may co-operate for their mutual benefit and for the preservation of the peace of the world".*

The United States of America was the last of the major power to establish diplomatic relations with the USSR.

Factors Influencing Soviet-US Relations

Let us consider the long-term factors most heavily affecting Soviet-US relations.

These relations are adversely affected by US imperialism's striving to dominate the world, a striving springing from monopoly capital's expansionist ambitions. Throughout the period since World War II the USA has been futilely trying to achieve that aim.

The US imperialists started an arms race and organised aggressive blocs. They began to arm the West German revanchists, interfere in the internal affairs of other countries and conduct subversion against the socialist states. By their actions they launched a cold war which they hoped would strengthen their positions and enable them to carry out their plans of aggrandisement.

The Soviet Union was the first bastion that the USA wanted to take in order to clear the way to world supremacy. The Soviet Union repulsed the aggressive moves of the imperialists. More, its position in the world grew steadily stronger, and this had a sobering effect on many United States political leaders.

To a large extent the post-war deterioration of Soviet-US relations was due to Washington's intensification of its assault on the national liberation movement. Various means were used to achieve this end, among them, an alliance with the colonialists and neocolonialist subterfuges designed to reduce the peoples of the developing countries to bondage.

* *Uneshnaya politika SSSR, 1925-1934. Sbornik dokumentov*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1945, p. 678.

The largest threat to peace was the use by the imperialists of armed force against advanced contingents of the national liberation movement. This was most strikingly illustrated by the war against the freedom-loving Vietnamese people. The atrocities perpetrated by the US military still further complicated Soviet-US relations.

Thus, the factors negatively affecting the relations between the USSR and the USA were the aggressiveness and expansionist character of US foreign policy, its anti-communism and anti-Sovietism, the subversion against the socialist countries, the arms race, the formation of military blocs, and the striving to crush the liberation struggle of the oppressed peoples.

If these were the only factors operating in international relations, not only Soviet-US relations but world politics as a whole would have led to catastrophic consequences. This, however, is not the case. The socialist community is well able to safeguard the peaceful labour and revolutionary gains of its peoples! The economic and defence potential of the USSR and the other socialist countries is growing steadily, leaving the aggressive circles of imperialism with not the least hope of victory in the event of another world war.

Soviet foreign policy and the Peace Programme of the 24th CPSU Congress are winning ever broader support in the world, while the most aggressive, adventurist forces of imperialism are finding themselves in deeper isolation and the blocs formed by them are wobbling. The governments of some Western countries are displaying a striving to shake off the fetters imposed by Washington and pursue an independent policy. This trend is gaining prominence in, for example, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and some of the Scandinavian countries. The Pentagon suffered one defeat after another in Vietnam. Lastly, the capitalist currency system has run into trouble. Western economists and business circles fear it may collapse despite the devaluation of the dollar and the other financial steps that have been taken. All the above-mentioned factors, both positive and negative, are affecting Soviet-US relations.

In US foreign policy elements of realism sometimes come to the fore and measures are initiated to ease world tension. Regrettably, the results of these measures are frequently nullified by the zigzags in Washington's policies. These zigzags

are due to the fact that in the US ruling elite there is no unanimity regarding strategy and tactics on the international scene. The proponents of a more realistic policy take into consideration the might of the world socialist community and the destructive power of nuclear weapons. However, the bellicose circles of monopoly capital refuse to reconcile themselves to reality and are pushing their country into an adventurist course. The military-industrial complex perseveres in trying to undermine relations with the USSR to the extent of blocking any step towards detente.

The Soviet stand relative to the USA has been stated at CPSU congresses and in Government Statements. At the 24th Congress Leonid Brezhnev reiterated the Soviet Union's principled attitude to relations with the leading power of the capitalist world. "An improvement in Soviet-American relations," he said, "would be in the interests of the Soviet and the American peoples, the interests of stronger peace. However, we cannot pass over the US aggressive actions in various parts of the world."*

In Soviet foreign policy determined resistance to imperialism's aggressive actions is combined with a constructive approach to urgent international problems, and an uncompromising stand in the ideological struggle with a readiness to promote mutually beneficial relations with countries belonging to opposing social systems. It takes into account the significance of the state of Soviet-US relations to the peoples of the two countries and to the international situation as a whole, the fact that on it depends whether the world will move towards lasting peace or towards mounting tension. For that reason the Soviet Union advocates an expansion of Soviet-US relations in areas that would allow organising mutually beneficial co-operation in the interests of the Soviet and the American peoples and strengthening world peace without departing from its foreign policy principles. As Leonid Brezhnev said at the 15th Congress of Soviet Trade Unions, "an improvement of relations between the USSR and the USA is possible. More, it is desirable but, needless to say, not at the expense of third countries or peoples, not to the detriment of their legitimate rights and interests. Such is our immutable stand".

* 24th Congress of the CPSU, p. 35.

Significance of Direct Official Soviet-US Contacts

The normalisation of Soviet-US relations would unquestionably improve the international climate. The representatives of the two countries have met in negotiation time and again. The Soviet Government has always contended that negotiations were an effective means of settling issues. However, in the vast majority of cases, Washington pursued other objectives. Its representatives participated in talks either for propaganda purposes or with the objective of forcing upon the USSR terms which they knew were unacceptable. In spite of this, Soviet diplomacy's principled, vigorous struggle for peace, including talks with US representatives, has yielded results. Due to these unremitting efforts considerable headway has been achieved in the settlement of some major post-war problems, for instance, the signing of the State Treaty with Austria, the agreement on Laos, the Moscow partial nuclear test-ban treaty and the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear arms.

The Soviet Government has always urged an expansion of personal contacts between the top leaders of the two Great Powers. In the 1940s through 1960s there were five meetings between Soviet leaders and the US presidents: with Truman at the Potsdam Conference in 1945, with Eisenhower at Geneva in 1955 and at Camp David in 1959, with Kennedy at Vienna in 1961, and with Johnson at Glassboro in 1967. On account of the unrealistic attitude of the US representatives, these summits, with the exception of the Potsdam Conference, yielded very little.

At the Potsdam Conference of the Heads of three powers—USSR, USA and Britain—decisions were adopted envisaging, in particular, the demilitarisation, democratisation and denazification of Germany. However, the USA and its allies soon backed down on their commitments with the result that the situation in Europe changed sharply for the worse, and for years Washington blocked every move to break the deadlock in its relations with the USSR.

Some possibilities for improving Soviet-US relations were opened by the Geneva Four-Power summit in 1955. It was the first top-level Soviet-US meeting at an international conference since the war. Washington had the opportunity to end the cold war and settle some extremely pressing prob-

lems, which would have reduced world tension and improved Soviet-US relations. For its part, the Soviet Union had every intention of discussing disarmament and European security and promoting East-West contacts.¹ At the conference the Soviet delegation offered to sign a treaty on collective security in Europe and proposed that the USA and its allies join it in an armaments cut-back and in reaching agreement on the total banning of nuclear weapons. These proposals were not accepted by the US delegation.

Nonetheless, after this conference the Geneva spirit could be felt in international relations for some time. The peoples, including the people of the USA, were fervently hoping for an easing of tension and the settlement of key world problems.

In January 1956, in order to sustain the Geneva spirit, the Soviet Union proposed a treaty of friendship and co-operation with the USA. The draft suggested by the USSR envisaged that friendly relations would be promoted and strengthened on the basis of equality, mutual respect of state sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs. However, there was no response to this proposal.

Later in the same year the Soviet Government again proposed steps to normalise its relations with the USA. These steps included the promotion of economic and cultural contacts and an expansion of scientific and technical links. The implementation of these proposals would have created a solid economic foundation for the relations between the Soviet Union and the USA and enabled the Soviet and American peoples to get to know and, consequently, understand each other better.

Rebuff to US Acts of Aggression. Soviet-US Talks in 1960-1961

Soviet diplomacy has always pressed for a just settlement of major world problems and for the creation of conditions favourable to the development of businesslike relations with the USA. It pursued this line in even the most dismal situations.

A Four-Power summit was scheduled to be held in mid-May 1960 in Paris. However, a series of provocative military and diplomatic moves were made by the USA on the eve of the conference. The Norstad Plan providing for a West Eu-

ropean nuclear assault force with the participation of the West German Bundeswehr was put forward. President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Secretary of State Christian A. Herter made statements in the worst cold war spirit against disarmament, the banning of nuclear armaments and the dismantling of US bases in foreign territory. This was climaxed on May 1, 1960 by the intrusion of an American Lockheed U-2 spy plane into Soviet air space for a distance of over 2,000 kilometres. The plane was brought down by a Soviet missile and the pilot, CIA agent Francis G. Powers, was captured.

This violation of the Soviet Union's frontier and sovereignty was assessed by the Soviet Government as an act of aggression designed to torpedo the summit conference.

The U-2 spy flight and the irresponsible statements by senior US officials aroused the indignation of Soviet and world opinion. Even the hardened American press criticised these provocative actions of its Government. These actions were further evidence that contacts between the leaders of the two powers were not desired by an influential group of politicians and military in the USA.

In November the presidential elections were carried by the candidate of the Democratic Party John F. Kennedy. In the spring of the following year his Administration decided to initiate talks with the Soviet Union. The USSR agreed to a meeting and the Heads of the two governments met in the Austrian capital on June 3-4, 1961.

The US President was handed Soviet memoranda calling for an end to the testing of atomic and hydrogen bombs and for the conclusion of a German peace treaty. Further, it was stated that the Soviet Union would continue to support the just national liberation movement of peoples against colonialism. No proposals that could help to normalise relations with the Soviet Union were made by the US side, which, however, agreed to adopt a more realistic attitude to the Laotian problem at the international conference in session at the time in Geneva.

The Caribbean Crisis

The most explosive post-war crisis flared up in Soviet-US relations in the autumn of 1962. It was sparked by the intensification of the aggressive imperialist actions against Cuba.

The economic blockade of Cuba was tightened. In Florida the CIA was maintaining and financing thousands of Cuban counter-revolutionaries. The contours of a new aggressive plan of the imperialists, who were determined to crush the Cuban revolution, became more and more clear cut.

In this situation the paramount task was to strengthen Cuba's defence capability. The Soviet Union and Cuba came to the conclusion that a resolute rebuff had to be given to the US policy of threats and aggression. The governments of the two countries were guided exclusively by peaceful aims, by their desire to cut short the new American aggression against the Cuban people. The Soviet Government indicated a simple way of normalising the situation in the Caribbean. "If normal diplomatic and trade relations were established between the United States of America and Cuba," a TASS Statement of September 11 declared, "for Cuba there would be no need to strengthen her defence capability, to strengthen her armed forces."

The US military stepped up preparations for an invasion of Cuba. On the pretext of large-scale military exercises the Pentagon massed troops at the bases in proximity to Cuba in October 1962. The 82nd and 101st airborne divisions were readied for combat. Units of the US Navy (over 180 vessels) and aircraft were concentrated around Cuba. The US forces in Western Europe, the 6th and the 7th fleets stationed in the Mediterranean and the Pacific respectively were also alerted.

It is not difficult to see what this crisis would have led to had the USSR not taken energetic measures. In a Statement of October 23, 1962 the Soviet Government assessed the naval blockade of Cuba as "unprecedented acts of aggression". The armed forces of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation were alerted.

At the same time, to prevent a further escalation of the crisis, the Soviet Union demanded an immediate session of the Security Council to consider the "violation of the UN Charter and the threat to peace by the United States of America".

In the United Nations the Soviet representatives demanded that the USA cease its interference in Cuba's internal affairs. U Thant, the then acting Secretary-General of the UN, appealed to the USA and the USSR to refrain from actions that could exacerbate the situation and bring with them

the risk of war. He urged them to help initiate talks for a peaceful settlement of the Caribbean crisis. The Soviet Union responded immediately by agreeing with these recommendations.

After a sharp political struggle in Washington, the US Government formulated its reply. John F. Kennedy gave the assurance that Cuba would not be invaded and promised that the blockade would be lifted forthwith. The US President's formal renunciation of the plans of aggression against Cuba led to a relaxation: the Caribbean crisis began to peter out.

It was ended through the energetic peaceful and, at the same time, firm actions of the Soviet Union, which resolutely championed the sovereign rights and security of a fraternal people.

Even in the strained situation of the early 1960s the Soviet Union's consistent efforts to settle complex international problems and its quest for mutually acceptable solutions aimed at easing tension yielded some practical results, in spite of the aggressive tendencies in US foreign policy.

In 1959 agreement between the USSR and the USA contributed to the conclusion of an international treaty providing for the Antarctic's use solely for peaceful purposes. In 1961-1963 the two countries coordinated their stand on a number of problems linked with disarmament talks and signed a partial nuclear test-ban treaty.

As a result, a tendency could be discerned towards a relaxation of tension. However, in the USA the ultras whipped up military hysteria and anti-Sovietism. In November 1963 John F. Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas.

Owing to various reasons, the positive elements that had appeared in US policy began to fade in 1964.

Escalation of the Aggression in Vietnam and Deterioration of Soviet-US Relations

In the period from 1964 through 1968 the relations between the USSR and the USA steadily deteriorated owing to the activities of forces hostile to world peace and security.

Washington set its sights on building up a NATO nuclear force in Western Europe and planned an atomic mine belt along the FRG's frontiers with the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia. In Latin America the US

imperialists forcibly intervened in the internal affairs of the Dominican Republic in 1965.

Soviet-US relations were further strained in early 1965 when the White House escalated the war of aggression in Vietnam. "The Soviet Union," the Soviet Government declared at the time, "has advocated and continues to advocate the establishment of normal relations with the USA and the improvement of these relations. But the promotion of relations is a reciprocal process and leaves no room for misunderstanding. This process clashes with aggressive policies which can blot out any steps taken with a view to improving Soviet-US relations."^{*}

President Lyndon B. Johnson paid no heed to this statement. The secret Pentagon documents published in 1971 made it clear that in escalating the aggression the US Government deliberately deceived the American people about the aims of its policy in Vietnam.

In 1966, expressing the will and feeling of Communists and all Soviet people, the 23rd Congress of the CPSU denounced the barbarous actions of the imperialists against the fraternal people of Vietnam.

On August 3, 1966, touching on Soviet-US relations, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Alexei Kosygin declared in the Supreme Soviet: "Whereas some years ago signs of a more realistic approach to present-day problems could be observed in the highest circles in Washington and one felt there was a certain understanding that the USA could not force its will upon other nations, today the tune in US policies is called more and more by aggressive military forces."^{**} He noted, however, that it was the Soviet Union's unchanging stand that relations between the two countries could be improved provided the USA abided by the norms of international law and ceased its interference in the internal affairs of other countries and peoples.

The Soviet Union kept a vigilant eye on the intrigues of the imperialists and extended massive assistance to the Vietnamese patriots fighting the aggression. As was stated by Leonid Brezhnev in November 1967: "Those who want to save mankind from a world nuclear and rocket war must

^{*} *Milestones of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1967, Moscow, 1967, p. 235.*

^{**} *Uneshnaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza i mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya. Sbornik dokumentov, 1966, p. 222.*

struggle against the aggressive intrigues and sorties of the imperialists with redoubled energy."^{*} It was precisely this struggle that the USSR waged for the termination of the war in Vietnam, where developments were not following the course desired by official Washington.

The setbacks in the war against the Vietnamese patriots aggravated the situation in the USA itself. In 1968 President Johnson had to order a halt to the bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Further, he announced he would not run for re-election.

Beginning of a Change in Soviet-US Relations

In this situation a Republican Government headed by Richard M. Nixon came to power in the USA. In the White House the understanding began to grow that unyielding anti-communism and anti-Sovietism had won no laurels for its exponents. Besides, it was becoming increasingly clearer that the world balance of strength was changing rapidly in favour of socialism and that a return to the cold war days would only bring the USA further foreign policy debacles. Many influential leaders of both the Republican and the Democratic parties became set in the view that the hope of strengthening the USA's international position and weakening the Soviet Union and other socialist countries by means of an aggressive policy was utterly without foundation. Meanwhile the policy of aggression and unbridled militarisation continued to worsen the state of the US economy and aggravate social and racial problems. To some extent this, too, compelled the US Government and the President himself to reckon with realities and with the spirit of the times. They got down to charting foreign policy strategy and tactics that would conform to the actual potentialities of US capitalism. Needless to say, the extremists had no intention of abandoning their activities and opposed every move towards realism. These factors underlay the inconsistency of US foreign policy.

On the one hand, the US President declared that his country wished to move from confrontation to talks and approved the certain vitalisation of Soviet-US economic, scientific and

^{*} L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course*, pp. 57-58.

technical links. A more or less positive approach was adopted by the USA to some problems. On the other hand, the Nixon Administration time and again stiffened its policy towards the USSR, plunged into further gambles in Southeast Asia and connived at the Israeli policy in the Middle East. At the 24th Congress of the CPSU this was noted by Leonid Brezhnev, who said: "The frequent zigzags in US foreign policy, which are apparently connected with some kind of domestic political moves dictated by short-term considerations, have also made dealing with the United States much more difficult."^{*}

In the early 1970s the US Government signed a number of international agreements that benefited the cause of peace. In this the decisive role was played by Soviet initiative, mainly by the broad programme for peace and international co-operation adopted at the 24th Congress of the CPSU. Public opinion throughout the world, including the USA, welcomed this Soviet programme for a radical improvement of international relations.

Treaties were concluded on banning the use of biological weapons and the floor of seas and oceans for military purposes, and a Four-Power agreement was signed on West Berlin. In 1971 the Soviet Union and the USA agreed on steps to avert any accidental or unsanctioned use of the nuclear arms controlled by them and to improve direct communication between the USSR and the USA through the use of artificial Earth satellites.

Talks were started between the two countries on limiting the race for strategic armaments. These talks were held alternately in Helsinki and Vienna. The Soviet Union pursues the objective of restricting the arms race forced on the world by imperialism and which has been poisoning the international atmosphere and Soviet-US relations throughout the period since the war. Parallel with the problem of limiting strategic armaments Soviet diplomacy has always insisted that it is necessary to agree on other steps linked with general and complete disarmament.

As a result of the implementation of the CPSU 24th Congress' constructive programme for settling the main international problems there has been a marked easing of tension in Europe. A considerable and growing section of American public opinion is making it clear that it is tired of the re-

^{*} 24th Congress of the CPSU, p. 35.

lapses into the cold war and does not believe the myth about the aggressiveness of the Soviet Union. This has impelled US political and business circles to begin a more serious quest for areas of co-operation with the USSR in order to settle outstanding international problems and questions concerning Soviet-US relations.

The history of Soviet-US relations bears testimony that the USSR has always advocated broad economic co-operation with the USA, the leading power of the capitalist world. In the 1930s the Soviet Union was a reliable buyer of products of key US industries such as the engineering, machine-tool and foundry equipment industries. There were favourable prospects for expanding trade after World War II as well. However, the White House obstructed the utilisation of these prospects. The agreement on the sale of goods to the Soviet Union on credit was annulled in 1947. A year later the US Department of Commerce enforced discriminatory rules for the control of exports with the result that there was a sharp curtailment of trade with the USSR. In 1949 the US Congress passed an act controlling exports. A long list of goods was banned for sale to socialist countries on the pretext of "security". In March 1951 the US Government ordered that licences had to be obtained for any goods exported to the Soviet Union. In July of the same year it dissolved the trade agreement that had been signed with the USSR in 1937. In the autumn of 1952 the US Congress passed the reactionary Battle Act, which imposed further restrictions on trade with the Soviet Union.

In Washington it was calculated that an embargo on key industrial products would hit the USSR and slow down its economic development. But that was a miscalculation. The Soviet Union is itself a major supplier of industrial plant to other countries. As regards American businessmen, they were deprived of the vast and stable markets of the socialist countries, markets which their West European competitors were only too glad to enter.

Until 1955, due to the US Government's policy of discrimination, trade with the USSR steadily diminished. Then it began to grow slowly: from the level of \$304 million in 1946 trade dropped to \$22 million in 1955, after which it rose to \$76 million in 1960 and to \$89 million in 1965. During the years that followed it remained at the level of roughly \$90 million annually.

In the early 1970s, in a situation witnessing ruthless competition in the world markets, more and more voices could be heard in the USA demanding a more realistic trade policy towards the USSR. The Government was compelled to depart from its hard line of blocking economic relations with the Soviet Union. In November 1971 the US Secretary of Commerce Maurice H. Stans visited Moscow, where he was received by Alexei Kosygin and other Soviet statesmen. At the talks the two sides discussed the state of the economic relations between the two countries and the prospects for promoting trade. In reply to the American assurance that the USA and the Soviet Union had much they could use to help each other through peaceful trade and industrial co-operation, Alexei Kosygin noted: "The further expansion of trade and economic co-operation between the USSR and the USA would accord with the interests of the two countries."

There were immediate results. Large contracts worth \$125 million were signed in Moscow on November 30, 1971 with American firms.

The future of trade relations between the two powers depends on whether Washington lifts all the discriminatory measures that had been instituted against economic contacts with the Soviet Union and accords it most-favoured nation status in trade.

The history of Soviet foreign policy shows that the USSR has always stood for friendship with the people of the United States and been firmly opposed to the predatory actions of US imperialism.

As early as 1919 a Congress of Soviets had approved a resolution moved by Lenin in which it was stated: "The Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic wishes to live in friendship with all nations and direct all its strength towards internal development." Leninist principles underlie the Soviet Government's policy towards the USA. It takes the interests of the Soviet and American peoples into account, champions a just peace and strives to organise good-neighbourly co-operation. At the same time, it opposes the US military wherever they kindle wars.

At the 24th Congress of the CPSU Leonid Brezhnev made the following point:

"We proceed from the assumption that it is possible to improve relations between the USSR and the USA. Our principled line with respect to the capitalist countries, including

the USA, is consistently and fully to practise the principles of peaceful coexistence, to develop mutually advantageous ties. . . . But we have to consider whether we are dealing with a real desire to settle outstanding issues at the negotiation table or attempts to conduct a 'positions of strength' policy."*

US President Richard Nixon visited the Soviet Union in the period from May 22 through 30, 1972. His talks with Soviet leaders in Moscow led to important agreements, which eloquently proved that despite their different social systems the USSR and the USA could improve their relations and thereby strengthen world peace and security.

The results of the talks were a major achievement of Soviet foreign policy in implementing the CPSU 24th Congress' Peace Programme. The agreements that were signed marked a turning point in the relations between the USSR and the USA and laid the foundation for their substantial development and for the further normalisation of the international situation as a whole.

The talks resulted in the signing of a vital document headed Basic Principles of Mutual Relations Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which outlined a wide-ranging programme for the fruitful development of Soviet-US relations on a solid, long-term basis without prejudice to third countries. It was the first time since the war that the US Government had formally recognised the immense significance of the principle of peaceful coexistence to world peace. In the Basic Principles it is stated that the two countries will proceed from the common determination that "in the nuclear age there is no alternative to conducting Soviet-American relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence. . . ."

The Moscow talks were further evidence that today outstanding international issues cannot and must not be settled by force. The USSR and the USA pledged "to avoid military confrontations and to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war"*** It was recognised that an essential condition for this was the observance of the principle of equality and equal

* 24th Congress of the CPSU, pp. 35-36.

** USSR-USA: *Cooperation for Mutual Benefit*, Moscow, 1973, p. 6.

*** *Documents of the USSR-USA Summit Talks*, Moscow, 1973, p. 52.

security, respect for each other's interests and the peaceful settlement of differences.

The Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed at Moscow, are of historic significance. Throughout the world these documents have been assessed as a major step towards eliminating the threat of a nuclear war, curbing the arms race and opening the prospect for an advance to general disarmament.

Fruitful results were achieved at the talks in the sphere of Soviet-US co-operation. Called the "Moscow cascade" by the press, the series of agreements that were signed provided the foundation for the promotion of trade, co-operation in environmental protection, outer space and health, and exchanges in science, technology, education and culture. In the joint communique the two sides declared they were convinced that the provisions stated in the Basic Principles "create new opportunities for the development of peaceful relations and mutually beneficial co-operation between the USSR and the USA".*

All these agreements are subordinated entirely to peaceful aims and accord with the interests of all mankind.

At the Moscow talks the sides considered important international problems. In keeping with its fidelity to proletarian internationalism, the Soviet Union firmly championed the national liberation movements, emphasising its solidarity with the just struggle of the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia against the US aggression and insisting on an end to the bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and on the complete and unconditional withdrawal of the troops of the USA and its allies from South Vietnam.

The Soviet-US talks clearly showed that the Soviet Union's class, profoundly principled foreign policy combines unhesitating condemnation of imperialism's aggressive moves with a constructive approach to urgent international problems; an uncompromising stand in the ideological struggle with a readiness to promote mutually beneficial relations with capitalist countries on the basis of peaceful coexistence.

* Ibid., p. 9.

A USSR-US Commercial Commission was set up in accordance with an understanding reached at the Moscow talks. At its second session in October 1972 the commission signed agreements on trade, the settlement of lend-lease debts and reciprocal credits. The trade agreement provides for reciprocal most-favoured nation treatment and the encouragement of commercial contacts. It has been planned that in the course of three years trade would treble compared with 1969-1971. Moreover, it was decided to open a Soviet Trade Mission in Washington and a US Commercial Office in Moscow.

These agencies have begun to function. Agreement was reached on settling questions such as reciprocal credits, co-operation in the building of industrial projects, licences, patents and other questions.

The US Secretary of the Treasury George P. Schultz visited Moscow in March 1973. He was received by Leonid Brezhnev, who underscored the importance of trade and economic relations between the USSR and the USA and stressed that these relations had to be based on complete equality and mutual benefit.

Visit by Leonid Brezhnev to the USA

Leonid Brezhnev's visit to the USA on June 18-25, 1973 and his talks with the President ushered in a further improvement of relations between the Soviet Union and the USA and an easing of international tension.

During the visit the Soviet and US leaders considered important aspects of the relations between the two countries and the ways and means of improving the international climate. In the joint communique they declared they would take further major steps to achieve maximum stability and efficacy in the relations between the two countries.

A number of new agreements were signed, the most important of which was, unquestionably, the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War. Under that agreement the USSR and the USA declared that their aim was to eliminate the threat of a nuclear war and of the use of nuclear weapons and that they would act in such a manner as to rule out the outbreak of nuclear war between them and between any of them and other countries. In fulfilment of that aim they would refrain from the threat and use of force against the other

side, its allies and third countries, and in the event there was the risk of a nuclear conflict they would immediately begin consultations and take every possible step to avert that risk.

In considering the results of Leonid Brezhnev's visit the highest organs of the Soviet state noted that the agreement was a major step towards reducing and ultimately removing the threat of a nuclear war, towards the creation of real guarantees of international security, and that its practical fulfilment would be of truly epochal significance for all mankind.

The USSR and the USA expressed their willingness to examine further ways for removing the threat of war in perpetuity and reached an understanding on the basic principles of a new agreement on limiting strategic arms that would be broader and more comprehensive than the agreement reached in 1972. In the Joint Communiqué they recorded that they would actively help to work out further measures aimed at limiting and ending the arms race and declared that general and complete disarmament was the end objective of their policy.

Agreements were signed on co-operation in the study of seas and oceans, in the peaceful uses of atomic energy, in agriculture and transport, and also on scientific, technical and cultural contacts, exchanges and co-operation. The understanding on the long-term promotion of trade and economic relations is expected to have favourable political results by consolidating the turn towards an improvement in Soviet-US relations. These agreements are widening the area of peaceful and mutually beneficial co-operation between the Soviet Union and the USA. This is consistent with the interests of the Soviet and American peoples and benefiting all mankind. "The main purport of what we spoke of and agreed on with President Nixon in international affairs," Leonid Brezhnev said in a speech televised in the USA, "is the firm determination of the two sides to make good relations between the USSR and the USA a permanent factor of international peace."*

During his visit in the USA Leonid Brezhnev met with the leaders of the Communist Party of that country.

The Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Council

* *Pravda*, June 25, 1973.

of Ministers of the USSR highly appraised Leonid Brezhnev's contribution and unconditionally approved the results of the talks. It was noted that the talks themselves and their successful completion "had laid a solid foundation for the normal development of Soviet-US relations, for strengthening mutually beneficial co-operation between our two countries and, at the same time, were a contribution to the reinforcement of detente and the consolidation of world peace and security".* Further, the conviction was expressed that the readiness of other countries to subscribe to the non-use of force and the prevention of nuclear war "would be a matter of exceptional importance in ensuring universal security and lasting peace on earth".

In summing up the results of the development of Soviet-US relations, Leonid Brezhnev said in October 1973: "As we know, the past two years have seen positive changes in the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America. The agreements concluded during our meetings with the US President in Moscow in May 1972 and in Washington last June have opened the way to transition in Soviet-American relations from confrontation to detente, normalisation and mutually beneficial co-operation. We are deeply convinced that this accords with the interests of the peoples of the Soviet Union and of all other countries, because it serves to strengthen international security."**

2. Franco-Soviet Relations

Historical Roots of the Friendship Between the Soviet and French Peoples

Franco-Soviet relations, that have been developing successfully during the past decade, are vital to security in Europe and throughout the world. Resting on a coincidence or proximity of views on many issues, on the positive experience of co-operation and on feelings of friendship between the peoples of the USSR and France, these relations have their roots deep in the past and create a favourable

* *Pravda*, June 30, 1973.

** L. I. Brezhnev, *For a Just, Democratic Peace, for the Security of Nations and International Co-operation*, Moscow, 1973, p. 10.

atmosphere for political, scientific and cultural co-operation.

The internationalist links between the peoples of the USSR and France have long-established, glorious traditions. The Paris Commune, history's first dictatorship of the proletariat, gave a strong impetus to the spread of revolutionary ideas in Russia. During the Russian revolution of 1905-1907 the democratic forces in France unconditionally sided with the proletariat of Russia.

The working people of France enthusiastically hailed the October Revolution. At numerous rallies and meetings millions of Frenchmen warmly welcomed the establishment of Soviet power in Russia and pledged staunch support for the world's first workers' and peasants' state. The protests of the French proletariat against their country's participation in the anti-Soviet intervention in 1918-1920 were a striking expression of class solidarity with the revolutionary masses of Russia.

The rapprochement between the two peoples was furthered by the struggle that they had to wage for many years against the aggressive ambitions of the German militarists. In the 1930s, when a flashpoint appeared in the very heart of Europe as a result of the establishment of the nazi regime in Germany, it became obvious that the security of the two countries demanded concerted efforts. Guided by the principle of peaceful coexistence the USSR offered to sign a treaty on mutual assistance with France. Despite their hostility for the Soviet system the more sober-minded French politicians saw the need for such an alliance. The Treaty was signed in May 1935. The Soviet Government sought to turn it into an effective instrument against fascist aggression, but the reactionary circles of the bourgeoisie were frightened by the growth of the democratic forces in France and connived at the expansionist plans nurtured by nazi Germany. They counted on directing her expansion eastward, against the USSR. For them the Franco-Soviet Treaty was a scrap of paper. This short-sighted, anti-national policy of the ruling elite led to the catastrophe that overtook France in 1940 as a result of the nazi invasion.

The struggle of the French people against nazi enslavement upset the calculations of the reactionary bourgeoisie. Franco-Soviet co-operation was revived in the flames of the Second World War. The people of France knew full well that the

USSR was a reliable and selfless ally. The crushing blows that were dealt the nazi hordes by the Soviet Army inspired the French patriots in their struggle for liberation.

The French Normandie squadron, formed at the close of 1942 and later enlarged to a regiment, was the only Western military unit that fought the common enemy on Soviet soil. For its distinguished services in combat the regiment was decorated with the orders of the Red Banner and Alexander Nevsky. Many of its pilots were awarded battle orders and four were created Heroes of the Soviet Union.

On December 10, 1944 France and the Soviet Union signed a Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance that was cemented with the blood shed by their sons on the field of battle. General Charles de Gaulle, then Chairman of the Provisional Government, said the following about the significance of the treaty: "For France and Russia to be united means to be strong, and to be disunited means to be in danger." The Soviet Government regarded the treaty as an important instrument for ensuring lasting peace in Europe and a good foundation for the further development of co-operation with France.

Franco-Soviet Relations in the Period of the Fourth Republic (1946-1958)

After the war the relations between the USSR and France took shape in a situation witnessing radical changes on the world scene. These changes opened favourable prospects for settling the cardinal problem of laying a solid foundation for a democratic peace and ensuring conditions under which German militarism would never again threaten its neighbours or world peace. The Soviet Government considered, as it does to this day, that France had a major role to play in the post-war democratic settlement. The interest of both countries in the total uprooting of German nazism and militarism, the fact that their views coincided on a number of questions related to European security and their mutual need for broader economic relations created a good basis for close co-operation between them.

However, during the initial years after the war France's ruling circles oriented their foreign policy towards the USA. They regarded the US imperialists as the mainstay against

socialism and democracy in France and in other countries. Beginning in 1947 Paris surrendered much of her independence in foreign policy and followed the USA's lead in major international issues. As a result, France was drawn into the Marshall Plan and then into the North Atlantic pact, which seriously prejudiced her sovereignty. The French imperialists joined actively in the arms race.

This turn in France's foreign policy was reflected in her relations with the Soviet Union. Her rulers sought to impute the blame for the deterioration of these relations to the Soviet Union. But the actual reason lay in the actions of the French Government, which joined in the cold war against the USSR and other socialist countries.

Ignoring France's national interests the French Government sided with the USA and Britain in the German problem, and in 1954 signed the Paris Agreements on West Germany's remilitarisation and her involvement in NATO. The USSR drew France's attention to the incompatibility of these agreements with the 1944 Treaty and warned that their ratification would deprive the Treaty of its practical significance and force. When, in spite of the will of the overwhelming majority of the French people, the French Parliament ratified the Paris Agreements, the Soviet Government was left with no alternative but to annul the 1944 Treaty.

The Atlantic policy led to a series of major foreign policy setbacks and seriously hurt France's national independence and prestige. It aroused growing alarm and indignation among the French people. The overt proponents of this policy were defeated at the parliamentary elections in early 1956. The new Government headed by the leader of the Socialist Party Guy Mollet declared it would pursue an independent foreign policy. The Government programme stated that it was necessary to secure a relaxation of tension and settle the problem of disarmament. Taking into account the French people's solidarity with the Soviet Union's struggle for peace, the Guy Mollet Government claimed that it was moving towards negotiations with the purpose of improving relations with the USSR. But developments showed that it had no intention of carrying out this programme.

A Government delegation led by Premier Guy Mollet arrived in Moscow in mid-May 1956. It agreed to accept the principle of peaceful coexistence as the basis for relations

with the USSR but refused to support the Soviet proposals on key international problems. The anti-Soviet campaign started by the French Right-wing press soon after the Moscow talks nullified the efforts to improve relations with the USSR.

Franco-Soviet Detente After the Establishment of the Fifth Republic

In 1958, following the establishment of the Fifth Republic and de Gaulle's election to the office of President, the French Government steered towards an independent policy and towards enhancing France's prestige in international affairs. Here an important role was played by the strengthening of the French economy and the growth of France's share of the capitalist world's product. A manifestation of the operation of the law of uneven development, this process sharply aggravated the contradictions between France and her rivals. The striving of the French monopolies to strengthen and enlarge their positions in Western Europe, shake off US tutelage and acquire new markets in Africa, Asia and Latin America encountered virulent opposition from Washington. This aggravated the divergences between France and the USA on many acute problems.

In its drive for more influence in NATO and to unite the West European states under its own leadership, Paris looked to a detente with Bonn. An outcome of this policy was the Treaty on co-operation signed in 1963.

That Treaty did not, however, yield the results expected in Paris and did not remove Franco-West German contradictions, which were further exacerbated at the close of 1963, when in French policy signs began to appear of a striving to make a sober assessment of the significance to France of economic and political co-operation with the Soviet Union. The emergent course towards a detente with the USSR received the approval of all the progressive forces in France and their vanguard, the Communist Party. In advocating a truly national policy and the consolidation of peace, the French Communist Party expressed the opinion of many millions of French working people.

The next few years were characterised by a marked expansion of the relations between the two countries. French Min-

isters visited the Soviet Union. There was an activation of inter-parliamentary contacts. In 1964 a visit to France was paid by a delegation of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR led by Nikolai Podgorny. A delegation headed by Artillery Chief Marshal N. N. Voronov went to France to attend the ceremonies marking the 20th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany. The delegation was received by President de Gaulle. A warm reception was given in France to envoys of the CPSU, the trade unions and the YCL. Soviet cosmonauts Yuri Gagarin and Valentina Tereshkova were guests of the French people.

Economic relations, too, made headway. A trade agreement for 1965-1969, envisaging roughly a 100 per cent increase in trade, was signed in Paris on October 30, 1964. The Soviet Union received a long-term credit for the purchase of equipment in France. For its part, it enlarged its deliveries to France of oil, oil products, sawn timber and chemical products. Scientific and technical contacts were established. Agreements on co-operation in colour television and in the peaceful uses of atomic energy were signed in 1965. These agreements were acclaimed by business circles in France.

Political contacts, too, were steadily broadened. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko visited France in April 1965 and a return visit was paid in the autumn of the same year by the French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville. The talks that were held during these visits showed that the attitude of the two countries was approximately the same with regard to important aspects of the problem of European security and that they concurred in their assessment of the developments in Southeast Asia. The talks were characterised by a spirit of understanding and were evidence of the utility of consultations on problems in which both countries were interested.

An important factor that led to the positive changes in Franco-Soviet relations was the Soviet Union's peaceful foreign policy and the enhancement of its influence in the world, and also the mounting impact of the policies pursued by the socialist community as a whole. A sober evaluation of the balance of strength in the world at the end of the 1950s and the early 1960s could not fail to bring French statesmen to the conclusion that if the adventurist actions of the USA unleashed a conflict France would, by virtue of her com-

mitments in NATO and other military blocs, be drawn into that conflict. That would seriously menace her security.

In the spring of 1966 the French Government took a further step towards reinforcing France's independent policy and sovereignty. It declared that it would withdraw from the NATO military organisation. On July 1, 1966 it followed up this declaration by beginning the withdrawal of French troops from subordination to the NATO Allied Command, while by April 1, 1967 all foreign, mostly US, military bases and troops and also the NATO Headquarters had been evacuated from France. These actions removed the obstacles that France's participation in the NATO military organisation had erected to an independent foreign policy.

A substantial contribution towards the furtherance of Franco-Soviet relations was made by the exchange of visits by the top leaders of the two countries in 1966. During his visit to the USSR (June 20-July 1) President de Gaulle toured Moscow, Novosibirsk, Volgograd, Kiev and Leningrad. The visit demonstrated the friendly feelings between the peoples of the two countries. Soviet people expressed their ardent desire to strengthen friendship with the French people, to work with them in order to consolidate peace in Europe and throughout the world. In a speech that was broadcast by radio and television Charles de Gaulle spoke of his appreciation of the welcome accorded to him by the Soviet people and gave the assurance that "the new France is a friend of the new Russia".

A Franco-Soviet Declaration was signed on June 30, 1966, at the end of the visit. It stated that the Soviet Union and France were of the opinion that European problems had to be settled in Europe itself. There had to be a relaxation in East-West relations to which end it was necessary to normalise and gradually expand businesslike contacts between all the European countries on the basis of respect for each other's independence and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. Grave concern was expressed over the escalation of the war in Vietnam. The only way out of the situation, it was noted in the Declaration, was to achieve a settlement on the basis of the 1954 Geneva Agreements, which ruled out foreign interference. Attention was drawn to the threat springing from the proliferation of nuclear arms and it was stated that new possibilities would be explored in order to expand Franco-Soviet contacts to the utmost.

During the visit the two governments signed agreements on co-operation in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes and on scientific, technical and economic relations. Further, it was decided to set up a Franco-Soviet Commission to consider practical questions related to the fulfilment of the existing agreements.

A new element in Franco-Soviet relations was the understanding that political consultations would be held regularly on European and international problems in which the two countries were interested, and that there would be bilateral talks.

To promote contacts at the summit the two countries agreed to establish direct communication between the Kremlin and the Elysée Palace.

At the talks held in France during Alexei Kosygin's visit in that country (December 1-9, 1966) it was noted with satisfaction that Franco-Soviet economic, scientific, technical, cultural and political relations were expanding swiftly. The two sides declared that they were making every effort to implement the provisions of the Joint Declaration of June 30, 1966 and other agreements and to explore new areas of co-operation. They reaffirmed their readiness to facilitate the further improvement of relations between European countries regardless of their political system and underscored the danger of the continued hostilities in Vietnam. The results of the talks in Moscow and Paris were welcomed with deep satisfaction by the Soviet people and by democratic circles in France.

Progress in Franco-Soviet Co-operation in 1967-1970

In subsequent years, despite the different socio-economic systems and the divergences on a number of problems, co-operation between the USSR and France became an important factor of stability in Europe and the rest of the world. To a large extent this was due to the regular reciprocal visits by statesmen and political and military leaders. In 1967 the Soviet Union was visited by the French Premier Georges Pompidou. That same year visits were exchanged by the Chiefs of the Soviet and French General Staffs. In the spring of 1968 a visit to the Soviet Union was made by the French Minister of the Armed Forces. At the close of 1969 and begin-

ning of 1970 visits were reciprocated by the Foreign Ministers Maurice Schumann and Andrei Gromyko. A major event was the official visit to the USSR in October 1970 by Georges Pompidou, who had been elected to the office of President of France in the summer of 1969. The Franco-Soviet Protocol signed during that visit provided for immediate contacts "in the event a situation arises that, in the opinion of the two sides, constitutes a threat to peace, a violation of the peace or a source of international tension", and for the expansion and deepening of political consultations on key international problems in which both countries were interested.

The Protocol gave the basis for further political consultations between the two governments on pressing world issues. European problems receive prominence on account of the responsibility of the two powers for the maintenance of peace in Europe and on account of the importance of these problems to international security. The political contacts brought to light that there was a substantial similarity of views between the two governments. Both desire an easing of tension in the relations between the European countries and concord between them in questions of peace and security, and both stand for the inviolability of the present frontiers of all the European states and favour the convocation of an all-European conference.

The attitudes of the Soviet Union and France are similar or coincide on the questions of a Middle East settlement and the restoration of peace in Indochina. Both attach importance to the problem of disarmament. They hold that the nuclear powers should meet and examine the ways and means of achieving real disarmament in that sphere. The views of the two countries are similar also on the question of banning chemical and bacteriological weapons and in their assessment of the threat that the use of sea and ocean floor for military purposes holds out to mankind.

There are, of course, divergences between them on a number of international issues. France has not signed the nuclear test-ban treaty and continues to test nuclear weapons in the Pacific. Neither has she signed the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, although Paris has declared that in that question its position would be identical with that of the signatory states. The chair of the French representative in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva remains empty.

But, on the whole, the political consultations held over the

past few years have shown that there is a wide area where Soviet and French interests and views coincide or are similar. This creates a realistic and solid foundation for the further development and consolidation of co-operation between them with the aim of easing world tension and strengthening peace.

There has been considerable progress also in economic, scientific and technical relations and trade between them. A network of organisations ensuring effective planning and the implementation of various contacts and exchanges has been set up and is functioning successfully. These contacts and exchanges are expanding. The Soviet-French Standing Commission, formed in fulfilment of the 1966 Declaration, began working in early 1967. Its functions are to determine the most promising areas for long-term economic, scientific and technical co-operation and consider questions related to the fulfilment of the programmes adopted by the two countries.

The practical aspects of these questions are handled by the Soviet-French Commission for Scientific, Technical and Economic Co-operation. Working groups are functioning successfully in the iron-and-steel, chemical, aircraft, automobile and other industries. A Chamber of Commerce with branches in Paris and Moscow has been set up to study the markets of the two countries and recommend the range of goods for these markets.

The broad possibilities and mutual benefit of Franco-Soviet economic relations are shown by the results of the fulfilment of the 1964 trade agreement. The envisaged volume of trade was surpassed, and in 1969 rose nearly 200 per cent above the 1964 level. The new agreement for 1970-1974 (signed on May 26, 1969) provided for doubling the volume of trade between the two countries. At the signing of this agreement it was noted that it was necessary to stimulate reciprocal deliveries of goods, particularly French imports of Soviet goods, especially machines, equipment and other manufactured goods, and also raw materials. Agreement was reached also on an increase of imports of consumer goods. The coincidence in time of the operation of this new agreement and the Soviet Union's new economic development plan allowed for a further stabilisation of trade on a long-term basis and for a fuller account of the requirements of the Soviet Union's planned economic development and of France's economy.

A specific of the trade between the two countries is that French firms sell equipment for Soviet industrial enterprises and help to assemble it. Under the 1969 agreement Soviet and French organisations are to build large industrial complexes jointly in the USSR and France.

The Soviet Union is participating in the construction of an iron-and-steel complex in Fos-sur-Mer (near Marseilles), and France is helping to build a truck factory and a pulp-and-paper mill in the USSR. Provision has been made for the development of a copper deposit in the Soviet Union and the delivery of natural gas to France in exchange for pipes and other equipment.

The conspicuous scientific and technological achievements of the USSR and France create the possibility for exchanges of know-how and for the joint fulfilment of scientific and technical programmes. Soviet and French scientists are successfully co-operating in the exploration of outer space, the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, the application of mathematical methods and computers in economic research and production management, and other areas. The industrial and technical co-operation between Soviet and French factories and organisations is opening up new aspects of peaceful co-existence in the light of the scientific and technological revolution. It creates the possibility for fruitful, mutually beneficial co-operation in furthering scientific and technological progress.

Visit by Leonid Brezhnev to France (October 1971)

The visit made to France by Leonid Brezhnev in October 1971 started a new phase of the development of friendship and co-operation between the two countries.

"The desire to strengthen peace is what above all unites the Soviet Union and France," Leonid Brezhnev said in Paris. "The striving for peace brings together all the peoples of the globe and leads to understanding between realistically thinking politicians. That is what led to the meeting between the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and the President of France. The actions of our two countries in favour of relaxation and the peaceful settlement of international issues are unquestionably a major factor in the modern world."

The talks between Leonid Brezhnev and Georges Pompidou were held in an atmosphere of friendship, mutual trust and a striving for agreement. As a result, decisions were adopted that are of paramount significance to turning Europe into a continent of peace, to the promotion of good-neighbourly, mutually beneficial relations. The Principles of Co-operation Between the USSR and France were signed at the Elysée Palace on October 30. In lucid and unequivocal language the document records the provisions guiding the actions of the two countries on the world scene, chiefly in Europe, and underlying the co-operation between them.

The preamble gives the principal aim pursued in the relations between the USSR and France. It is their common desire "to strengthen the contribution of both countries to the cause of peace in Europe and in the whole world and to promote co-operation among all states". As recorded in the Principles, a new element in the relations between the two countries is their solemn pledge to continue their policy of accord and co-operation, which is called upon "to become permanent policy in their relations and a permanent factor of international life".

Co-operation between the USSR and France, the Principles state, meets the common aspirations and mutual interests of the Soviet and French peoples, is not directed against the interests of any nation and in no way affects the commitments undertaken by the two countries in respect of third states.

An extremely important point mirrored in the Principles is the agreement to continue political consultations with the purpose of exploring possibilities of concerted actions in various areas, and also in international organisations and at international conferences in the interests of strengthening peace.

The Principles declare that as Great Powers and permanent members of the Security Council the USSR and France bear a responsibility for world peace, particularly in Europe, where this responsibility stems from the results of World War II. The Principles note the immense importance of close Franco-Soviet co-operation in Europe, jointly with interested states, in the maintenance of peace and in pursuing a course aimed at detente, in the strengthening of peace and peaceful relations between all countries on condition of the unswerving observance of the following principles: inviolability of the present borders, non-interference in internal affairs, equality,

independence, and renunciation of the use or threat of force.

The USSR and France pledged that they would work for the speediest attainment of a political settlement in areas where peace was being endangered or violated, that they would make their utmost contribution in order to solve the problem of general and complete disarmament, and first of all, nuclear disarmament, overcome the world's division into military-political groups and strengthen the role of the United Nations Organisation in keeping with the provisions of its Charter.

In the Franco-Soviet Declaration, signed at the same time, it is stated that the two countries were determined "to advance further the cause of detente" and to "deepen and strengthen still more" the co-operation between the USSR and France, especially their political co-operation, which serves exclusively peaceful aims.

It is noted with satisfaction in the Declaration that "new encouraging signs of a further evolution in the direction of detente" had appeared in Europe. The two countries reaffirmed the closeness of their views regarding an all-European conference. During the Franco-Soviet talks considerable attention was given to a discussion of the situation in the world's flashpoints from the angle of concerted action by the two countries in favour of a political settlement in the Middle East and in Southeast Asia. They reaffirmed their stand relative to general and complete disarmament, chiefly nuclear disarmament, under effective international control. France supported the Soviet proposal for a conference of the five nuclear powers and for a world conference on disarmament.

The General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and the President of France comprehensively reviewed the state and development prospects of the relations between the two countries. With the aim of further expanding mutually beneficial relations the two countries signed an agreement on the development of economic, technical and industrial co-operation over a period of ten years.

Soviet foreign trade organisations signed a contract with Renault, the nationalised French car concern, on the latter's participation in developing the production techniques and manufacture of diesel engines for the truck factory at Naberezhniye Chelny on the Kama River in the Soviet Union. Understanding was reached on an expansion of Soviet-French cultural contacts and on the promotion of military contacts.

An event of major international importance, Leonid Brezhnev's visit to France raised Franco-Soviet co-operation in all areas, and particularly in the political field, to a new level. As a result, Franco-Soviet co-operation is becoming a permanent factor in international relations helping to attain a peaceful settlement of acute problems, relax tension and strengthen security in Europe and in the whole world.

A further landmark in the growth of friendly relations and respect between the USSR and France was the meeting between Leonid Brezhnev and Georges Pompidou near Minsk in January 1973. This unofficial visit by the French President was devoted entirely to talks. The USSR and France reaffirmed their determination to help achieve detente in Europe, reach a settlement in Indochina and the Middle East and foster further progress towards disarmament. The sides expressed their desire to double the trade between them by 1974 and reached an understanding that in the immediate future they would draw up and sign a 10-year programme for widening economic, technical and industrial co-operation.

The Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of the USSR approved the results of this meeting and noted the importance of the statement in the communique that "the policy of accord and co-operation remains permanent policy in Franco-Soviet relations".

At the next meeting between Leonid Brezhnev and President Georges Pompidou on June 25-27, 1973 the two leaders expressed deep satisfaction over the broadening constructive co-operation between the two countries and reaffirmed that their countries would continue promoting such co-operation. As during the previous visit to France Leonid Brezhnev met with leaders of the French Communist Party.

3. Soviet-British Relations

From the History of Soviet-British Relations

Soviet policy towards Britain has always been, and still is, based on the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence and permeated with the most friendly feelings for the British people. At the same time, the Soviet Union has invariably

opposed the aggressive and colonialist actions of the British ruling classes and exposed the extreme inconsistency of the foreign policy pursued by both Conservative and Labour governments.

From the very first days of its existence the Soviet Government has held the view that peaceful co-operation with Britain is not only possible but necessary. In an interview granted to the British journalist Michael Farbrman Lenin noted that "we do not consider the differences between Britain and ourselves to be in any way insurmountable".*

The British ruling classes, however, pursued a hostile policy aimed at deposing the Soviet Government by means of a foreign intervention and gave all-out assistance to the white-guards. This policy, inspired by Winston Churchill, drew a blank.

Relations with Soviet Russia began to be normalised in the early 1920s when it became obvious to Britain that her plans of overthrowing the people's power were unrealistic. She was the first bourgeois country to conclude a trade agreement with Soviet Russia (spring of 1921). Diplomatic relations were established in 1924. In 1927 they were broken off by the British Government. In 1929 they were resumed.

In the 1930s the Soviet Union endeavoured to enlist Britain's co-operation in ensuring peace in Europe through a system of collective security. However, the proponents of "Western security" at the expense of the USSR gained ascendancy in the British Government. Chamberlain's Munich deal with Hitler went a long way towards starting the Second World War. But the British ruling circles miscalculated sorely in their policy of setting nazi Germany against the Soviet Union. After the nazis invaded Poland the flames of war spread to the West.

The Soviet Union and Britain became allies in the struggle against fascism. It was then that considerable progress was made in strengthening friendship between the peoples of the two countries. There were grounds for hoping that fruitful co-operation between the USSR and Britain would continue after victory had been won over nazi Germany. But the British Government sharply changed its course and, along with the USA, adopted a policy hostile to the USSR. Churchill was one of the principal inspirers of the cold war.

* V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, p. 384.

Relations Between the USSR and Britain After the Second World War

After the war the Soviet Union did not relax its efforts to improve political and economic relations with Britain. Its view was that as a major European power Britain could make a substantial contribution to security in the continent. However, her Government doggedly pursued the line of violating the Potsdam and other agreements signed by the Great Powers during and after the Second World War, and of forming aggressive blocs against the USSR and other East European socialist countries.

Towards the close of the 1940s and during the 1950s the Soviet Union repeatedly drew Britain's attention to the fact that she was jeopardising peace with her short-sighted policy of reviving German militarism and dividing Europe into two military blocs. Soviet diplomacy exposed the colonialist policies of the British imperialists in Asia and Africa and gave its support to the national liberation movement.

Aggravating during the cold war, the differences between the USSR and Britain were over European and such international problems as general and complete disarmament, the German peace treaty, the banning of all nuclear tests, the establishment of a system of European security and the dismantling of bases in foreign territory. In cases where the British Government dissociated itself from the most aggressive policies of the USA and tried to pursue a more or less independent line, the positions of the USSR and Britain drew closer. This found expression in Soviet-British co-operation on the world scene.

For instance, Britain was one of the countries that drew up and signed the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam and contributed to the signing of the International Agreement on Laos in 1962. In August 1963 she signed the Moscow partial test-ban treaty. However, the British Government was extremely inconsistent in co-operating to strengthen peace. This was due, above all, to the very nature of British imperialism and its dependence on its military bloc partners, chiefly the USA.

The Soviet Union has always been and continues to be emphatic in its condemnation of all the aggressive and colonialist policies of the British ruling circles. At the same time, it favours an improvement of its relations with Britain. In

the field of economic co-operation its efforts meet with understanding in British business circles who see the benefit of an expansion of contacts with the Soviet Union.

During the initial years after the war trade between the two countries showed an upward trend. In 1948 it quadrupled compared with 1946 and amounted to 147 million rubles. However, the Labour Government soon adopted a policy of discrimination against the Soviet Union, wrecking a long-term trade agreement and banning the export of commodities such as machine-tools, forge and press equipment and instruments, industrial diamonds, rare metals and alloys. This hit the interests of Britain heavily, too.

Nonetheless, the Soviet Government's consistent policy led to some progress. In April 1956 a Party and Government delegation of the USSR visited Britain. At the talks the sides came to the conclusion that it was in the interests of the peoples of both countries to strengthen Soviet-British relations in the political field and in trade, science, culture and other areas. In early 1959 the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan visited the USSR where he had talks with Soviet leaders on a number of international problems and on bilateral relations. Soon afterwards an agreement to expand cultural, scientific and technical co-operation was signed. A direct air service was inaugurated between Moscow and London.

In May 1959 the USSR and Britain signed a five-year trade agreement. This accord was the fruit of the Soviet Union's persevering efforts to end discrimination against it and place trade with Britain on the solid foundation of planning. The agreement contained the important provision that traditional Soviet goods would be imported by Britain under an open general import licence. As a result trade between the two countries increased by over 50 per cent.

There was an expansion of Soviet-British political contacts, too. Visits to the Soviet Union were made by members of the British Government and leading members of the Conservative Party. A visit to Britain was made in March 1965 by the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. The British Foreign Secretary visited the Soviet Union in November 1965. Following the talks held during that visit a consular convention was signed in Moscow on December 2. However, Britain continued to take her cue from the USA in major international issues such as collective security in Europe and a settlement in Vietnam.

The Soviet Union went on trying to improve political and economic relations with Britain. Important steps in that direction were the visit by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Alexei Kosygin to Britain in February 1967 and the talks that were held in Moscow in January 1968 between British statesmen and the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Leonid Brezhnev, the President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Nikolai Podgorny and the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Alexei Kosygin. In the period from May through June of the same year visits were made to the USSR by the British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart and the President of the Board of Trade Anthony Crosland. The USSR and Britain signed an agreement on scientific and technical co-operation in January 1968 and a merchant marine treaty in April of the same year.

Despite these favourable developments, the British ruling circles once again steered towards a deterioration of relations with the Soviet Union. Much of the progress that had been achieved was nullified by the anti-Soviet campaign that was started in connection with the events in Czechoslovakia. In August 1968 Britain unilaterally discontinued political contacts with the USSR and halted the talks that were in progress on trade and cultural relations.

However, the Soviet Government's unrelaxing efforts to normalise relations between the two countries led to a gradual expansion of contacts in various areas. A three-year agreement on contacts in science, education and culture and a new long-term trade accord were signed in Moscow in 1969.

The Conservative Government that came to power in 1970 adopted a hostile attitude towards countries of the socialist community. In the autumn of 1971 it inspired a gross provocation against the USSR, claiming that the personnel of Soviet organisations in Britain were conducting unlawful activities.

As a result of the unrealistic attitude adopted by the Heath Government there was a substantial shrinkage of Soviet-British economic, scientific and technical contacts. Trade dwindled from 641 million rubles in 1970 to 558 million rubles in 1972 and in Soviet trade with the industrialised capitalist states Britain dropped to fourth place after the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan and Finland. This situation alarmed public opinion, including business circles in Britain. Nor could the British Government ignore the pos-

itive changes in the situation in Europe and the rest of the world.

In 1972 it facilitated the conclusion of an agreement on trade credits for the USSR, and in 1973 took the initiative in convening the Inter-Governmental Commission on Scientific, Technical, Trade and Economic Co-operation, which had not met for two years. Agreement was reached on broader scientific and technical contacts and on an increase in trade. An official visit was paid to Moscow by the British Foreign Secretary Alec Douglas-Home on December 2-5, 1973. At the talks it was noted with satisfaction that the relations between the two countries were improving, the importance of continuing political contacts and consultations was underscored and steps were mapped out for broadening economic co-operation, one of these steps being the signing of a ten-year trade agreement. Further, it was decided to mark the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Britain in 1974 and the opinion was stated by both sides that friendly relations between the USSR and Britain were consonant with the interests of the peoples of the two countries and were helping to strengthen peace.

4. Relations Between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany

Through no fault of the Soviet Union's the development of its relations with the Federal Republic of Germany has been complex and contradictory. From the very outset anti-communism and anti-Sovietism became the keynotes of Bonn's policies. As soon as Konrad Adenauer was installed as Chancellor in 1949 he announced that his Government could not be friendly to the USSR.

Bonn hoped that with the aid of its imperialist allies it would be able to alter the territorial and political status quo and balance of strength in Europe and throughout the world in its favour. For many years these objectives underlay the aggressive policies of the FRG Government. It went to all lengths to poison relations with the USSR and other socialist countries, erecting obstacles to the healing of the deep wounds inflicted by Hitlerism. This was the principal obstacle to normal relations between the FRG and the socialist countries.

As regards the Soviet Union it had never been guided by a desire for revenge. It saw its internationalist duty in helping the German people uproot militarism and revanchism and lay the foundations for their country's democratic and peaceful development. The success of this policy is vividly seen in the reforms that have been put into effect in East Germany, and in the fraternal friendship, mutual assistance and comprehensive co-operation between the USSR and the German Democratic Republic.

Diplomatic Relations Between the USSR and the FRG (1955)

Soviet policy in German affairs has been consistently principled and peaceable. Its approach to the German question has always been realistic and constructive, with the decisions of the anti-Hitler coalition as its guide-lines.*

It is profoundly significant that the establishment of diplomatic relations with the FRG was initiated by the USSR. Although the policies pursued by Bonn were arousing serious concern, the Soviet Government had no intention of ignoring the FRG's existence. Its realistic attitude was that it was necessary to reckon with the actual state of affairs in Germany, where two states had emerged. From this stemmed the concrete actions of Soviet diplomacy.

In a Note to the FRG Government on June 7, 1955 the Soviet Union proposed talks with the object of normalising relations.

A turn towards normalisation was consonant with the interests of both countries. It would have contributed towards strengthening peace and the security of all the European states. This initiative was highly appreciated by public opinion, by political parties and organisations and by the trade unions in the FRG.

Circumstances compelled the FRG ruling circles to accept the invitation to send a delegation to the USSR. An FRG Government delegation led by Chancellor Adenauer visited Moscow from September 9 to 13, 1955.

The FRG ruling circles were not inclined to abandon their aggressive policies and sought to use the talks to obtain fundamental concessions from the USSR. At the talks the Soviet

* See Chapter Five.

Government proposed a programme for normalising relations on a mutually acceptable basis. However, the FRG delegation made the satisfaction of untenable demands the condition for diplomatic, trade and cultural relations. For instance, Adenauer declared that the post-war frontiers established at Potsdam were "not final". The Soviet Union flatly rejected these revanchist claims.

In the joint communique it was stated that the two countries had agreed to establish diplomatic relations with embassies in Moscow and Bonn. Further, they agreed that they would later discuss the question of trade.

In connection with Adenauer's pronouncements at a press conference in Moscow, a TASS Statement of September 14 pointed out that the FRG "exercised jurisdiction in the territory under its sovereignty"* and that the question of Germany's frontiers had been settled in the Potsdam Agreement.

The talks in Moscow contributed to an easing of international tension and created a basis for mutually beneficial contacts between the Soviet Union and the FRG.

Talks and Agreements, 1958

Notwithstanding these favourable developments the ruling circles in the FRG continued pinning their hopes on the cold war. The Soviet Government sincerely desired businesslike co-operation. In a Statement issued by TASS in March 1956 it was declared that the Soviet Government believed that all the conditions were on hand for good, friendly relations between the USSR and the FRG and that it would welcome an expansion of trade, for which there were broad possibilities, too.

On Soviet initiative an exchange of views took place between the Heads of the Soviet and FRG governments in 1957. The Soviet Government declared it was not satisfied with the way contacts were developing following the establishment of diplomatic relations and stressed that there was every possibility of achieving a "decisive turn from mutual suspicion and even certain hostility to trust and friendship" in the interests of the Soviet and German peoples. The FRG ruling circles, it was noted, were erecting obstacles to the realisation

* *Pravda*, September 16, 1955.

of these possibilities. For instance, as a precondition they were demanding the settlement of the "repatriation problem", claiming that "many thousands" of German citizens were still on Soviet territory. "Assertions of this kind," stated a Soviet Note of July 6, 1957, "are by no means conducive to the establishment of the understanding needed between the USSR and the FRG for the settlement of the problems that have arisen or may arise in the relations between the two countries."

The Bonn Government's refusal to expand trade and economic relations with the USSR incurred the displeasure of West German businessmen and public opinion. This displeasure mounted in proportion to the development of crisis phenomena that affected the economy of the Western countries in 1957-1958 and to the stiffening of inter-imperialist competition. The West German journal *Der Spiegel* wrote at the time that when the decline began in the German economy heightening interest was shown in trade with the Soviet Union.

The Bonn cold war policy towards the socialist states was increasingly finding itself in a blind alley. Contradictions multiplied in the Government coalition and in the ranks of the CDU/CSU. The course of events was making it imperative for the Government to take a sober view of the existing situation and abandon its unrealistic tactics and dogmas. Under the impact of these factors and as a result of the active foreign policy of the USSR and the other socialist countries the FRG Government had to agree to new talks with the Soviet Union.

These talks, held in 1958, culminated in the signing of a long-term agreement on trade and settlements, an agreement on general questions of trade and shipping, and a consular treaty. In some areas the USSR and the FRG accorded each other most-favoured nation treatment. A Soviet trade mission was opened in West Germany. The list of exports and imports for 1958-1960 was endorsed and a considerable expansion of Soviet-West German trade was planned. This development was assessed in the Soviet Union as the second most important step in USSR-FRG relations after the establishment of diplomatic relations. On the basis of these agreements headway was made in the promotion of economic contacts. In 1955-1959 trade rose from 47,700,000 to 188,400,000 rubles, i.e., by almost 300 per cent.

An agreement on cultural, scientific and technical exchanges for 1959-1960 was signed in 1958. In the preamble it was stated that the "exchange in the fields of culture, science and technology can foster a further strengthening of the relations between the two countries".

On Soviet initiative views were exchanged with the FRG on a wide range of questions in 1959-1961. In its messages, statements and notes the Soviet Government called on Bonn not to remain aloof from the efforts to settle outstanding international issues and end the cold war, stressing that to do so it had to renounce its policy of war preparations and threats and go over to peaceful coexistence with all countries. But this was ignored in Bonn. Due to the adamant stand of the Bonn Government no progress was made in the talks on cultural, scientific and technical contacts in 1961-1962.

Soviet-West German Relations in the 1960s

At the close of 1958 and the beginning of 1959 the Soviet Union advanced proposals for a German peace treaty and the normalisation of the situation in West Berlin. The hostile attitude of the FRG ruling circles to a German peace settlement made its imprint on West Germany's relations with the USSR. In a Memorandum handed to Chancellor Adenauer on February 17, 1961 it was stated that the "Soviet Government regards a peace treaty with Germany as the main question in Soviet-West German relations and attaches paramount importance to the immediate settlement of that question".

However, as a condition for improving relations Bonn demanded that the USSR cease to invoke the Potsdam Agreement as the foundation of its policy in the German question. The FRG rejected direct talks as proposed in the Soviet Government's Memorandum of December 27, 1961. In 1962 the FRG recalled its Ambassador in Moscow Hans Kroll, whom the revanchist circles had charged with trying to improve relations with the USSR. Horst Gröpper, described as a rabid anti-Communist by *Der Spiegel*, was appointed in his place.

Acting on NATO recommendations, the FRG Government in 1963 banned the sale of large-diameter pipes to the USSR despite the fact that the contracts for these pipes had been

signed with its knowledge. This was a flagrant contravention of the principles of international law, the principles of fidelity to agreements. "The character of this action by the Federal Government," stated a Soviet Note of April 6, 1963, "makes it clear to the Soviet Government that this is an act of open hostility with the purpose of aggravating USSR-FRG relations, which, in their present state, leave much to be desired."

The FRG Government refused to sign a new agreement on trade, which in 1964 was reduced to occasional transactions.

From time to time, for tactical reasons, the FRG ruling circles declared they were prepared for rapprochement with the Soviet Union. However, on account of their hostile policies, as was acknowledged even by the West German press, there was no progress in the relations with the USSR. Noting the untenability of the "positions of strength" policy, the newspaper *Westfälische Rundschau* wrote that the CDU/CSU leaders would have liked to wave their fists at the Communists, but that this show of muscles could not move even the smallest stone in the German question.

In 1964,* in spite of growing public criticism the FRG Government took further steps to restrict and obstruct relations with the USSR. Its representatives in NATO and the EEC spoke in favour of discriminatory measures in trade with the USSR, against granting it long-term trade credits. It persisted in refusing to sign a new trade agreement.

While showing that this was an unrealistic policy, the Soviet Union steadfastly adhered to its course of peaceful coexistence with the FRG. At the 23rd Congress of the CPSU the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko said: "We stand for the normalisation and improvement of relations with the FRG on the basis of a turn by that country towards peaceful coexistence and a policy of realism."

When the coalition Government** was formed in Bonn the USSR and the FRG exchanged views on an agreement re-

* Adenauer retired in October 1963. He was replaced as Chancellor by Ludwig Erhard, who headed the FRG Government until November 1966.

** A coalition Government consisting of representatives of the CDU/CSU and the SPD was formed on December 1, 1966 following the government crisis lasting for several weeks. It was headed by Kurt Kiesinger with Willy Brandt, Chairman of the SPD and former burgomaster of West Berlin, as Vice-Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs.

nouncing the use of force. The drafts of statements on this question were handed to the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn in February 1967. The substance of these statements was that some of the basic factors of the situation in Europe should be considered "debatable", namely, the inviolability of the post-war frontiers, the existence of two sovereign German states, the denial to the FRG of access to nuclear weapons and the invalidity of the Munich agreement from the moment it was concluded.

In reply the Soviet Government stated its considerations regarding the conditions on which it could agree to an exchange of declarations on the renunciation of the use of force. Its point of departure was that these statements should cast no doubt whatever on the results of the Second World War or on the character of post-war development, and that they should meet with the requirements of European security. Bonn adopted a negative stand on all the basic questions put forward by the Soviet Government concerning European security and West Germany's relations with socialist states.

This attitude seriously complicated economic co-operation with the Soviet Union despite the fact that growing interest in such co-operation was shown by business circles who did not wish to lose a large and promising market. In 1960 the FRG was the Soviet Union's largest capitalist trading partner. In 1965-1968 it dropped to fourth and then to fifth place.

In assessing the FRG's policies towards the Soviet Union in 1949-1969 it must be noted that there were serious miscalculations springing from an unrealistic evaluation of the new balance of strength in Europe and throughout the world. Bonn had to look for a way out of the resultant impasse.

Moscow Treaty of August 12, 1970

The Bundestag elections in September 1969 made Willy Brandt Chancellor. The defeat of the CDU/CSU and the formation of a Government by the SPD and the FDP mirrored the changes in West German public opinion, which was more and more insistently demanding a realistic foreign policy. This demand was regarded with understanding in the Soviet Union.

The resolute stand of the socialist states and all other peace forces against militarism and revanchism and the further

growth of the political, economic and military strength and international prestige of the USSR and the socialist community as a whole compelled the FRG ruling circles to renounce most of the elements of the unrealistic policy that they had pursued for many years in their relations with the socialist countries. Also a contributing factor was the desire of the West German business circles for trade and economic co-operation with the socialist states.*

In a statement on behalf of the Government in the Bundestag on October 28 the Chancellor said that the FRG needed peace in the full sense of the word with the Soviet people as well. In November 1969 the FRG Government proposed beginning talks with the USSR on the renunciation of the use of force. A new round of opinion exchanges was started on this question on December 8 in Moscow with the FRG Ambassador in the USSR and then between a delegation led by the Soviet Foreign Minister and an FRG delegation. In the summer of 1970 the talks ended with the drawing up of the text of a treaty, which was signed on August 12, 1970 during an official visit to the USSR by the Federal Chancellor Willy Brandt.

The preamble stated that the two countries desired to contribute to the consolidation of peace and security in Europe and the world. The conviction was expressed that "peaceful co-operation between states on the basis of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations accords with the aspirations of the peoples and the broad interests of international peace". The USSR and the FRG recorded their desire to express in contractual form "their determination to improve and extend co-operation between them, including economic relations and scientific, technical and cultural ties, in the interests of both states".

Article 1 of the Treaty stated that the two countries "regard it as an important aim of their policy to maintain international peace and achieve a relaxation of tension". They expressed their desire to promote the "normalisation of the situation in Europe and the development of peaceful rela-

* In 1969 West Germany's trade with socialist states totalled 11,600 million marks (exports—6,700 million marks; and imports—4,900 million marks). In the FRG's overall foreign trade the share of these countries was relatively small—5.5 per cent. Soviet-West German trade reached 496,800,000 rubles in 1969.

tions between all European states, and proceed in doing so from the actual situation existing in this area".

The central place in the Treaty is occupied by Article 3, which says that the Soviet Union and the FRG "agree in recognising that peace in Europe can be maintained only if no one encroaches on the present frontiers". Proceeding from this recognition they undertook unflinchingly to respect the territorial integrity of all the European states in their present frontiers and declared that they had no territorial claims on any country and would not advance such claims in the future. They pledged to regard as inviolable now and in the future the frontiers of all the states in Europe as they ran on the day the Treaty was signed, including the Oder-Neisse line, which formed the western frontier of the Polish People's Republic, and the frontier between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic.

The Moscow Treaty thus recognises the present and future inviolability of frontiers. This is what mainly determines its European and world significance. This Treaty is a shattering blow to the revanchists and neonazis in the FRG who are opposed to recognising the results of the Second World War and the territorial and political status quo in Europe. It provides the foundation for good-neighbourly relations between all the countries of Europe.

A major element of the Treaty is the commitment (Article 2) to settle disputes, in accordance with the aims and principles of the UN Charter, exclusively by peaceful means and, in issues affecting European and world security and in relations with each other, to refrain from the threat or use of force.

Article 4 states that the Treaty does not prejudice any previous bilateral or multilateral treaties or agreements concluded by the USSR and the FRG.

In the Joint Communiqué the signatories expressed the conviction that the Treaty was "opening favourable prospects for the successful development of peaceful co-operation between the USSR and the FRG in diverse spheres in the interests of their peoples". It would help to strengthen security in Europe, settle the problems existing in that area and organise peaceful co-operation between all the European states regardless of their social systems. The governments of the USSR and the FRG would contribute "to the realisation of steps serving these aims".

Moreover, an understanding was reached at the talks on many questions related to European politics. This was mirrored in a separate document, "Understanding on Intentions", which concerns the development of relations between the GDR and the FRG on the basis of complete equality, without discrimination, the steps that would enable the GDR and the FRG to become members of the United Nations, and the settlement between the FRG and Czechoslovakia of problems linked with the invalidity of the Munich agreement.

As an important contribution to the creation of a system of collective security in Europe, the Moscow Treaty facilitated the convocation of the European Conference on Peace and Security. Moreover, it was an important step towards the formal recognition of the German Democratic Republic, a peace-loving socialist German state, by the FRG and other Western powers.

The Treaty opened the road for the normalisation of the FRG's relations with Poland, Czechoslovakia and other socialist countries.

It is helping the working class and all other working people, all the progressive forces in West Germany in their struggle against monopoly rule, for their vital rights, against revanchism and neonazism. The Treaty itself and the struggle over its ratification led to a further demarcation of the political forces in the FRG, showing who were for and who were against the easing of international tension and the settlement of outstanding issues by negotiation.

In assessing the significance of the Treaty with the FRG, Leonid Brezhnev said: "Everybody benefited equally: the socialist countries, the FRG and all who desire the consolidation of peace in Europe and the easing of world tension."

The Treaty put an end to the long period of strained relations between the USSR and the FRG induced by the policies of the ruling circles in Bonn. It creates the political and legal foundation for the establishment of good-neighbourly relations and mutually beneficial co-operation between the two countries.

Since the signing of the Treaty progress has been achieved in promoting these relations. This was seen particularly at the meeting in the Crimea on September 16-18, 1971 between Leonid Brezhnev and the Federal Chancellor Willy Brandt, who noted that "there are vast possibilities for steadily expanding mutually beneficial co-operation between the two

countries in the most diverse areas". In November 1971, when the FRG Foreign Minister Walter Scheel paid an official visit to the Soviet Union, the two countries reiterated their readiness to sign a trade agreement in the near future in order to promote economic co-operation, and stated their desire to draw up an agreement on cultural exchanges. They noted the possibility and desirability of expanding scientific and technical co-operation and declared they would set up a mixed commission for economic co-operation.

There was a further expansion of trade and economic contacts between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany in 1969-1970. For instance, Soviet foreign trade organisations and West German concerns signed an agreement on February 2, 1970. Within a period of 20 years, beginning in 1973, the Federal Republic of Germany is to receive over 52,000 million cubic metres of Soviet natural gas. West Germany started to export to the Soviet Union large-diameter pipes and other equipment for the gas industry. The Soviet Union was given a credit of 1,200 million marks to pay for these goods.

In 1971 Soviet-West German trade totalled over 600 million rubles. The long-term agreement on trade and economic co-operation signed by the USSR and the FRG in Bonn on July 5, 1972 will help to the further expansion of trade between the two countries.

Meanwhile, a sharp struggle raged in the parliamentary organs of the FRG around the ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw* treaties, which were attacked violently by conservative and openly revanchist elements. The act of ratification was postponed several times, and there was the threat that the treaties would not be ratified. Characterising the attitude of the treaties' adversaries, Leonid Brezhnev said at the 15th Congress of Soviet Trade Unions in March 1972 that "they contend that the treaties are not good on the grounds that they guarantee the inviolability of the frontiers in Europe, and there is talk that the pertinent articles in the treaties should be 'reconsidered'. But is it not obvious that the opponents of the treaties neither have nor will have interlocutors for negotiations on a reconsideration of the frontiers?" The Soviet Union, he said, is sincere and

* Treaty between the FRG and Poland.

serious in its approach to an improvement of relations with the FRG. "One of the factors we are taking into consideration is that the majority of the West German population is in favour of an improvement of relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries."^{*}

Large sections of the population of the FRG, notably the working class, young people and intellectuals, actively championed the realistic tendencies in the FRG Government's foreign policy. The West German Communists were in the front ranks of the forces pressing for a relaxation of tension in the continent and for an improvement of the FRG's relations with the European socialist countries. These efforts were rewarded. The Moscow Treaty was ratified by the Bundestag on May 17, 1972.

Visit by Leonid Brezhnev to the FRG

The visit paid by Leonid Brezhnev to the Federal Republic of Germany on May 18-22, 1973 was eloquent testimony of the triumph of the Leninist policy of peaceful coexistence of states, regardless of their social systems, and of the successful implementation of the Soviet Peace Programme. Leonid Brezhnev's talks with Chancellor Willy Brandt and other West German statesmen and his meetings with leaders of the Communist Party of Germany, the trade unions and the business world helped to consolidate the new political climate that had begun to develop between the two countries. Leonid Brezhnev was accorded a very cordial friendly welcome by broad sections of the population and received many thousands of letters and telegrams of greetings from all parts of the FRG.

At the talks, which were held in a constructive spirit, the participants summed up what had been achieved and discussed and determined the prospects for the future. The agreement on economic, industrial and technical co-operation that was concluded envisages the building of industrial complexes conforming to the economic interests of the two countries, co-operation in the production of individual types of equipment and other goods and also of raw materials,

^{*} L. I. Brezhnev, *Leninskim kursom*, Vol. 3, pp. 488-89.

exchanges of patents and technical information, and the sending of experts for the rendering of technical services and training. The USSR and the FRG signed an agreement on cultural co-operation and a protocol to the 1971 agreement on air communication.

Both sides declared that the Moscow Treaty of August 12, 1970 was an historic landmark in the relations between the two countries and in European development as a whole, that it was "a reliable basis for surmounting the bitter past and restructuring and improving relations between the two countries". They expressed their determination to implement the treaty and on its basis to secure the steady improvement and development of the relations between them.

The visit by Leonid Brezhnev reinforced the turn towards new, normal peace-time relations and mutually beneficial co-operation between the Soviet Union and the FRG. At the same time, its significance goes far beyond the context of bilateral relations inasmuch as the relations between the USSR and the FRG are an important link of international relations generally and in Europe, in particular. Having considered the results of the visit, the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Council of Ministers of the USSR noted that it was a tangible contribution to the implementation of the foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state and was "of considerable significance to further progress towards detente and the strengthening of peace and the security of all the peoples of Europe".

The attainment of these objectives has been and remains one of the central aims of the USSR, of its friends and allies, of all the peace forces.

5. Soviet-Italian Relations

From the History of Relations Between the USSR and Italy

During the past half century there have been many ups and downs in the relations between the Soviet Union and Italy. However, one thing is certain and it is that friendly relations have always benefited both countries, helping to

strengthen Italy's economic and political position. A departure from these relations and membership of aggressive blocs invariably led to a curtailment of Italy's independence and to a decline of her prestige in the world.

Italy was one of the first West European states to establish diplomatic relations and conclude a trade agreement with the Soviet Union. In those days economic links with the USSR held a prominent place in Italy's foreign trade and demonstrated the huge benefits of co-operation with the USSR, whose economy is not subject to the chaotic fluctuations of the capitalist market. The relations between the two countries deteriorated in the mid-1930s, when Italy opted for aggression.

During the Second World War, as Nazi Germany's principal ally in Europe the Mussolini regime involved Italy into a piratical invasion of the Soviet Union. But the Italian working people were opposed to the war and during its concluding stage fought shoulder to shoulder with the Soviet people against fascism. In the Italian Resistance movement there were hundreds of Soviet people who found themselves in Italy at the time. This fighting co-operation in the struggle against fascism might have been a good foundation for the development of friendly relations between the two countries after the war.

When Italy withdrew from the war the USSR was the first country in the anti-Hitler coalition to resume diplomatic relations with her, and gave its utmost assistance to enable the Italian people to take the road of democracy as soon as possible. When the peace treaty was being drawn up the Soviet Union protected Italy against the attempts of the imperialist powers to force onerous terms on her.

However, guided by their class interests Italy's ruling circles oriented their policies towards the USA, with the result that the country was drawn into a system of economic, political and military blocs spearheaded at the Soviet Union. This greatly restricted Italy's independence. In order to justify this policy the reactionary press spread fabrications claiming that the USSR was holding up the return of prisoners of war, obstructing Italy's admittance to the United Nations, and so forth. By joining actively in the cold war the Italian Government erected a barrier to friendly relations with the Soviet Union.

In subsequent years the USSR initiated many moves to normalise relations with Italy. On May 20, 1958 the Soviet Union offered to sign a 20-year Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression with Italy. This offer was welcomed by broad democratic strata in Italy, but the ruling circles clung to their cold war orientation. In the spring of 1959, despite the relaxation that had set in in international affairs in the latter half of the 1950s and the widespread popular protests, the Italian Government permitted the US military authorities to establish missile-launching sites on Italian territory. In the summer of the same year it declined the initiative of the USSR and other socialist countries, which proposed that the Balkans and the Adriatic area should be declared a nuclear-free zone.

The arguments of the Italian ruling circles that it was necessary to rely on strength in foreign policy mirrored their fear of the growing working-class and democratic movement in Italy herself, of the mounting influence exercised by the Italian Communist Party and of the consolidation of the world socialist system. Besides, the Italian Government did not make a secret of the fact that anti-communism was the guide-line of its internal and external policies. Indicative in this respect was the statement of the Italian Foreign Minister Giuseppe Pella that he would rather have Italy risk an atomic invasion than see the establishment of a communist regime.

The anti-Soviet myths being spread in Italy were exploded by the Soviet Union's consistent efforts to improve its relations with Italy. Its economic, scientific and technological achievements brought a section of the Italian business world around to a more sober evaluation of the benefits that Italy could derive from a normalisation of relations and an expansion of economic links with the Soviet Union.

The majority of the Italian people were opposed to the Atlantic policy. They wanted an easing of international tension and improved relations with the USSR. A radical reconsideration of foreign policy was demanded from the Government by the Italian Communists. In his report to the 9th Congress of the Italian Communist Party in early 1960 Palmiro Togliatti noted that throughout the post-war period the aims, orientation and character of Italian foreign policy had not met with the true interests, aspirations and calling of the nation. He urged the Government to reconsider its policy. The solution, he said, lay in "total renunciation of the policy

founded on strength or the threat of retaliation, in general disarmament, in peaceful coexistence".

Towards the close of the 1950s the artificial alienation that sprang exclusively from the cold war and was inconsonant with the true interests of the Soviet Union and Italy had gradually begun to disperse through the efforts of the USSR and the forces in Italy that were advocating co-operation between the two countries.

Activation of Soviet-Italian Contacts in the Early 1960s

The trend towards normalisation began to be discerned mainly in the area of economic contacts. For some years after the war trade between the USSR and Italy was promoted on the basis of short-term agreements that were signed in accordance with the Treaty on Trade and Shipping (December 1948). A long-term agreement on reciprocal deliveries of goods for 1958-1961 envisaging a steady growth of trade was signed in Rome in 1957. A payments agreement establishing the most convenient form of mutual settlements for both countries was signed at the same time. This switch to elements of planning economic links on a long-term basis had a favourable effect on the relations between the two countries in other areas.

In October 1959 the Italian Minister of Foreign Trade Rinaldo Del Bo went to Moscow for the express purpose of holding talks on trade for 1960. By that time it had begun to be evident that the Italian firms were showing a heightening interest in the Soviet market. At the end of 1958 and beginning of 1959 Soviet foreign trade organisations signed contracts worth 100 million rubles with a number of firms, the Montecatini chemical concern, in particular, for the delivery to the Soviet Union of plant for three chemical factories in 1960-1962. The desire of Italian businessmen for broader economic contacts met with understanding from Soviet foreign trade organisations.

During the talks with Del Bo agreement was reached on questions of political importance. In the communique it was noted that all Italian prisoners of war had been repatriated, that none of them had been detained in the USSR under any pretext.

The "problem" of prisoners of war, which had for many years been poisoning the relations between the two countries, was thus settled. At the talks with Del Bo agreement was reached also on questions concerning trade and cultural relations. The results of this visit showed that provided there was mutual understanding it was easy to find a good foundation for the successful development of links and for the normalisation of relations between the USSR and Italy.

In early 1960 the President of the Italian Republic Giovanni Gronchi visited the USSR at the invitation of the Soviet Government.

The Italian President's decision to visit the USSR gave rise to a sharp political struggle. The decision was warmly welcomed by all the proponents of relaxation, by democratic public opinion. The hope that the visit would help to improve relations between Italy and the Soviet Union and improve the overall international situation was expressed at rallies and demonstrations, in the resolutions and petitions of various public and party organisations and in the innumerable letters and telegrams addressed to the President. The Gronchi visit was supported by the bourgeois circles that wanted Italy to pursue a more independent policy and were realistically evaluating the benefits held out by an expansion of links with the Soviet Union.

But the visit was violently resisted by the extreme Right-wing parties and reactionary clerical circles, who sought to dissuade the Government from what they called "hasty action" and expressed doubts about the usefulness of the visit.

Although the Government adhered to the cold war policy, its assessment of the situation obtaining in the world at the time and of the balance of strength in Italy led it to approve the visit.

At the talks in Moscow the Italian side formally recognised the principle of peaceful coexistence as the foundation for relations with the USSR. The problem of disarmament and European security was discussed. It was noted with satisfaction that trade was expanding between Italy and the Soviet Union and a decision was adopted to sign an agreement on cultural co-operation.

President Gronchi's visit to the USSR marked the beginning of a dialogue between the two countries. The Italian Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani and the Foreign Minister Antonio Segni visited the USSR in 1961. Alexei Kosygin

visited Italy in 1962 at the invitation of Italian business circles, and again in 1964 to attend the opening of the Soviet trade and industry exhibition in Genoa.

The first half of the 1960s saw unquestionable progress in Soviet-Italian economic co-operation. The volume of trade envisaged by the 1957 agreement was exceeded. The new agreement, signed in 1961 for a period of four years, provided for a considerable growth of trade. The complications engendered by the cold war were thus gradually removed and the conditions created for the further advancement of mutually beneficial links.

Present Relations Between the USSR and Italy

In Soviet-Italian relations a new phase commenced in the second half of the 1960s. It was characterised by a substantial expansion of political contacts and by a transition from limited trade agreements to broader economic, scientific and technical co-operation.

In April 1966 the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko visited Italy where the talks brought the positions of the two countries closer together not only in the area of direct relations but also on some major international problems. A new element was introduced into the relations between the two countries by the understanding on political consultations and on bilateral contacts.

A further boost to Soviet-Italian links was given at the close of January 1967 when Nikolai Podgorny visited Italy. At the talks in Rome there was a broad exchange of views on the most pressing problems of peace and international co-operation and a comprehensive examination of Italian-Soviet relations. In the communique it was noted, for example, that both the Soviet Union and Italy attached immense importance to a relaxation of international tension and to security in Europe. They felt that there had to be further progress towards creating an atmosphere of trust and understanding in Europe and accentuated the need for better relations between the countries of Eastern and Western Europe, and for more intensive economic, scientific, technical, trade and cultural contacts on both a bilateral and an all-European basis. Both countries favoured the holding of a European conference, declaring that if it was properly pre-

pared it could become a forum for understanding and concerted action. They expressed their concern over the threatening situation in Vietnam.

It was noted with satisfaction that in many areas Soviet-Italian relations had expanded considerably.

Economic, scientific and technical co-operation was given close attention. Noting that there were considerable possibilities for promoting co-operation, the two sides agreed to continue exploring new areas where an accord on contacts could be reached.

The sides stressed that the current exchanges of opinion were useful and agreed that personal contacts should be maintained between statesmen with the purpose of holding consultations on questions affecting the interests of the two countries and that these consultations should be more constructive.

In continuation of the fruitful talks held in Rome Soviet statesmen had talks with Amintore Fanfani, then the Italian Foreign Minister, during his visit to Moscow in May 1967. Touching on Soviet-Italian relations, the sides stated their intention of moving further, of promoting co-operation in all areas.

The basis for the successful development of relations between the two countries was extended by the agreement on economic, scientific and technical co-operation concluded in April 1966. The Soviet-Italian Commission set up in accordance with the 1966 agreement began functioning at the close of the same year with the exploration of the most promising areas of co-operation as its principal objective.

A new impulse to Soviet-Italian relations was given in recent years. At the 24th Congress of the CPSU Italy was named among the capitalist countries with which mutually beneficial economic, scientific and technical contacts were developing on a large scale and on a long-term basis. Indeed, the agreement signed in August 1966 with Fiat on co-operation in the building of a car works at Togliatti and the agreement of December 1969 on the exchange of Soviet natural gas for pipes and other equipment for pipe-lines were among the largest contracts ever signed by the Soviet Union with a Western country. Considerable commercial exchange is envisaged by the Soviet-Italian trade agreement for 1970-1974. Growing importance is being acquired by scienti-

fic and technical co-operation on the basis of long-term agreements signed with leading Italian chemical, engineering, computer and light industry concerns. Scientific contacts are expanding and substantial headway has been made in promoting cultural contacts, particularly in the sphere of the theatre, films, television and tourism.

The gratifying results achieved during the past decade or so show that co-operation meets with the interests of both countries and has excellent prospects. Unswervingly abiding by the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence of states regardless of their socio-economic systems, the Soviet Union is consistently pursuing a policy of furthering mutually beneficial co-operation with all countries desiring such co-operation. For her part Italy shows a steadfast desire for expanding links with the Soviet Union.

A feature distinguishing current Soviet-Italian relations is the growing attention that is being given to the political aspects of co-operation. Symbolic in this respect are the results of the official visits made to Italy by the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in 1970 and to the Soviet Union by the Italian Foreign Minister Aldo Moro in July 1971. At the talks during these visits while expressing their desire to continue promoting mutually beneficial contacts on a firmer foundation the sides noted the usefulness of bilateral political consultations and agreed that such consultations should be developed at various levels. Life is bearing out the fact that problems of international economic contacts closely intertwine with political questions and, in the case of Italy and the Soviet Union, with the settlement of the long-standing problem of normalising the situation in Europe and ensuring security and the mutual trust necessary for broad economic, scientific and cultural co-operation among all European countries.

Lately there has been a further consolidation of the political and economic relations between the USSR and Italy. A Soviet-Italian protocol on consultations was signed in October 1972 during a visit to the Soviet Union by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Italy Giulio Andreotti. This document makes political consultation at different levels a permanent factor of the relations between the two countries and gives wide scope not only to bilateral relations. It provides for Soviet-Italian co-operation in strengthening world peace and achieving progress towards disarmament

and security in Europe. It states that in the event a situation arises which, in the opinion of the two countries, threatens or disturbs peace or may cause dangerous international complications the Soviet and Italian governments would contact each other with the purpose of achieving understanding regarding the measures necessary to normalise the situation.

In the joint communique it was underscored that by signing the protocol the USSR and Italy expressed their desire to achieve closer relations in all areas, including political contacts.

6. Soviet-Japanese Relations

Soviet Opposition to an Imperialist Peace With Japan

The surrender of Japan, Nazi Germany's Far Eastern ally, was predetermined when her main land forces were defeated by the Soviet Army. The instrument of surrender, under which Japan accepted the programme for a post-war settlement, was signed on September 2, 1945. The programme, which was worked out by the anti-Hitler coalition, limited her sovereignty to the Japanese islands and provided for the restoration of Korea's independence, the return of South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands to the Soviet Union and of Taiwan, the Pescadores and Manchuria to China, Japan's conversion into a peaceful democratic state and the removal from power and influence of those who had deceived and deluded the people of Japan into taking the road of worldwide conquest. Japan was temporarily occupied by the USA, which was pledged to carry out joint decisions on behalf of the Allied powers.

The Soviet Union was categorically opposed to the occupation policy being determined exclusively by the USA. Inter-Allied agencies—the Far Eastern Commission in Washington to map out joint policy towards Japan and the Allied Council for Japan in Tokyo to help in the practical realisation of that policy—were set up on the insistence of the USSR. In these agencies the Soviet representatives showed that the USA was pursuing an imperialist policy, and made every effort to secure the implementation of measures

that would guarantee Japan's democratisation and peaceful development.

In view of the Soviet stand, which had wide support in Japan, the US occupation authorities had to satisfy some of the demands of the democratic forces. The chief Japanese war criminals were tried and sentenced, universal suffrage was introduced and the Constitution was amended to include articles prohibiting Japan from participating in war and having an army, navy and air force. The agrarian reform in the main swept away feudal relations in the countryside.

However, the central objective of US policy was to subjugate Japan economically and politically and turn her into a US military springboard in the Far East. In pursuance of this objective the occupation authorities suppressed the democratic forces and strengthened the position of the monopolies and the reactionaries. After the USA failed to subjugate China with the aid of the Kuomintang regime, it shifted the accent in its Far Eastern policy to an alliance with the Japanese monopolies. The Yoshida Government, representing monopoly capital, was formed in 1948. On the instructions and with the backing of the occupation authorities it launched a programme of "economic stabilisation" at the expense of the living standard of the people, further restricted the freedom of the trade unions and virtually outlawed the Communist Party. It began building up armed forces in the guise of a police force. Through the Yoshida Government the USA controlled Japan, where a ramified network of US military bases was set up.

As the imperialist objectives of the US occupation became more and more clearly defined, the Japanese working people showed a growing determination to achieve the restoration of national independence and democratic rights. For their part, the ruling circles demanded greater freedom of action in internal and international affairs.

The Soviet Union insisted that a peace treaty with Japan be drawn up with account of the programme which the Allied powers had agreed on. At the close of 1949 the Soviet representative in the Far Eastern Commission again exposed the US tactics of procrastination on this issue and declared that a peace treaty should be signed as soon as possible. But the US leaders refused even to consider a peace settlement that would ensure Japan's genuinely independent and democratic

development. In flagrant contravention of joint decisions, they steered towards a treaty that would help to preserve their control of Japan and turn that country into an ally and junior partner against the socialist countries and the liberation movement in the Far East and Asia as a whole. The USA had the support of Britain and other colonial powers and also of the ruling circles in Japan, who were eager to receive American economic aid and to co-operate with the USA in suppressing the democratic forces.

The USA rejected the Soviet demand that a peace treaty should be drawn up by the Council of Foreign Ministers or some other international forum of the principal participants in the war against Japan, including the People's Republic of China. Following the separate bilateral talks with its allies and the Japanese Government during which it agreed the draft of the Treaty that it had drawn up, the USA announced the date of a peace conference in order to get the Treaty signed.

The USA forwarded the preliminary terms and draft Treaty to the Soviet Government and, on the strength of that, asserted that the Soviet Union was participating in the separate talks. This manoeuvre was exposed. In its memos to the USA in May 1951 the Soviet Government pointed out that the Treaty had been drawn up in violation of the established procedure and did not accord with the aim of ensuring Japan's development as a peaceful, democratic state. It offered suggestions for the removal of these shortcomings. In a Note of June 10, 1951 it again stated that the American draft was fundamentally at variance with the efforts to ensure lasting peace in the Far East and with the national interests of Japan herself.

By reducing the peace conference to a treaty-signing ceremony, the USA calculated that the Soviet Government would decline the invitation. However, the USSR decided to attend the conference, which was held in San Francisco in September 1951.

In a strained atmosphere the Soviet Union used the rostrum of the conference to expose the imperialist terms of the Treaty and put forward a constructive programme for a democratic peace settlement in the Far East. The Soviet delegation showed that the American draft clashed with the Allied decisions; that it created the conditions for the rejuvenation of militarism and revanchism; that it infringed on

the sovereignty and democratic rights of the Japanese people; that it contravened the legitimate rights of countries that had suffered from Japanese imperialist aggression. While accepting without amendment 22 of the 27 articles in the Treaty, the Soviet delegation proposed amendments and additions that fully accorded with the earlier agreed programme of the Allied powers and would have ensured Japan's independent democratic development and a lasting peace in the Far East.

Brushing aside the objections of the USSR and some other countries, the USA and its allies succeeded in getting the American draft signed on September 8.

The Peace Treaty contained no provisions limiting Japan's armed forces and thereby created the conditions for the restoration of militarism. It said nothing about the return of Taiwan to China or of South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands to the Soviet Union, although one of the articles stated that Japan renounced these territories. In violation of the Allied decisions Japan was made to turn the Ryukyu (the largest US base in the Far East was on Okinawa), the Bonin and other islands over to US administration. Besides, the USA refused to invite the People's Republic of China, the Mongolian People's Republic, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Korean People's Democratic Republic to sign the treaty despite the fact that their peoples had suffered from aggression and made a large contribution to the victory over the Japanese militarists. Moreover, the USA and Japan signed a Security Treaty, which perpetuated the US military presence in Japan and gave the US military the authority to suppress uprisings and disorders.

The terms of the San Francisco treaties gave the USA a number of benefits. They also benefited the Japanese ruling elite, who used US support to trample on the rights of the working people, increase the profits of the monopolies, build up armed forces and resume their expansionist foreign policy. By legalising US military control of Japan these treaties were a threat to peace in the Far East and clashed with the interests of the Japanese people, who were demanding an independent national policy. Partnership with the USA drew Japan into the orbit of the US policy of aggression and isolated her from the other states of Asia. Moreover, the anti-socialist policy underlying the Peace Treaty forced on Japan by the USA was also inimical to Japan's interests.

In view of the Peace Treaty's imperialist character it was not signed by the USSR and the other socialist countries that attended the San Francisco Conference. This action stimulated the struggle of the Japanese people for independence and democracy, expressed internationalist solidarity with the Asian socialist countries and was a protest against the violation of the Allied terms for a peace settlement in the Far East.

Normalisation of Soviet-Japanese Relations

The Soviet Union's refusal to sign the Peace Treaty did not mean its attitude to Japan was hostile. On the contrary, it wanted good-neighbourly relations with that country on the basis of peaceful coexistence and co-operation in ensuring peace in the Far East. In August 1953 the Soviet Government declared it would subscribe to any move towards a normalisation of relations. This was underscored also in the Soviet-Chinese Declaration of October 12, 1954.

In Japan the unfriendly policy that the Government was pursuing towards the socialist countries was heavily criticised not only by democratic circles but also by influential businessmen, including members of the ruling party. They insisted on trade and political contacts with the Soviet Union. At the close of 1954 the Japanese parliament passed a vote of no confidence in the Yoshida Cabinet for, in particular, its total subservience to the USA in foreign policy. The new Government, headed by Hatoyama, stated in its programme that it intended to establish diplomatic and economic relations with the USSR.

In response the Soviet Government suggested discussing practical steps for normalising relations. At the contacts that followed it was decided to begin talks on a peace treaty. These talks commenced in June 1955 in London. The Soviet delegation presented a draft treaty in which, fully in accord with the decision of the Allied powers, it was stated that Japan recognised the return of South Sakhalin and the transfer of the Kuril Islands to the Soviet Union (acts that had taken place in 1945). However, the Japanese representatives put forward territorial claims and used them to block a settlement. The talks dragged on and in March 1956 they were suspended by Japan. Some months later they were re-

sumed in Moscow but came to a deadlock on account of the Japanese position.

While categorically rejecting Japan's unfounded claims, the Soviet Government made every effort to reach agreement. It declared it was prepared to consider Japan's wishes regarding the islands of Habomai and Shikotan provided understanding was shown for the Soviet position, and to increase trade to 1,000 million rubles in the course of five years. This declaration was welcomed by Japanese business circles. In order to prevent the talks from being wrecked by Japanese reactionary elements, who were acting with US backing, the Soviet Union offered to end the state of war and establish diplomatic relations without the conclusion of a peace treaty so that the question of a peace settlement could be considered later.

In May 1956 the Soviet Union and Japan signed a fishing convention that was to come into force only after the conclusion of a peace treaty or the establishment of diplomatic relations.

The Soviet attitude lent strength to the realistic tendencies in the policy of the Japanese Government, with the result that a decision was passed to send a Government delegation to Moscow to complete the talks.

A Joint Declaration ending the state of war and restoring diplomatic and consular relations was signed by Japan and the USSR on October 19, 1956. In this Declaration the two countries reaffirmed their readiness to settle disputes by negotiation and to refrain from the threat or use of force. They pledged not to interfere in each other's internal affairs and recognised each other's right to individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the UN Charter. They mutually renounced all the claims arising out of the war, including the Soviet Union's right to reparations, and committed themselves to continue the talks on a peace treaty. The Soviet Government reiterated its agreement to transfer the islands of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan following the conclusion of the treaty.

Expansion of Soviet-Japanese Relations

The Moscow Declaration laid the foundation for co-operation on the basis of peaceful coexistence. As envisaged by the Declaration, the Soviet Union supported the efforts to

admit Japan to the United Nations. The first long-term Soviet-Japanese trade agreement was signed on December 6, 1957. The fishing convention came into force and a joint Fishing Commission began to function. In order to strengthen peace and security in the Far East the Soviet Union called upon the Japanese Government to declare that its policy was directed towards peaceful aims and offered to guarantee Japan's neutrality, which, it noted, could be done by a unilateral commitment by the USSR, or jointly with the USA or, lastly, through the United Nations.

Following the resignation of the Hatoyama Cabinet, the ruling elite in Japan undertook another attempt to make Japan's relations with the USSR dependent on the terms put forward by the USA. The new Government declined to sign a peace treaty, declaring that relations could be normalised only if Japan's territorial claims were satisfied. The extension of Japan's military alliance with the USA seriously undermined Soviet-Japanese contacts and the cause of peace in the Far East.

A new Security Treaty was signed in Washington in January 1960. It did not mention the right of the US military authorities to interfere in Japan's internal affairs but reaffirmed the continued presence of US forces in Japan. The Treaty provided for Japan's further rearmament and her participation in military operations jointly with the USA. A particularly ominous point was that the Treaty envisaged the possibility of Japanese military operations in the Far East, which, according to the official explanation given in Tokyo, included China, Korea and the Soviet Maritime Region.

The Soviet Government had no alternative but to warn that this was inconsistent with the 1956 Joint Declaration. Further, it notified the Japanese Government that under these circumstances it could not transfer the islands of Habomai and Shikotan because that would enlarge the territory used under the Treaty directed against the USSR.

Japan's rulers, however, continued their military co-operation with the US imperialists. In 1969 there were on Japanese territory, including the Island of Okinawa, 265 US military installations, including large naval and air bases with nuclear weapons. That year the USA and Japan agreed on an automatic prolongation of the Security Treaty. In 1971, as a concession to Japan, the USA agreed to return Okinawa

while retaining control of the military bases on that island. For her part Japan pledged further support for Washington's aggressive policies and to step up her military build-up. A sum of 5,800,000 million yen (a 2.4-fold increase over allocations for the preceding plan) were appropriated under the fourth five-year plan (1972-1976) for the enlargement of the armed forces.* Japan's support for the US aggression in Vietnam, it was noted by the Soviet Government, could not "fail to prejudice Soviet-Japanese relations".**

In the long run, however, the Soviet policy of peace and the benefits of economic relations with the USSR induced business circles and sober-minded politicians to increase their pressure for broader relations with the USSR. The democratic circles demanded closer relations and the conclusion of a peace treaty with the USSR, declaring that every step in that direction made Japan more independent of the USA.

As had been the case in previous years, progress was achieved through the efforts of the USSR. In 1961 the Soviet Government took the initiative by offering to expand co-operation with Japan. In line with this initiative a Soviet industrial exhibition was opened in Tokyo and a Japanese industrial exhibition was held in Moscow. These exhibitions drew considerable attention. In 1964 the Japanese ruling circles declared themselves in favour of a further strengthening of good-neighbourly relations. In response the Soviet Union suggested practical steps to foster the development of economic contacts and trade on mutually beneficial terms.

As a result of this initiative reciprocal visits were made by the Foreign Ministers in 1966-1967. At the talks during these visits the sides declared that they favoured the development of relations on the basis of mutual benefit, equality and non-interference in internal affairs despite the differences in political doctrines and social systems. Understanding was fostered by the 1966 trade and payments agreement for 1966-1970, the consular convention and the agreements on a direct air service and cultural exchanges. Trade made substantial headway, increasing from 3,600,000 rubles in 1956 to 653 million rubles in 1970. In September 1971 the two countries signed a new five-year agreement on trade and

* In 1971 the Japanese Armed Forces had 325,000 effectives.

** *Pravda*, January 30, 1968.

payments envisaging a trade turnover of 5,000 million rubles in 1971-1975.

Other forms of economic contacts were promoted. In 1965 the USSR Chamber of Commerce and the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry agreed to set up national committees for business co-operation. The ways and means of fostering economic contacts are discussed at the regular conferences held alternately in Moscow and Tokyo. In 1968 Soviet foreign trade organisations and combined groups of Japanese firms signed an accord on credits for the development of the timber wealth in the Soviet Far East and on deliveries of timber to Japan. In 1970 an agreement was signed on co-operation by Japanese firms in the building of a sea port in Wrangel Bay. At the fifth conference of the committees for business co-operation in early 1972 views were exchanged on deliveries of Tyumen oil to Japan, the building of an oil pipe-line to the port of Nakhodka, the development of the coal resources in Yakutia, the surveying for oil in the Sakhalin shelf and scientific and technical co-operation.

It must be noted that in Japan there are influential circles opposed to any improvement of relations with the Soviet Union. They are endeavouring to disrupt final normalisation and undermine the successfully progressing commercial co-operation between the Soviet Union and Japan. They campaign for the return to Japan of the so-called northern territories.

At the 24th Congress of the CPSU Leonid Brezhnev stated the Soviet position on this issue, saying: "We believe there are considerable possibilities for further extending mutually advantageous co-operation with Japan, although the attempts by some Japanese circles to exploit the so-called territorial question have naturally done nothing to benefit Soviet-Japanese relations. Their complete normalisation on an appropriate contractual basis is also being hampered by the existence of foreign military bases in Japan. The fact is that such normalisation would be in line with the long-term interests of the peoples of the two countries, and the interests of peace in the Far East and in the Pacific area."*

The visit to Tokyo by the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in early 1972 was a practical step towards the

* 24th Congress of the CPSU, p. 35.

realisation of the policy charted by the Congress. During that visit both sides recognised that the relations between the two countries had to be founded on equality, non-interference in internal affairs and mutual benefit, and agreed that talks on a peace treaty would be conducted in 1972. A high evaluation was given of the state of commercial contacts between the two countries and a readiness was expressed to sign an agreement on scientific and technical co-operation. Moreover, understanding was reached on cultural exchanges and it was reaffirmed that the two countries would consult each other regularly on international issues.

Noting that important talks would be held between the Soviet Union and Japan in 1973 with the aim of settling the problems left over from the period of the Second World War, Leonid Brezhnev said in December 1972: "We are striving for a mutually acceptable understanding on the entire set of issues under discussion. However, it is clear that no positive results in the negotiations can be expected unless the Japanese side also displays the same willingness. The Soviet Union, for its part, is in favour of truly friendly relations with Japan."^{*}

Japan's leaders responded to the Soviet Union's realistic attitude. In March 1973, on their initiative, there was an exchange of personal messages between Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka and Leonid Brezhnev. Commenting on the Brezhnev message of reply, the Japanese Prime Minister declared that he fully subscribed to the official Soviet stand in the question of the further progress of relations between the USSR and Japan and hoped they would develop as good-neighbourly relations, in the direction of co-operation.

Talks between Soviet leaders and a Japanese Government delegation led by the Prime Minister took place in Moscow in October 1973. At the talks it was recorded that "the strengthening of good-neighbourly, friendly relations between the USSR and Japan on the basis of non-interference in internal affairs, mutual benefit and equality is not only consonant with the common interests of the peoples of the two countries but is a large contribution to the cause of peace and stabilisation in the Far East and throughout the world". The sides stated they would make every effort

to expand the relations between the USSR and Japan. They exchanged views on the question of a peace treaty and decided to continue their negotiations in 1974. On October 10, 1973 the Soviet and Japanese Foreign Ministers signed agreements on scientific and technical co-operation, on exchanges of scientists and post-graduate students and on the protection of birds and their sanctuaries. Views were exchanged on major international problems. The Soviet-Japanese talks in October 1973 showed that all the conditions existed for the development of friendly relations between the two countries.

7. The Soviet Union's Relations With Other Capitalist Countries

Compared with the first decades after the war the Soviet Union's contacts with other countries of the capitalist world have become much more diversified. The objective conditions for co-operation between states with different socio-economic systems are thus being utilised in practice. The growth of the Soviet Union's links with the small capitalist countries is an expression of the striving of these countries to pursue an independent foreign policy and promote discrimination-free economic and cultural co-operation. The Soviet Union bases its relations with these countries on the principles of equality, respect for their independence and sovereignty, and mutual benefit.

The relations between the Soviet Union and Finland are a striking example of peaceful coexistence. A fundamental turn in these relations took place after the Second World War with the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance of April 6, 1948 serving as a solid foundation for the expansion of contacts and good-neighbourly links.

In 1955 the two countries signed an agreement on scientific and technical co-operation, and in 1960 they concluded an agreement on cultural exchanges.

Soviet-Finnish trade has been expanding continually on the basis of five-year agreements. In the Soviet Union's trade with the capitalist world Finland occupied third place in 1969, when the trade between the two countries exceeded 500 million rubles. The joint reconstruction and utilisation

^{*} L. I. Brezhnev, *The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, pp. 58-59.

of the Saimaa Canal has done much to further the economic relations between the two countries. In 1971 they signed a treaty on the development of economic, technical and industrial co-operation.

The political contacts between the two countries are likewise expanding. The Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance was prolonged for 20 years before its date of expiry during President Urho Kekkonen's visit to Moscow in 1970. The development of good-neighbourly relations with Finland, Leonid Brezhnev said on October 2, 1970, "has now received further clear prospects. We attach great significance to this in the context of the further consolidation of peace and security in Northern Europe". Finland vigorously supports the Soviet Union's constructive proposals for ensuring peace in Europe. Her Government joined in the initiative of the socialist countries in calling for a European conference on security and co-operation.

The foreign policy that Finland has been pursuing for over 30 years, a policy of promoting friendly, good-neighbourly relations, has the wholehearted support of her people, who consider that friendship with the USSR accords with their national interests. For its part, the Soviet Union gives every attention to furthering the mutually beneficial contacts with its northern neighbour.

The Finnish President Urho Kekkonen and the Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa visited Moscow during the 50th anniversary of the USSR. In the talks with Soviet leaders Kekkonen noted that "the people of Finland are deeply grateful to the founder of the Soviet state V. I. Lenin and to the Soviet Union's Leninist foreign policy, which laid the foundations for Finland's independent development and for friendship between the peoples of Finland and the Soviet Union". At the talks it was noted that further prospects for co-operation in various areas were being gradually opened on the basis of the 1948 Treaty.

The State Treaty signed in 1955 and the Constitutional Law on permanent neutrality provided the long-term basis for understanding and co-operation between the USSR and Austria. During a visit to Austria in 1966 Nikolai Podgorny said: "The Austrian Federal Government's consistent fulfilment of the commitments stemming from the State Treaty and its policy of permanent neutrality are a sound and healthy basis for the further growth of Austria's prestige

in the world and for friendship and co-operation with the Soviet Union and with neighbouring and other countries of the world."

When the Austrian Federal Chancellor Josef Klaus visited Moscow in March 1967 an understanding was reached on continuing the talks on the sale of Soviet natural gas to Austria and the building across her territory, with the participation of Austrian enterprises, of the USSR-Italy gas pipeline. Trade is growing, too. The agreements that have been signed in recent years are a firm basis for expanding economic co-operation between the Soviet Union and Austria.

Stability characterises the Soviet Union's relations with Sweden, which, like Finland and Austria, is a neutral European country. These relations are expressed in trade, economic, scientific, technical and cultural exchanges and in political co-operation in a number of international problems. Soviet-Swedish trade is expanding swiftly, growing at a faster rate than Sweden's trade with other countries: from 98.4 million rubles in 1965 to 234 million rubles in 1970. The range of goods has almost doubled in recent years with the prospect of a further expansion of trade in machines and equipment. Agreements on trade (for 1971-1975) and economic, scientific and technical co-operation and a Treaty on the peaceful uses of atomic energy were signed in 1970. The agreements provide for exchanges of specialists, scientific and technical know-how, economic information and industrial co-operation. A mixed inter-Government commission has been set up and a committee for the promotion of trade and economic co-operation functions in each country.

Underlying the friendly relations between Sweden and the Soviet Union is the desire of both countries to ensure peace and security in Northern Europe.

A good-neighbourly spirit permeates the Soviet Union's relations with the other Scandinavian countries. This was noted throughout the world when Alexei Kosygin visited Denmark and Norway in 1971.

Economic contacts with these countries are being broadened. Soviet-Danish trade is based on a long-term agreement (for 1970-1975), which provides for a growth of deliveries not only of traditional but also of new commodities. In 1970 the USSR and Denmark signed agreements on economic, scientific and technical co-operation and on contacts between

Danish firms and the USSR Chamber of Commerce. Further, the two countries have agreements on co-operation in fishing and on preventing the pollution of the Baltic. They have signed an agreement on a motor-coach service.

As in the case of the trade agreement with Denmark, the Soviet Union's trade agreement for 1971-1975 with Norway envisages increasing reciprocal deliveries of traditional and new commodities. The two countries co-operate in the exploitation of the fish and power resources of the frontier rivers.

With Iceland, too, the Soviet Union has good relations. When in 1970 Iceland joined the European Free Trade Association she made the condition, in view of the importance of her trade with the Soviet Union, that she would continue importing Soviet goods.

The USSR has businesslike relations with Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg. These relations were given a further boost as a result of the official visit made to these countries by the Soviet Foreign Minister in July 1972.

An agreement on economic, industrial and technical co-operation, signed with the Netherlands, provides for a growth of contacts in these areas. The Netherlands and the Soviet Union declared themselves in favour of continuing bilateral consultations.

During the Soviet Foreign Minister's visit in Luxemburg the two sides considered various aspects of the relations between the two countries in a spirit of co-operation and mutual benefit.

Lately there has been a considerable broadening of Soviet-Belgian relations. Much is being done by the mixed commissions set up in the USSR and Belgium to promote scientific, technical and cultural exchanges. There has also been a substantial growth of trade. The USSR and Belgium have signed a Consular Convention and declared their readiness to sign a maritime agreement in the near future.

The Soviet Union regards the further consolidation of relations with the capitalist countries of Europe as a vital condition of lasting peace. "We are prepared," Leonid Brezhnev said, "to develop all the positive elements that are entering, or have entered, into the practice of our relations with countries like Finland, our good neighbour, and Italy, the Scandinavian countries and a number of others. We are also prepared to improve relations with those European countries,

with which they are as yet unsmooth—provided, of course, these countries show by deed a willingness to do the same.”*

Relations are developing successfully with Canada, the Soviet Union's northern neighbour. Diplomatic relations were established in 1942, during the Second World War, and expressed the affection and gratitude of the Canadian people to the heroic Soviet people and their army.

During the early years after the war the relations between the Soviet Union and Canada were adversely affected by the foreign policy of that country's ruling circles, who were powerfully influenced by Britain and especially by the USA. In those years Canada was drawn into the vortex of aggressive imperialist policy. The Canadian Government bound itself to the USA by military, political and economic alliances, including NATO and the North American Air Defence Command.

But with spread of the US monopolies in the Canadian economy anti-US feeling began to grow. The tendency towards an independent foreign policy became more marked under pressure from public opinion, which demanded that Canada free herself from the embrace of US imperialism. Canadian national interests demanded, in particular, closer political and economic relations with socialist countries, chiefly with the USSR.

A new chapter was opened in Soviet-Canadian relations in 1971 by the visits of the Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau to the Soviet Union and of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Alexei Kosygin to Canada. In Moscow the sides agreed that good-neighbourly relations conformed to the interests of both nations and were helping to ease tension and ensure world peace. A protocol on periodic consultations on key international problems and on questions of bilateral relations was signed on May 19, 1971. The two countries expressed their desire for exchanges of visits by statesmen, politicians, representatives of trade and public organisations, science, technology and culture, and tourists. They came to the conclusion that there were favourable possibilities for expanding economic contacts.

Further headway in the relations between the two countries was made during Alexei Kosygin's visit. As was noted at the time by Gerard Filion, President of the Canadian

* L. I. Brezhnev, *The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, p. 54.

Manufacturers' Association, Canadian businessmen wanted more trade contacts with the USSR. He expressed the hope that the agreement that had been signed would lead to closer co-operation. The understanding reached during the visits on an expansion of contacts is being implemented. The visit to Canada in March 1972 by a delegation of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was assessed as an important political act directed towards the further promotion of the relations between the two countries. Earlier, in 1971, Canada and the Soviet Union signed an agreement on the utilisation of scientific and technical achievements in industry and a protocol on consultations. Along with the trade agreement they form a firm basis for the development of Soviet-Canadian co-operation.

The Soviet Union's relations with capitalist countries, both big and small, are thus being stabilised and expanded. This development rests on the Soviet Union's immutable policy of peace, a policy founded on the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence.

THE SOVIET UNION'S STRUGGLE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE

1. The Struggle of the USSR and Other Socialist Countries Against the Revival of Militarism, Revanchism and Neonazism in the FRG, for a German Peace Settlement

The Question of Germany's Destiny After World War II

As soon as the Second World War ended the German question became the focal point of a sharp political and diplomatic struggle.

The war started by nazism was the most destructive in history. Nearly 50 million people died in battle. In the concentration camps the nazi butchers slaughtered 8 million more. That aggression gave further confirmation of Lenin's assessment of German imperialism, which he called a "bloody and filthy imperialist predator".*

That is what made the eradication of militarism and nazism and the provision of conditions for the peaceful, democratic development of the German people the heart of the German question.

In 1943-1945, as members of the anti-Hitler coalition, the USSR, the USA and Britain adopted programme decisions on Germany's future development (later France subscribed to these decisions). In the Potsdam Declaration it was stated: "German militarism and nazism will be extirpated and the Allies will take in agreement together, now and in the future, the other measures necessary to assure that Germany never again will threaten her neighbours or the peace of the world. It is not the intention of the Allies to destroy or enslave the German people. It is the intention of the Allies that the German people be given the opportunity to prepare for the eventual reconstruction of their life on a democratic and peaceful basis."**

Demilitarisation, democratisation and denazification were thus the principles to which the Allies had committed themselves in their policy towards Germany. The strict and con-

* V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, p. 499.

** *The Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences*, Moscow, 1969, p. 320.

sistent implementation of these principles and a German peace settlement embodying them were the only true way of achieving a democratic solution of the German question. Scrupulously abiding by the Four-Power decisions and relying on the democratic section of the German people, the Soviet Union carried out measures to eradicate militarism and nazism and enforce democratic reforms in East Germany. Had the other participants in the Potsdam Conference fulfilled its decisions as faithfully as did the Soviet Union the world would have long been free of the causes that had time and again given rise to dangerous tension in Europe and prevented it from being turned into a continent of peace.

The Western powers unremittingly sabotaged every effort to settle the German question on the basis of Allied decisions. The USA, Britain and France steadily departed from the decisions of the Potsdam Conference and steered towards Germany's division and the militarisation of her Western part. When, as a result of their policies, the split became a fact (the Federal Republic of Germany was proclaimed in May 1949) the Western powers stepped up the restoration of West Germany's military and industrial potential and drew her into their military, political and economic alliances. Militarism and revanchism were quickly revived with the connivance of the occupation authorities and step by step West Germany was turned into an assault force against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. Imperialist diplomacy rejected the Soviet proposal for a German Peace Treaty that would halt these developments that were menacing peace and the German people themselves.

Following the formation of the two German states,* the ruling circles of the Western powers used the cold war situation they had themselves created as the pretext for speeding up the FRG's remilitarisation. In June 1950 Chancellor Adenauer demanded permission for the formation of a police force. Several weeks later *United States News & World Report* wrote that there was a plan for building up a West German army and a military industry to maintain that army.

In September 1950 a conference of Western Foreign Ministers and the NATO Council session in New York passed

* The German Democratic Republic was proclaimed on October 7, 1949.

decisions on the German question that were in flagrant contravention of the Potsdam Agreement. These decisions were directed towards a further compounding of the international situation and whipping up the cold war against the socialist countries. Some Western politicians were undoubtedly aware of the consequences of this step.

In the light of these developments it became increasingly imperative to curb the forces of militarism, revanchism and neonazism and set up a system of collective security in Europe. The concrete ways and means of achieving this aim were indicated at the 20th through 24th congresses of the CPSU, at plenary meetings of the CPSU Central Committee, at sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and in the pronouncements of leaders of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government. The question was constantly on the agenda of the socialist community. On the initiative of the Soviet Union the German question and the problem of European security were repeatedly considered at international conferences (Heads of Government, Foreign Ministers and so on), by the Council of Foreign Ministers* during the initial post-war years, at bilateral talks and in the form of exchanges of notes and statements between the USSR and other countries.

In opposition to the ominous plans of the imperialists the socialist countries put forward constructive proposals. A Statement adopted at a conference of Foreign Ministers of eight socialist countries in Prague in October 1950 noted that the separate decisions passed by the Western powers in New York had no legal force and were not conducive to a German peace settlement. It was suggested that the four Great Powers declare that they would not permit the remilitarisation of Germany, that Germany would not be drawn into any plans of aggression, that they would steadfastly implement the Potsdam decisions on ensuring conditions for the formation of a united, peace-loving, democratic German state. Measures were proposed to prevent the restoration of Germany's war potential. The Prague Statement declared that the situation demanded the immediate conclusion of a peace treaty, the restoration of Germany's unity and the withdrawal of all occupation forces within a year after unity was achieved. Moreover, it suggested setting up an all-German

* Set up by decision of the Potsdam Conference.

constituent council of representatives of the two parts of Germany on a parity basis with the main task of preparing the ground for a provisional democratic, peace-loving Government for the whole of Germany.

In the course of November and December 1950 the Soviet Union sent the three Western powers notes proposing a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers to consider the fulfilment of the Potsdam Agreement relative to Germany's demilitarisation. The USA, Britain and France adopted a negative attitude to that proposal. To induce them to change that attitude the USSR suggested (in March 1951) that such a meeting should be preceded by a conference of Deputy Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers and proposed the agenda for that conference.

The Soviet Union and other socialist countries thus made every effort to secure the consistent fulfilment of the Potsdam Agreement by all the states that had signed it.

Soviet Draft of the Principles of a Peace Treaty With Germany (March 1952)

On March 10, 1952 the Soviet Government published its draft of the principles of a peace treaty with Germany. It was necessary, the draft stated, to hasten the signing of a peace treaty that would "ensure the elimination of the possibility of a revival of German militarism and aggression".

The draft provided for Germany's restoration as a single state; the withdrawal of the occupation forces and the dismantling of military bases not later than a year after the signing of the treaty; measures to ensure the German people with democratic rights; the creation of conditions for the unhampered functioning of progressive parties and organisations; the banning of organisations hostile to democracy and peace. It called for a commitment by Germany not to enter into any coalitions or alliances directed against any country that fought in the war against fascism. German territory was determined as lying within the frontiers fixed by the Potsdam Conference. No restriction was imposed on Germany's peaceful economic development, trade and shipping or on her access to world markets. Germany could have the national armed forces needed for defence. The countries signing the peace treaty would support Germany's application for membership of the United Nations.

The Soviet draft was a sound point of departure for a German peace settlement. But the imperialists began to drag out its discussion. In Bonn, too, the draft was given a hostile reception. The Adenauer Government regarded its rejection by the Western powers as a success of the "positions of strength" policy.

Berlin Four-Power Foreign Ministers Conference (January-February 1954)

The Soviet Union had on many occasions suggested holding a conference of representatives of the Four Powers to examine urgent international issues, but these proposals clashed with the imperialist policy of continuing the cold war. However, as the forces of peace, democracy and socialism gained strength the futility of the cold war policy of balancing on the brink of war became increasingly more obvious. The course of the struggle over the German question was influenced by the developments in the summer and autumn of 1953: the failure of the Korean gamble of the USA and its allies, and also of the counter-revolutionary putsch provoked by imperialist reaction in the GDR on June 17. The testing of a hydrogen bomb in the Soviet Union had a sobering effect on the hotheads in the West. The Western powers accepted the Soviet proposal for a meeting of the Conference of Foreign Ministers.

The Conference sat in Berlin from January 25 through February 18, 1954. On the initiative of the Soviet delegation it considered the German question, European security, an Austrian State Treaty and other questions.

The Soviet Union put forward a comprehensive programme for the settlement of the German question, which, it felt, was the principal unresolved post-war problem. The utmost importance was attached to the drawing up and signing of a peace treaty, an enlarged draft for which was submitted by the Soviet Union for discussion at the Conference. A point included in this draft was that Germany would not be committed to any political or military obligation springing from the treaties and agreements concluded by the GDR and the FRG prior to the signing of a peace treaty and their unification in a single state. The Soviet Union suggested that the draft peace treaty should be agreed within three months and that a conference should be held in 1954 to examine it.

Further, the Soviet Union suggested the formation of a provisional all-German Government and free elections throughout Germany following the evacuation of the occupation forces. The German people, it was stressed by the Soviet delegation, would participate directly in all these measures. Further, the Soviet proposals provided for comprehensive co-operation between the GDR and the FRG with the object of drawing them together and reuniting Germany.

The proposal of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries for a system of collective security in Europe was of inestimable significance. The idea for such a system dates back to the 1930s when the Soviet Union put forward constructive and realistic proposals that were totally new in the practice of international relations. The fact that it was possible to set up a system of collective security was confirmed by the Soviet-French and Soviet-Czechoslovak treaties of mutual assistance signed in May 1935 with the object of repulsing aggression.

Had it been set up in the pre-war years a system of collective security might have averted the impending catastrophe. But in those days the leaders of Britain and France ignored the Soviet warnings and declined all its proposals on this question. Their short-sighted policy cost mankind untold sacrifice and suffering. Developments eventually compelled the leaders of the Western powers to form an anti-Hitler coalition jointly with the USSR. Life thus proved the vital need for collective action against aggression.

At the 1954 Berlin Conference the Soviet Union submitted the draft of a General European Treaty of Collective Security in Europe in which account was taken of the existence of two German states, which could take part in the European system of collective security. Acceptance of the Soviet proposals would have led to a fundamental improvement of the situation in Europe and helped to settle outstanding issues, including the German question.

But the attitude of the USA, Britain and France was negative. They would not hear of inviting representatives of the GDR and the FRG to a conference and produced the Eden Plan, in which prominence was given to what were termed as free elections under the control and in the presence of the occupation forces of the Four Powers. The signing of a peace treaty was put off indefinitely. The future united Germany would be committed to the obligations that had

already been undertaken by the FRG. In other words, the Eden Plan gave a reactionary and militarist orientation to the development of a united Germany. Needless to say, it could not serve as the basis for a just, democratic settlement of the German question. It was glaringly incompatible with the Potsdam Agreement and inimical to European security and the national aspirations of the German people.

Long before the Berlin Conference was convened Bonn made sure that its partners would not reach agreement with the Soviet Union on the questions that were to be discussed.

Due to the obstructionist stand of the Western powers the Conference failed to arrive at agreed decisions. Nevertheless, it showed that the initiative in raising and discussing key problems related to Germany and European security was firmly in the hands of the Soviet Union. Its proposals, stemming as they did from its desire to consolidate peace in Europe, drew the attention of wide sections of public opinion who steadily increased their pressure against the revival of militarism, revanchism and neonazism on German soil.

In July 1954, motivated by a desire to give the discussion of European security a constructive character, the Soviet Government suggested a European conference to consider the question of a system of collective security. Once again the reaction of the Western powers was negative.

Paris Agreements of 1954. Militarisation of the FRG Is Expedited

An agreement on relations between the USA, Britain, France and the FRG was signed in Bonn in May 1952. In parallel, the Treaty on the European Defence Community was signed in Paris. In violation of the Potsdam Agreement this Treaty envisaged the FRG's contribution to the planned European Army.

The movement that was started in Europe against the ratification of the Bonn and Paris agreements in the long run wrecked the plan for setting up the European Defence Community. On August 30, 1954 France's National Assembly rejected the Treaty on the EDC by 319 votes against 264 (with 12 abstentions). This, as the Western powers saw it, posed a threat to the remilitarisation of West Germany.

In October 1954 a conference of nine Western states was

held in the French capital. On October 23 these countries signed a series of accords, known as the Paris Agreements, which envisaged FRG armed forces consisting of 12 infantry divisions, 1,350 combat aircraft and naval units. West Germany undertook "not to manufacture in its territory atomic, biological and chemical weapons". The possibility of West Germany receiving nuclear arms from without was passed over in silence.

The Paris Agreements provided for West Germany's membership of NATO and the Western European Union. Earlier, the FRG Government had declared that it was the sole representative of the German people in international affairs.* A reunified Germany, it was stated in the Agreements, would be "integrated within the European Community". Moreover, the USA, Britain and France reiterated their "rights ... relating to the stationing of armed forces" in West Berlin. This amounted to direct support for the "positions of strength" policy which Bonn at that time hoped to use as the vehicle for the realisation of its revanchist plans.

The sovereignty accorded to the FRG under the Paris Agreements was restricted by significant reservations about the special rights of the USA, Britain and France up to permission to the military authorities in West Germany to take protective measures in the event of what was described as a direct threat to their forces.

The Paris Agreements meant that the Western powers had completely relinquished the Potsdam decisions on the German question and were intent on intensifying the cold war against the USSR and other socialist countries.

* This unrealistic foreign policy became known as the Hallstein Doctrine. Put forward as soon as the FRG was proclaimed, it was officially formulated at a conference of West German envoys in Bonn in December 1955 and was named after Walter Hallstein, then the State Secretary of the FRG Foreign Ministry.

The doctrine ignored the fact that there were two German states. Spearheaded mainly at the GDR, it required that the FRG should not establish or maintain diplomatic relations with countries that recognised the GDR. In line with this doctrine West Germany severed diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia in 1957 and with Cuba in 1963, and unceasingly blackmailed sovereign Asian, African and Latin American countries that desired normal relations with the GDR.

However, at the close of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s it became obvious that the Hallstein Doctrine had failed hopelessly.

The Struggle Against the Paris Agreements

The substance of the Paris Agreements was exposed by the Soviet Union and by progressive circles throughout the world.

The Soviet Government pointed out that these agreements were incompatible with the letter and spirit of the Soviet-French (1944) and Soviet-British (1942) treaties on mutual assistance, which provided for joint measures to prevent further aggression by German militarism. If, a Soviet Note of November 13, 1954 declared, the Paris Agreements were ratified by Britain and France the Soviet Union would be forced to denounce these treaties. On behalf of the governments of the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia (which had held consultations on this matter), the Note proposed a conference on the question of setting up a system of collective security in Europe.

But the Western powers were determined to ratify the Paris Agreements and they turned down this proposal.

A conference of eight European socialist countries (China sent an observer) on ensuring peace and security in Europe was held in Moscow on November 29 through December 2, 1954. This conference closely analysed the international situation and drew the conclusion that the Paris Agreements had substantially increased the threat of another war. The Declaration adopted by the conference stated: "The situation that has arisen places on the agenda the task of combining the efforts of the countries represented at this Conference with the purpose of ensuring their security."*

The socialist countries qualified the Paris Agreements as an actual refusal to settle the German issue and to restore Germany's unity on the principles of peace and democracy. They reaffirmed that the only basis for settling that issue was to abandon the plans of remilitarising Germany and drawing her into military blocs and to hold elections throughout Germany with the purpose of forming a Government of a united, democratic and peaceful Germany.

In the Declaration it was stressed that true security could be achieved in Europe only if instead of closed military groups of European states directed against each other there

* *Moskovskoye soveshchaniye yevropeiskikh stran po obespecheniyu mira i bezopasnosti v Yevrope*, Moscow, 1954, p. 158.

was a system of collective security. It should embrace all the European countries regardless of their socio-political system and the German people should have an equal say in it. The USA and other countries bearing the responsibility for the settlement of the German question could participate in the system of collective security. The members of that system would be committed to settle all outstanding issues by peaceful means and in the event of any threat of an armed attack in Europe they would act in concert to remove that threat.

The true interests of the German people, the Declaration noted, were inseparable from the interests of peace and an effective system of collective security in Europe.*

The Declaration stated the collective stand of the socialist countries on one of the key problems of post-war international relations. The Moscow Conference and the Declaration adopted by it were a contribution to the struggle against the revival of militarism and revanchism in West Germany, for the settlement of the German question in the spirit of the Potsdam Agreement.

Simultaneously, the Soviet Union launched new initiatives in the German issue. Desiring to consolidate the friendly relations with the GDR and taking into account the interests of the people of the two German states, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR passed a Decree on January 25, 1955 terminating the state of war and calling for the establishment of peaceful relations with Germany. The war-time legal restrictions on German citizens became null and void. On January 15, 1955 TASS issued a Statement in which, on behalf of the Soviet Government, it proposed that general elections should be held in Germany before the end of the year so that the German people could state their will regarding Germany's unification and future. It declared that provided there was agreement with the GDR and the FRG the Soviet Government would consent to the presence of international teams of observers at the elections. This step, motivated by the desire to hasten the adoption of mutually acceptable decisions, was a concession to the stand taken by the Western powers.

However, continuing their propaganda campaign over the question of "free German elections" and playing on the national feelings of the people, the imperialist powers gave this proposal a hostile reception.

* *Moskovskoye soveshchaniye*. . . , pp. 154-55, 156, 157.

The socialist countries were not alone in opposing the Paris Agreements. They were vigorously supported by progressive circles in many West European countries, including the FRG. However, it did not prove possible to prevent their ratification.

The situation in Europe changed radically after the Paris Agreements came into force on May 5, 1955. German militarism was given the conditions for speedily building up a war potential. The FRG became a member of the North Atlantic bloc. The Paris Agreements raised new and very considerable obstacles to the settlement of the German question.

In this situation the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries had no alternative but to take serious measures. In May 1955 the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR annulled the Soviet-British and Soviet-French treaties of 1942 and 1944 respectively. That same month the European socialist countries signed the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance. This was a major step towards strengthening security in Europe and countering the dangerous plans of the West German revanchists and their NATO allies.

Signing of the State Treaty With Austria

In order to strengthen security in Europe it was extremely important to settle the question of a State Treaty with Austria. That country had been annexed by Nazi Germany in 1938, an action that was condemned by the Soviet Union. When the British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden visited Moscow in December 1941 the Soviet Government proposed that Austria should be restored as an independent state. A Declaration on Austria was adopted at the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the USSR, the USA and Britain in Moscow in the autumn of 1943. The Declaration stated that the Anschluss was null and void and that the three Great Powers wished to see Austria restored to freedom and independence.

Austria regained her independence after the Second World War. However, for many years this was not formalised in the shape of a Treaty. The Austrian question was debated at 33 sittings of the Foreign Ministers Council, at 260 meet-

ings of Deputy Foreign Ministers and at 85 sittings of the Vienna Commission of the Ambassadors of the Four Powers, but all without result. The Western powers did not disguise their intention of turning Austria into a NATO "alpine fortress". The Bonn revanchists dreamed of another Anschluss. The FRG monopolies were penetrating Austria's economy.

At a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in February 1955 it was noted that there was no justification for delaying the conclusion of a State Treaty with Austria. In April of the same year Soviet-Austrian talks were held in Moscow on the initiative of the Soviet Government. These talks created the foundation for the speedy settlement of the Austrian question.

The State Treaty on Austria's restoration as an independent and democratic state was signed on May 15, 1955 in Vienna's Belvedere Palace by the Foreign Ministers of the USSR, the USA, Britain, France and Austria. The Treaty came into force in July of the same year. In October the Austrian Parliament passed a Constitutional Law on permanent neutrality that committed Austria to refrain from entering into military alliance and from allowing foreign military bases on her territory. Austria's permanent neutrality was formally recognised in December 1955 by the USSR, the USA, Britain and France.

The State Treaty restored Austria's sovereignty and put an end to the occupation regime. It guarantees her security and protects her against an economic or political Anschluss by Germany. It contains the important provision that the former German assets would not be transferred to the FRG monopolies.

The conclusion of the State Treaty and Austria's proclamation of a policy of neutrality were a major contribution to European security and the easing of international tension.

Guided by the principle of peaceful coexistence, the Soviet Union promotes co-operation with Austria on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.

Geneva Summit (July 1955)

As a result of efforts by the USSR and other peace-loving states, a conference of the Heads of Government of the Soviet Union, the USA, Britain and France was held in Geneva on

July 18 through 23, 1955. On its agenda were the German question, European security, disarmament and the promotion of East-West contacts.

European security occupied the central place in the work of this Conference. Taking the stand of the Western powers into account, the Soviet delegation moved a detailed draft, in which it proposed concluding a European treaty on collective security in two stages. The members of the North Atlantic bloc and the Warsaw Treaty would undertake to refrain from using armed force and to settle issues solely by peaceful means. At the second stage, when all the commitments on ensuring security in Europe would come into force, NATO, the Paris Agreements and the Warsaw Treaty would be replaced by a European system of collective security. A significant proposal by the Soviet Union was that until the question of a European treaty was settled the members of the existing groups should sign a treaty renouncing the use of armed force against each other.

Although no agreement was reached, the Heads of Government came to the understanding that the proposals that had been made would be examined by the Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers. An important point in the pertinent directive was that the German question should be settled in accordance with the national interests of the German people and the interests of European security.

Public opinion throughout the world saw the Geneva Conference as the first step towards the adoption of concrete measures to avert military conflicts and end the cold war.

The Soviet Union took every possible initiative to consolidate and develop the results of the Conference. Important practical steps in that direction were the establishment of diplomatic relations with the FRG and the signing of a Treaty on relations between the USSR and the GDR, which provided for joint action to achieve, by negotiations, a peaceful settlement for the whole of Germany and to ensure peace and security in Europe.

The results of the USSR's vigorous efforts to prevent the emergence of a flashpoint of aggression in the heart of Europe were summed up at the 20th Congress of the CPSU in February 1956. The Central Committee report re-emphasised that it was vital to set up a system of collective security in Europe and that the annulment of the Paris Agreements

would open a sure road to the settlement of the German question.

The same issues that were brought up at the summit were considered at the Geneva Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the USA, Britain and France (October 27 through November 16, 1955). At that Conference the Soviet Union submitted a new draft for a system of collective security in Europe that included many of the points made by the Western powers. But the latter insisted on the acceptance of the Eden Plan. By rejecting the Soviet suggestion that representatives of the GDR and the FRG should be invited to the Conference, they gave further evidence of their reluctance to settle the German question on a democratic and peaceful basis.

Revival of Militarism in the FRG Increases Tension in Europe

Within a few years after the Paris Agreements came into force West German militarism, aided by the USA, Britain and France, became a serious threat to peace in Europe. A law on compulsory military conscription was passed in July 1956, bringing the Bundeswehr into being. Positions of command were occupied by former Nazi generals and other senior officers. A spirit of revenge and aggression was cultivated in the West German armed forces. Innumerable militarist associations and revanchist organisations became active on the political scene, demanding a revision of the frontiers and the absorption of the German Democratic Republic.

At the close of 1958 the FRG acquired nearly \$1,500 million worth of missiles, tanks, jet aircraft, warships and ammunition on the basis of an agreement signed with the USA in December 1955. The FRG's purchases of military equipment in Britain, France, Canada and other NATO countries added up to hundreds of millions of marks.

The revanchists made no secret of their intention to gain possession of nuclear weapons. A nuclear physics research agency was set up in the FRG in 1954 and work was started on the development of rockets and guided missiles.

Anti-communism was fostered by the CDU/CSU politicians, the generals and the bourgeois propaganda machine. The attacks on democratic elements were intensified and the

popular resistance to the country's militarisation was suppressed. An anti-democratic election law was passed in March 1956. The Communist Party was banned in August of the same year.

In 1957 the FRG joined the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community.* Bonn counted on using these organisations to strengthen its position in the capitalist world. In a Statement of the Soviet Foreign Ministry in March 1957 it was noted that the FRG's formation and its membership of the EEC and EURATOM had raised "further serious obstacles to the restoration of the German people's national unity because West Germany will be more deeply involved in the Western military groups opposed to other European states".** This conclusion was borne out by developments. The paths of the two German states increasingly diverged. The West German monopolies recovered the positions they had lost as a result of the war and became a leading factor in the Common Market.

The missile and nuclear armament of the Bundeswehr was one of the key military-political issues which the FRG sought to settle at the close of the 1950s. On March 25, 1958 the Bundestag passed a resolution investing the Government with the appropriate powers. Shortly before this, the FRG came to an understanding with the USA on the purchase of US rockets for the delivery of nuclear devices.

These dangerous policies of the West German militarists were exposed by the Soviet Union. In a Note of April 27, 1957 it was stated that the Soviet Government felt that it was its "duty to declare that in pursuing a policy of nuclear armament and in unfolding preparations in West Germany for a nuclear war the Government of the FRG is threatening the security of the European peoples and the interests of the German people themselves". Similar warnings were sounded in other Soviet documents. In the Message of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to the FRG Bundestag of March 31, 1958 it was stated that the FRG's nuclear armament would

* State-monopoly associations of six countries: Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Luxembourg, France and the FRG. The Treaties came into force in January 1958. In the EEC the leading role is played by the West German monopolies, which account for approximately 45 per cent of the Common Market's industrial product.

** *Izvestia*, March 17, 1957.

close the only existing road to the restoration of the German people's unity, namely, through a rapprochement and agreement between the two German states.

Supported by the other socialist countries, these actions of the Soviet Union had their effect. In the long run Bonn did not get access to nuclear weapons. However, at the close of the 1950s West German imperialism substantially strengthened its position among the leading capitalist countries and its role in NATO was enhanced. These years witnessed the shaping of the Washington-Bonn axis, with the result that the FRG became US imperialism's chief ally in Europe. It calculated on carrying out its expansionist plans with US assistance. West Germany was becoming a centre of tension in Europe.

Soviet Proposals for a Peace Treaty. The Question of Normalising the Situation in West Berlin

In 1958-1959 the Soviet Union came forward with new proposals on the German question which took into account the substantial changes that had occurred on German territory. It was no longer possible to speak of a peace treaty with a single Germany. The Paris Agreements had widened the rift between the two states, which were developing along different lines. The Soviet Government therefore proposed that a peace treaty should be signed with the GDR and the FRG or with a confederation of these states if such a confederation was formed. In view of West Berlin's dangerous role in the cold war of the imperialists against the socialist community, it insisted on a settlement of that problem, too.

The draft peace treaty proposed by the USSR on January 10, 1959 covered a wide range of problems whose settlement would remove the survivals of the Second World War in Europe.

The commitments that Germany, as represented by the GDR and the FRG, would assume under that Treaty would ensure her development as a peaceful, democratic state. Under the terms of the Treaty Germany would resolve all her international controversies solely by peaceful means and would not join any military alliances directed against any of the signatory powers. The draft stated that the German frontiers, as established by the Potsdam Conference, were

immutable. It envisaged the democratisation of public life and guarantees for the basic rights and freedoms of man throughout Germany. All attempts to settle the question of uniting Germany by force were emphatically rejected. The draft stated: "The German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic solemnly pledge never to resort to force or the threat of force as a means of unifying Germany, and shall peacefully resolve any disputes that may arise in their relations."

The military clauses declared that Germany could have national armed forces necessary for defence. They forbade her to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction, rockets, bombers and submarines. All foreign troops and military bases, the draft said, would be evacuated from Germany. The draft declared that no restrictions would be imposed on the development of Germany's peaceful economy, which would serve to enhance the well-being of the German people.

Signed on the basis of the Soviet proposals, a peace treaty would have thus closed the book on the Second World War and finalised the actual post-war arrangement in Europe. It would have created the conditions for effective co-operation between the GDR and the FRG.

Moreover, the Soviet draft provided for the settlement of the question of West Berlin, which is situated on GDR territory.

In the aggressive plans of the imperialists a special role was assigned to West Berlin, which had been turned into a centre of provocations, espionage, subversion and hostile propaganda against the socialist countries. In the Western press it was described as a springboard for penetration into the East and a front-line city. As such its role grew in proportion to the revival of militarism in West Germany. Small wonder that bellicose circles declared they were prepared to go to war for West Berlin.

In its Notes of November 27, 1958* to the USA, Britain and France, the Soviet Union pointed out that they were grossly violating the Potsdam Agreement and suggested ending the occupation regime in West Berlin and turning it into a demilitarised free city.

In the settlement of the West Berlin question, it was

* *Izvestia*, November 28, 1958.

stressed in the Notes, it was imperative that the sovereign rights of the German Democratic Republic should be respected and strictly observed.

These provisions were further enlarged upon in the clauses of the draft peace treaty envisaging the normalisation of the situation in West Berlin.

The Western powers reacted negatively to the Soviet proposals. Their replies were consistent with their cold war and "positions of strength" policies. Nevertheless, world opinion pressured them into agreeing to hold talks with the USSR.

A conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the USA, Britain and France took place in Geneva. It dragged out from May to August 1959. In face of the Soviet Union's clear-cut, realistic proposals imperialist diplomacy had recourse to tactics of obstruction and procrastination. They put forward a package plan in which the signing of a German peace treaty was made dependent on the settlement of such difficult problems as the reunification of Germany, disarmament and so forth. Essentially, the Western powers were unwilling to sign a peace treaty with the two German states, end the abnormal situation in West Berlin and thereby remove a centre of tension.

A new development at that conference was that for the first time the German question was considered with the equal participation of representatives of the GDR and the FRG. Unlike the FRG representatives, the GDR delegation made a constructive contribution to the work of the conference.

The talks in Geneva showed that the "positions of strength" policy was collapsing. The Western powers had to conduct the talks on the basis of the Soviet proposals for a peace treaty and for the normalisation of the situation in West Berlin. Moreover, the talks demonstrated the hollowness of the efforts of the FRG ruling circles to isolate the GDR.

Measures Instituted by the GDR on August 13, 1961

A conference of First Secretaries of the Central Committees of the Communist and Workers' parties of the Warsaw Treaty countries took place in Moscow on August 3 through 5, 1961. After considering issues relating to the German question it instructed the appropriate organs to chart the necessary foreign policy and economic measures that would

ensure the signing of a peace treaty and the observance of its provisions, including the provisions on West Berlin. The participants in the conference declared that they were prepared to achieve a German peace settlement in agreement with the USA, Britain and France.

The USA and its NATO allies ignored the initiatives of the socialist countries and continued fanning international tension. "The imperialists," it is stated in the resolution passed by the 22nd Congress of the CPSU on the report of the Central Committee, "have created a dangerous situation in the heart of Europe, threatening war in reply to the proposal of the Soviet Union and other peace-loving countries to eliminate the remnants of the Second World War, conclude a Peace Treaty with Germany and normalise the West Berlin situation."^{*}

The US President requested Congress to allocate a further sum of \$3,500 million with the purpose of stepping up the arms race. The armed forces were enlarged. The aggressive blocs redeployed troops and conducted exercises. Provocations recurred with growing frequency from West Berlin and the FRG. War hysteria was stirred artificially in the USA and other NATO countries. Acting on orders from official quarters the propaganda machine spread the sinister myth that the Soviet proposals for a German peace settlement and the normalisation of the situation in West Berlin were menacing the capitalist world.

In August 1961 *Tribune*, a British weekly, wrote: "There is no reason, in fact, for any Western leader to lose his temper. The West is not being challenged to a third world war. It is being invited, by a former ally, to end the second. This objective is as much in Western interests as those of the Soviet Union."

However, the sabre-rattling did not cease. The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries had no alternative but to strengthen their defence capability.

The Western war preparations were accompanied by an intensification of subversion in West Berlin. This compelled the GDR, in agreement with the other Warsaw Treaty states, to set up, as from August 13, 1961, a similar system of control and protection on the frontier between its capital and West Berlin as exists on the frontiers of every sovereign

^{*} *The Road to Communism*, Moscow, 1962, p. 417.

country. With the assistance of the socialist community the GDR made its frontiers secure.

Meeting with failure in yet another sector of the cold war international reaction started a new anti-Soviet, anti-communist campaign, in which the West German revanchists were particularly active. The USSR and other socialist countries firmly repulsed the imperialist military and political pressure.

Against the FRG's Nuclear Armament

While the revanchists were intensifying West Germany's militarisation and making every effort to obtain nuclear weapons through participation in the project to set up NATO multilateral nuclear forces, the Soviet Union and the fraternal socialist countries took resolute action against this project, which had been nurtured in the West since 1959. One of the cardinal points in it was that the FRG was to be given access to nuclear weapons. This aroused apprehensions throughout the world.

In a Note to the FRG on July 11, 1964 the Soviet Union pointed out that the attempts to arm the Bundeswehr with missile-nuclear weapons was a gross violation of the FRG's commitments stemming from Nazi Germany's unconditional surrender, the Declaration on Germany's defeat and other post-war international agreements. On the same day the USSR warned the USA and other countries participating in the project that in the event NATO multilateral nuclear forces were formed the USSR and other peace-loving countries would take steps to safeguard their security.

A communique issued by the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee in January 1965 stated: "In its aggressive policy imperialism is assigning a special role to the plans to form NATO multilateral nuclear forces. The Warsaw Treaty countries consider that these plans, which have the backing of the ruling circles of the USA and West Germany, constitute a serious threat to peace in Europe and the world as a whole."*

* *Uneshnaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza i mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya. Sbornik dokumentov, 1964-1965*, p. 111.

The action taken by the socialist countries brought the NATO members round to a more realistic approach to the question of nuclear forces. France's leaders declared in 1964 that they doubted the advisability of forming such forces.

The failure of the aggressive plans was due largely to the consolidation of the socialist community and the defensive Warsaw Treaty Organisation.

On June 12, 1964 the Soviet Union and the GDR signed a Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Co-operation in which they declared they would act together to counteract the revanchist and militarist forces and continue their joint struggle for peace and security in Europe, of which one of the basic factors was the inviolability of the GDR's state frontiers. They reaffirmed that they would regard West Berlin as an independent political entity.

This Treaty was a major contribution to the struggle that the USSR, the GDR and all other peace-loving forces were waging for peace and security in Europe. In 1967 the GDR signed analogous treaties with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria.

The USSR and the FRG's New Eastern Policy

After having fanned the cold war for many years and sought to deal with the socialist countries "from positions of strength" the FRG found that its foreign policy had run into a blind alley. In view of the steadily growing economic and military might and international influence of the socialist countries the ruling circles in Bonn became increasingly conscious that the FRG was perilously vulnerable militarily and strategically and that a catastrophe was inevitable if the imperialists provoked a military conflict in Europe. In Bonn they realised that any war started on FRG territory would at once dislocate the republic's normal life, bring utter destruction and involve colossal loss of life.

Moreover, the FRG ruling circles had to take into account the trend towards detente, which under the impact of the policy pursued by the socialist countries was becoming more pronounced in international affairs. The extinction of the much vaunted economic miracle in West Germany compelled them to give more attention to finding the ways and

means of invigorating economic life. In this context they showed particular interest in their Eastern neighbours, with whom the FRG's Western competitors had already established effective economic and trade contacts.

It was growing obvious that in spite of subversion by the West German authorities, the GDR was winning stronger positions in the world.

In Bonn they had to reckon with West German public opinion, which was demanding normal relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. To a certain extent a reappraisal of Bonn's foreign policy possibilities was dictated also by the fact that West German imperialism had gained strength.

All these factors prompted the FRG to modify its foreign policy and diplomacy. However, the modifications were not introduced at once. The first indications of these modifications were seen in the early 1960s.

The new policy was manifestly contradictory. By means of this new policy the West German monopolies hoped to build economic, trade, cultural and other bridges with the socialist countries in order to undermine the socialist community. A special role was accorded to ideological subversion. At the same time, the FRG ruling circles had by no means abandoned their intention to revise the political and territorial results of the war.

In the 1960s the new policy was vitalised in various directions and forms. The accent was placed on trade. In 1961 the FRG signed a trade protocol with Hungary. In 1963 through 1964 it signed agreements on trade and the opening of trade missions with Poland, Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria, and on trade with Yugoslavia. In the period 1958 through 1969 trade between the FRG and the socialist countries more than doubled.

The FRG ruling circles began to look for new methods of implementing their policy towards the GDR. The "change through detente" theory, propounded as early as 1963, called for the renunciation of attempts at direct violence in favour of broader contacts with the German Democratic Republic with the objective of gradually securing a change in its social system and policy. The GDR's proposals for normal relations on the basis of international law continued to be turned down.

On March 25, 1966 the FRG Government sent what it called a Peace Note, in which it declared its desire to have

good relations with its East European neighbours and gave the assurance that it did not pursue a "policy of revenge or restoration". In this Note it suggested an exchange, with the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia and any other East European country, of formal statements renouncing the use of force in the settlement of outstanding issues.

In its Note of reply of May 17 the Government of the USSR agreed that an exchange of declarations renouncing the use of force in relations between European states would be an "important element enhancing European security today". It made a number of proposals whose acceptance would have consolidated peace and security, and noted that the peoples were expecting the FRG Government to effect a turn in its policy towards realism and peaceful co-operation.

In connection with the formation of the coalition government headed by Kurt Kiesinger in December 1966, Leonid Brezhnev stated: "If the present Government of the FRG adopts a sober approach to the existing situation in Europe, if it does not encroach upon the interests of other countries and peoples and in practice demonstrates its desire to strengthen peace in our continent, we shall be among those who shall welcome such a policy."

However, instead of dissociating itself from the Adenauer-Erhard heritage, the Government formed through a coalition of the CDU/CSU and the SPD concentrated on achieving the old revanchist aims by new methods.

Although the FRG established diplomatic relations with Rumania in 1967 and with Yugoslavia a year later, in Bonn they continued insisting that no change had taken place in the "German legal view, according to which the Federal Government alone has the right and obligation to speak on behalf of the entire German people". It was not accidental that the National Democratic Party, whose membership exceeded 30,000 in 1967, became increasingly more active.

The Soviet Government repeatedly drew the attention of the West German leaders to the dangerous aspects of the political developments in the FRG and stressed that it was necessary to "preclude a course of events that could lead to the creation of a new hotbed of fascism in Europe and threaten world peace". Together with the other socialist countries the Soviet Union exposed the anti-democratic sub-

stance and objectives of the "emergency laws" railroaded through the Bundestag in 1968 after a long struggle.

The situation required a determined, sustained effort by all the peace forces to strengthen European security and settle outstanding European issues.

2. The Pressing Task of Ensuring Collective Security in Europe

The 23rd Congress of the CPSU on European Security

In the period from the mid-1950s through the mid-1960s the Soviet Union and other socialist countries came forward (jointly and individually) with a number of proposals and initiatives designed to strengthen peace and security in Europe. These included the Polish proposal of October 2, 1957 for the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Europe, the Soviet proposals for a German peace treaty and the normalisation of the situation in West Berlin, and the draft of a non-aggression pact between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO countries (1963).

The 23rd Congress of the CPSU passed decisions outlining further steps to improve the situation in Europe, namely, to initiate talks on European security; to consider the proposals of socialist and other European states on a military detente and a reduction of armaments, on the promotion of mutually beneficial relations between all European states and, in this connection, on the holding of an international conference; and to continue the quest for a solution of one of the cardinal problems of European security—the settlement of the German question—so that recognition of the existing European frontiers, including the frontiers of the two German states, could serve as the basis for removing the remnants of the Second World War in Europe.

The Congress decisions were warmly welcomed throughout the world. The steps recommended by the Congress were the point of departure of the Soviet Union's further efforts to ensure peace and security in Europe.

1966 Bucharest Declaration. 1967 Conference at Karlovy Vary

At a sitting in the Rumanian capital on July 4 through 6, 1966 the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee analysed the situation in Europe and adopted a Declaration on European Peace and Security.

"The participants in the Conference," the Declaration stated, "appeal to all the European governments and peoples, to all the forces of peace and progress in our continent regardless of their ideological, political and religious convictions to unite their efforts in order to make Europe, one of the major centres of world civilisation, a continent of comprehensive and fruitful co-operation between equal nations and a powerful factor of lasting peace and understanding throughout the world."

On the basis of these fundamental propositions the Declaration outlined a programme for strengthening peace and security in Europe. This programme called for:

- the promotion of good-neighbourly relations between all the European states in line with the principles of peaceful coexistence founded on respect for independence and national sovereignty, equality, non-interference in internal affairs and mutual benefit;
- the easing of military tension through the disbandment of the existing military alliances or, if the Western powers were still not prepared to take that step, the attainment of an agreement on the dissolution of the NATO and Warsaw Treaty military organisations;
- partial measures towards a military detente in the continent (the dismantling of military bases and the withdrawal of troops from foreign territory, the reduction of the numerical strength of the armed forces of the two German states, measures to eliminate the threat of a nuclear conflict, and so on);
- measures to rule out the FRG receiving direct or indirect access to nuclear weapons;
- recognition of the inviolability of existing frontiers, including the Oder-Neisse frontier and the frontier between the GDR and the FRG;
- the achievement of a German peace settlement based on the recognition of the existence of two German states;
- a European conference to examine the ways and means

of ensuring security in Europe and organise co-operation between all the European states.

This was a realistic programme for establishing peaceful relations and mutually beneficial co-operation between all the countries of Europe. It was endorsed and enlarged on at a conference of 24 European Communist and Workers' parties on European security at Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia, in April 1967. This conference called upon all the peace forces to unite in an active struggle against the arms race and the threat of war, for peace and security in Europe. The points made at the conference were that the inviolability of the post-war frontiers in Europe and the existence of the GDR and the FRG as sovereign and equal states had to be recognised, that the possibility of the FRG receiving access to nuclear weapons had to be ruled out and that the Munich treaty had to be declared invalid from the moment it was signed. It expressed itself in favour of normal relations between all countries and the GDR, including between the two German states and between the GDR and West Berlin.

In its efforts to ensure European security the Soviet Union took as its point of departure the fact that despite the intrigues of the forces of aggression there were realistic conditions for achieving that aim. These conditions were the enhanced international influence of the socialist countries, the intensification of the struggle for peace by the Communist and Workers' parties and by public organisations throughout the world, and the fact that bourgeois politicians were becoming increasingly aware of the danger of the arms race and were displaying a desire to promote commercial relations. At the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow on June 17, 1969 it was noted that the attainment "of lasting security in this continent is a problem which holds a paramount place in the minds and aspirations of the European peoples".*

Proposals of the Socialist Countries (1969-1970)

Continuing their efforts to turn Europe into a continent of peace, the socialist countries formulated proposals for a European conference. At its sitting in Budapest on March 17,

* *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow 1969*, p. 33.

1969 the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee adopted a message to all the European countries in which, as a practical step, it suggested a meeting of all the interested European states for the purpose of agreeing the procedure for convening a conference and determining the agenda for it. The message declared: "We are prepared to consider, at the same time, any other proposal regarding the method for preparing and convening this conference."

This initiative gave further impetus to the drive for collective security in Europe. On May 7, 1969 the Government of Finland declared that if the other European states felt this would be expedient it was prepared to undertake to organise the conference on European security and also the preliminary meetings to discuss the question of holding that conference.

In October 1969 a conference of Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Treaty states in Prague proposed that the agenda of the European conference should include:

1. The question of ensuring security in Europe and of renouncing the use or threat of force in the relations between European states, and
2. The question of expanding trade, economic, scientific and technical relations on the basis of equality for the promotion of political co-operation between the European states.

European security was one of the principal questions considered by the Party and Government leaders of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, Rumania, the USSR and Czechoslovakia at a meeting in Moscow in December 1969. At that meeting it was noted with satisfaction that the collective proposals of the socialist countries for a European conference were receiving broad support. In the communique issued by the meeting it was stated that the socialist countries were determined that in Europe tension should give way to good-neighbourly relations and that peaceful coexistence should become an abiding norm of relations between European countries. The interests of peace required that all countries should establish equal relations with the GDR on the basis of international law and that they should recognise the existing European frontiers, including the Oder-Neisse frontier, as final and inviolable.

At their next meeting, in Budapest in June 1970, the Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Treaty countries discussed the preparations for a European conference and suggested

enlarging the agenda by including in it a point on the establishment of an agency for security and co-operation in Europe. The agency could consider the questions entrusted to it by the conference and coordinate measures to strengthen peace and co-operation in Europe. It could also consider the question of reducing foreign armed forces on the territory of European states. Moreover, it was suggested that the second point of the agenda, formulated at Prague, should include a provision on the promotion of cultural relations. The Foreign Ministers declared that within the framework of this point their countries were prepared to discuss environmental protection.

This was a further demonstration by the socialist countries of their willingness to look for a mutually acceptable approach and take into consideration any proposals that would help to convene a European conference and ensure its success.

New Initiatives by the Socialist Countries in the Struggle for Peace and Security in Europe

The efforts of the socialist countries to consolidate European peace helped to change the situation in the continent and vitalise the peace forces in all countries, including the FRG. More and more people in the Federal Republic of Germany joined the movement demanding a policy founded on the actual situation and balance of strength in Europe. Pressured by the rank-and-file, the leadership of the Social Democratic Party likewise began to urge the implementation of such a policy. Speaking at the Social Democratic Party convention in Nuremberg in 1968 its leader, Willy Brandt, declared that the facts were that the frontiers in Europe could not be changed by force and that the Federal Republic should be prepared to sign binding agreements on this issue.

With the formation of an SPD-FDP Government headed by Willy Brandt in 1969 the Federal Republic of Germany adopted a more realistic foreign policy on a number of issues. In a Government policy statement the new Chancellor recognised the fact that there were two states on German soil. True, he reaffirmed Bonn's old attitude that the Federal Government could not give international legal recognition to

the GDR, but declared that non-discriminatory bilateral talks could be held at Government level in order to agree on co-operation on the basis of a treaty. Further, he said his Government wanted to begin talks with the socialist countries, including the GDR, for an agreement on the renunciation of the use of force.

In November 1969 the FRG forwarded its proposals to the USSR. They were also formulated in a Note of November 25 to Poland. Three days later, acting on instructions from his Government, the FRG Ambassador in the USSR signed the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

The socialist countries responded to these changes with understanding. In the communique on the meeting of the leaders of the fraternal countries in Moscow in December 1969 it was stated: "If the new West German Government draws the lessons from history, frees itself of the ballast of the past and, acting in the spirit of the times, displays a realistic approach to the problems giving rise to tension in the relations between the European states this would be welcomed by the socialist countries and by all peace-loving peoples."

On December 17 a new initiative was launched by the GDR. In a message to Gustav Heinemann, the FRG President, Walter Ulbricht, Chairman of the State Council of the GDR, wrote that peaceful coexistence and the establishment of good-neighbourly relations between the two German states required that the relations between them should be founded on universally recognised norms of modern international law. A draft Treaty on the establishment of equal relations between the two states, approved by the State Council of the GDR, was forwarded to the Government of the FRG. The reply stated that the Government of the FRG was prepared to begin talks with the Government of the GDR, but no mention was made of normal relations between the two German states on the basis of international law.

On GDR initiative meetings took place between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the GDR Willi Stoph and the FRG Chancellor Willy Brandt in Erfurt on March 19 and in Kassel on May 21-22, 1970. Willi Stoph suggested a constructive programme for regulating the relations between the two states and stressed that formal recognition of the German Democratic Republic and of the territorial status quo in Europe by the Government of the FRG was basic to the

interests of peace and security in the continent. The official exchange of views proposed by the GDR commenced at the close of 1970 at the level of State Secretaries.

The signing of a Treaty by the Soviet Union and the FRG* opened the door to the conclusion of similar treaties with other countries. The Polish Government had time and again declared that it was prepared to normalise relations with the FRG if that country's ruling circles recognised the realities in Europe, including the frontier along the Oder and the Neisse. On May 17, 1969 Poland called upon the FRG to come to an agreement that would regulate the relations between them. The talks that were initiated led to the signing of a Polish-West German Treaty on December 7, 1970.

In the Treaty it is stated that "desirous of creating a lasting basis for peaceful coexistence and the development of normal, good relations between them" the two countries would strive to consolidate peace and security in Europe, the prime conditions for which were the inviolability of frontiers and respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all the European countries. It was agreed that the existing frontier demarcated at the Potsdam Conference would be Poland's western border. The two countries declared that their present frontiers were inviolable and that they neither had nor would have territorial claims on each other. They renounced the use or threat of force in their relations and pledged to be guided by the aims and principles of the United Nations.

The Treaty contained the commitment that the two countries would "undertake further steps aimed at full normalisation and all-round development of their mutual relations, the lasting basis of which shall be the present Treaty", and that they would promote economic, scientific, technical, cultural and other contacts. It was agreed that after the Treaty came into force the two countries would establish diplomatic relations.

The Polish-West German Treaty was yet another important step towards the attainment of the system of European security desired by all the European peoples. Speaking at the 10th Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party on November 24, 1970, Leonid Brezhnev said: "The Treaty between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Ger-

* For the Soviet-West German Treaty see Chapter Four.

many and the recently initialled Treaty between the Polish People's Republic and the FRG are likewise the result of the coordinated, principled policy pursued by our community for many years and of the realistic stand adopted by the new Government of the FRG—apparently not without the influence of the mood of broad sections of that country's population. These documents are founded on the unqualified recognition of the actual situation in Europe, the situation that took shape as a result of the liberation struggle of the peoples during the Second World War. They create good conditions for extending peaceful co-operation between the European states in many areas and, at the same time, safeguard the legitimate interests of the German Democratic Republic and other socialist countries."*

At a conference in Berlin on December 2, 1970 the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee issued a Statement on security and peaceful co-operation in Europe, in which it was pointed out that the enforcement of the USSR-FRG and PPR-FRG treaties would be consistent with the vital interests of all countries and peoples. Noting that the adversaries of detente had not ceased their dangerous activities and that the aggressive circles in NATO and the revanchist elements in the FRG had even stepped up their provocations, the Statement declared that the Warsaw Treaty countries were determined to continue acting jointly in the interests of security in Europe. It was emphasised that lasting peace in the continent could not be built without the GDR. "Equal relations between the German Democratic Republic and other countries that have not yet established such relations, including relations between the GDR and the FRG founded on universally accepted norms of international law, and the GDR's admission to the United Nations and other international organisations as an equal member are vital demands of the times and would be a substantial contribution to European and world security," the Statement declared.

At their conference in Bucharest on February 18 through 19, 1971 the Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Treaty countries agreed that the time had come for a "new and more active phase of the preparations for a European conference".

* L. I. Brezhnev, *Leninskim kursom*, Vol. 3, p. 163.

**The 24th Congress of the CPSU on the Task of Strengthening
Peace and Security in Europe**

The situation in Europe received considerable attention at the 24th Congress of the CPSU, which noted that the improvement of Soviet-French relations and the treaties signed with the FRG by the USSR and Poland had had a positive effect on the course of European affairs.

The Central Committee report advanced an action programme with the aim of achieving a further improvement of the situation in Europe. This programme called for:

- a European conference, which was desired by the majority of the European countries and the preparations for which were entering the phase of practical politics;

- the speediest enforcement of the Soviet-West German and Polish-West German treaties;

- the settlement of the problems related to West Berlin on the basis of respect for the Allied agreements determining West Berlin's special status and for the sovereign rights of the GDR as an independent socialist state;

- the establishment of equal relations between the GDR and the FRG founded on universally accepted norms of international law and the admission of these two states to the United Nations;

- the satisfaction of Czechoslovakia's just demand that the Munich agreement of 1938 should be recognised as invalid from the moment it was signed.

European problems occupy a prominent place in the Peace Programme adopted by the 24th Congress of the CPSU. The points made in that programme are that the territorial changes that had taken place in Europe as a result of the Second World War have to be finally recognised, that a radical turn has to be made towards detente and peace in Europe, that the success of a European conference has to be ensured and that every effort has to be made to achieve collective security in Europe. The Soviet Union reiterated the stand, jointly expressed by the member states of the defensive Warsaw Treaty Organisation, that that organisation could be disbanded simultaneously with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation or that, as a first step, the military organisations of these blocs could be dissolved.

The Soviet Peace Programme underscores that it is important to renounce the use or threat of force for the settlement of outstanding issues and proposes the appropriate bilateral and regional agreements. Moreover, it indicates that the Soviet Union stands for the dismantling of foreign military bases and for a reduction of armed forces in areas where the military confrontation is especially dangerous, above all in Central Europe.*

In fulfilment of the 24th Congress' decisions on foreign policy the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government initiated new major moves towards the consolidation of peace in Europe. Leonid Brezhnev visited France, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Bulgaria and the GDR, and had talks with the FRG Federal Chancellor Willy Brandt in the Crimea. Alexei Kosygin visited Canada, Denmark and Norway. Visits to a number of countries were made by Soviet Party and Government delegations. Many agreements were signed on trade, on economic, scientific and technical co-operation and on cultural exchanges.

An extremely important agreement on West Berlin was signed on September 3, 1971 by the Soviet Union, the USA, Britain and France. This agreement is based on the territorial and political realities in Europe. One of its main provisions states that the Western sectors of Berlin "continue not to be a constituent part of the Federal Republic of Germany and not to be governed by it". This agreement removes a dangerous centre of tension and friction between countries in the very heart of Europe and is a crushing blow to elements that for many years had used West Berlin as a "front-line city" in their subversive activities against the socialist community. It gives full recognition to the sovereign rights and interests of the GDR and enhances its prestige, role and influence in international affairs.

In November 1971 a plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee adopted a decision headed "The International Work of the Central Committee of the CPSU After the 24th Congress", in which it was stated: "In this period the new steps that have been taken to speed up the ratification of the USSR-FRG and PPR-FRG treaties and to normalise relations between all the states in the continent founded on the recognition of the inviolability of the frontiers that have taken

* 24th Congress of the CPSU, p. 38.

shape as a result of the Second World War, including the frontier between the GDR and the FRG, the realisation of the principles of equality, independence and non-interference in internal affairs and the renunciation of the use of force in the settlement of international issues have been a substantial contribution to the creation in Europe of a situation that would totally rule out the danger of war in the continent.²²

A further constructive step towards the solution of European problems was the Declaration on Peace, Security and Co-operation in Europe adopted by the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee at its meeting in Prague in January 1972. Reiterating the proposals of the USSR and the other socialist countries for a European conference, the Declaration called for the recognition and implementation of the following basic principles of security and of the relations between the European states:

inviolability of frontiers, including the frontiers that emerged as a result of the Second World War; non-use of force and the settlement of all outstanding issues exclusively by peaceful means; peaceful coexistence of European states belonging to different social systems; good-neighbourly relations and co-operation in the interests of peace; mutually beneficial relations between countries in the sphere of economic, scientific and technical contacts, tourism and environmental protection; disarmament; support for the United Nations.

These proposals were acclaimed by wide sections of public opinion and by the governments of many European countries. Their implementation would help to turn Europe into a continent of lasting peace and create an effective system of European security. The attainment of these aims is regarded by the Soviet Union as one of its prime foreign policy tasks.

The coming into force in June 1972 of the treaties of the Soviet Union and Poland with the FRG, which Leonid Brezhnev called an event of historic importance, and of the Four-Power agreement on West Berlin was of immense significance to the efforts to strengthen peace and security in Europe. These documents form a definite system of treaties

* *Pravda*, November 24, 1971.

that pave the way to a new pattern of relations between European countries with different social systems and to the moulding of lasting European security.

West Germany's Treaties With the GDR and Czechoslovakia

Further progress along this road was marked by the improvement of the relations of the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Hungary with the FRG in 1972-1973. A Treaty on the Principles of Relations Between the GDR and the FRG was signed on December 21, 1972. It stated that the two countries were "establishing normal, good-neighbourly relations on the basis of equality" and the observance of the principles of the UN Charter. In it the two states declared that they "will settle outstanding problems exclusively by peaceful means" and "refrain from the threat or use of force". They reiterated "the present and future inviolability of the frontier between them" and pledged to abide by the principle that they could not represent or act on behalf of each other on the international scene and that the sovereign power of each was limited to its sovereign territory.

A treaty normalising the relations between Czechoslovakia and the FRG was signed in Prague on December 11, 1973. It stated that the Munich agreement of 1938 had been imposed on Czechoslovakia by the nazi regime under threat of force and that the sides regarded it as null and void. The two countries pledged to settle the issues between them exclusively by peaceful means and to refrain from the threat or use of force. They reaffirmed the present and future inviolability of the frontiers between them and declared that they neither had nor would have claims to each other's territory. Moreover, provision was made for the expansion of economic, scientific, technical and other co-operation.

On December 21, 1973 agreement was reached on the establishment of diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level between Bulgaria and the FRG and between Hungary and the FRG. As a result, all the European countries of the socialist community now have diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of Germany. This represents a new link in the chain of developments marked by detente in Europe and progress in the relations between the socialist countries and the FRG on the basis of the realities in Europe.

European Conference on Security and Co-operation

As a result of the tireless efforts of the USSR and other socialist countries the idea of consolidating peace in Europe is winning more and more adherents. Firm support for this idea was expressed by the Assembly of Public Opinion for Security and Co-operation in Europe, held in Brussels in June 1972. Progressive public opinion helped to achieve an understanding on multilateral consultations on preparations for a European Conference. These consultations took place in Helsinki from November 1972 to June 1973. They ended with the decision to hold the conference in three phases and with agreement on the agenda: security in Europe; economic, scientific and technical co-operation and co-operation in environmental protection; co-operation in humanitarian and other areas; further steps after the conference. These decisions were a major success of the efforts of the Soviet Union and the fraternal socialist countries, and of all other peace forces.

The first phase of the Conference on European Security and Co-operation took place in Helsinki on July 3-7, 1973. The second phase opened in Geneva on September 18, 1973. The Conference was attended by representatives of 33 European countries, the USA and Canada. The Soviet Union submitted the draft of a General Declaration on the Fundamentals of European Security and the Principles of Relations Between States in Europe envisaging the observance of the following principles in the relations between states regardless of their political, economic and social systems: sovereign equality, non-use of force, inviolability of frontiers, territorial integrity, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-interference in internal affairs, respect for human rights and basic freedoms, equality and the right of peoples to decide their own destiny, co-operation with the aim of maintaining peace and security, and scrupulous fulfilment of obligations under international law. Steps were mapped out to give effect to these principles. Draft decisions on economic, scientific and technical co-operation and on environmental protection were submitted by the delegations of the GDR and Hungary, and on the promotion of cultural co-operation, contacts and information exchanges by the delegations of Poland and Bulgaria. The Czechoslovak delegation proposed the formation of a

Consultative Committee for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

The purpose of the proposals made by the socialist countries was above all to ensure the confirmation by the participants in the Conference of the principles of relations between European states, including territorial integrity, the inviolability of frontiers and the non-use of force, and the adoption and strict fulfilment of these principles by the governments and peoples of Europe. Further, these proposals call for a European programme of economic co-operation that would be consistent with the requirements and potentialities of the scientific and technological revolution and provide for mutually beneficial long-term contacts on a large scale. The USSR and the other countries of the socialist community are urging comprehensive cultural co-operation, the expansion of information exchanges and contacts between nations. They hold that such co-operation must be founded on respect for the sovereignty, laws and customs of each country and pursue the aim of promoting the mutual cultural enrichment of peoples, the growth of understanding and the consolidation of good-neighbourly relations. They emphatically denounce the attempts to disguise interference in internal affairs with hypocritical statements about freedom and human rights. "They talk of 'liberalisation'," Leonid Brezhnev said at the Congress of Peace Forces in October 1973, "but what they mean is elimination of socialism's real gains and erosion of the socio-political rights of the peoples of the socialist countries." He added: "It is impossible to fight for peace while impinging on the sovereign rights of other peoples. It is impossible to champion human rights, while torpedoing the principles of peaceful coexistence."^{*}

The Soviet Union wants to see the successful completion of the European armed forces reduction talks that commenced in Vienna on October 30, 1973, with the participation of a number of European states. It holds that the agreement at the negotiations should cover a cutback in Central Europe both of foreign and national land and air forces, including forces equipped with nuclear arms. The agreement should not upset the present balance of strength, prejudice the security of any country or give any country advantages over other states.

^{*} L. I. Brezhnev, *For a Just, Democratic Peace, for the Security of Nations and International Co-operation*, pp. 38, 40.

The socialist countries are by no means closing their eyes to the difficulties on the road to the creation of a system of European security. The reactionaries, militarists and revanchists of all hues have not abandoned their efforts to reverse the course of events. One of their allies is Peking. The Maoists are hindering the efforts to achieve security and co-operation in Europe, associating themselves openly with the most fanatic proponents of the cold war.

However, the proposals of the socialist countries for peace, security and co-operation in Europe are winning the vigorous support of broad sections of public opinion in Europe, of all the peace forces in the continent, for they are fully consistent with the present-day realities in Europe and with the aim of achieving lasting peace, which is ardently desired by all peoples. At the Congress of Peace Forces in October 1973 Leonid Brezhnev noted: "We have faith in the ultimate success and the historic role of the European Conference, despite all the difficulties that are still to be overcome by those participating in that unique forum. . . ."*

* L. I. Brezhnev, *For a Just, Democratic Peace, for the Security of Nations and International Co-operation*, p. 23.

CHAPTER SIX

THE SOVIET UNION'S STRUGGLE AGAINST IMPERIALIST AGGRESSION IN ASIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

One of the cardinal objectives of Soviet foreign policy is to safeguard peace and security in Asia and the Middle East. To this end the Soviet Union directs its efforts towards uniting the socialist countries of Asia on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, helping the liberation movement and promoting friendship with the developing countries on the basis of peaceful coexistence and anti-imperialist solidarity.

A key element of this policy is that the Soviet Union uses its influence to protect the peoples of Asia and the Middle East against armed aggression. The actions taken by the USSR were decisive in halting a number of the military adventures launched by the imperialists in Asia during the post-war years. Today, as was underscored at the 24th Congress of the CPSU, the Soviet Union considers that to ensure world peace and security it is imperative to remove the flashpoints created by the forces of aggression in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. The USSR is bending every effort to achieve a political settlement in these areas on the basis of respect for the legitimate rights of the victims of aggression.

1. The USSR in the Struggle for Durable Peace in the Far East

Termination of the Korean War

Korea was split in two when the pro-imperialist Syngman Rhee puppet regime was established in South Korea. The Korean People's Democratic Republic made every effort to unite the country peacefully. In June 1950 the Supreme People's Assembly of the KPDR called for the fusion of

the higher organs of power in the two parts of Korea in order to prepare for nation-wide elections.

In reply to this call the Syngman Rhee regime, encouraged by the USA, attacked the Korean People's Democratic Republic on June 25 and started a civil war. The People's Army, which mounted a counter-offensive to repulse the aggression and ensure the republic's security, hurled back the attackers and pursued them into the territory of South Korea. The Truman Administration sent troops to Korea to save the tottering puppet regime and strengthen the Kuomintang regime on Taiwan.

The instigators of the aggression calculated on liquidating the Korean People's Democratic Republic, creating the conditions for reinstalling the Kuomintang in China, weakening the positions of socialism and undermining the liberation movement of the Asian peoples. A resolution passed by the Security Council under pressure from the USA and in the absence of the Soviet representative declared that North Korea was the "aggressor" and prescribed military assistance for the South Korean regime (the resolution was adopted after US troops had landed in Korea). Moreover, the military units of the interventionists commanded by a US general were called "United Nations Forces" and given the right to use the UN flag.

Along with United States and Syngman Rhee units, the "United Nations Forces" included units from Britain and some other NATO member states, as well as from countries completely dependent on the USA. Following up their temporary successes, the interventionist forces crossed the 38th parallel and started an offensive in North Korea.

The peace forces throughout the world were posed with the task of defending the Korean People's Democratic Republic and halting the conflict that was threatening to grow into a world war. In this task the principal role was played by the socialist countries, chiefly by the Soviet Union.

The USSR did not recognise the Security Council resolution because it amounted to direct support for the armed aggression against the Korean people and was adopted in violation of the UN Charter, in the absence of representatives of the Korean People's Democratic Republic and of one of the Security Council's permanent members. On July 15 the Soviet Union backed an Indian proposal for the cessation

of the armed conflict and the settlement of the Korean question by negotiation. This proposal was turned down by the USA and its allies.

On August 1, 1950 the Soviet Union resumed its participation in the work of the Security Council. First in this body and then, jointly with the representatives of Poland and Czechoslovakia, at the 5th General Assembly its representatives demanded the withdrawal of foreign troops so that the war could be ended and the Korean people could decide their affairs by themselves. This peace initiative was ignored by the aggressors.

Chinese volunteers entered North Korea in October. With massive assistance from the USSR and other socialist countries the Korean People's Army and the Chinese volunteers repulsed the interventionists and stood firm at the 38th parallel.

The Soviet Union sent arms, ammunition, vehicles and equipment to the people's forces. There were Soviet military advisers in Korea. Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Mongolia, Poland and Rumania supplied the Korean People's Democratic Republic with locomotives, machine-tools, electrical equipment, trucks, fabrics and food.

The efforts of the USSR and other socialist countries helped to isolate the aggressors, intensify discord in their camp, stiffen the condemnation of the intervention by the developing countries and mobilise all the peace forces for an active struggle to end the war. The resultant international situation was thus not in favour of the intervention.

On June 23, 1951 the Soviet Union proposed that the belligerents begin armistice talks and withdraw their forces to the 38th parallel. The Korean People's Democratic Republic and China accepted this proposal. The USA had no other choice than to agree to talks, which began on July 10, 1951 in the demilitarised zone on the 38th parallel.

The US delegation, however, steered towards a rupture so as to impute the blame to the other side.

The diplomatic moves by the socialist countries made it possible to surmount the impasse.

Following up the initiative taken by Poland, which on April 9, 1953 recommended an immediate cessation of hostilities and the re-opening of the talks, the UN General Assembly, in spite of the manoeuvres by the USA, voted in favour of a just and honourable armistice in Korea.

The USA had to consent to a resumption of the talks and on July 27 sign the armistice agreement, which provided for the total cessation of military operations and all acts of hostility in Korea until the final peace settlement was achieved at a political conference of the interested states. A demarcation line was marked out on the 38th parallel.

This put an end to three years of devastating warfare and extinguished a dangerous threat to world peace. The termination of the war was a signal success of the foreign policy of the USSR and other socialist countries in their struggle for peace and the easing of international tension.

Soviet Support for the Korean People's Efforts to Unite Their Country Peaceably

Moves by the USA prevented the final settlement of the Korean question and that country's peaceful reunification. On October 1, 1953 the USA and the puppet Syngman Rhee Government signed a Mutual Defence Treaty providing for the permanent stationing of US forces in South Korea.

The Korean question was discussed in Geneva from April through July 1954 at a conference of Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, China, Britain, France and the USA. Representatives of the Korean People's Democratic Republic and also of the Syngman Rhee regime and the USA's other allies in aggression took part in the conference. The imperialists turned down the proposals of the socialist countries for uniting Korea by means of elections after the evacuation of all foreign troops. In the terms of an ultimatum they demanded UN controlled elections with South Korea occupied by US forces. This led to a suspension of the talks.

Beginning with 1954 the situation in Korea was debated at every session (except the 19th and the 26th) of the General Assembly. The Soviet delegation invariably insisted on the participation in the debate of KPDR representatives, without whom no decision could have legal force. At every session the USA sought to get only the South Korean representative invited to the General Assembly and to secure the reaffirmation of the resolutions on Korea's unification through elections under the supervision of a UN commission with US troops remaining in South Korea. As the Soviet delega-

tion pointed out repeatedly, these resolutions echoed the "misguided decisions whose untenability has been shown by developments".

The Chinese volunteers returned home in 1958, but the USA continued to refuse to evacuate its troops from Korea.

The Soviet Union, the Korean People's Democratic Republic and other socialist countries countered the imperialist manoeuvres with a programme for a settlement in conformity with the interests of the Korean people and peace in the Far East. Underlying this programme was the provision that Korea's unification should be the affair of the Korean people themselves without foreign interference. To this end the Korean People's Democratic Republic made repeated overtures to the Seoul regime, proposing the restoration of economic, trade and cultural contacts and agreement on democratic elections, the evacuation of foreign troops, the renunciation of the use of force and a cutback of the armed forces. In supporting the initiative of the KPDR the Soviet Government noted that "in view of the existence of two states with different social systems the country's reunification cannot be achieved by imposing the will of one state on the other and, much less, by attempts at the forcible union of one part of the country with the other".

The South Korean population, too, campaigned for Korea's peaceful reunification. The anti-popular Syngman Rhee clique was deposed in the spring of 1960 during turbulent actions by the people. But the new Government, which was soon headed by Park Chung Hee, continued the old policy. With US assistance the South Korean armed forces, whose numerical strength reached 600,000, were modernised.

The South Korean and US forces systematically fomented provocations against the KPDR. The US spy ship *Pueblo* was detained in KPDR territorial waters in January 1968. The vessel's captain and crew admitted that they had been on a CIA espionage mission. The USSR supported the protest of the Korean People's Democratic Republic and warned that actions of this kind "may lead to another war in Korea and to a more serious complication of the situation in the Far East".

In 1971 the Korean People's Democratic Republic again called upon the Government and people of South Korea to

take steps towards the country's reunification by securing the evacuation of the US forces and then gradually normalising relations and preparing for nation-wide elections. The KPDR followed up these proposals by offering to replace the armistice agreement by a peace treaty with South Korea.

As was pointed out in the Central Committee report to the 24th Congress of the CPSU, this peace initiative was welcomed by the Soviet Union.

At the talks with a KPDR Government delegation in February 1972 the Soviet representatives reaffirmed the USSR's absolute support "for the KPDR's policy of achieving Korea's reunification by the Korean people themselves on a democratic basis" and its solidarity "with the new constructive proposals of the KPDR Government for the elimination of tension in the Korean peninsula".

Lately the efforts of the KPDR have yielded tangible results. The talks between officials of the KPDR and South Korea in July 1972 led to the signing of a joint North-South Statement, in which one of the cardinal agreed principles was that the country's reunification should be decided independently, without foreign interference, by peaceful means, without the use of force. Further, the Statement specified the practical measures for relaxing tension and restoring contacts between the North and the South.

The first act towards the realisation of these measures was the commencement of Red Cross negotiations on the establishment of contacts and the reunification of families and relatives. The KPDR suggested that a North-South Confederation should be set up as an immediate step towards the country's earliest peaceful reunification.

During a visit to the Korean People's Democratic Republic in September 1972 a CPSU delegation declared that the Communists of the Soviet Union and all Soviet people "supported all the constructive steps and efforts of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party and the Government of the KPDR to normalise the situation in Korea, secure the evacuation of the US forces from South Korea and achieve the country's independent peaceful reunification".

2. The Struggle of the USSR Against the Imperialist Aggression in Indochina

The 1954 Geneva Agreements on Indochina

Together with other peace-loving states the Soviet Union did much to help end the war that the French imperialists had been waging since 1946 against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the peoples of Laos and Cambodia. The USA gave its support to France in the calculation of ultimately crowding out the French monopolies and gaining control of these countries. Washington became particularly active in fanning the war in Indochina after the signing of the armistice in Korea.

The colonialists suffered one defeat after another. At Dien Bien Phu the People's Army of the DRV surrounded the main forces of the French expeditionary corps. At the close of 1953 President Ho Chi Minh declared that if France wished to sign an armistice and settle the Vietnam question by negotiations the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was prepared to discuss these issues provided its independence was respected.

This was the situation when on Soviet initiative the Foreign Ministers of the USSR, the USA, Britain and France exchanged views at their conference in Berlin on the inclusion of the Indochina issue in the agenda of a new conference with the participation of China. This was categorically opposed by the US Secretary of State.

The secret Pentagon documents published in 1971 indicate that already then President Eisenhower had approved a political programme for Southeast Asia providing for the continuation of the war in Indochina with active US intervention. But in view of the military setbacks and the popular discontent in France with the policies that it was pursuing the French Government could not afford to ignore the possibility for negotiations. This view was shared by Britain. The threat of isolation made the USA agree with the view of its partners that a blatantly negative attitude could not be adopted in face of the Soviet initiative. It was decided that the question of ending the war in Indochina would be examined at a conference of five Foreign Ministers in Geneva.

The discussion of the Indochina question commenced on May 8, 1954, the day after Dien Bien Phu fell. Representatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam participated in the conference, which was presided over by the Foreign Ministers of the USSR and Britain. The Soviet and Chinese delegations supported the programme put forward by the DRV for the restoration of peace in Indochina. This programme called for an immediate cease-fire to be followed by a political settlement under which France would recognise the independence of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos and evacuate her forces from these countries, and also for the unification of each of these states by means of free general elections.

The delegations of the socialist countries rejected the claims of the imperialists as being incompatible with the sovereignty of the countries of Indochina and submitted proposals that took into account the wishes of France and her allies. This course made it difficult to suspend the negotiations, which was what the USA wanted. Nonetheless, pressured by the USA France demanded what was virtually the DRV's surrender and brought the talks to the verge of collapse. On June 12 the French National Assembly passed a vote of no confidence in the Government's policies and demanded the termination of the dirty war. The new Premier declared he would seek a mutually acceptable settlement.

The cease-fire agreement and the Final Declaration were signed in Geneva on July 20 and 21, 1954. A provisional demarcation line was established in Vietnam somewhat south of the 17th parallel. In Laos the Pathet Lao Resistance forces were given control of two northeastern provinces. An international commission consisting of representatives of India, Canada and Poland was set up to supervise the fulfilment of the armistice terms. Under the terms of the agreements no foreign military bases could be sited in Indochina, and Laos, Cambodia and the two parts of Vietnam were obligated to refrain from joining any military bloc. France pledged to evacuate her forces from these countries.

The Final Declaration provided for free elections in Laos and Cambodia in 1955 and in Vietnam in 1956 for the purpose of forming national governments and of re-uniting Vietnam. The signatories of these agreements were committed

to respect the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of these states and to desist from interfering in their internal affairs.

The termination of the war in Indochina was an object lesson showing that the imperialists were no longer able forcibly to change the social system and return to the fold of capitalism countries that had broken away from it or suppress the liberation movement. It was a further vivid demonstration of the significance of joint action by the socialist countries and of the leading role played by the USSR in the struggle against imperialist aggression.

The USSR's Efforts to Ensure the Fulfilment of the Geneva Agreements

As a Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference the Soviet Union consistently used its best endeavours to ensure the full and exact fulfilment of the conference's decisions. Soviet diplomacy countered the manoeuvres of the USA, which began to violate the commitments taken at Geneva even before the ink on the agreements had dried.

The USSR welcomed Cambodia's decision to pursue an independent policy. This decision was formalised in 1957 in the neutrality law. In 1959 when SEATO pressure on Cambodia mounted, the Soviet Government declared its support for that country's neutrality and denounced the subversive actions of the imperialists. In 1962 it backed the request for international guarantees for Cambodia's neutrality, and at a sitting of the Security Council in 1964 condemned the South Vietnamese air raids on that country. Subsequently, it came forward time and again in defence of Cambodia's sovereignty.

US intervention was the main reason for the aggravation of the situation in Laos. Formed in 1960, that country's Government, headed by neutralist leaders, co-operated with the Patriotic Front representing the democratic forces and proclaimed a policy of neutrality. The USA instigated a rising by reactionary groups.

In line with the Geneva Agreements the Soviet Union sided with the efforts to achieve national unification and consolidate the independence of Laos and extended material assistance to the new Government. It insisted that the situa-

tion should be examined at an international conference and drew the USA's attention to the fact that it was violating the commitments on non-interference in the affairs of Indochina and that it was necessary to achieve a peaceful settlement in Laos.

After the Government forces and the PFL units had inflicted a series of defeats on the insurgents, the puppet leaders were compelled to agree to an armistice and negotiations.

The negotiations were conducted along two channels. At the meetings of representatives of the main political groups (the Patriotic Front of Laos, the neutralists and the pro-US Right-wing forces) the talks centred on the composition and programme of the Government. In Geneva a conference of 14 countries* considered the international aspects of the Laotian question. The negotiations were dragged out by the manoeuvres of the USA and its satellites. A Government of national unity was formed only in the summer of 1962. It declared that it was determined that Laos should become a neutral, independent, democratic, united and flourishing country. This statement was included in the Soviet-sponsored Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos, which was approved by the Geneva Conference on July 23, 1962. The countries that signed the Declaration undertook to respect Laos' sovereignty and to refrain from interfering in its internal affairs or drawing it into military agreements. The Declaration stated that all foreign military personnel would be withdrawn from that country.

Once again the implementation of the agreement was disrupted by the USA. For this purpose it used a Right-wing group that in 1964 had seized control of Vientiane, with the result that the PFL representatives in the coalition Government had to quit the capital. The situation was further aggravated with the defection of some of the neutralist leaders to the side of the reactionaries, who in fact resumed the civil war. US aircraft began the systematic bombing of the areas controlled by the patriotic forces.

The USSR took every possible step to halt the intervention and secure the fulfilment of the Geneva decisions. In

* Burma, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, India, Cambodia, Canada, the People's Republic of China, Laos, Poland, South Vietnam, the USSR, Britain, the USA, Thailand and France.

its statements the Soviet Government exposed and condemned the US aggression against the Laotian people and demanded that Laos should be allowed to solve its internal problems without foreign interference.

With similar consistence the Soviet Government aligned itself with the DRV's insistence on national elections within the timetable established by the Geneva decisions. In May 1956, on its initiative, the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference called upon the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and South Vietnam to begin consultations on that question.

US Armed Aggression in Vietnam

But US interference obstructed the realisation of the national aspirations of the Vietnamese people. The USA steered a course aimed at turning South Vietnam into virtually a colony and a military springboard. A year after the Geneva Conference the USA engineered the deposition of the Emperor Bao Dai, who represented the pro-French feudal-landowner circles. The US puppet Ngo Dinh Diem was installed as head of the republic. On the insistence of the USA, which, as was brought to light by the secret Pentagon documents, felt that free elections would bring the Communists to power, the new Government refused to hold such elections. Realising that this flagrant flouting of the will of the people would evoke determined resistance, the USA stepped up the reorganisation of the Saigon armed forces, whose strength was increased to 300,000 effectives by the close of 1961.

The disruption of the country's re-unification, the establishment of a semi-colonial regime and the outrages perpetrated by the US pawns aroused the indignation of the people. In 1960 the patriotic parties and organisations united to form the South Vietnam National Liberation Front, which proclaimed as its objectives the overthrow of the pro-US regime, the formation of a democratic coalition Government and Vietnam's peaceful re-unification. Under its leadership the scattered self-defence units were fused into a Liberation Army. This army soon cleared the enemy out of a considerable part of South Vietnam with a population of many millions.

The successes of the liberation forces precipitated a crisis in the puppet regime. In 1963 the USA was compelled to remove Ngo Dinh Diem. In the course of the next 20 months there were nine changes of government in Saigon. However, the imperialists were unable to strengthen the position of their puppets although the Saigon army was led by 30,000 US "advisers". This prompted Washington to embark on direct intervention in Vietnam.

To justify the aggression, its organisers had recourse to provocations. They staged an "attack by DRV torpedo boats" on US warships in the Gulf of Tonkin, with Saigon motor boats playing the role of attackers. On August 7, 1964, three days after the faked attack, the US Congress approved the so-called Tonkin resolution. The President was empowered to order unrestricted military operations in Vietnam. The aggression in Vietnam was escalated and soon assumed an unprecedented scale. A huge war machine was concentrated in that country by the Pentagon. From 1965 onwards the US units became the main combat force against the Liberation Army. Towards the close of 1967 the number of US troops in that country exceeded half a million. The interventionists dealt brutally with the civilian population. In the period from 1961 through 1969 poison chemicals were dropped on an area of 38,000 square kilometres, poisoning 1,300,000 people. All the inhabitants of Song My and some other villages were butchered.

Operations were escalated also against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The first US aircraft appeared over the DRV on August 5, 1964, when they bombed several towns. In February 1965 the raids became systematic. In the period up to 1972 inclusively US planes dropped nearly 7,400,000 tons of bombs in Indochina, or twelve times more than during the Korean war and almost four times more than during the Second World War.

As in Korea, the USA sought to give the aggression the semblance of a joint operation by the countries of the "free world". But their allies no longer showed any desire to fight for US interests. The only response to their call came from the Seoul rulers, who sent 50,000 troops to South Vietnam, while Thailand, the Philippines, New Zealand and Australia, which sent small contingents, announced in 1971 that they would withdraw these contingents partially or entirely.

According to the above-mentioned secret Pentagon documents, the USA's objectives were to demoralise the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the South Vietnam National Liberation Front and achieve a military victory, i.e., defeat the South Vietnamese patriots and halt the aid they were receiving from the DRV, weaken and discredit the socialist state of the Vietnamese people and the liberation forces of Laos and Cambodia, and consolidate the American position in Southeast Asia. For the sake of these objectives the American people were drawn into the longest war in their history. In that war (1965-1973) the USA spent nearly \$140,000 million, while the casualties totalled almost 350,000 men (including about 50,000 dead). The heroic resistance of the Vietnamese people and the political struggle waged by the USSR and other socialist countries, by all progressive forces throughout the world, drove the US aggressors to the wall.

Soviet Assistance to the Liberation Struggle of the Vietnamese People

The patriots of South Vietnam counter-attacked the aggressor with growing success. In January 1968 their offensive operations on all the fighting fronts threw the enemy into confusion, and in 1969-1971 they dealt him further staggering blows. In 1969 the liberation forces were in actual control of almost three-fourths of South Vietnam.

A congress of people's representatives, held in the liberated area on June 8, 1969, proclaimed the Republic of South Vietnam and formed a Provisional Revolutionary Government. The action programme adopted by the SVNLF called for the further cohesion of the people's armed forces against the US aggression and for the abolition of the colonial regime set up by the USA.

The USA laboured in vain trying to force the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to halt rendering fraternal assistance to the population of South Vietnam. In April 1965 the National Assembly of the DRV unanimously passed a decision to resist aggression until the enemy was defeated. During the hostilities the valiant patriots of Vietnam shot down over 8,600 US aircraft and helicopters. Despite the formidable difficulties, the workers and peasants ensured

uninterrupted supplies for the people and the army. In the course of the struggle the Patriotic Front led by the Working People's Party of Vietnam grew stronger and the republic's defence potential was enhanced.

In 1965 the DRV offered to sign a peace settlement provided the USA withdrew its forces, the people of South Vietnam were given the opportunity to decide their internal affairs by themselves and the question of the country's peaceful re-unification was left to the population of the two zones. While insisting on these terms, the DRV at the same time declared that it was prepared to discuss the ways and means of achieving peace if the USA unconditionally ceased the bombing raids and other military actions against it.

Throughout this period the Soviet Union urged that the Geneva Conference Co-Chairmen should demand an end to US interference in Vietnam, but Britain refused to take that step. In August 1965 the Soviet Government warned Washington that it bore a grave responsibility for the military provocations against the DRV. Massive Soviet assistance* enabled the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to repulse the aggressor. The American press and politicians noted time and again that this assistance had reinforced the defences of the DRV and that the bombing raids had begun to cost the US Air Force dear.

The South Vietnamese patriots received similarly consistent support from the USSR. In 1965 the Soviet Government declared that it regarded the National Liberation Front as the true spokesman of the people of South Vietnam and that it subscribed to its demands. The Central Committee of the SVNLF set up a permanent diplomatic mission in Moscow. In the talks with an SVNLF delegation in November 1969 the Soviet Government stated that it was determined to continue rendering every possible assistance and support for the struggle waged by the people of South Vietnam, the National Liberation Front and the Provisional Revolutionary Government. The patriots of South Vietnam highly appreciated this internationalist stand of the Soviet Union. At the 24th Congress of the CPSU its representative said: "Permit me to use this occasion to express the profound gratitude of the people and the Na-

* See Chapter Two.

tional Liberation Front of South Vietnam to the Communist Party, Government and people of the Soviet Union for their sympathy, support and generous, invaluable and effective assistance."²

At the United Nations and other international forums the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries denounced the escalation of the war and the diplomatic manoeuvres of the USA. The USSR opposed every move to have the Vietnam question brought up in the Security Council or other United Nations organs, as that would have undermined the mechanism of the 1954 Geneva Conference, whose decisions provided the foundation for the settlement in Vietnam. Judging by the secret Pentagon documents, the USA intended to continue the hostilities regardless of how the question was decided in the United Nations, and its insistence that the question should be considered in the Security Council was only a move to deceive public opinion.

In talks and contacts with the USA, for instance, during Alexei Kosygin's talk with President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1967, the Soviet Union made it plain that the imperialists were trying in vain to impose their will on the Vietnamese people by force of arms. At meetings with the heads of other states the Soviet leaders explained the position of the DRV and of the patriots of South Vietnam and urged energetic action against the US intervention. Further, the Soviet Government warned the countries that had sent troops to Vietnam of their responsibility for their participation in the war of aggression.

Through the efforts of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, of all the peace forces, the aggressor found himself ever deeper in isolation. The demand that the intervention should cease and that the Vietnamese people be given the opportunity to settle their affairs by themselves was supported by most of the developing countries and by some of the USA's allies, including France.

The American people were becoming more and more aware of the senselessness and danger of the war. This was seen in the mass protests and demonstrations that erupted

* *XXIU syezd KPSS. Stenograficheskii otchet*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1972, p. 368.

throughout the USA. The more far-sighted representatives of the ruling class likewise began to urge negotiations for the termination of the war in Vietnam. This was one of the main issues during the 1968 election campaign. Neither the ruling Democratic Party nor the opposition Republican Party could afford to ignore the mood of the people, who wanted an end to the shameful adventure.

Negotiations to End the War

On March 31, 1968 President Johnson ordered a restriction on the bombing of the DRV and agreed to talks. At the meetings between representatives of the DRV and the USA in Paris, which began on May 13, 1968, an understanding was reached on quadripartite talks on a peace settlement with the total cessation of the bombing of the DRV. The meetings between representatives of the DRV, the SVNLF (the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam as from June 1969), the USA and the Saigon regime opened in Paris in early 1969.

The SVNLF 10-point programme, submitted in 1969 and then augmented and enlarged on in 1971 and 1972, was backed by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. In 1971 the DRV negotiator handed the US delegation a document headed "Nine-Point Peace Initiative of the Government of the DRV", which comprehensively stated the Vietnamese stand.

The programme put forward by the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam for a peace settlement provided, first and foremost, for the recognition of the right of the Vietnamese people to independence, the unconditional evacuation of US forces from South Vietnam and the cessation of all acts of aggression by the USA against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The political system in South Vietnam was to be decided by the people themselves by elections without any interference from the USA. These elections were to be held following the formation of a Government of national concord as a result of negotiations between the Provisional Revolutionary Government and the Saigon administration. The country's re-unification was to be achieved peacefully, by stages, through negotiation,

with South Vietnam pursuing a policy of neutrality and with both the DRV and South Vietnam strictly abiding by the provisions of the 1954 Geneva Agreement that they should not enter any military alliances. The USA was to cease its aggression against Laos and Cambodia and observe the Geneva provisions relative to these states so that the countries of Indochina could settle the issues between them by themselves.

But for a long time there was resistance to a settlement that would accord with the aspirations of the Vietnamese people. In 1969 the White House announced that it would "Vietnamise" the war, i.e., reduce the number of US forces in South Vietnam, considerably expand the air war against the peoples of Indochina, increase the numerical strength of the Saigon army (to about 1,000,000 effectives in 1972), supply that army with a large quantity of military equipment and use it for intervention in Cambodia and Laos.

In line with this new "Vietnamisation" policy and in violation of its commitments regarding the terms of the negotiations, the USA in 1970 resumed the barbarous bombing of North Vietnam. That same year pro-US groups staged a coup in Pnompenh. This was followed by the invasion of Cambodia by US and Saigon forces. In 1971 the South Vietnamese troops invaded Laos. At the same time, the USA intensified the bombing of areas controlled by the Patriotic Front of Laos. The "Vietnamisation" policy thus signified the continuation and extension of the aggression against the peoples of Indochina with the aim of imposing on them puppet regimes obedient to the USA.

The patriots of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia successfully repulsed the aggressors. In their valiant struggle for independence they continued to receive massive assistance from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, from all the progressive states in the world.

In the spring of 1972, referring to the new escalation of the aggression against the DRV, the Soviet Government declared that "the Government of the USA bears the full responsibility for the possible consequences of its unlawful actions". The Soviet Union wholeheartedly subscribed to the programme for a peace settlement advanced by the DRV and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam.

"There is only one way of solving the Vietnamese problem," it is stated in the Central Committee report to the 24th Congress of the CPSU. "It is clearly indicated in the proposals of the DRV Government and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, proposals which we firmly back."*

The Appeal headed "Freedom and Peace to the Peoples of Indochina", adopted on April 8, 1971 by the 24th Congress of the CPSU, solemnly reiterated that the Soviet Union would continue giving every possible support to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to help it strengthen its defence capability and would consistently and firmly side with the liberation movement in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. The Appeal called upon all people who prized freedom, peace and progress to condemn the US aggression in Indochina and demand the withdrawal of US forces and the granting to the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia their legitimate right to be masters in their own land.**

Steadfastly in line with this principled policy the USSR delegation at the Soviet-US summit in May 1972 stressed the Soviet Union's solidarity with the just struggle of the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia for freedom, independence and social progress and declared the Soviet Union's unchangeable support for the demand that foreign troops should be evacuated from South Vietnam and that the peoples of Indochina should be given the possibility of settling their affairs by themselves. The leading organs of the CPSU and the Soviet Government considered the results of the talks and expressed their approval of the firm attitude adopted by the Soviet delegation, underscoring that the "Soviet Union's solidarity with the heroic struggle of the Vietnamese people has been and remains immutable".***

Cessation of the War in Vietnam and Laos—a Victory of All the Forces of Peace and Progress

On September 11, 1972 the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam made new proposals on the terms for peace. It reiterated the demand that the USA

* 24th Congress of the CPSU, p. 30.

** Ibid, pp. 326, 327.

*** *Pravda*, June 2, 1972.

should cease the war of aggression, evacuate its forces and halt the "Vietnamisation" actions. Pointing out that in South Vietnam there were two governments and two armies, it proposed that the political settlement in South Vietnam should be founded on that reality. Approving this initiative, the DRV Government noted that the Provisional Revolutionary Government was prepared to reach an agreement that would preclude the establishment in South Vietnam of a communist system or a pro-US puppet regime.

Combining determined resistance to aggression with peace efforts, the Government of the DRV, with the complete accord of the Provisional Revolutionary Government, submitted on October 8, 1972 the draft of an agreement on the termination of the war. As a result of this initiative, the text of the agreement was specified and the date was set for signing it. But on the pretext that there were objections from the Saigon puppets the USA went back on the understanding that had been reached. In a Statement of October 26 the DRV Government exposed the US delaying tactics and called upon all peace-loving countries, international organisations, the American people and the peoples of the whole world to compel the US Government to abide by the understanding. The text of this Statement was handed to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on October 27 by the diplomatic representatives of the DRV and the Republic of South Vietnam in Moscow. From the Soviet side it was declared that the USSR "supports the efforts to achieve a speedy end to the war started by the USA against the Vietnamese people".

On October 18, again violating the pledges it had repeatedly made, the USA resumed the unrestricted bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam with Hanoi and Haiphong, including the residential districts of these cities, as the main targets. As was pointed out by the Government of the DRV and the Provisional Revolutionary Government, the USA resorted to this step simultaneously with the demand, made at the Paris talks, for a modification of the achieved agreement in order to compel the Vietnamese people to accept the American terms for a settlement. While resolutely repulsing the aggression, the patriots did not abandon their efforts to attain peace on the basis of the

USA's recognition of the Vietnamese people's legitimate rights. During this crucial period the representatives of the DRV and the Provisional Revolutionary Government set a striking example of revolutionary diplomacy, combining firmness and a principled attitude with a constructive approach and flexibility. As in the past, a huge contribution to the successes of the Vietnamese patriots was made by the Soviet Union. Speaking in the Kremlin on December 21, Leonid Brezhnev said that "we give our Vietnamese friends active assistance in their efforts for a just peace settlement".*

On January 27, 1973, following the failure of their new attempts to bring the patriots to their knees by military force and political manoeuvres, the US and the Saigon regime had no alternative but to sign the agreement ending the war in Vietnam. The signatories to that agreement pledged to respect the independence, sovereignty, unity and national integrity of Vietnam as recognised in the 1954 Geneva Agreements. The USA undertook to end all military operations against the DRV. The terms of the agreement were that 60 days after the cease-fire the USA and its allies would withdraw all their armed forces and military advisors from South Vietnam and dismantle their military bases. The question of the Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam was to be decided by the parties concerned in South Vietnam. The articles relating to the political settlement in South Vietnam envisaged the right of the people of South Vietnam to self-determination, the holding of genuinely free elections under international supervision with guarantees for democratic freedoms, and the formation for the organisation of these elections, by agreement between the Provisional Revolutionary Government and the Saigon regime, of a People's Council of national conciliation and concord. The Provisional Revolutionary Government was thus recognised as a party in the political settlement. It was provided that the re-unification of Vietnam would be effected gradually, by peaceful means, through coordination between North and South Vietnam. Prior to re-unification the two parts of Vietnam would maintain a demilitarised zone on either side of the demar-

cation line, which, it was emphasised, was temporary and was not a political or territorial frontier. An international commission consisting of Canada (replaced by Iran in August 1973), Hungary, Indonesia and Poland was set up to supervise and control the fulfilment of the terms of the agreement. The signatories to the agreement undertook to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of the countries of Indochina to enable their peoples to settle their problems by themselves.

As provided for in the agreement on the termination of the war, an international conference on Vietnam was held in Paris from February 26 through March 2, 1973. It was attended by the countries that had signed the agreement (the DRV, the USA and the Republic of South Vietnam and the Saigon regime), the permanent members of the Security Council (the Soviet Union, France, China and Britain), the countries forming the supervisory and control commission, and the UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim. The purpose of the conference was to work out guarantees for the preservation of peace in Vietnam and help to restore peace throughout the whole of Indochina.

The Soviet delegation consistently helped to carry out these tasks and, in the course of the conference, undeviatingly supported the representatives of the DRV and the Provisional Revolutionary Government. It emphatically rejected the attempts, made on the pretext of "extending the mechanism of control", to create difficulties for the implementation of the agreement on the termination of the war and for guaranteeing the national rights of the Vietnamese people. The Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko warned that no attempts would be permitted to weaken the position of the democratic forces of South Vietnam, above all of the Provisional Revolutionary Government, and denounced the Saigon regime's violations of the cease-fire agreement. Through the efforts of the Soviet Union the "Act of the International Conference on Vietnam" was approved unanimously.

The participants in the conference took note of and approved the agreement on the termination of the war in Vietnam and committed themselves to respect its terms and prevent actions contravening these terms. They reiterated their recognition of and respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Vietnam and the right

* L. I. Brezhnev, *The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, p. 45.

of the people of South Vietnam to self-determination. It was placed on record that if necessary the international conference on Vietnam could be reconvened at the joint request of the DRV and the USA or of any six participants.

The end of the war in Vietnam was an overwhelming victory of the Vietnamese people and all the forces of progress and peace. It marked the success of the diplomacy of the socialist community. As was pointed out by Leonid Brezhnev, it confirmed the "enormous viability of socialism", gave striking evidence of the efficacy of the policy of internationalism pursued by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and showed how imperialism's possibilities had shrunk.*

The beneficial impact of the victory of the Vietnamese people manifested itself in the agreement, signed on February 21, 1973, on the restoration of peace and national concord in Laos. The agreement provided for the termination of hostilities and for a political settlement on the basis of the 1962 Geneva Agreements on Laos with full recognition for the equality of the Patriotic Front of Laos and the Vientiane Government in the implementation of measures designed to achieve such a settlement. In connection with the signing of the agreement, the leaders of the Soviet Union sent a message to the Patriotic Front of Laos, writing that "this great victory of the Laotian patriots was won by them in a selfless struggle for the freedom and independence of their country".

3. The Soviet Union's Efforts to Extinguish the Hotbed of War in the Middle East

After the Second World War the imperialists precipitated a number of dangerous military crises in the Middle East. They used force in an attempt to destroy the liberation movement and preserve or restore their rule. In safeguarding the countries of that region against aggression and preserving peace on the basis of respect for their rights the premier role was played by the Leninist foreign policy of the Soviet Union. Fulfilling its internationalist duty the

* *Pravda*, January 31, 1973.

USSR continues to spare no pains to secure the abolition of the consequences of the aggression which Israel and its imperialist backers had launched against Arab countries.

The Soviet Union's Defence of Egypt During the Triple Aggression

In the summer of 1956 the USA and Britain went back on their promise to grant Egypt loans for the building of a high dam on the Nile. In retaliation, the Egyptian Government nationalised the Anglo-French operated Suez Canal, which had for many decades served as a means of pillaging and subjugating Egypt. Nationalisation made it possible to direct the revenues from the operation of the canal into economic development.

Although Egypt declared that she was prepared to pay compensation to the share-holders and abide by the 1888 International Convention on the free use of the canal, the Western powers proclaimed that she had acted illegally and resorted to economic sanctions. At the London conference on the Suez issue in August 1956 the USA proposed the so-called Dulles Plan, which, on the pretext of "free navigation", provided for control of the canal by the USA, Britain and France.

In a statement published on August 9, 1956 the Soviet Government denounced this attitude of the Western powers as hostile to Egypt and as a threat to peace and security. At the London conference the Soviet delegation supported the Indian proposals that confirmed Egypt's sovereignty over the canal. By concerted efforts the Soviet Union and the neutralist states prevented the adoption of the Dulles Plan and thus deprived the imperialists of the possibility of referring to the decisions of the conference to substantiate their claims to the canal.

At the discussion of the Suez issue in the Security Council in October 1956 the Soviet delegate showed that the demand for "international control" was untenable and urged an arrangement for the free use of the canal under which Egypt would retain possession and control of that waterway. The Soviet initiative made it possible to reach agreement on some of the terms for a settlement of the conflict.

However, the agreement was broken by Britain and France. The evidence in the memoirs of Anthony Eden,

who was British Prime Minister during the Suez crisis, is that from the very outset these countries planned to use the canal's nationalisation as the excuse for attacking Egypt. They calculated not only on regaining control of the canal but also on suppressing the national liberation movement and consolidating colonial rule in the Middle East. In this adventure they counted heavily on Israel.

It will be recalled that in 1947 the UN General Assembly had passed a decision which ended British rule and formed two states—an Arab and a Jewish state—in Palestine. The Soviet Union had voted for that decision, which made it possible to abolish colonial control quickly and to ensure the evacuation of British forces. Acting on the principle that every people had the right to form an independent national state, the USSR had established diplomatic relations with Israel in 1948.

But as soon as the new state was proclaimed its ruling elite steered a course towards the seizure of Arab territory in flagrant violation of the UN decision. During the war of 1948-1949 Israel occupied almost two-thirds of the territory that should have belonged to the Palestinian Arab state and evicted nearly a million people from the seized territory.

In 1949 the belligerents signed an armistice. But Israel refused to clear out of the occupied territory or to permit the refugees to return to their homes. This prevented the establishment of peace.

The Western powers used the clash for interference and for fanning tension in the Middle East. With the Arab states consolidating their independence the imperialists began to regard Israel as an assault force against the liberation movement. The Israeli ruling circles willingly served as the agents of the imperialists against the freedom and progress of the peoples of the Middle East. They were planning to annex more Arab territory.

In the night of October 29-30, 1956 Israeli troops invaded Egypt. On the next day Britain and France began military operations in the zone of the Suez Canal. The aggressors massed a large force, hoping for a quick victory.

The Egyptian people did not submit to the aggressors. In their just struggle they relied first and foremost on the support of the USSR. On October 31 the Soviet Govern-

ment demanded the immediate cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the invading forces. Its representatives in the United Nations pressed for the condemnation of the aggressors and for a motion prescribing that they evacuate their forces without delay.

On November 2 the General Assembly passed a resolution demanding an immediate end to the hostilities and the evacuation of the invading armies. Britain, France and Israel ignored this resolution. Their forces seized the Sinai Peninsula and Port Said and were poised for a strike on Egypt's vital centres.

On November 5, 1956, when it became evident that the aggressors had no intention of abiding by the UN resolution, the Soviet Government called upon the Security Council to recommend that the members of the United Nations, notably the USSR and the USA, should give armed assistance to Egypt. It informed the governments of the countries that had attacked Egypt that it intended to take determined steps to cut short the aggression.

The Soviet Union's resolute actions yielded results. Within a few hours of the Soviet warning Britain, France and Israel ordered their forces to halt their operations. However, the invaders refused to leave the occupied regions until Egypt approved the "internationalisation" of the Suez Canal and made territorial concessions to Israel. The Soviet Union continued its resolute defence of the legitimate rights of the Egyptian people.

The British and French forces were compelled to quit Egypt at the close of 1956 and the beginning of 1957. The Israeli units were also withdrawn in March 1957. As a compromise, Egypt agreed to the stationing of UN troops in the evacuated areas, notably at Sharm el-Sheikh, at the entrance of the Gulf of Aqaba, on whose shore the Israeli port of Eilat is situated. As was explained by the UN Secretary-General in 1967, this was a voluntary concession and Egypt had every right to renounce it at any time. Israel refused to permit UN forces to be stationed on her territory and, consequently, Egypt found herself in an unequal position. Soon Britain and France acknowledged that their claims were untenable and signed an agreement with Egypt on compensation to the share-holders of the Suez Canal Company and on the payment to Egypt of dues for the use of the canal.

The failure of the Suez adventure undermined British and French influence in the Middle East, whose people saw that even by force of arms the imperialists could no longer restore their rule.

Soviet Action to Stop the Intervention in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan

The USA was not directly involved in the attack on Egypt and even aligned itself with the demand for the evacuation of the invasion forces. The motivation for this attitude was that the USA aimed to crowd Britain and France out of the Middle East and strengthen its relations with the Arab states. But the US imperialists supported the attempts of their rivals to crush the Arab liberation movement. The USA was privy to the military preparations against Egypt and, according to Eden, approved the use of force as an extreme measure. In the UN its diplomats blocked the moves to condemn Britain, France and Israel as aggressors. Further, Washington turned down the Soviet proposal for joint steps to halt the aggression.

In early 1957 the US Congress approved the Eisenhower doctrine, under which the President was empowered to send troops to any Middle Eastern country to fight "international communism". The USA thereby took over Britain's role as the chief policeman in that area.

The sinister design behind the Eisenhower doctrine was exposed in a TASS Statement of January 13, 1957. In February and April of the same year the Soviet Union urged the Western powers to settle the Middle East problems by peaceful means, calling upon them to respect the sovereignty of the countries of that area, refrain from drawing them into military blocs and interfering in their internal affairs, and render them economic assistance. The imperialists turned a deaf ear to this approach. More, in order to impose fettering agreements on the Arab countries under the Eisenhower doctrine the USA chose to use force.

In 1957 its preparations for the invasion of Syria created the threat of a major war. On September 3 the Soviet Government declared that it would not remain indifferent to developments that might lead to an armed conflict in the Middle East. During the discussion of the Syrian complaint

in the General Assembly the Soviet delegation alerted the United Nations to blackmail by the imperialists. These moves, supported by the peace-loving countries, forced the US military to relinquish their plan.

But in the summer of 1958, in agreement with Britain, the USA landed marines in the Lebanon, where the patriotic forces had risen against the pro-Western Government headed by Camille Chamoun. One day after the landing of US marines in the Lebanon British paratroopers occupied the Jordanian capital. The imperialists planned to invade revolutionary Iraq after seizing control of the Lebanon and Jordan.

The Soviet Government exposed the hypocrisy of the assertions about "protecting the independence" of the Lebanon and Jordan. In a message to the Western powers on July 19 it declared that the invasion and the threat of its escalation "may lead to extremely dangerous and unforeseen consequences, and touch off a chain reaction that will be impossible to stop". As an immediate step the USSR insisted on the evacuation of the occupation forces.

The General Assembly, convened in emergency session at the request of the Soviet Union, rejected the US proposals that it approve the invasion and order the formation of UN armed forces for the maintenance of peace in the Middle East, and demanded the earliest possible withdrawal of foreign troops from the Lebanon and Jordan.

Ultimately, at the close of 1958, the USA and Britain had to evacuate their forces. Chamoun, who had invited the US forces to fight the patriots, resigned the premiership. The new Government announced that it would pursue a neutralist policy and, in effect, refused to co-operate with the USA on the terms of the Eisenhower doctrine.

Yet another attempt of the imperialists to dominate the Middle East thus ended in failure.

Israeli Aggression Against Arab States

Nonetheless, the imperialist powers did not renounce their plans of using force against the liberation movement and the progressive development of the Middle Eastern states. However, in view of the lessons they had received, the USA and its imperialist partners did not venture to

start a new intervention themselves. Instead, they used Israel's Zionist circles who were dreaming of a "Greater Israel stretching from the Nile to the Euphrates".

With the failure of the tactics of overthrowing the progressive Arab governments with the help of internal reaction, the orientation towards collusion with Tel Aviv's Zionist rulers for the purpose of unleashing aggression became increasingly clear-cut. In May 1963 the US President declared that the rapprochement with Israel was called forth by changes not in the military but in the political equilibrium and by the striving to limit the spread of communism in the Middle East. Under an agreement signed in 1952 Israel began receiving military supplies from the USA. As from the beginning of the 1960s these supplies included heavy armaments. There was a sharp increase of the flow of arms on the eve of the aggression. In only the period from March through May 1967 Israel received 400 tanks and 250 aircraft from the USA, 800 army trucks from the FRG, and a Leviathan submarine and a number of Centurion tanks from Britain.

As was noted by the CPSU Central Committee at its plenary meeting in June 1967 international imperialism's conspiracy was directed chiefly "against one of the contingents of the national liberation movement, against the progressive Arab states that have launched progressive socio-economic reforms and are pursuing an anti-imperialist policy". The organisers of the conspiracy counted, moreover, on undermining the friendship between the Arab states and the socialist countries.

After the abortive attempt at a reactionary coup in Syria at the close of 1966, the preparations for aggression were stepped up. On April 7, 1967, after innumerable frontier incidents, Israeli troops entered Syria. Arab-Israeli relations were aggravated to the point of rupture. On April 26, in order to ease the tension, the Soviet Union urged Israel to display restraint and moderation. But the Israeli rulers paid no attention. On May 9 the Knesset gave the Government the authority to order military operations against Syria.

By virtue of anti-imperialist solidarity and concern for its own security the United Arab Republic could not remain idle. It demanded the recall of the UN forces and moved its own troops to the Sinai Peninsula to repulse aggression. President Nasser personally assured the United Nations

Organisation, the USSR and the USA that Egypt would not be the first to start hostilities. As a result of these moves the attack on Syria, scheduled to begin on May 17, was averted.

Under cover of a slander campaign about a "threat of attack" Tel Aviv now concentrated its forces for a strike against the UAR.

The USSR made another attempt to prevent a conflict. On May 23, in a statement on the situation in the Middle East, the Soviet Government showed the hollowness of Israel's designs to play the part of colonial overseer for the imperialist powers. The aggression, the statement stressed, would be opposed by the USSR and all other peace-loving states.

The USA gave countenance to the accusations that the UAR had aggressive intentions towards Israel and demonstratively readied its 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean for action. At the same time President Johnson's personal representative went to Cairo where he assured the UAR Government that Israel would not start hostilities as long as diplomatic efforts were being continued and reached an understanding on an exchange of visits by the Vice-Presidents of the USA and the UAR. This was a move to divert attention from the war preparations.

The USSR's Struggle to Halt the Israeli Aggression

Meanwhile Israel completed her preparations and launched a sneak attack on June 5, 1967. A considerable number of Egyptian aircraft was destroyed in a sudden air strike. In desert fighting the Arab forces were unable to make a stand against the invaders without air cover.

It was imperative to stop the aggression within the shortest time possible. In a special statement of June 5 the Soviet Government demanded the immediate and unconditional cessation of the hostilities and the withdrawal of the Israeli forces to the armistice line. In the Security Council the Soviet representative reiterated this demand at an emergency sitting. In an undisguised attempt to give Israel the opportunity to defeat the UAR and Syria, the USA and Britain opposed the demand for the withdrawal of Israeli

troops. To prevent procrastination, the Soviet Union, with the agreement of the Arab countries, supported the resolution calling only for the cessation of hostilities, and made the reservation that this did not remove the question of the evacuation of the Israeli forces from the seized territories. The resolution was passed by the Security Council on June 6. Accordingly, the Arab states ordered their forces to cease hostilities. Israel, however, continued the operation, and on June 9 attacked Syria.

On June 10 the Soviet Union broke off relations with Israel, stating in the pertinent Note: "If Israel does not at once cease hostilities the Soviet Union, jointly with other peace-loving states, will apply sanctions to Israel with all the ensuing consequences."

The resolute steps by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia likewise severed relations with Israel) had a sobering effect. Hostilities were halted everywhere on June 10. Israel had seized Gaza, the Sinai Peninsula (with the exception of a small area at the northern entrance of the Suez Canal), Western Jordan with a population of over 1,000,000, and the Syrian Golan Heights. But the central objective was not achieved: the imperialists and their accomplices failed to secure the overthrow of the progressive regimes in the UAR and Syria.

Soviet Action to Abolish the Consequences of the Israeli Aggression

Soviet policy in connection with the Israeli aggression in the Middle East in June 1967 was discussed at a plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee. Two of the cardinal objectives of that policy, it was decided, were to prevent the aggressors from gaining any advantage from their perfidious actions and ensure the unconditional evacuation of their forces from the seized Arab territories. At the plenary meeting it was stressed that Soviet policy had to continue its "determined resistance to the intrigues of imperialism, expose its true, anti-popular make-up" and cut short the attempts to undermine trust between the peoples of the Arab countries and the socialist states.

At the conferences held in Moscow (June 1967) and Bu-

dapest (July 1967) on the initiative of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the leaders of the Communist and Workers' parties and Heads of Government of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia declared their firm determination to continue giving the friendly Arab states concerted political and economic support and strengthening their defence capability.

The Soviet Government took steps to put this programme into effect.

Agreement on coordinated measures to abolish the consequences of the aggression was reached at the talks held in June and July 1967 by Nikolai Podgorny, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, in the UAR, Syria and Iraq and at subsequent meetings between Soviet and Arab leaders.

As was noted at the 24th Congress of the CPSU by Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet Union helped "to restore the defence potential of the Arab states which were subjected to invasion, the UAR and Syria in the first place".* Soviet military supplies, the leaders of these countries pointed out time and again, not only made up for the losses but made it possible to equip the Arab armies with modern weapons.

An emergency session of the UN General Assembly was requested by the USSR in the summer of 1967. At that session Alexei Kosygin, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, who led the Soviet delegation, unequivocally condemned the Israeli aggressors, saying that the Soviet Union would "undertake all measures within its powers . . . to bring about the elimination of the consequences of the aggression and help to establish durable peace" in the Middle East. Exposing the Zionist slander that the Soviet Union was denying Israel the right to state existence, he emphasised that "the Soviet Union is not against Israel, but against the aggressive policy pursued by the ruling circles of that state". In the draft resolution moved by the Soviet Union it was demanded that Israel evacuate her troops unconditionally and fully reimburse the damage they had inflicted on the Arab states. Most of the UN members supported this draft, while the US delegation had no choice but to withdraw its draft, which, in

* 24th Congress of the CPSU, p. 30.

effect, was an attempt to reward Israel for the aggression. By passing the resolution demanding that Israel relinquish her aim of annexing the Arab part of Jerusalem, the General Assembly reaffirmed that territorial acquisitions by force of arms were impermissible. However, due to the manoeuvres of Israel's imperialist backers it was unable to pass a decision on the evacuation of the invaders.

On an Egyptian motion seconded by the Soviet Union, this question was considered by the Security Council. On November 22, after a sharp struggle against the USA's attempts to impose a decision sanctioning the seizure of Arab territories, a resolution was passed on the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. This resolution called for the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from all occupied territories, the termination of the state of belligerency, respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and its right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries, freedom of navigation through international waterways and a just settlement of the refugee problem. The Soviet Union voted for this resolution in view of the fact that the evacuation of the invading forces was the prime condition for peace.

In order to help the interested states carry out this resolution the UN Secretary-General appointed the Swedish diplomat Gunnar Jarring as his special representative in the Middle East. The Soviet Union declared its support for the Jarring mission. As for Egypt, she not only agreed to co-operate with Jarring but in May 1968 proposed a plan for the practical implementation of the Security Council resolution. However, with encouragement from the USA, Israel demanded the establishment of new frontiers as the first step. As a result, by the close of 1968 it became evident that the Jarring mission was not successful. The situation was further aggravated by the military provocations launched by Israel in the zone of the Suez Canal and by the bombing of civilian objectives in Egypt by Israeli aircraft. The Tel Aviv rulers hoped that these measures would force the Arab states to accept their demands.

The Soviet Government denounced these provocations and warned Israel (for instance, after the raid on the Aswan-Cairo power transmission line in October 1968) of the grave responsibilities that she was assuming for pos-

sible consequences. The Soviet Union proposed a peace settlement on the basis of the resolution of November 22, 1967 to allow the fulfilment of the points on the termination of the state of war and on guarantees for the security of all the Middle Eastern states to proceed in parallel with the evacuation of the Israeli forces. This initiative, supported by Egypt, led to an understanding on talks between representatives of the USSR, the USA, Britain and France in the United Nations. At these talks, which began in New York in April 1969, the USSR insisted on a just settlement in accordance with the Security Council resolution and proposed constructive steps for the achievement of that aim. The USA opposed the approval of these steps.

In August 1967 the Heads of Government of the Arab states met in Khartoum where they reaffirmed the need for a joint struggle for the liberation of the occupied territories chiefly by political and economic means. They set up the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development: the oil-exporting countries undertook to pay the countries that had been subjected to aggression, notably Egypt, compensation amounting to £135 million annually for the losses sustained as a result of the closure of the Suez Canal; this money was to be paid until the consequences of the aggression were eliminated. Subsequently, the imperialists succeeded in weakening co-operation among the Arab states. The differences fanned by the colonialists prevented the Arab summit conference, held at the close of 1969, from coordinating action by the Arab states. The Palestine Resistance issue was also used by the imperialists and their flunkies in their efforts to undermine Arab unity. The Resistance movement emerged in the 1960s among the Arab refugees in Jordan, Syria and the Lebanon. Its scale broadened after the events of 1967, when most of the scattered groups united to form the Organisation of Palestine Liberation. The Arab countries support this organisation's just demands for the liberation of the territories seized by the aggressors and the return of or compensation for the property of the refugees. They helped to form armed guerrilla units of fighters for the liberation of Palestine.

The Soviet Government considers that "at present the pooling of the efforts of all the Arab states and peoples and the mobilisation of their potentialities in the struggle against the aggressive imperialist forces and their agents are

of great significance in reinforcing their common struggle against imperialism and Zionism, for national and social liberation".* The USSR welcomes the efforts to unite the Arab states on a democratic, anti-imperialist foundation. It regards the Palestine Resistance movement as part of the national liberation movement of the Arab peoples and supports the efforts of the Arab people of Palestine to restore their legitimate rights.

An understanding on a cease-fire in the zone of the Suez Canal and on the resumption of the Jarring mission was reached in 1970. Gunnar Jarring requested Egypt and Israel to declare their attitude to the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967. In its reply the Egyptian Government reaffirmed its willingness to carry out all the terms of the resolution and suggested a programme for implementing the resolution: the evacuation of Israeli troops from all the seized territories and the settlement of the refugee problem with account of the lawful rights of the Arab people of Palestine. Egypt agreed to end the state of belligerency, recognise Israel and to raise no obstacles to the passage of Israeli ships through the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba. Provision was also made for international guarantees for all the states in the area through the formation of United Nations forces with the participation of four of the permanent members of the Security Council and the establishment of a demilitarised zone.

These peace proposals were highly evaluated by the Soviet Union. "The constructive stand of the Arab countries, primarily that of the United Arab Republic," it was noted in the Statement headed "For a Just and Lasting Peace in the Middle East" that was adopted by the 24th Congress of the CPSU, "provides favourable conditions for the full implementation of the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967."**

The USSR expressed its readiness to help set up international guarantees for a political settlement in the Middle East. In order to normalise the situation the Soviet representative at the talks in New York suggested a statement in support of the Jarring mission.

However, with the connivance of the USA, Israel's Zion-

* *Pravda*, October 14, 1971.

** 24th Congress of the CPSU, p. 328.

ist rulers persisted in their employment of obstructionist tactics. Tel Aviv did not reply to the Jarring request. The Israeli leaders, including the Prime Minister, declared that Israel would not evacuate her troops and, as a condition for peace, demanded the perpetuation of Israel's seizure of the Golan Heights, Gaza and some other Arab territories. The USA stepped up its deliveries of military supplies and in 1970-1971 granted Israel further credits for armaments. Washington's mediation in securing the implementation of the proposal for opening the Suez Canal, made by Egypt in early 1971, was used by US diplomacy for an effort to legalise the occupation of Arab territories on the pretext of a "partial settlement".

With US encouragement Israel's Zionist rulers are not only obstructing a peaceful settlement but escalating their aggressive actions. On September 8, 1972 Israeli aircraft bombed towns and villages in Syria and the Lebanon. On September 16 Israeli tanks and motorised units invaded the southern regions of the Lebanon.

On September 18 the Soviet Government published a Statement in which it emphatically denounced these armed provocations and subscribed to the demand for the immediate termination of the aggression and the evacuation of Israeli troops. The Israeli aggressors had to pull their forces out of Lebanese territory, but they continued holding the territories seized in 1967 and refused to comply with the Security Council resolution.

The situation in the Middle East remains extremely tense. But the efforts of the USSR and all other peace forces to extinguish that flashpoint and achieve a political settlement have yielded tangible results. The defence capability of the Arab states has been strengthened and international support for their just demands is mounting. The assertions about Israel's "peaceableness" have been exploded, and its ruling circles and their imperialist patrons are finding themselves deeper in isolation. The following analysis, given in the Central Committee report to the 24th Congress of the CPSU, is being borne out by developments: "In the final count, the advantages obtained by the invaders as a result of their piratical attack are illusory. They will disappear as mirages pass from view in the sands of Sinai. And the longer the delay in reaching a political settlement in the Middle East, the stronger will be the indignation of world

public opinion, and the Arab people's hatred of the aggressor and its patrons, and the greater the harm the Israeli rulers will inflict on their people and their country."** Expressing the will of all Soviet people, the Congress reaffirmed that the Soviet Union was determined to achieve a just political settlement in that region. The Government of the USSR unswervingly pursues the policy, charted by the Congress, of quenching the hotbed of war in the Middle East.

The 1973 Military Conflict. Peace Conference on the Middle East

The military flare-up of October 6, 1973 in the Middle East was the inevitable outcome of the policy pursued by Israel and the international forces backing her. The reasons for the military conflicts that periodically break out in that region are clear, Leonid Brezhnev said on October 26, 1973, namely "Israel's seizure of Arab territories through aggression, Tel Aviv's stubborn refusal to reckon with the legitimate rights of the Arab peoples, and the support this policy of aggression is getting from forces of the capitalist world that are seeking to hinder the free and independent development of progressive Arab states".**

The military clash in 1973, the fourth in 25 years, saw the heaviest fighting. It showed the enhanced fighting capacity of the Arab armies, which made skilful use of sophisticated equipment and broke through what the Israeli command regarded as "invincible" fortified lines that had been erected on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal and along the Golan Heights seized by Israel in 1967. The staunchness of the Arab people was not broken by the barbarous bombing by Israeli aircraft of civilian targets in Syria and Egypt, where they caused innumerable casualties among the civilian population. The fact that chiefly by sneak action Israel pressed the Arab troops at the final phase of the conflict and seized further small territories, including a bridgehead on the western bank of the canal,

* 24th Congress of the CPSU, p. 31.

** L. I. Brezhnev, *For a Just, Democratic Peace, for the Security of Nations and International Co-operation*, p. 15.

did not change the situation, especially as Egypt held a liberated zone east of the canal.

During the crisis there was an enhancement of Arab solidarity in the struggle against imperialism. Iraqi units, troops from Morocco, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia, aircraft from Algeria and medical personnel from the Lebanon fought shoulder to shoulder with the armies of Egypt and Syria. At a conference of Arab states in mid-October it was decided to cut back the monthly output of oil by 5 per cent until Israeli troops were withdrawn from the territory occupied in 1967. Acting on this decision the oil-producing countries agreed to reduce output in November by 25 per cent and in December by another 5 per cent. They halted exports of oil to the USA and the Netherlands because of the pro-Israel stand adopted by the governments of these countries. The Iraqi Government nationalised the property of two US companies operating in Iraq and also the share of the Dutch monopolies in the Basra Petroleum Company.

During the conflict Israel found herself in isolation: nearly 30 African states broke off or suspended diplomatic relations with her. The change in the balance of political forces in favour of the Arabs was due mainly to the exposure of the policy of violence and aggrandisement pursued by Israel and the growing understanding that the Arab peoples were waging a just struggle. A contributing factor was the explanation given by the governments of Egypt and Syria that they were determined to liberate the occupied territories and secure the satisfaction of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arabs, that it was not their intention to abolish the State of Israel. The use of the oil weapon by the Arab states pursued the same aim. With the exception of the fascist regime ruling Portugal at the time, none of the USA's Western allies permitted the use of their territory for the transportation of American arms to Israel. Moreover, they condemned the decision of the US Government to alert its forces, including the American contingents in Europe.

The stand adopted by the Soviet Union and fraternal socialist countries, who gave the Arab states unstinting political, moral and other assistance, went a long way towards halting the hostilities and creating a situation favourable to the attainment of peace in the Middle East.

On October 7 the Soviet Government condemned Israel's predatory policy and insisted on the satisfaction of the Arab countries' legitimate demands for the liberation of all the territories seized in 1967. Analogous statements were made by the other countries of the socialist community. On October 12 the Soviet Union warned that the bombing and shelling of civilian objectives and the peaceful population by the Israeli armed forces would have serious consequences to Israel herself. Following an exchange of views during the visit to Moscow by Houari Boumedienne on October 14-15, the USSR and Algeria reaffirmed that they would give their utmost assistance to facilitate the liberation of the occupied Arab lands. Alexei Kosygin visited Cairo on October 16-19 to discuss the problems linked with the new phase of the Middle East crisis. The Middle East situation was examined also in the talks between Leonid Brezhnev and the US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who visited Moscow on October 20.

On October 22 the Security Council passed a resolution, sponsored jointly by the Soviet Union and the USA, calling for a halt to all hostilities within 12 hours with the troops remaining in the positions occupied by them. The countries involved were urged to begin talks on a just and lasting peace in accordance with the UN resolution of November 22, 1967. The resolution was accepted by Egypt and Syria, and by Israel. But in contravention of her obligations under that resolution Israel started offensive operations. She ignored the Security Council's new decision calling for the withdrawal of troops to the positions occupied by them on October 22 despite her assurances that she would abide by that decision. In protest against these perfidious actions the Soviet Government warned Israel "of the extremely grave consequences arising from the continuation of her aggressive actions". In response to Egyptian President Sadat's request for Soviet and US representatives to supervise the fulfilment of the Security Council decisions, the USSR sent its representatives and expressed the hope that the USA would take similar action.

As was stated by Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet Union was prepared to co-operate with all interested countries in normalising the situation in the Middle East. At the same time, the Soviet Union made it clear that the artificial fanning of passions and the dissemination of lies about the

USSR's attitude were not helping to achieve such co-operation. It called for a responsible, honest and constructive approach. In the TASS Statement of October 28 it was pointed out that the alerting of the US armed forces was not facilitating an easing of tension and the restoration of peace in the Middle East. The consistent and flexible attitude adopted by the USSR enabled the Security Council to approve a resolution, sponsored by eight non-aligned countries, on the withdrawal of troops to the positions occupied by them on October 22 and the formation by the Security Council of a UN force to supervise the ceasefire. The only objections to these, as to previous efforts at ensuring peace in the Middle East were raised by the Peking representatives. Their refusal to take part in the voting and their slanderous accusations levelled at the USSR were clearly designed to aggravate the conflict and isolate the Arab countries from the socialist community in order to facilitate the manoeuvres of the aggressor.

The staunchness displayed during the military conflict by the armies and peoples of Egypt and Syria, the solidarity of the Arab states and the support for their struggle from the Soviet Union and all other peace-loving, anti-imperialist forces helped to create a situation, more favourable than formerly, for a peace settlement in the Middle East.

After Egypt and Israel signed a protocol under which they pledged to abide by the Security Council's terms for a ceasefire, including the withdrawal of troops to the lines held by them on October 22, the countries involved agreed to hold a conference on a Middle East peace settlement.

The conference opened in Geneva on December 21, 1973 with delegations from Egypt, Jordan, Israel, the Soviet Union and the USA. It was attended also by the UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim. Addressing the conference, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko said that it was regarded in the Soviet Union with deep satisfaction as the first major step towards the settlement of one of the most acute international problems. Noting that the intolerable situation in the Middle East had been created by the policy pursued by Israel, he stressed that the key to a peace settlement lay in the undeviating observance of the principle that territory should not be acquired by war. He

urged the conference to work out a constructive and realistic peace programme that would envisage the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all the territories occupied in 1967, the recognition of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all the Middle East states, including Israel, and the protection of the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine. Moreover, he stressed that the Palestinian problem could not be settled without representatives of the Arab people of Palestine. The Soviet Union felt that a settlement of this kind "would lay a durable foundation for peaceful coexistence and good-neighbourly relations between all the states and peoples of the Middle East".

The Soviet Union and Collective Security in Asia

The fact that almost two-thirds of the Soviet Union's territory is in Asia makes it a leading Asian power. From the very first days of its existence the Soviet state has been trying to safeguard peace in Asia through the consolidation of the independence and unity of the Asian states.

The treaties it signed in 1921 with Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey provided for the promotion of good-neighbourly relations conforming to the interests of the countries concerned. The idea of peaceful co-operation recorded in these treaties was given further embodiment in the treaties on neutrality and non-aggression signed with these countries in the 1920s-1930s. Under the terms of these treaties the signatories pledged that they would not accede to alliances or agreements directed against the other signatory and that they would settle disputes peacefully. One of the terms of the Soviet-Afghan Treaty was that neither of the signatories would permit its territory to be used for hostile policy and actions by third countries against the other signatory.

In the 1930s, when the situation in Asia deteriorated sharply, the Soviet Union urged the conclusion of a Pacific regional pact with the participation of all countries desiring to preserve peace. At the Brussels Conference in 1937 the Soviet Union proposed collective measures to resist aggression by imperialist Japan. In that same year the Soviet Union stated that it was prepared to sign a mutual assis-

tance treaty with China. The effectiveness of collective measures against aggression was convincingly demonstrated by the successful actions that were taken on the basis of the Soviet-Mongolian 1936 Protocol on Mutual Assistance. But in a situation where most of Asia was dominated by the imperialists it did not prove to be possible to agree on collective steps to ensure security in that continent.

With the strengthening of socialism's positions and the abolition of colonial rule in Asia new possibilities arose for maintaining peace through the joint efforts of the Asian states. The key to success in this sphere was provided by the Soviet Union's fraternal relations and all-sided co-operation with the Mongolian People's Republic, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Korean People's Democratic Republic. In the Soviet Union's treaties on mutual assistance with Mongolia and the Korean People's Democratic Republic it is accentuated that the signatories will do all in their power to help preserve and strengthen peace and security in Asia and that they will participate in all international actions directed towards the attainment of that objective. The fact that national liberation and progress in social and economic development are enabling the Asian countries to play a bigger role in world politics is also of immense significance.

The 20th Congress of the CPSU, held in 1956, noted in its resolution that collective security in Asia was among the cardinal aims whose achievement would create the foundation for durable peace. The Bandung Conference's call for the creation of a peace zone in Asia was highly appraised by the Soviet Union. Evaluating the significance of this call in the context of current developments Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko said in 1969: "Many Asian countries are looking for the possibility of ensuring peace and security by collective effort. This idea in fact permeates the decisions of the Bandung Conference."*

Particularly great significance was acquired by the question of collective security in Asia in the 1960s in view of the military aggression by the imperialists and their puppets and China's departure from co-operation with the peace-loving states in preserving peace in Asia. Developments vividly demonstrated that the way to effective

* *Izvestia*, September 20, 1969.

security in Asia was not through the formation of opposing military blocs and groupings but through good-neighbourly co-operation and common effort in defence of peace.

One of the pivotal aims of Soviet foreign policy is to help promote such co-operation. In 1969 Leonid Brezhnev pointed out that parallel with the creation of a system of collective security in Europe "we are of the opinion that the course of events is also putting on the agenda the task of creating a system of collective security in Asia".* The Soviet Government rejected the slanderous assertion that such a system would be directed against some Asian state. It stressed that it was prepared to exchange views on and discuss all the problems linked with the formation of that system. A substantial step in that direction was the signing of treaties of friendship and co-operation with India, Egypt and Iraq.

In the opinion of the Soviet Union collective security in Asia should rest "on principles such as the renunciation of the use of force in the relations between states, respect for sovereignty, inviolability of frontiers, non-interference in internal affairs and broad economic and other co-operation based on full equality and mutual benefit. We continue, as we have always done, to urge such collective security in Asia and to achieve it we are prepared to co-operate with all countries."**

There was a quick response to the Soviet initiative in many Asian countries. The Indian Foreign Minister noted that its purpose was to strengthen peace and that it coincided entirely with India's view that the Asian countries should sign a general agreement on relations based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence and non-aggression pacts. Prominent personalities in Japan welcomed the idea of Asian security and noted that the development of Soviet-Japanese relations was a contribution towards the realisation of that idea. Also noteworthy is that the member states of the Association of South East Asian Nations have urged turning that region into a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality without any kind of interference from other countries, and that Malaysia

decided to withdraw from the Asian and Pacific Council.

There are many difficulties on the road to Asian security. "Possibly, time and effort will be required for the realisation of this idea," Andrei Gromyko said at the 26th General Assembly. "But the situation in Asia requires that these efforts should be made now, and perseveringly at that."

In order to discredit the idea of collective security in Asia some of its opponents spread the assertion that the Soviet Union had put forward this idea with the aim of "containing" or "encircling" China. Noting that assertions of this kind had no foundation, Leonid Brezhnev said: "As we conceive the idea, the People's Republic of China will become an equal partner of such a system."**

There are many difficulties to be overcome in the realisation of collective security in Asia, but the interests of the peoples of that continent and of all the peace forces demand the establishment of such security. In calling for a broad and constructive discussion of this question, Leonid Brezhnev said on November 29, 1973 in an address in the Indian Parliament that the time had come to turn Asia into a continent of peace, friendship and co-operation and that "it is worth working and fighting for that great aim".**

* *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow 1969*, p. 171.

** L. I. Brezhnev, *Leninskim kursom*, Vol. 3, pp. 493-94.

* L. I. Brezhnev, *The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, p. 58.

** *Visit by Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev to India*, p. 84 (in Russian).

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE SOVIET UNION'S EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE
DISARMAMENT AND STRENGTHEN THE UN
AS AN INSTRUMENT OF PEACE

1. Soviet Proposals for Disarmament in the 1950s

The USSR and the Disarmament Problem

The cessation of the arms race is one of the most vital issues to mankind. The plans of international imperialism's forces of aggression, and the willingness of the most bellicose elements of the imperialist military to take any risk, including a nuclear war, for the sake of attaining their aims create a real threat to peace. In this situation disarmament, i.e., the limitation and destruction of the material means of waging war, would obviously be a major guarantee of peace. Naturally, it would not extirpate the social causes of war, which are rooted in imperialism, in its aggressive nature and ambitions. But even a reduction of the technical means of war would improve the international climate and limit the possibilities open to aggressors.

Talks on disarmament have been proceeding for several decades. This question was discussed in the League of Nations. For many years it has held the attention of the United Nations and its various committees and commissions. Due to the stand adopted by the USA and other Western powers the talks have so far yielded only modest results. However, the discussion of the problem of disarmament has ranged far beyond negotiations between diplomats and experts. Most of the world's population has joined in the struggle to resolve this problem. Through energetic and resolute action the peoples can and will compel the proponents of the "policy of strength" to end the arms race.

The Soviet Union is in the van of the struggle for disarmament. Lenin, the founder of the Soviet state, said that disarmament was the ideal of socialism. The Soviet

Union and the other socialist countries do not need the arms race, but they are forced to maintain their defence capability at a level enabling them to repulse any attack from without and ensure peace. If the Western powers agreed to the relinquishment of armed forces and armaments mankind would be delivered from the threat of a nuclear conflict and from the burden of military expenditures, and vast sums of money could be used for improving life.

Soon after the Second World War the USSR proposed the banning of nuclear weapons and the reduction by one-third of the conventional armed forces of all countries. In 1947, on its initiative, the General Assembly passed a resolution condemning war propaganda. Further, the Soviet Union proposed that the Great Powers should combine their efforts to prevent the threat of another war and sign a Peace Pact.

All these proposals were turned down. In 1949 the Western powers set up the North Atlantic alliance. This was followed by the formation, under the aegis of US imperialism, of other aggressive military blocs in Europe and Asia and the steady build-up of the military strength of the members of these blocs. In December 1954 the imperialists agreed on arming the NATO armies with nuclear weapons and on the further and larger scale arming of West Germany. The Pentagon proclaimed its massive nuclear strike doctrine. A new phase of the arms race was thus started by the USA and its allies.

To ease international tension and strengthen peace it became increasingly urgent to take practical steps towards disarmament. As in previous years, the initiative was taken by the Soviet Union.

In 1955 the Supreme Soviet of the USSR drew the attention of the peoples and parliaments to the dangerous situation that had arisen as a result of the actions of the Western governments. The Declaration adopted by it on February 9, 1955 called for an end to the arms race and the banning of nuclear and other weapons of mass annihilation. On February 18 the Soviet Government proposed the destruction of the stockpiles of atomic and hydrogen bombs, the conservation of armed forces, armaments and military spending at the 1955 level, and a world conference on a general arms reduction and the banning of nuclear weapons.

Soviet Proposals for an Arms Reduction and the Banning of Nuclear Weapons (1955-1959)

On May 10, 1955 the Soviet Union made new proposals on the question of disarmament. These proposals formed a constructive programme for the reduction of conventional armaments and the banning of nuclear weapons. It included measures to remove the threat of another war and promote trust between countries.

In order to facilitate agreement, the USSR acceded to some of the wishes of the Western powers. In 1952, to counter the Soviet proposal for a one-third cutback of armed forces, Western diplomats had declared themselves in favour of establishing a maximum level for the numerical strength of the armed forces of the five Great Powers: from 1,000,000 to 1,500,000 each for the USSR, the USA and China, and from 700,000 to 800,000 each for Britain and France. Moreover, the Western powers placed it on record that they were prepared to ban nuclear weapons if the USSR agreed that nuclear arsenals would be destroyed only after a substantial reduction of conventional armed forces and armaments.

The Soviet Union accepted both these proposals and there seemed to be no further fundamental difficulties to the working out of practical measures. However, it soon transpired that the Western governments had insisted on their proposals in the calculation that they would be unacceptable to the USSR. Finding themselves in an embarrassing situation they in effect went back on their own proposals.

The fact that the imperialists had proposed disarmament exclusively for propaganda purposes and not from a desire to reach agreement was borne out again at the 1955 Geneva summit.

The Soviet delegation urged agreement in areas of disarmament where the position of the Great Powers either coincided or had drawn close together: as a first step it suggested recording agreement on the strength levels of the armed forces of the five Great Powers and on the sequence and timetable of the total banning of nuclear weapons. It called on the participants in the summit to undertake the commitment that none of them would be the first to use atomic or hydrogen weapons. As a counter-proposal President Eisenhower suggested an "open skies" plan, under which the USSR and the USA would exchange military

information and photograph each other's territory from the air. This implied control and the receipt of spy information instead of disarmament. Moreover, the Eisenhower plan would have put the USSR in an unequal position because the "open skies" did not include NATO's West European members on whose territory there were innumerable US military bases. The British delegation suggested establishing a zone for the inspection of the armed forces on either side of the line dividing East and West Europe, but likewise said not a word about the main problem—the reduction of armaments.

The summit failed to adopt any concrete decisions. It was only agreed that the disarmament problem would be discussed at the level of Foreign Ministers, who would be guided by the work that had been done and by the proposals that had been made. But the Foreign Ministers conference likewise proved to be abortive on account of the attitude of the USA and its allies.

The Soviet Union continued to press for disarmament. The plan submitted by it to the 11th General Assembly in November 1956 was, as in previous cases, drawn up with account of the statements of the Western powers.

This plan envisaged:

the reduction, within two years, of the armed forces of the USSR, the USA and China to 1,000,000-1,500,000 effectives each, of Britain and France to 650,000 effectives each, and of the other states to 150,000-200,000 effectives each;

the banning, within two years, of atomic and hydrogen weapons with the immediate cessation of the testing of these weapons;

a substantial cutback of the armed forces of the USA, Britain and France stationed in the territory of NATO members, and of the Armed Forces of the USSR stationed in the territory of Warsaw Treaty countries;

the dismantling, within two years, of the bases in the territory of other countries and a reduction of military expenditures;

the establishment of effective international control of disarmament with the setting up of control posts to preclude sudden attack.

After long procrastination the Western powers declared that a broad agreement should be preceded by an agree-

ment on a more limited disarmament programme. Responding to these declarations, the Soviet Government proposed partial disarmament measures on April 30, 1957.

In addition to a reduction of the armed forces and armaments of the five Great Powers under international control these measures provided for a commitment not to use any kind of nuclear weapons and an immediate decision on the question of halting nuclear tests. The USSR agreed to aerial inspection in a specified zone in Europe and also in the Far East, including part of the territories of the USA and the Soviet Union.

At the same time, the USSR submitted the draft of a declaration on measures to strengthen world peace and security. The draft provided for a commitment that the signatories would not use atomic and hydrogen weapons and that they would work for the total banning of these weapons; that they would condemn war propaganda; and that their relations with all countries would be founded on the principles of peaceful coexistence.

The Soviet Union submitted its proposals for partial disarmament also to the 12th and then the 13th General Assembly. These proposals took many of the Western suggestions into account. But, as had been the case earlier, the USA and the other imperialist powers prevented the adoption of coordinated positive decisions on disarmament. The talks showed that as soon as the USSR agreed to their proposals the Western powers looked for new pretexts and subterfuges to avoid an agreement and shift the blame to the Soviet Union.

Unilateral Reduction of Armed Forces by the USSR and Other Socialist Countries

The Soviet Union's desire to speed up the settlement of the problem of disarmament was demonstrated by the unilateral measures implemented by it. Soon after the war the Soviet Government had ordered the demobilisation of a considerable part of the Armed Forces. Without waiting for the conclusion of an international disarmament agreement the USSR effected a further cutback of its Armed Forces, believing that the Western powers would follow its example. In the 1950s four major cutbacks were put into effect:

in 1955 by 640,000
in 1956-1957 by 1,200,000
in 1958 by 300,000
in 1960 by 1,200,000.

As a result the strength of the Soviet Armed Forces was reduced to 2,423,000 effectives, i.e., below the level that had been suggested by the Western powers in 1956 for the USA and the USSR (2,500,000 effectives) and below the numerical strength of the US Armed Forces, although the USSR has a much larger territory and a longer frontier than the USA.

The Soviet Union took other steps to ease international tension. In 1955 it dismantled its military bases at Porkkala-Udd in Finland and at Port Arthur in China. In 1958, by agreement with the countries concerned, the number of Soviet troops in the GDR and Hungary was reduced. That same year all Soviet troops were evacuated from Rumania, where they had been stationed under the terms of the Warsaw Treaty.

Other socialist countries likewise reduced their armed forces substantially: Poland by 161,500 effectives, the GDR by 30,000 effectives, Rumania by 115,000 effectives, Czechoslovakia by 64,000 effectives, Hungary by 35,000 effectives and Bulgaria by 41,000 effectives.

As a result their armies were reduced by 446,500 effectives.

On March 31, 1958 the Supreme Soviet of the USSR passed a decision to halt the testing of all types of atomic and hydrogen weapons in Soviet territory. It was hoped that this would be the beginning of a world-wide ban on nuclear tests. Had the Western powers taken steps in response to the measures put into effect by the USSR and other socialist countries a practical beginning would have been laid for disarmament. Success in the solution of that problem would have facilitated the settlement of other outstanding international issues.

It should be noted that the problem of control, raised by the West as a pretext for rejecting disarmament, could not hinder the cessation of nuclear tests. At the international conference of experts, held in July-August 1958, it was noted that at the modern level of technology no nuclear test could go unrecorded. Contrary to the usual claims of the USA and Britain, a halt to nuclear tests

would thus have not threatened the security of any country. Nevertheless, they again turned down the Soviet proposal. Moreover, in the period from April through October 1958 the USA tested nearly 70 atomic and hydrogen devices.

Under conditions where its own security was threatened the USSR had no choice but to resume nuclear tests. It announced this on October 3, 1958. On the next day the Soviet delegation at the 13th General Assembly again proposed that the UN should call upon the nuclear powers to halt nuclear tests forthwith.

Proposals of the Socialist Countries for Nuclear-Free Zones

The creation of nuclear-free zones would be a significant step towards diminishing the threat of nuclear war. The socialist states have repeatedly moved concrete proposals on this point.

In 1957 the Polish Government proposed the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe. At the 12th General Assembly the Polish Foreign Minister declared that if the two German states banned the production and use of nuclear weapons on their territories, Poland would do the same. Czechoslovakia announced that it would be prepared to make a similar commitment. The GDR Government, which had offered to sign an agreement with the FRG on the renunciation of the production and siting of nuclear weapons on German territory, cabled the General Assembly chairman, notifying him of its support for the Polish initiative.

On February 14, 1958 the Polish Government followed up its initiative by proposing that Poland, Czechoslovakia, the GDR and the FRG should be regarded as a zone lying outside any possible nuclear conflict. This proposal, designed to strengthen security in one of the most tension-fraught regions of Europe, was supported by the USSR and other socialist countries. On February 20, 1958 the Soviet Government declared that it was prepared to undertake the relevant commitments provided the USA, Britain and France acted in the same way.

However, the US ruling circles categorically rejected the idea of a nuclear-free zone. Their example was followed

by the FRG and their other partners in aggressive blocs. Their argument, founded on the claim that the Warsaw Treaty countries had larger conventional armed forces, was that the formation of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe would put them at a disadvantage.

Once again, in November 1958, Poland took the initiative, declaring she was prepared, in agreement with her allies, to discuss the question of creating a nuclear-free zone in two stages. At the first stage the production of nuclear weapons would be banned on the territory of Poland, Czechoslovakia, the GDR and the FRG and the commitment would be taken by the countries in the zone that the armies on their territory that had no missiles and nuclear weapons would not be armed with such weapons. At the second stage all nuclear weapons and missiles would be removed from the zone. These steps would be accompanied by a cutback of conventional armed forces.

This plan, too, which took into account the most essential Western objections, was not accepted. The Western powers thereby gave further evidence of their reluctance to improve the international climate.

On June 25, 1959 the Soviet Government suggested the creation of a zone free of nuclear weapons and missiles in the Balkans and the Adriatic (embracing Bulgaria, Rumania, Albania, Yugoslavia and Greece), with Italy pledging to refrain from siting nuclear and missile bases on her territory.

The enemies of peace replied to this initiative with provocative assertions that the security of some of the above-mentioned countries would not be adequately ensured.

To eliminate all doubts the Soviet Government proposed that the USA, Britain, France and the USSR should guarantee the security and independence of the countries of that zone.

The immense importance of this Soviet proposal was that at the time Turkey, Italy and Greece were pressured by the USA into agreeing to the siting of US nuclear and missile bases on their territory. The Soviet proposal was supported in the Balkans. Rumania not only subscribed to it but took the initiative in convening a conference of the Heads of Government of the Balkan states to consider urgent issues, including the question of a nuclear-free zone.

The Bulgarian Government likewise announced that it was prepared to consider its territory as part of such a zone.

To improve the situation in Northern Europe the USSR, Poland and the GDR suggested proclaiming the Baltic a zone of lasting peace. In 1958 the USSR recommended turning the Middle East into a peace zone, and in 1959 it proposed that such zones, notably nuclear-free zones, should be created in the Far East and in the entire Pacific basin.

The creation of nuclear-free zones in Northern, Central and Southern Europe would have meant a ban on the siting of nuclear weapons and missiles in a wide area extending from the Arctic Ocean to the Mediterranean directly in the region of confrontation between the NATO and Warsaw Treaty armed forces. This would have excluded the possibility of a trivial incident, carelessness on the part of military personnel or any accident triggering a thermo-nuclear war.

The proposals for the creation of zones free of nuclear weapons and missiles were supported by world public opinion, which justifiably regarded such zones as an effective way of consolidating peace.

But the rulers of the Western powers used various pretexts to reject the idea of nuclear-free zones.

2. The USSR's Efforts in the United Nations to Achieve International Detente, Disarmament and Co-operation in the 1960s-1970s

Soviet Proposals for General and Complete Disarmament

The further economic advancement of the socialist countries, the more rapid progress of the Soviet Union than the USA in some areas of science and technology, and the spectacular breakthrough in outer space tremendously enhanced the prestige of the USSR and of the socialist community as a whole.

Besides, 13 years of the cold war had shown the futility of the attempts of the imperialists to deal with the USSR from "positions of strength". The growth of the Soviet

Union's defence potential completely upset the military-strategic doctrines underlying that policy. The people of the United States were now facing a situation where the adventurism of some of the architects of foreign policy was threatening their country with a national catastrophe.

In this situation an immense role was played by the vigorous actions of the USSR and other socialist states on the world scene. The growing international support for the Soviet initiatives was beginning to influence both the external and internal policies of the leading Western powers.

The deadlock into which the Western attitude had led the talks that had been conducted over a period of many years required a quest for a new approach to the settlement of the disarmament problem.

It was the Soviet Government's firm belief that the way out of the deadlock lay in general and complete disarmament. In its Declaration of September 18, 1959, submitted to the 14th General Assembly, it underscored its conviction that it was possible to prevent civilisation from following the road that had twice led to a world war.

The programme for general and complete disarmament proposed by the Soviet Union envisaged the disbandment of all armed forces (land, naval and air forces), the destruction of all types of armaments and military equipment, including nuclear, missile, chemical and germ weapons, the cessation of military training, the annulment of every form of military service, the dissolution of war ministries, general staffs and other military organisations, and the discontinuance of allocations for military purposes.

All countries would only have strictly limited contingents of police (or militia), equipped with small arms, for the maintenance of internal law and order.

The Soviet Government proposed that this programme should be implemented in three stages over a period of four years. The money thus released, the Soviet Declaration pointed out, would be used to reduce or completely annul taxes, subsidise the national economy and render aid to countries that had won liberation from colonial oppression.

It was suggested that a control agency consisting of representatives of all countries should be set up to supervise the timely fulfilment of the steps towards general and com-

plete disarmament. The volume of control and inspection by this agency would conform to the degree of disarmament at the given phase. After general and complete disarmament had been achieved it would have free access to all the objectives subject to inspection.

This fundamentally new disarmament programme ushered in a new stage in the struggle to end the arms race and deliver mankind from the growing burden of military expenditures and the threat of wars of annihilation. Earlier, the proponents of the arms race had claimed that any step towards disarmament would upset the world balance of strength and place some countries in an unequal position relative to their security. The new Soviet disarmament programme ruled out advantages for any country.

The new approach made it easy to decide the question of inspection, which had been one of Western diplomacy's principal arguments against any agreement. Under general and complete disarmament the difficulties of inspection would be removed because countries would have nothing to hide from each other.

The Soviet programme was supported by the socialist states. It was acclaimed by Afghanistan, India, Indonesia, the UAR, Ghana, Guinea and other countries. Pressured by public opinion the imperialist powers, too, had to declare their agreement with the Soviet proposals.

On November 20, 1959 the General Assembly unanimously approved the idea of general and complete disarmament. On June 2, 1960, acting on the resolution adopted by the General Assembly the Soviet Union proposed the basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. These provisions took into account the many suggestions that had been made during the debate on the disarmament problem at the 14th General Assembly. Moreover, they included the proposals made by de Gaulle that general and complete disarmament should, at its very first phase, begin with the banning and destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons. In proposing these basic provisions the Soviet Union, which had the edge in the most effective means of this kind (intercontinental ballistic missiles), showed that it was prepared to relinquish this key advantage. In view of the Western powers' apprehensions over a large cutback of armed forces and conventional weapons at the first stage, the Soviet

draft envisaged postponing this cutback to the second stage. Guarantees were provided against the possibility of aggression in a disarmed world: this had been insisted upon by the small countries, which called for the formation of "international armed forces". One of the provisions of the Soviet draft was that when necessary units of the police (or militia) remaining in the different countries would be placed at the disposal of the Security Council. These units would be used for the maintenance of peace and not for action against peoples fighting for independence and social progress or for interference in the internal affairs of nations. The terms for inspection at every stage were also worked out in greater detail. The competence of the international inspection organisation would be extended in proportion to progress in disarmament.

The Soviet draft was turned over to the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee set up in 1959 and consisting of representatives of five socialist countries and five Western powers.

Soviet Initiative in Defence of Peace at the 15th-17th Sessions of the General Assembly (1960-1962)

The growing might of the socialist community, the appearance of new sovereign states and the deepening of capitalism's general crisis were mirrored in the international situation and in the work of the United Nations. On the eve of the 15th General Assembly the UN had 82 members. Seventeen countries were admitted to membership of the UN at that session. This substantially changed the balance of strength in that organisation in favour of the peace forces.

This was seen already at the 15th General Assembly, which was a notable landmark in the history of the UN. The session opened on September 20, 1960 and closed on April 22, 1961. On the Soviet Union's suggestion many countries were represented by Heads of State and Government. The session debated the most pressing problems:

1. General and complete disarmament. On September 23 the Soviet delegation submitted the draft of the Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament, which repeated the proposals of June 2, 1960 and

took into account the suggestion of the Western powers for combining nuclear disarmament with a cutback of armed forces and conventional weapons. The Basic Provisions were a detailed programme for settling a difficult and urgent problem. In it strict international inspection was organically linked with practical steps towards the reduction and abolition of all forms of armaments and armed forces.

In view of the vital importance of disarmament to all nations, the Soviet Government recommended that neutralist states should also be represented on the Disarmament Committee.

The delegations of the socialist countries supported the Soviet plan and moved a number of additions.

The Polish representatives suggested setting up a special UN committee to consider, on the basis of scientific data, the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons.

Rumania renewed her proposal for a treaty on collective co-operation and security with the aim of turning the Balkans and the Adriatic into a zone free of foreign military bases, missile launching sites and nuclear weapons.

Many African and Asian countries aligned themselves with the idea of a treaty on general and complete disarmament and with the Soviet stand on some important aspects of the problem. Twelve neutralist countries submitted the draft of directives on general and complete disarmament. By and large this draft conformed to the aim of general and complete disarmament and received the backing of the Soviet Union. The countries belonging to aggressive blocs opposed the adoption of the draft. This was the first time that a large group of Asian and African states formed a united front with the socialist countries against the imperialist powers in the question of disarmament.

Although the question of general disarmament was not resolved at the 15th General Assembly, the fact that it was debated was a victory of the Soviet Union's peace policy. The Soviet proposals drew mankind's attention to the most important present-day problem and further enhanced the USSR's prestige as the leading force in the struggle for world peace and security.

2. The abolition of imperialism's colonial system. On September 23, 1960 the Soviet Government submitted to the General Assembly the draft of a declaration on grant-

ing independence to colonial countries and peoples which provided for the immediate and unconditional end to colonialism. On December 14 the General Assembly adopted a Declaration worked out by 43 African and Asian countries and containing the basic principles of the Soviet draft. This historic event was made possible by the initiative and consistent struggle of the Soviet Union for the freedom and equality of nations.

3. Modifications of the structure of the UN's executive organs. At the General Assembly on October 3, 1960 the Soviet delegation raised the question of restructuring the UN in accordance with the actual situation in the world. It drew attention to the following facts:

Over 15 years had elapsed since the creation of the UN. More than 1,000 million of the world's population of 3,000 million were living in the socialist countries. New states that were pursuing a neutralist policy had emerged in Asia and Africa. Their population, too, exceeded 1,000 million people. These changes were not reflected in the UN structure. A group of imperialist and colonial powers headed by the USA was predominant in the UN and was using the apparatus of that organisation in its own interests, disregarding and flouting the rights of the socialist and neutralist states. The fact that the Secretariat, the UN's executive organ handling current work, was an obedient instrument of the imperialists was particularly prejudicial to the functions of the UN as a whole.

The principles of sovereign equality of states and of equal representation not only of individual countries but also of groups of countries, as recorded in the UN Charter, were thus flagrantly violated.

The Soviet initiative laid the beginning for steps to bring the structure of the Secretariat and other UN organs in line with the actual situation in the world. Under-Secretaries-General were appointed from among the citizens of all the main groups of countries and a decision was passed to give the new states a larger representation in the Security Council, the number of whose members was increased in 1963 from 11 to 15 (five permanent members—the USSR, Britain, China, the USA and France—and ten non-permanent members), and in other UN organs.

The Soviet initiatives at the 15th General Assembly spurred the efforts of the peace forces, sharpened the

vigilance of the peoples and won new friends for the socialist community. The debates showed the diminishing influence of the imperialist powers, the mounting prestige of the USSR and other socialist countries and the growing role of the new Asian and African states.

Disarmament was the central problem at the 16th General Assembly (September 1961 through February 1962). Most of the delegations agreed with the USSR that general and complete disarmament was the best solution.

Once again the Soviet delegation submitted the draft of the basic provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament and, in addition, a memorandum on measures to ease international tension. Moreover, a Soviet-US statement on principles for disarmament negotiations was put before the General Assembly. The statement had been agreed during an exchange of views between the USSR and the USA in the summer and autumn of 1961. The statement pointed out that the purpose of negotiations was to ensure that "disarmament is general and complete and war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems". It called for the disbandment of armed forces, the dismantling of military installations, including bases, the destruction and cessation of the manufacture of weapons of mass annihilation and of the means of delivering such weapons. The disarmament measures, the statement noted, had to be put into effect under strict international supervision.

The 16th General Assembly unanimously recommended the adoption of these principles as the basis for further negotiations.

US and British diplomacy pursued the tactic of creating the impression that the Soviet Union's rejection of "active" control was the only obstacle. The Soviet delegation showed the hollowness of assertions of this kind. The USSR was prepared to accept any proposal for supervision and inspection provided the Western powers agreed to general and complete disarmament.

Despite their subtle demagoguery, the delegations of the USA and its partners in imperialist blocs found themselves in isolation. The resolution passed by the General Assembly on December 20, 1961 contained the recommendation that the disarmament negotiations should be based on the principles agreed upon between the Soviet Union and the

USA. On a proposal from the USSR, representatives of eight neutral countries were admitted to the Committee of Ten, which consisted of representatives of socialist and imperialist states. The Eighteen-Nation Committee, the agency for conducting talks on disarmament, was thus formed. The General Assembly recommended that on the basis of the agreed principles the Committee should draw up within the shortest time possible an agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international supervision.

Two important documents were adopted by the General Assembly on November 24, 1961 on a motion by a group of African and Asian countries. These were a declaration on banning the use of nuclear weapons and a decision proclaiming Africa a nuclear-free zone. In addition, the Assembly passed a resolution calling for steps to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and for commitments by non-nuclear countries to refrain from manufacturing or acquiring such weapons and to prohibit the use of their territories for the siting of foreign nuclear weapons.

The first meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee opened in Geneva on March 14, 1962. It consisted of representatives of the socialist community (the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Bulgaria), the Western powers (the USA, Britain, France, Italy and Canada) and neutralist states (Burma, Brazil, India, Mexico, Nigeria, the UAR, Sweden and Ethiopia).

The Soviet representative submitted the draft of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international supervision embodying the points made by the Soviet delegation at the 15th General Assembly.

Drawn up entirely in accord with the principles endorsed by the 16th General Assembly as the basis for negotiations, the draft provided for general and complete disarmament in three stages over a period of four years in such a way as to give no advantages to any country. An international disarmament organisation set up within the UN framework and possessing the necessary inspection means would commence functioning parallel with the beginning of disarmament.

In addition, the Soviet representative suggested a logical and effective method of work, namely, a discussion of the Soviet draft point by point, with all the amendments and

additions proposed by the participants in the negotiations, thereby agreeing the provisions of the treaty step by step.

The delegations of some NATO countries sought to start a general disarmament discussion that had no connection with the working out of specific commitments. The same purpose, that of diverting the Committee from working out a treaty on general and complete disarmament, was pursued by the US delegate when he moved a proposal under the general heading of "Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World". The Outline contained verbose pronouncements about the aims, tasks and methods of disarmament. But it avoided all mention of the question of implementing disarmament. The US proposal steered the negotiations away from the principles that had been approved by the 16th General Assembly and thereby acted as a further obstruction to agreement.

The Soviet Government did not relinquish its efforts to find the way to the speediest settlement of all the disarmament problems. In the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee and at the 17th General Assembly (September 1962) its representatives submitted new proposals that took into account various of the points made by the Western powers. It was prepared to accept recommendations to reduce the danger of accidental war such as exchanging military missions and establishing immediate and reliable communication between the Heads of Government and with the UN Secretary-General. It agreed to a certain lengthening of the period for implementing the programme of general and complete disarmament.

The USSR approved the use of so-called black boxes (automatic seismic stations) for inspection, agreed to the participation of foreign experts in the delivery and installation of these stations and in taking readings, and accepted the suggestions on the sites for the black boxes and on the inspection procedure.

Thanks to the Soviet Government's perseverance agreement was reached not only on the general principles but also on the preamble and some articles of a disarmament treaty.

At the 17th General Assembly the Soviet delegation moved a proposal for normalising the international situation. The USSR and the USA jointly submitted a resolu-

tion on international co-operation in the use of outer space for peaceful purposes; this resolution was unanimously passed by the General Assembly. Further, the Soviet delegation proposed a declaration on converting to peaceful uses the means and resources released by disarmament. This motion was supported by the USA. An agreed draft declaration was thus worked out and unanimously approved by the General Assembly. There was a favourable world-wide response to the Soviet proposal for holding an international trade conference with the aim of promoting broad world trade on principles of equality and mutual benefit and putting an end to the imperialist policy of embargoes and discrimination against the socialist community.

The Moscow Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty

Science has reached a level of development where even national means of inspection can easily detect any nuclear explosion. This was the USSR's motivation when it proposed that the banning of nuclear tests should be followed by the establishment of mutual inspection with such means of detection. This proposal was turned down by the USA and Britain on the claim that broad international inspection was required. They also rejected the compromise recommendations of the neutralist states which did not provide for mandatory on-the-spot inspection but did not rule out such inspection in individual cases of voluntary invitation by countries on whose territory phenomena were detected whose origin was not quite clear to the international commission. The USSR accepted these recommendations as the basis for further discussion.

The USSR's drawn-out negotiations with the USA and Britain showed that due to the attitude of the Western powers it was still impossible to reach agreement on the banning of all nuclear tests.

In the summer of 1963, after carefully weighing the situation, the Soviet Government suggested ending tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. The question of setting up a system of international inspection no longer arose for the Western powers had earlier acknowledged that a ban on the above tests did not require such a system.

At the talks held in Moscow from July 15 through 25, 1963 the representatives of the USSR, the USA and Britain reached agreement on the text of a Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water. The Treaty was signed in Moscow on August 5.

Under the Treaty its signatories undertook to prohibit, to prevent and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under their jurisdiction or control: in the atmosphere, beyond its limits, including outer space, or under water, including territorial waters or high seas. Underground nuclear explosions remained outside the ban, but were partially limited because the Treaty prohibited explosions causing radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the state under whose jurisdiction or control such explosions were conducted. The signatories committed themselves to refrain from helping any country to conduct nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space or under water.

The Treaty is of unlimited duration and open to all states for signature at any time. It came into force on October 10, 1963.

This was the first time in the period overshadowed by the cold war that countries with different social systems came to an agreement on a major problem affecting the vital interests of the world's entire population. The Treaty pursues the objective of ending the environment's contamination by radioactive fallout, which is a menace to health and a serious threat to fauna and flora.

The Moscow Treaty was hailed throughout the world. Within the very first few weeks it was signed by the vast majority of countries.

Soviet Proposals for Disarmament at the 18th and 19th Sessions of the General Assembly

At the 18th General Assembly the Soviet Union used the favourable situation to propose a programme designed to achieve a major advance in the disarmament talks and secure an effective settlement of that vital issue.

The Soviet Government agreed with the Western powers that until general and complete disarmament was achieved a number of intercontinental, anti-missile and ground-to-air

weapons could be preserved on the territory of the USSR and the USA.

The proposal for the non-proliferation of the arms race to outer space was both constructive and timely. On October 17, 1963 the General Assembly passed a resolution recording the agreement reached by the USSR and the USA, on Soviet initiative, to refrain from placing in orbit around the Earth any devices carrying nuclear warheads or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction.

With general and complete disarmament as its ultimate objective, the USSR urged steps that would halt the arms race and expand the area of international trust. With this aim in mind in 1964 the Soviet Government submitted a proposal for relaxing world tension to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee and to the 19th General Assembly. It attached great significance to a 10-15 per cent or any other agreed reduction of the military budgets of the major powers. In its own budget for 1965 it reduced military allocations by 500 million rubles.

Acceptance of the other Soviet proposals would have improved the international climate: the withdrawal or numerical cutback of foreign troops on the territory of other countries, the dismantling of foreign military bases, the creation of nuclear-free zones, a ban on the use of nuclear weapons and on the proliferation of these weapons, and so on. The Soviet Government supported the Polish initiative calling for a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe and its new proposal for a moratorium of nuclear armaments in that area. It aligned itself with the proposals for nuclear-free zones in Northern Europe, the Balkans, Africa, the Indian Ocean, the Middle East and other regions. It declared that it would welcome the decision of any country to deny permission to foreign powers to use its territory, ports and airfields for the siting of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

In the 1960s when a number of non-nuclear countries were drawing close to the scientific and technological level enabling them to develop the atomic bomb the problem of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons became very pressing indeed. At least seven countries were in a

position to begin the production of nuclear weapons, and many more states were swiftly progressing in that direction. One could easily see how much greater the threat of war would be if the aggressive elements of a number of countries came into possession of nuclear weapons.

On September 24, 1965, to close the road to the further proliferation of these weapons, the Soviet Union submitted to the 20th General Assembly a draft of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. At the debate the Soviet draft received the backing of socialist and developing states. The realisation that a nuclear war would destroy the capitalist system itself, pressure from public opinion and the fact that they could not ignore the attitude of the peace-loving states left the imperialist powers with no choice but to agree to discuss the Soviet draft. A resolution passed unanimously by the General Assembly called for the conclusion of a treaty that would be void of any loopholes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form.

The question of a treaty was put before the Eighteen-Nation Committee, but for a long time the talks failed to yield any encouraging results. The reason for this was that the Western powers, chiefly the USA, tried, in spite of the recommendations of the General Assembly, to leave loopholes in order to give access to nuclear weapons to NATO members, notably the FRG.

At the 21st General Assembly in 1966 the USA and Britain, which in stating their position had to consider the public mind in their own countries and throughout the world, were among the 45 countries that moved a resolution under the heading "Renunciation by States of Actions Hampering the Conclusion of an Agreement on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons". This resolution, based on the Soviet draft, called upon countries to make every effort to facilitate and expedite the conclusion of a treaty.

However, in the talks that followed the representatives of the imperialist states continued their obstructionist tactics. It was only after the 22nd General Assembly, acting on a motion by the USSR, Bulgaria, Poland, Czechoslovakia and other countries, had instructed the Eighteen-Nation Committee to complete the drafting of a treaty by March 14, 1968 that an agreed draft was finally submitted to the

General Assembly. This document was the result of the collective effort of many countries interested in halting the nuclear arms race and eliminating the threat of a nuclear war. On June 12, 1968 the General Assembly approved the draft. That was a major success of the peace forces and a signal triumph of the foreign policy of the USSR and other socialist countries.

On June 20, 1968 the Security Council passed a resolution, proposed by the USSR, the USA and Britain, on guarantees for the security of the non-nuclear states that would sign the treaty. The USSR, the USA and Britain pledged that in the event the need arose they would provide assistance, in accordance with the UN Charter, to any non-nuclear state that was a party to the treaty. The Security Council resolution approving these guarantees removed the apprehensions of the non-nuclear states.

On July 1, 1968 the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was opened for signature simultaneously in Moscow, London and Washington. As the initiator, the Soviet Union was one of the first to sign the treaty.

The struggle now centred on expediting the signing of the treaty, against which the reactionary imperialist circles had started a violent campaign. All the progressive forces came out in support of the Soviet peace initiative. The 1969 International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties stressed in its documents that for the preservation of peace the most urgent task was to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The principal task was to put the non-proliferation treaty into effect.

On a motion by the Soviet Union and some other socialist countries the 24th General Assembly again called upon countries that had not signed the treaty to sign and ratify that important document as quickly as possible. By the beginning of 1970 the treaty had been signed by nearly 100 countries.

The reciprocal commitments entered into the treaty (Articles I and II) by nuclear and non-nuclear states blocked all the ways for the proliferation of nuclear arms. The nuclear powers undertook not to transfer such arms or control over them to any non-nuclear state. For their part, the non-nuclear countries undertook not to receive or acquire nuclear weapons and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of these weapons.

Nuclear explosive devices for peace requirements hardly differ from analogous devices for military purposes. Therefore, in order to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, the treaty imposes a ban also on these devices.

Does this ban prejudice the non-nuclear countries when the need arises for peaceful nuclear explosions, for the building, say, of canals or tunnels? The answer is given by Articles IV and V, which state that it is the inalienable right of all the parties to the treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and obligate the nuclear powers to provide non-nuclear states, on favourable terms, explosive devices for peaceful purposes. This signifies considerable economic benefits for the non-nuclear countries.

The treaty does not ban nuclear weapons or their production. The question of controlling the activities of the nuclear powers in the development of nuclear weapons does not therefore arise. The purpose of the treaty is to provide reliable guarantees against the use of fissionable nuclear materials for the production of weapons in non-nuclear states. Article III of the treaty therefore obligates non-nuclear countries to accept the guarantees of the International Atomic Energy Agency. These guarantees consist of means of observation to make sure that fissionable materials and various special equipment (reactors and so on) are used exclusively for peaceful purposes. Over a period of more than a decade the 100-member International Atomic Energy Agency has gained considerable experience of applying guarantees, which at present cover 30 countries and 67 reactors.

International control of the uses of nuclear energy in the non-nuclear countries that have signed the treaty is an effective means of verifying their commitments, especially as the treaty prohibits the transfer to non-nuclear states of fissionable materials or equipment for the production of such materials in circumvention of such control.

The treaty constitutes a major achievement by Soviet foreign policy. It marks a new and important milestone on the road towards ending the arms race and delivering mankind from the threat of a thermo-nuclear war.

To come into force the treaty had to be ratified by 43 countries, including the USSR, the USA and Britain. This condition was fulfilled on March 5, 1970.

Soviet Memorandum of July 1, 1968

The Soviet Union has never regarded the ban on the proliferation of nuclear weapons as an end in itself, as a means of consolidating the Five-Power "nuclear monopoly". In fulfilment of the pledge to take effective measures to achieve nuclear disarmament, the USSR sent a Memorandum to all governments on July 1, 1968. As steps to end the arms race it proposed:

- a discussion in the Eighteen-Nation Committee of a draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons as a matter of high priority;

- immediate negotiations on stopping the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the reduction of their stockpiles and the destruction of these arsenals under appropriate international control;

- an agreement on concrete steps for the limitation and subsequent reduction of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons;

- an immediate ban on flights by bombers with nuclear weapons on board, and a halt to patrolling by submarines carrying nuclear missiles, where the range of such missiles covers the national borders of the contracting parties;

- an immediate agreement banning underground nuclear tests with the use of national means of detection to supervise the ban.

The Memorandum called for measures to prohibit chemical and bacteriological weapons, the dismantling of foreign military bases, regional disarmament and the peaceful use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor.

It urged all governments to contribute to the successful settlement of the problem of general and complete disarmament, and reiterated the Soviet Union's support for the General Assembly's recommendation for a world disarmament conference. The Soviet Memorandum was considered at the 23rd General Assembly, following which it was forwarded to the Eighteen-Nation Committee for a detailed study.

This initiative of the USSR was a further contribution to the efforts to end the arms race and achieve a cardinal solution of the problem of disarmament. It underlay a series of Soviet proposals at the United Nations and helped to consummate a number of important agreements on the question of disarmament.

Treaty on the Demilitarisation of the Sea-Bed

In March 1969, in line with the proposals contained in the Memorandum of July 1, 1968, the Soviet Government submitted to the Disarmament Committee the draft of a treaty prohibiting the use of the sea-bed, the ocean floor and their subsoil for military purposes. This draft subsequently underlay the joint Soviet-US draft.

The struggle in the Disarmament Committee was mainly over what was meant by the demilitarisation of the sea-bed, what area of the sea-bed should be covered by the treaty, and what forms and methods should be used to supervise the fulfilment of the treaty.

The reply to the first and most important question was in the ban on the emplacement of installations with nuclear or any other weapons of mass destruction, i.e., the most dangerous kinds of weapons, on the sea-bed.

The complexity of the second question lay in the fact that the broad coverage of the sea-bed by the treaty had to be combined as far as possible with the interests of the coastal states. Each country with a coastline regards part of the coastal waters as its territory. This zone, usually 12 miles wide, is called territorial waters in international law. But there are exceptions to the rule. For instance, some Latin American states claim a zone up to 200 miles wide as their territorial waters.

After long consideration a compromise was reached in the Disarmament Committee. The draft contained the provision that the operation of the treaty would affect only the seas and oceans up to the beginning of territorial waters, regardless of the width of these waters.

The problem of effective inspection likewise posed considerable difficulties. It was finally agreed that this inspection would also apply to territorial waters but should not hinder the use of the sea-bed by any coastal country for peaceful purposes or for self-defence (fishing, research, the building of defence installations).

The draft that was approved by the Disarmament Committee was submitted to the 25th General Assembly. In the resolution, passed in the General Assembly by a vast majority on December 7, 1970, it was stated that the demilitarisation of the sea-bed would strengthen world peace and relax international tension. The Disarmament Committee

was instructed to continue drawing up the treaty. The negotiations that were held on the basis of this resolution led to agreement on the final text of the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, which was signed by 67 countries in 1971.

The signatory states undertook not to implant or emplace on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof any nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass destruction as well as structures, launching installations or any other facilities specifically designed for storing, testing or using such weapons. Each signatory state was given the right to verify, through observation, the activities of the other signatory states beyond the limits of territorial waters. Provision was made for consultations and the possibility of inspection in the event of doubt regarding the activities of any signatory state on the ocean floor. The signatory states undertook to continue negotiations in good faith concerning further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof.

This treaty laid a good foundation for excluding huge expanses, occupying three-fourths of the earth's surface, from the nuclear arms race. It marked an important practical step towards disarmament.

Efforts of the USSR to Strengthen the UN as an Instrument of Peace

The United Nations Organisation has been in existence for nearly three decades. It took its beginning from the victory of the peoples of the anti-Hitlerite coalition over nazi Germany and militarist Japan. Its Charter mirrored the spirit of the times. The Charter's most important principles, the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko said at the jubilee 25th General Assembly, "were not just determined during the talks of the Allied powers and at conferences, but emerged, above all, as a result of the atmosphere of powerful anti-fascist liberation upsurge. Contrary to the pre-war League of Nations, the new world organisation was set up from the very beginning on the basis of universality, of the sovereign equality of states, irrespective

of their social systems. The UN Charter, of which our country is one of the authors, has become a charter of peaceful coexistence, translating into the language of international law the ideas of peaceful coexistence of states put forward by Lenin at the dawn of the Soviet State.”*

Ever since the establishment of the UN it has been the Soviet Union's aim that in line with the provisions of its Charter it should consistently serve the cause of peace, strengthen international security, champion the independence of oppressed peoples and safeguard the sovereignty and equality of all countries. As early as 1950, the imperialists had used an obedient majority of votes to force the General Assembly to pass a resolution headed “Uniting for Peace”. The significance of that move was to usurp the rights of the Security Council, whose decisions are adopted in accordance with the rule of unanimity of the Great Powers, and transfer, in violation of the Charter, the function of maintaining peace and security to the General Assembly, where the USA and its partners had the possibility of using their “voting machine”.

However, the USA encountered the firm determination of the socialist and neutralist states to strengthen the UN as an instrument of peace. The attempts to block the UN's functions failed in face of the firm resistance of the USSR and other peace-loving states.

The USSR's efforts to strengthen the UN and international co-operation acquired special significance in recent years when, on the one hand, the changes in the balance of strength in the UN gave that organisation more opportunities for action against colonialism and aggression and, on the other, the imperialists redoubled their pressure to divert the UN from the struggle to strengthen peace and settle acute political problems. At the 20th through 25th sessions of the General Assembly, the Soviet Union tirelessly continued its drive to enhance the UN's role as an instrument of peace, against the activation of the imperialist forces in the world. At the 20th General Assembly in 1965 it proposed the draft of a Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and on the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, which called upon the General Assembly to demand

that acts constituting armed or any other type of interference in the internal affairs of states, as well as any acts directed against the just struggle of peoples for national independence and freedom, should be halted forthwith and not be permitted in the future. The draft stated that it was necessary “to call on all states to be guided in their international relations by the principle of mutual respect and non-intervention in internal affairs for any reason, whether economic, political or ideological”. The provisions of the Soviet draft reaffirmed and specified the requirements of the UN Charter and were consistent with the decisions passed at the Bandung, Belgrade and Cairo conferences of non-aligned countries. The principles enunciated in the Declaration sprang from the very nature of socialist foreign policy and were founded on an analysis of world developments and the main trends in the foreign policy of the imperialist states, chiefly of the USA.

The Soviet draft was supported by 57 Asian, African and Latin American countries, who became its co-authors, and was passed by an absolute majority in the General Assembly.

At the 21st General Assembly in 1966 the Soviet Union proposed a discussion of the fulfilment of the above-mentioned Declaration. The discussion acquired the character of world-wide condemnation and exposure of the USA's aggressive policies, which were threatening world peace. The delegations of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and also of many African and Asian countries demanded an end to the war against the peoples of Indochina. Sharp criticism was levelled at the provocations of the US military against Cuba and at imperialist policy towards other countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The resolution that was adopted reaffirmed the principles and norms stated in the 1965 Declaration. It demanded the immediate cessation of every kind of intervention in the internal affairs of countries and denounced all forms of such intervention as being the main source of the threat to peace. At the 22nd General Assembly the Soviet-initiated discussion of the question of defining aggression in the light of the contemporary situation again made it possible to draw the attention of the UN members to the conflicts started by the imperialist forces, chiefly to the war of the USA against the Vietnamese people and to the Israeli aggression

* *Pravda*, October 23, 1970.

against Arab states. Despite the opposition of the USA and some of its allies in military blocs, the Soviet proposal was supported by the majority of the delegations. The adopted resolution stated that it was the predominant view that it was necessary to define aggression as soon as possible. A committee was set up to examine all the aspects of this question.

At the 24th General Assembly in 1969 the Soviet Union and a number of other socialist countries proposed that attention should be centred on the problem of strengthening international security. The concrete recommendations on this question were that troops should be withdrawn from territories that had been occupied as a result of hostilities or with the aim of suppressing the national liberation movement, that an end should be put to repressions against the liberation movements of peoples still under colonial rule and that these peoples should be granted independence. It was suggested that non-fulfilment of these recommendations should be regarded as a flagrant violation of the UN Charter.

The importance of the problem of regional security was stressed by speakers during the discussion of the Soviet proposals. This was only natural, for world security depended on the preservation of peace in the various regions.

The General Assembly approved the idea of a Declaration. The adopted resolution provided for including the question of a Declaration in the agenda of the 25th session and for exchanges of views regarding the steps to put it into effect.

At its jubilee 25th session the General Assembly considered over a hundred issues. As at the previous sessions, the most acute political questions were brought up for discussion either on the initiative or with the direct participation of the USSR. The most important of these was the draft of a Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, which, moved by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, was an enlargement on the decisions passed by the preceding session. Characterising this document, the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko said that cumulatively the steps envisaged in it could substantially improve the international situation.

This initiative was given a hostile reception by the Western diplomats. The delegates of Australia, Japan and other

countries moved a draft resolution of their own, the intention being to supplant the clear-cut, considered measures proposed by the socialist countries with vague declarative postulates. This move, designed to secure the rejection of proposals for strengthening world peace, was resisted not only by the socialist countries but also by many other states.

Drafts were moved by 23 Latin American countries and then by 33 non-aligned states.

Despite the intrigues and divisive activities of the Western diplomats, during the discussion of the draft Declaration the conditions arose for uniting the efforts of the socialist states and of Asian, African and Latin American countries.

On December 16, 1970 the General Assembly passed the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security (the only vote against it was from the Republic of South Africa).

Containing the main provisions of the draft submitted by the socialist countries, the Declaration called upon all states:

- to adhere strictly to the principles of the United Nations Charter;

- to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state;

- to prevent the military occupation or acquisition of foreign territory resulting from the use of force;

- to help enhance the authority and effectiveness of the Security Council and of its peace-keeping decisions;

- to desist from any forcible action aimed at suppressing the liberation movements of peoples still ruled by colonial or racist regimes;

- to expedite the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control;

- to promote international, including regional, co-operation with the purpose of strengthening security;

- to reach agreement on the definition of aggression as soon as possible;

- to ensure the full application of the principle of the UN's universality in order to make it a more effective instrument for strengthening international security;

- to take as their point of departure the fact that there is a close connection between international security, eco-

conomic progress and disarmament and that any advance made towards any of these objectives will constitute progress towards all of them;

to help reduce the economic gap between developed and developing countries.

The Declaration reaffirmed that no violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms could be permitted and denounced all forms of racial discrimination. Throughout the world the Declaration was evaluated as a programme whose implementation would improve the international situation.

Another major achievement of the socialist countries was the 25th General Assembly's adoption of the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. It gave legal embodiment to the key principles of co-operation, notably the principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems.

The Declaration solemnly proclaimed that all states should refrain from the use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations and that they should settle their disputes exclusively by peaceful means and desist from interfering in the internal and external affairs of other states. It called upon all states, irrespective of the differences in their political, economic and social systems, to co-operate with one another in order to maintain international peace and security. It underlined the right of all countries to determine their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development and stressed the sovereign equality of all states and their duty to fulfil in good faith the Charter of the United Nations, generally recognised principles and rules of international law and international agreements.

The Soviet Union constructively contributes to the manifold work of the UN in settling the urgent social and economic problems arising from the scientific and technological revolution (aid to developing states, over-population, environmental protection, development of natural resources and so on). But it is categorically opposed to the efforts of certain circles to "depoliticise" the UN.

"The preservation and consolidation of peace and the prevention of another war," the Soviet Foreign Minister

stated at the 26th General Assembly, "constitute the central task of the UN and the pivot of its work."^{*}

The Soviet Union firmly opposes the attempts to revise the UN Charter, in particular to nullify or essentially weaken the role of the Security Council, on the pretext of "streamlining" the UN structure. The efforts of the USSR to enhance the efficacy of this main instrument for ensuring peace have the understanding and support of all countries really desiring international security.

The struggle for disarmament remains one of the most important areas of the work of the USSR and the fraternal socialist countries in the United Nations.

The 26th General Assembly was in session in the period from September through December 1971. It was convened in an auspicious international situation that sprang largely from the impact of the programme of peace and co-operation adopted at the 24th Congress of the CPSU. Expressing the socialist nature of Soviet foreign policy, this programme moved the most urgent problems affecting all mankind to the forefront of international life. These are problems in whose settlement all countries and all nations are vitally interested.

Naturally, the programme had wide repercussions in the United Nations as well. In his statement to the General Assembly the UN Secretary-General noted that Leonid Brezhnev's report to the Congress was one of the central foreign policy speeches of 1971. At the 26th General Assembly the Soviet delegation comprehensively specified and substantiated the constructive proposals put forward by the CPSU Congress. Speaking at the Assembly the representatives of many countries assessed these proposals—from the eradication of existing flashpoints to the implementation of the principle of collective security, from the steps towards disarmament and the abolition of colonialism to co-operation in the settlement of world-wide economic, scientific and technical problems—as the foundation for practical action by the UN. The vital importance and dynamism of the programme adopted by the 24th CPSU Congress is attested by the fact that many of its provisions were considered by the General Assembly.

One of the major elements of this Peace Programme is

^{*} *Pravda*, September 29, 1971.

its orientation towards disarmament. "The struggle for an end to the arms race, both in nuclear and conventional weapons, and for disarmament—all the way to general and complete disarmament," Leonid Brezhnev said at the Congress, "will continue to be one of the most important lines in the foreign-policy activity of the CPSU and the Soviet State."* At the General Assembly the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko pointed out that "if we are to select an area of international relations in which the interests of all states come into contact and in which an impetus from the United Nations is particularly necessary in order to accelerate progress we will find that this is the sphere of problems related to the cessation of the arms race and to disarmament." Fully in accord with this assessment the Soviet delegation once again drew the attention of the General Assembly to the most important problems confronting man in this sphere.

Soviet Proposal for a World Disarmament Conference

On September 6, 1971 the Soviet Union proposed that the holding of a world disarmament conference should be included in the agenda of the 26th General Assembly as an important and urgent problem. The Soviet Government held that despite the agreement on a number of measures to limit armaments no fundamental progress had been achieved in curbing the dangerous process of building up and improving armaments. A world disarmament conference could be the forum at which all countries without exception would take part and contribute towards the settlement of the entire range of problems related to both nuclear and conventional armaments.

At the discussion of the question of holding a world disarmament conference the Soviet representative pointed out that it did not clash with the proposal for a conference of the five nuclear powers. Inasmuch as disarmament could not be achieved quickly, the USSR felt it was expedient to make the conference a standing international forum convened periodically to examine urgent questions.

UN Secretary-General U Thant's report on the economic

* 24th Congress of the CPSU, p. 34.

and social consequences of the build up of war potentials eloquently showed how important and vital it was to accept the Soviet proposals. The expenditures on armaments throughout the world amounted to \$200,000 million in 1970, while in the 1960s they had totalled nearly \$1,900,000 million. This was in excess of the cumulative income of all the developing countries and represented at least 60 per cent of the total world income. Annually countries were allocating 2.5 times more funds for military purposes than for the health services, and 1.5 times more than for education. In recent years the USA had been spending 8.8 per cent of its GNP on armaments and only 6.1 per cent on education and the health services. Under the fascist dictatorship Portugal had been allocating 6.7 per cent of her GNP for military purposes and only 0.7 per cent for the health services.

In the socialist countries the expenditures on education are considerably higher than on defence. Noting the growth of the allocations on defence in the developing countries, the authors of the report (it was prepared by scholars from 14 countries) stressed that this was due to the wars they had to fight. Most of the military conflicts were provoked by the imperialists.

The proposal for holding a world disarmament conference was unanimously approved by the General Assembly. This was a major success of the peace forces in a hard-fought struggle. The pressure of the elements opposed to such a conference could be felt from the very outset of the session, at the sittings and behind the scene. Some of the Western representatives made an attempt to divest the resolution of the provision allowing all countries, regardless of membership in the UN, to take part in the preparations and in the conference itself. This was a move aimed at closing the door to countries like the GDR that were not members of the UN.

The Soviet proposal was crudely attacked by the Chinese delegation,* which declared it would not take part in the

* At the 26th General Assembly, nearly 23 years after that issue had first been raised at the UN, a decision was passed to recognise the Government of the People's Republic of China as the representative of China in the UN and to expel the Kuomintang representatives from that organisation. "The Soviet Union," Andrei Gromyko said at the session, "is and has always been opposed to depriving the PRC of its

voting on the Soviet motion. The Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister motivated this attitude with the assertion that disarmament was not in the interests of many peoples fighting for national liberation. China, he claimed, had to develop her own nuclear weapon in face of what he called the nuclear threat from the two "super powers". It will be recalled that in 1964 China had proposed a world conference on the level of Heads of Government to examine the question of the total prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons. The USSR had backed this initiative. But now the Chinese representative asserted that such a conference could not be convened until the two "super powers" had committed themselves to desist from using nuclear weapons under any conditions, including defence.

It was obvious that anti-Sovietism was the actual motivation of China's uncompromising stand and the guideline of her representatives in the UN. Their moves were designed to divert attention from China's atmospheric nuclear tests, which were contaminating the air with radioactive fallout to a dangerous level, particularly in neighbouring countries.

China's stand on the disarmament question was characterised by her failure to make constructive proposals and her negative attitude to the international agreements that had already been achieved. This gave the USA and Britain the excuse to question the expediency of adopting the Soviet proposal. Nevertheless the resolution moved by Egypt and co-authored by 27 socialist and non-aligned countries of Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America was passed without voting.

The peace forces consider that one of their prime tasks is to facilitate the thorough examination of the question of holding a world disarmament conference.

legitimate rights in the UN, to the concept of 'two Chinas' and to any concept of 'dual representation of China'. That is our principled stand." The USA and the group of countries linked with it voted against the resolution. After the PRC had taken its seat in the United Nations the Maoists in fact sided with the imperialists in many fundamental issues on an anti-Soviet platform.

Convention on the Prohibition and Destruction of Bacteriological Weapons

In the Disarmament Committee in September 1969 the Soviet Union submitted the draft of a convention banning the development, manufacture and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and requiring the destruction of these weapons. Again in 1971, together with fraternal socialist countries, the USSR submitted the draft of an analogous convention to the General Assembly. A positive result of this initiative was that it drew the attention of governments and public opinion to the need to destroy these terrible weapons of mass annihilation and reinforce the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of poison gases and bacteriological weapons in war.

The opinion of the socialist states that it was necessary to ban chemical and bacteriological weapons simultaneously was shared by many countries. But, giving its usual argument about the "difficulties of inspection", the USA refused to ban chemical weapons.

Jointly with the fraternal countries the Soviet Union proposed an agreement prohibiting solely bacteriological weapons as a first step towards a broader agreement. This initiative received wide support. In December 1971 the 26th General Assembly endorsed the agreed draft of a convention, which was opened for signature simultaneously in Moscow, London and Washington on April 10, 1972.

This convention envisages not a simple limitation but the total destruction of an entire class of deadly weapons. This is its fundamentally new aspect. It provides for a system of guarantees to ensure its fulfilment, including the specification of international procedures in accordance with the UN Charter and guarantees of assistance to countries suffering as a result of violations of the convention by other states.

The signing of the convention eloquently demonstrated the efficacy of the peace initiatives of the socialist countries and shows that today the forces of aggression cannot totally ignore these initiatives. The banning of biological weapons will unquestionably facilitate further steps towards disarmament, particularly in the field of chemical weapons, on whose prohibition the Soviet Union continues to insist.

Soviet Draft of a Treaty on the Uses of the Moon

The draft of a treaty on the uses of the Moon, proposed by the Soviet Government in June 1971, is one of the major Soviet initiatives to strengthen peace and international co-operation. The aim of this initiative is to create a sound international legal foundation for the exploration of the Moon and prevent the Moon's conversion into a military springboard.

In accordance with the principles of the UN Charter, the draft states, no force may be used on the Moon or in circumlunar space. The Earth's satellite may be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. No military bases, fortifications or weapons of mass destruction should be sited on the Moon. Investigations of the Moon must be conducted by reasonable means without upsetting the equilibrium of the lunar environment or polluting it with extra-lunar matter. All countries should have the equal right to explore and study the Moon anywhere on its surface or in circumlunar space. The surface and subsoil of the Moon should not be the property of any states, international or national organisations, or individuals.

The close attention received by the Soviet draft at the 26th General Assembly was evidence of world-wide understanding of the vital significance of the Moon's peaceful use to mankind. In November 1971 the 26th General Assembly unanimously passed a resolution instructing the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space to study as a priority project the Soviet draft of a treaty on the uses of the Moon. In another resolution the General Assembly called upon countries to sign a treaty on the principles of the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, and also an international agreement on the rescue of spacemen.

Soviet Proposals at the 27th and 28th General Assemblies

The Soviet Union's consistent determination to enhance the efficacy of the UN as an instrument of world peace and security was again forcefully demonstrated at the

27th General Assembly, which sat from September 19 through December 19, 1972. On its initiative important international political issues, which, as in previous years, highlighted the work of the General Assembly, were included in the agenda. Through the efforts of the USSR, fraternal socialist countries and all other peace-loving states constructive decisions were passed on these issues. The implementation of these decisions will lead to a further easing of tension and to the strengthening of peace and good-neighbourly relations between all countries.

On September 15, 1972 the Soviet Union proposed that the General Assembly should include in its agenda the question of the non-use of force in international relations and the perpetual prohibition of nuclear weapons. In submitting the draft of a resolution on this question, Andrei Gromyko noted that in many of its decisions the UN had reiterated that force was impermissible in the settlement of international problems and had repeatedly recommended the banning of nuclear weapons. However, these questions had been examined in isolation from each other and this made an agreement difficult to reach. When the question of banning nuclear weapons was brought up, some countries doubted the feasibility of such a step until the use of force was eliminated from the relations between states. The importance of a decision on the non-use of force was diminished by the absence of a ban on the use of nuclear weapons. The coupling of these questions greatly facilitated the quest for a settlement.

A key feature of the Soviet proposal was that the decision of this important problem should not be reduced to a simple recommendation or statement of intent, but that it should acquire the force of a law. For this purpose the draft resolution called upon the Security Council to pass a decision that would make the pertinent General Assembly statement binding on all countries. The Soviet delegation convincingly showed that the commitments suggested by it did not question the inalienable right of countries subjected to attack to repulse aggression with the use of all the means at their disposal and that they did not restrict the right of the peoples of colonial countries to fight for independence with the use of the necessary means.

Aimed at strengthening security and creating better conditions for disarmament, the Soviet proposal was realistic

and consistent with the interests of all countries. That was precisely why it received wide support and occupied a prominent place in the debate at the General Assembly. In this situation the representatives of the Western powers did not venture to oppose the proposal openly. They passed it over in silence and sought to muzzle other countries in the question of the non-use of force and a ban on nuclear weapons. However, these manoeuvres got them nowhere. The Chinese delegation likewise made futile attempts to hinder the discussion and approval of the Soviet initiative. Here a large role was played by the flexibility of Soviet diplomacy.

The Soviet representatives conducted broad talks with the aim of agreeing the text of the resolution that would include the basic provisions of the Soviet draft and be acceptable to the majority of countries. The attitude of many delegations was taken into account. As a result 23 countries helped to co-author the final draft of the Soviet resolution and it was passed by an overwhelming majority. The only countries to vote against it were China, Albania, fascist Portugal and the Republic of South Africa. The Maoists thus found themselves in the company of rabid colonialists and racists.

Noting that the adoption of the resolution was an important international development, Leonid Brezhnev said: "Following up this UN resolution, we declare the Soviet Union's readiness to come to terms and appropriately formalise reciprocal commitments with any of the nuclear powers on the non-application of force, including the banning of the use of nuclear weapons against one another."^{*}

Enlarging on the decisions of the preceding session, the USSR moved a concrete proposal regarding a world disarmament conference. On the eve of the General Assembly Bulgaria, France, Hungary, Mexico, Czechoslovakia, Sweden, Japan and many other countries had declared themselves in favour of such a conference in reply to an inquiry from the UN Secretary-General. Support was pledged by the Foreign Ministers of the non-aligned countries at their conference in August 1972. For its part, the Soviet Union proposed that the General Assembly should approve the

^{*} L. I. Brezhnev, *The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, p. 59.

measures to convene a conference so that all countries—big and small, developed and developing, nuclear and non-nuclear—could, on a basis of equality, state and compare their considerations on the question of disarmament and come to an agreement on the practical steps to be taken in that direction.

The only opposition to this proposal came from the USA and China. The Chinese delegation declared that a conference would be useless but, at the same time, insisted on impracticable "preliminary conditions" and tried to give the debate an anti-Soviet orientation. These discreditable manoeuvres received no support, with the result that the Chinese representative voted for the resolution in order to avoid openly antagonising the Third World countries. The resolution was passed by 105 votes. It appealed to all governments to continue their efforts to create the conditions for the convocation of a world disarmament conference at an appropriate time and provided, as was suggested by the Soviet Union, for the establishment of a 35-nation committee to examine all the considerations put forward on this question by the different governments.

The Soviet Union and other socialist countries moved a proposal aimed at implementing the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security. The resultant debate touched on important political problems, namely, the eradication of existing flashpoints and conflict situations, the conclusion of an agreement on co-operation and the maintenance of peace, the creation of systems of collective security in various parts of the world, the abolition of colonialism and racism and the enhancement of the UN's role in ensuring security. The adopted resolution, that was moved by 55 socialist and developing countries, contained all the main provisions of the initial draft. The resolution was passed in the absence of the Chinese delegation, which walked out demonstratively before the vote was taken, and against the votes of the Republic of South Africa and fascist Portugal.

Thus, on the initiative of the Soviet Union, the 27th General Assembly reaffirmed that an effective ban on chemical weapons was one of its prime objectives and passed decisions aimed at facilitating disarmament, the banning of weapons of mass destruction, the abolition of colonialism and the promotion of international co-operation. This result showed the further growth of the influence of the peace

forces in the UN, and the viability and efficacy of Soviet foreign policy's Peace Programme.

On the international scene the favourable changes induced chiefly by the consistent fulfilment of the Soviet Peace Programme and the vigorous coordinated actions of the socialist community profoundly influenced the proceedings at the 28th UN General Assembly that sat in September-December 1973.

The session was opened with the admission of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany to UN membership as independent, sovereign states. This decision, as was pointed out by many members of that organisation, was entirely in accord with the principle of universality underlying the United Nations.

The delegates of 122 of the 135 countries belonging to the UN spoke in the general debate. Most of the speakers noted that the detente was of immense significance to the destiny of mankind and insisted that the UN should help to turn it into a global process embracing all the regions of the world. Andrei Gromyko, who headed the Soviet delegation, proposed a concrete programme for reinforcing the UN's efforts in the drive for international security. "The peoples," he said, "expect the UN to take steps to facilitate the further improvement of the international situation. In the context of the favourable changes taking place in the world the possibilities are widening for the UN to make its large contribution towards the consolidation of the detente, towards making it stable and irreversible." Constructive proposals for strengthening the UN as an instrument of peace were made by the representatives of socialist countries and of many non-aligned states.

At the session attention was centred on the proposals submitted by the USSR and other countries of the socialist community on political problems (they had made similar proposals at previous sessions of the General Assembly). Most of the delegations welcomed the Soviet Union's action in raising the question of reducing the military budgets of the Security Council's permanent members by 10 per cent and using part of the released funds for aid to developing states. In raising this question the Soviet delegation pointed out that the adoption and fulfilment of the appropriate decision would make it possible to increase aid to develop-

ing states in Asia, Africa and Latin America and enable the countries reducing their military budgets to channel considerable resources for peaceful needs. The speakers noted the importance of the Soviet initiative, the significance of the measures proposed by the Soviet Union in achieving understanding and an atmosphere of trust in international relations. The General Assembly passed a resolution calling for the implementation of the Soviet recommendations. Of the Security Council's permanent members only China was openly opposed to a reduction of military budgets.

The 28th General Assembly made progress in an important issue like clearing the way to a World Disarmament Conference. In an endorsed resolution sponsored by a group of developing countries it was noted that the peoples were vitally interested in ending the arms race and in settling the disarmament problem, with a World Disarmament Conference as one of the vehicles. Provision was made for the formation of a special committee to study all the considerations regarding the convocation of the conference and the problems involved. The debate on the question of strengthening international security, raised on Soviet initiative, showed the steadily expanding co-operation between the socialist and the Afro-Asian countries, who co-sponsored a resolution passed by the General Assembly. The resolution noted the immense significance of the positive changes in Europe and called for the spread of the detente to all regions of the world, for the promotion of multilateral and regional co-operation and for steps to ensure collective security. Some other questions related to the reduction and banning of individual types of arms were considered. A resolution was passed on holding a conference in 1975 to check on the implementation of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

The 28th General Assembly witnessed the successful consummation of the long struggle of the socialist and other peace-loving states to secure the examination of the Korean problem with the participation of representatives of the Korean People's Democratic Republic. The invitation extended to the KPDR to send a delegation with the status of an observer allowed the problem to be examined more comprehensively and objectively. The General Assembly passed a decision (on which the USSR and other socialist

countries had insisted for many years) on the dissolution of the notorious "UN Commission for the Unification and Restoration of Korea", which had been a vehicle of imperialist interference in the affairs of the Korean people. A favourable situation was thereby created for the disbandment of the UN Armed Forces Command in South Korea and the withdrawal of US troops from that country.

As the previous sessions, the 28th General Assembly witnessed a further offensive against colonialism and neo-colonialism. The effective co-operation between the socialist and developing countries was seen most strikingly in that area. As a result of their concerted efforts, the General Assembly passed another resolution condemning colonial and racist regimes, demanded the absolute fulfilment of the Declaration on the Independence of Colonial Countries and Peoples and approved a ten-year action programme of struggle against racism and racial discrimination. It upheld the demand for an end to the occupation of some areas of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau and the withdrawal of the forces of the Portuguese colonialists.

In the debate on the Middle East situation the overwhelming majority of the speakers denounced Israel's policy of aggrandisement. In its decision on the UN report on an inquiry into Israel's actions in occupied territories the General Assembly reaffirmed the inalienable rights of the Arab people of Palestine and condemned the policy of "Israelisation" and Israel's violation of the agreement on the protection of the civilian population in time of war.

China's stand was sharply inconsonant with the constructive course of the proceedings at the General Assembly. The Chinese delegates levelled slander against the Soviet Union, opposed every positive change in international developments and sought to hinder detente. Peking adopted a negative stand on all major international issues—disarmament, international security and so on—in some cases voting against the recommendations for the settlement of these issues and in others demonstratively refusing to participate in the voting.

Despite the efforts of the Maoists and the manoeuvres of the imperialist opponents of detente the 28th General Assembly made a contribution to the relaxation of tension and

the promotion of international co-operation on the basis of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems.

During the period that has passed since the first extended draft on nuclear disarmament was submitted to the UN, the Soviet Union has been enlarging on and specifying its proposals for the limitation and banning of all weapons of mass destruction, the reduction of conventional armaments and the achievement of general disarmament. The drive for disarmament by the Soviet Union and all other peace forces has yielded results. The imperialist powers have had to sign a number of international treaties in this sphere, including:

1. The 1963 Moscow partial test-ban Treaty.
2. The 1967 Treaty on the principles of the activity of states in outer space.
3. The 1968 Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.
4. The 1971 Treaty banning the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the sea-bed and ocean floor and in their subsoil.
5. The 1972 Convention on the prohibition and destruction of bacteriological weapons.
6. The Soviet-US treaties on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems and the interim agreement between these countries on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms.

All these treaties and agreements help to curb the arms race, diminish the threat of a nuclear war and open the prospect for progress towards general disarmament. They meet with the interests of all countries. In carrying out the historic decisions of the 24th Congress of the CPSU, the Soviet Union is consistently working for the adoption of further practical steps towards disarmament and the consolidation of peace.

Its efforts have helped to strengthen the UN as an instrument of peace. Characterising the present role of the United Nations and the importance of the work of the socialist countries in that organisation, Leonid Brezhnev noted: "Despite all its shortcomings and weaknesses, the United Nations Organisation has made a useful contribution to the realisation of the purposes and principles proclaimed in its Charter. It has helped to surmount a number of acute international crises. We regard this result as a major

success of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, of other socialist countries, of all the peace forces on our planet.”*

The Soviet Union has steadfastly opposed the attempts of imperialist circles to turn the UN, after the model of the League of Nations, into a rostrum for empty declarations pursuing the aim of masking their aggressive manoeuvres on the world scene. It has always been the Soviet Union's vision that the United Nations Organisation should direct its efforts to the maintenance of peace and security. In the programme of peace and co-operation adopted at the 24th Congress of the CPSU it is underscored that the possibilities of the UN should be used in full to give a rebuff to acts of aggression and international arbitrariness.

With this programme as its solid foundation, the Soviet Union continues its successful struggle to turn the UN into a genuine instrument of peace and co-operation among all countries on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence.

CONCLUSION

Day-to-day developments are bearing out the prescience and wisdom of the Leninist foreign policy pursued by the CPSU and the Soviet Government, showing its efficacy and growing influence on the international situation. While playing the premier role in the struggle for world peace, Soviet foreign policy immutably preserves its class, internationalist and anti-imperialist character. In summing up the half-century experience of Soviet foreign policy, Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, noted that “from the first foreign policy act of Soviet Power—the Decree on Peace—to the Peace Programme of the 24th Congress of the CPSU, our Party and state have steadily adhered to the main guidelines of struggle for peace and for the freedom and security of the peoples”.*

The Soviet foreign policy aims to strengthen world peace, halt acts of aggression, and help all nations implement their right of independent development and enjoy the fruits of modern civilisation. It renders every possible assistance to the peoples fighting against imperialism and all forms of exploitation, for human dignity, democracy and socialism.

In its drive for these lofty purposes the Soviet Government is guided by principles, whose formulation was among Lenin's most valuable contributions to the treasure-store of Marxism-Leninism. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union constantly draws upon and creatively develops the great heritage left by Lenin. In scientifically charting the Soviet Union's policy on the world scene, mapping out diplomatic strategy and tactics and giving day-to-day leadership

* L. I. Brezhnev, *Leninskim kursom*, Vol. 3, p. 148.

* L. I. Brezhnev, *The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, p. 41.

to Soviet foreign policy the CPSU Central Committee bases itself on a comprehensive analysis of the changes taking place in the world and utilises the potentials created by the growing might of the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community, the struggle of the working class of the capitalist countries, and the democratic and liberation movements.

The activities of the CPSU and the Soviet Government on the international scene have been eminently intensive and strenuous in recent years. The 24th Congress of the CPSU outlined the concrete ways of achieving foreign policy aims, and developed and enriched the theoretical foundation of the foreign policy line of the CPSU and the Soviet Government in the present situation, when real possibilities had arisen for effecting a radical turn in the international climate, for furnishing "a broad basis for constructive discussion and solution of the problems that had accumulated".*

The foreign policy guidelines and the Peace Programme adopted by the 24th Congress of the CPSU continue to exercise a profound influence on world politics. All people of good will have assessed the decisions of the Congress as a realistic blueprint to achieving detente and a lasting peace. These decisions have the solid support of the socialist community and the Communist parties of the capitalist countries. The constructive character of the Peace Programme has been acknowledged also by sober-minded statesmen in the West, and leaders of the Third World have declared their solidarity with its principles. By effectively helping to foster understanding between countries with different social systems and activate the struggle of the progressive forces for peace, against aggression and colonialism, the Peace Programme has become a key factor in improving the international climate.

With the backing of the Soviet people and in close co-operation with the Communist and Workers' parties and governments of the countries belonging to the socialist community, the CPSU and the Soviet Government have embarked on a consistent struggle to fulfil the foreign policy programme formulated by the 24th Congress. The implementation of that programme has been the subject of many plenary meetings

* L. I. Brezhnev, *Everything for the People's Benefit*. (Speech before the Baumansky constituency of Moscow on June 14, 1974), Moscow, 1974, p. 23.

of the CPSU Central Committee. The decision "On the International Activity of the CC CPSU in Pursuance of the Decisions of the 24th Party Congress" of April 27, 1973 charts the prospects and practical tasks of the struggle for the further cohesion of the socialist community, the consolidation of links with the forces of national liberation and the conversion of peaceful coexistence into an indispensable norm of government-to-government relations. "The Plenary Meeting of the CC," the above-mentioned decision states, "instructs the Political Bureau to continue steadfastly to pursue the foreign policy line laid down by the 24th CPSU Congress, acting on the theses and conclusions of the report of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at this Plenary Meeting, to work for the full realisation of the Peace Programme, and to strive to make the favourable changes achieved in the international situation irreversible."* Moreover, it stressed that there had to be constant vigilance and preparedness to repulse the intrigues of aggressive imperialist circles, that a consistent struggle had to be waged against reactionary ideology and propaganda and that broad and convincing information had to be given to world opinion on the life, ideals, achievements and international actions of the Soviet Union.

The foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet Government has been exhaustively generalised and given further impetus by Leonid Brezhnev, who analysed the processes taking place in the world profoundly, from the standpoint of Marxism, scientifically substantiated the steps taken to give effect to the Peace Programme and formulated new tasks springing from the programme's successful implementation and the changes in the international situation.

In the interests of implementing the foreign policy line charted by the 24th Congress it has become the practice for the key talks conducted by delegations and leaders of the USSR with representatives of foreign countries to be examined collectively by the leading organs of the CPSU and the Soviet state, namely, the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Council of Ministers of the USSR. In endorsing the political and practical results of the negotiations of the Soviet leaders with the party and government

* *New Times*, Vol. 18, May 1973, p. 4.

leaders of the socialist countries, and of summit talks with the leaders of the capitalist and developing states, the Soviet leading organs underscore that the Soviet Union is prepared to facilitate the implementation of the achieved agreements and consolidate the positive results of exchanges of opinion, and that it is determined to continue opposing the intrigues of imperialism's forces of aggression.

A major result of Soviet foreign policy was the turn in international relations from the cold war to peaceful coexistence and detente. This epochal achievement was primarily the result of the cohesion of the socialist community countries and the all-round development of the relations between them on the basis of socialist internationalism. "The successful development of our socialist community as a whole and of each socialist country individually is, of course, the main prerequisite for the effectiveness of our class international policy."* Concern for the promotion of friendship and co-operation with fraternal countries is an organic element of the policy of the CPSU and the Soviet Government. The regular multilateral and bilateral meetings between the leaders of the socialist states are an eloquent expression of the course towards the further consolidation and improvement of the alliance founded on common ideology and aims and on the international solidarity of the working people, whose vanguard is the working class and its Communist and Workers' parties.

The socialist community's purposeful, co-ordinated policy, which has scored new successes in recent years, is exercising a growing influence on the world situation.

At its session in Warsaw on April 17-18, 1974 the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee reiterated the immutability of the member-states' policy of consolidating the political detente and complementing it with a military detente in Europe and facilitating the settlement of acute international issues in order to safeguard peace and security and meet the legitimate demands of other nations. It was declared that detente had to embrace all the regions of the world. In their statements "For a Lasting and Just Peace in the Middle East", "For a Lasting Peace in Vietnam and the Protection of the Just National Interests of the Vietnamese People" and

* L. I. Brezhnev, *Our Course: Peace and Socialism*, Part Three, Moscow, 1973, p. 69.

"Cease the Terror and Persecution Against Democrats in Chile" the socialist countries once more demonstrated their unshakable support for the struggle of the Arab peoples against imperialist aggression, for peace and social and economic progress, and expressed their unqualified support for the policy of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam in pressing for the strict and absolute fulfilment of the Paris Agreement by all the signatories of that document. The Political Consultative Committee demanded an end to the persecution of the Chilean patriots and called upon other countries and world public opinion to support the progressive forces in Chile.

The unity of the socialist countries was fostered by the personal contacts between their leaders. Leonid Brezhnev made an official friendly visit to Cuba on January 28-February 3, 1974. Fidel Castro, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba and Prime Minister of its Revolutionary Government, welcomed the distinguished Soviet visitor as an outstanding revolutionary representing the country that had extended disinterested, generous assistance to Cuba at critical moments. In their Joint Declaration the Soviet and Cuban leaders expressed their determination, in keeping with the principles of socialist internationalism and a spirit of equality and mutual respect, to attain the utmost strengthening and development of Soviet-Cuban friendship, which is a most valuable achievement of the two nations who are welded together by their common social system and their unity of aims in the peaceful construction of socialism and communism. They denounced imperialist interference in the affairs of the Latin American nations and urged that in that area, too, the relations between countries should be based on equality, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and renunciation of the use or threat of force. The Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Council of Ministers of the USSR considered the results of the visit and approved entirely Leonid Brezhnev's work during his visit to the Republic of Cuba, evaluating the visit as a major event ushering in a new phase in the promotion of solidarity between the two fraternal peoples on the historic road of fraternal friendship and all-round co-operation between their Communist parties and governments.

On July 17-18, 1974 a friendly visit was paid to Moscow by Erich Honecker, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany. His talks with Leonid Brezhnev were held in an atmosphere of cordiality and complete understanding. At these talks it was underscored that closer relations between the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic in all areas of party, state, economic and cultural life was the highroad for the development of the ties between the USSR and the GDR.

The fruitful development of relations between the USSR and Hungary was demonstrated by the talks between a Party and Government delegation led by Janos Kadar, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, and Soviet leaders on September 25-30, 1974 in Moscow.

In 1974 the socialist community marked the 30th anniversary of people's Poland, Rumania's liberation from fascist tyranny, and the socialist revolution in Bulgaria, the 25th anniversary of the GDR and the 50th anniversary of the Mongolian People's Republic. The festivities commemorating these events were attended by Party and Government delegations of the USSR led by Leonid Brezhnev in Warsaw, Berlin and Ulan Bator, by member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Nikolai Podgorny in Sofia, and by member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Alexei Kosygin in Bucharest.

The favourable changes on the world scene fostered the further consolidation of the Soviet Union's relations with Asian, African and Latin American countries on the basis of anti-imperialist solidarity and peaceful coexistence. Co-operation between socialist and developing nations remains an important factor in the struggle to uproot colonialism and racism, cut short neocolonialist designs and consolidate the independence and progress of the nations that have won liberation. "We know full well and always bear in mind that, together with the peoples of the socialist countries, the peoples of the Asian, African and Latin American states form an important contingent, so to say, of the standing army of peace in international relations. Together we have accomplished a great deal, and we are convinced that our ways will not part. The Soviet Union, for its part, is prepared to take

all the measures necessary to strengthen and develop our co-operation."^{*}

Striking testimony of the deepening and expansion of this co-operation was given during the visits paid to the Soviet Union in 1974 by leaders of Afghanistan, Argentina, Egypt, Iran, Libya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Syria, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and Zambia, and by the talks between representatives of the Soviet Union and some other developing countries. On July 11, 1974, during Nikolai Podgorny's visit to Mogadiscio, the Soviet Union and the Somali Democratic Republic signed a Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation that laid a solid foundation for the further development of friendly relations and the joint struggle against imperialism and colonialism, for peace, national liberation and social progress.

Agreements on the disengagement of forces in the Sinai Peninsula (January 18, 1974) and the Golan Heights (May 30, 1974) were signed largely on account of the policy pursued by the USSR and other socialist countries and the all-round development of their relations with the Arab states. The Soviet Union regards these agreements as the first steps towards removing the flashpoint in the Middle East and underscores the importance of settling basic issues at the Geneva Peace Conference with the participation of all interested countries and representatives of the Arab people of Palestine.

The USSR unfailingly supports the efforts of the Arab countries to consolidate their unity in the struggle to eradicate the aftermaths of the Israeli aggression. At a conference in Rabat, Morocco, in October 1974 the Arab leaders reached agreement on support for the Arab people of Palestine establishing national rule under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organisation. In the talks with a PLO delegation in November 1974 the USSR lauded the decision tying in the Palestinian issue directly with a Middle East settlement as a whole. Moreover, the USSR declared that in line with an earlier agreement, steps were being taken to open a PLO mission in Moscow. At the celebrations marking the 50th anniversary of the Mongolian People's Republic Leonid Brezhnev re-emphasised that the USSR was vitally interested

^{*} L. I. Brezhnev, *Our Course: Peace and Socialism*, Part Two, Moscow, 1973, p. 59.

in the earliest attainment of a lasting and just peaceful settlement in the Middle East. "To this end," he said, "we shall work in contact and co-operation with the fraternal socialist countries, with our Arab friends—Egypt, Syria, Iraq, the leaders of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, Algeria and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen—in contact and co-operation with other countries that show a sincere desire to contribute to the attainment of this aim, which is highly important to world peace."*

The joint struggle waged by the socialist and developing states for the liberation of oppressed peoples, against colonialism and neocolonialism helped to expose the fascist regime in Portugal and depose it in April 1974 as a result of action by the democratic forces in that country. The new government recognised the independency of Guinea-Bissau, which in September 1974 became a member of the United Nations. In 1975 the independence of Mozambique and other former Portuguese colonies was proclaimed. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries have established diplomatic relations with Portugal's new government.

A consistent stand in defence of the independence, integrity and non-alignment of Cyprus was adopted by the Soviet Union in connection with the military putsch of July 15, 1974 and the subsequent developments on that island. It denounced the organisers of the revolt against the lawful government and stressed that their actions were inconsistent with the present trend towards detente and an improvement of relations between countries. The Soviet Government noted that the situation was continuing to deteriorate as a result of the attempts of the NATO militarists to abolish the Republic of Cyprus and underscored the utter untenability of a "settlement" in a narrow circle of NATO member-states in circumvention of the Security Council's resolutions calling for the evacuation of foreign troops and the restoration of constitutional order in Cyprus. It proposed that the situation should be examined at an international conference within the framework of the United Nations with the participation of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, the Security Council members and a number of other countries, notably unaligned states, in order to work out decisions that could ensure Cyprus' existence as an inde-

* *Pravda*, November 27, 1974.

pendent, sovereign and territorially integral state and meet with the interests of Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

In its undeviating fulfilment of the Peace Programme, the Soviet Union has in recent years achieved further major advances in promoting relations with capitalist countries towards detente and mutually beneficial co-operation. The Soviet-US summit held in Moscow on June 27-July 3, 1974 resulted in the signing of agreements on co-operation in the fields of energy, housing and other construction, medicine and economic, industrial and technical co-operation, and also a treaty on the limitation of underground nuclear tests and protocols to this treaty and to the 1972 treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems.

A working meeting was held between Leonid Brezhnev and US President Gerald R. Ford near Vladivostok on November 23-24, 1974. In the Joint Communiqué signed by them the Soviet Union and the USA reaffirmed their determination to promote relations in a spirit of joint decisions and the fundamental treaties and agreements signed over the past few years. They expressed the conviction that the course of consolidating peace and furthering detente was consistent with the vital interests of the Soviet, American and other peoples and reaffirmed their intention to promote their joint efforts so that the relations between the USSR and the USA should go on improving and that this process should become irreversible.

The two leaders gave much of their attention to the ways and means of averting the threat of war and ending the arms race. It was stressed that vigorous efforts had to be made to stave off the danger of nuclear weapons proliferating and work out mutually acceptable decisions on the question of prohibiting action to influence the environment for military purposes and on measures concerning lethal chemical means of warfare. In a joint statement the two leaders reaffirmed their determination to seek a further cutback of strategic offensive weapons. To this end they reached an understanding on a new agreement for 1977-85 that would, in keeping with the principle of equality and equal security, give the two countries the right to have a certain agreed aggregate number of strategic carrier rockets. The realisation of this understanding will be a major step towards lasting world peace and security.

In the exchange of views on international problems the

two sides expressed their common opinion that it was possible to consummate the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe at the summit level in the immediate future and that the Cyprus issue and the Middle East problem had to be settled strictly in conformity with the United Nations resolutions. The Vladivostok summit was further evidence of the great practical significance of regular summit meetings to the beneficial development of relations between the USSR and the USA in the interests of their peoples and in the interests of world peace. While noting the practically worldwide favourable response to the results of the summit, Leonid Brezhnev said that "we see in this response a manifestation of powerful, popular support for the policy of peace and international co-operation pursued by our Party and the Soviet Government".*

The talks with the new leaders of France and the FRG, who declared their adherence to the foreign policy course of their predecessors, were likewise of great importance in consolidating the turn in international relations towards peaceful coexistence and detente.

FRG Chancellor Helmut Schmidt paid an official visit to Moscow on October 28-31, 1974 and in the talks that were held during that visit considerable attention was given to the relations between the FRG and the USSR. In the joint statement, signed by Leonid Brezhnev and Helmut Schmidt, the common opinion was expressed that the policy based on the 1970 treaty "was consonant with the interests of the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany and the general trend towards further detente in Europe and the world".** The two countries were in agreement that there were auspicious prospects for a further improvement of relations and mapped out practical steps to achieve that aim.

Relative to the situation in Europe the Soviet and FRG leaders stated that they would do their utmost to make the process of detente and expanding co-operation among the European nations irreversible. They declared themselves in favour of the successful completion of the European Conference and an early settlement of some other international issues.

* *Pravda*, November 27, 1974.

** *Pravda*, October 31, 1974.

The talks ended with the signing of an Agreement on the Further Development of Economic Co-operation envisaging the expansion of economic, industrial and technical links, the building of large projects, the granting of credits on the most favourable terms and the extension of co-operation in the supply of raw materials and energy.

Leonid Brezhnev had talks with President of France Valéry Giscard d'Estaing at Rambouillet on December 4-7, 1974 at a time when the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two countries was marked. At these talks the two leaders reaffirmed the stability of the policy of concord and co-operation pursued by the USSR and France since 1966, a policy that had in many ways been the initial factor of detente and the restructuring of East-West relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems.

These talks, highlighted by realism and a constructive approach, reaffirmed the proximity of viewpoints on many international questions. The two countries stressed the great significance of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, declaring that there were good prospects for consummating it within a short span of time and signing the closing documents at the summit level. Moreover, they declared themselves in favour of the implementation of the UN resolutions on a settlement in the Middle East and Cyprus, of the further consolidation of peace in Indochina and the holding of a World Conference on Disarmament. They underscored their common desire to continue regular political consultations on world issues and noted that the holding of these consultations at summit level was a permanent element of Soviet-French co-operation.

Special attention was devoted to economic problems. In order to expand and improve co-operation the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and the President of France signed on December 6, 1974 an Agreement on Economic Co-operation for 1975-1979. Under this agreement the two countries pledged to co-operate in the building of large projects of mutual interest, promote industrial co-operation between the appropriate enterprises and organisations, including joint production, grant credits on the most favourable terms and set up mixed Soviet-French companies. Moreover, they signed a credit agreement on the funding of key projects of economic co-operation.

There has been a further improvement of Soviet-British relations as well.

British Prime Minister Harold Wilson made an official visit to the USSR on February 13-17, 1975. Following the talks in Moscow the Soviet and British leaders declared they were pleased to note the recent improvement of the relations between the two countries and that steps would be taken to promote these relations. Acting on the striving to give a stable and constructive basis for Soviet-British relations and facilitate further detente Leonid Brezhnev and Harold Wilson signed a Protocol on Consultations and a Joint Soviet British Declaration on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The former document provides for an expansion and deepening of political consultations on international problems and on questions related to Soviet-British relations. Similar significance attaches to the Joint Declaration, according to which the two countries will direct their efforts towards consolidating peace and averting the threat of war, including nuclear war. Economic questions were also comprehensively scrutinised. As a result the two countries signed a Long-Term Programme for the Development of Economic and Industrial Co-operation and a Programme for Scientific and Technological Co-operation.

The Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Council of Ministers of the USSR examined the results of the talks and underscored that the "Soviet-British summit is of considerable importance to the development of stable relations between the Soviet Union and Great Britain on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence, to fruitful and mutually advantageous co-operation between them. At the same time, its results are a positive contribution to the consolidation of international peace and security, particularly in Europe."^{*}

Disarmament remains one of the cardinal orientations of the foreign policy pursued by the CPSU and the Soviet Government. The aims in this area, formulated in the Peace Programme, have been given practical expression in the multilateral and bilateral treaties and agreements concluded after the 24th Congress of the CPSU. They are embodied in the proposals made by the Soviet Union and form the basis

^{*}*Izvestia*, February 22, 1975.

of the talks now under way. One of the central aims of the Soviet foreign policy of peace is to wage a vigorous struggle for the implementation of these proposals.

At the 29th UN General Assembly, held in September-December 1974, the efforts of the Soviet Union were directed towards the earliest attainment of this target and strengthening detente and international co-operation. On Soviet initiative the General Assembly considered the prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human wellbeing and health. The draft convention on this question, moved by the Soviet delegation, envisages the obligation to refrain from evolving meteorological, geophysical and any other scientific and technical means of influencing the environment, including the climate and weather, for purposes incompatible with the security and vital interests of mankind, and to have no part in and in no way to encourage activity contravening the terms of the convention. The signing of such a convention, Andrei Gromyko, member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, declared at the General Assembly, "would avert the appearance of new means of warfare and, at the same time, facilitate the solution of the global problem of protecting the environment".^{*} This proposal of the USSR received broad support. By 126 votes with five abstentions the General Assembly passed a resolution commissioning the Disarmament Committee to draw up an agreed text of a convention with account of the draft submitted by the Soviet Union.

A step forward has also been made towards the implementation of a Soviet proposal, discussed at previous sessions of the General Assembly, on holding a World Conference on Disarmament. The General Assembly unanimously approved a resolution reaffirming the desire of UN members to hold such a conference and instructed a special committee to continue the preparations for it.

At the General Assembly the representatives of socialist countries—Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Mongolia, Poland, Rumania and the USSR—submitted a proposal for giving the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance observer status. Approval of this proposal signifies recognition

^{*} *Pravda*, September 25, 1974.

for the important role played by this economic organisation of the socialist community in organising international economic relations.

The Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community initiated the adoption of a number of other resolutions aimed at consolidating peace and denouncing colonialism and racism. By an overwhelming majority of votes the General Assembly deprived the Republic of South Africa of the right to take part in its proceedings and recommended that the Security Council should reconsider the relations between the UN and that country. It was only by the veto invoked by the Western permanent members of the Security Council that prevented the expulsion of the racist regime from the United Nations.

The resolutions of the 29th General Assembly on the Palestine and Cyprus questions were a tangible contribution to the struggle for a further easing of international tension. The General Assembly reaffirmed the right of the Arab people of Palestine to self-determination, national sovereignty and return to their homeland with the utilisation, for the attainment of these aims, of all the means conforming with the UN Charter, and gave the Palestine Liberation Organisation, whose Executive Committee Chairman Yasser Arafat participated in the session's proceedings, the status of permanent observer at the UN. The member-states of the United Nations called upon all countries to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment policy of the Republic of Cyprus, and demanded the earliest evacuation of foreign troops and the termination of foreign interference in the republic's affairs. Soon after the adoption of this resolution, the constitutional President Archbishop Makarios returned to Cyprus.

However, on some issues the General Assembly did not display sufficient consistency. For instance, it was decided to refer for further study the question of reducing the military budgets of the Security Council permanent members and using the saved funds to help the developing nations, whereas in the opinion of the socialist states and a number of other peace-loving countries it would have been more expedient to determine the practical ways of carrying out the pertinent resolutions adopted by the 28th General Assembly. Further, the imperialist powers prevented the adoption of a resolution calling for the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea

and secured the passage of a resolution that in effect sanctioned continued US military presence in that country. The United Nations was by no means strengthened as an instrument of peace and security by the establishment of a special committee for the study of views and proposals for amending the Charter, for, if amended, it would hamper the fulfilment of the UN's basic tasks of maintaining world peace and security.

But the main results of the 29th General Assembly show that in the favourable conditions of detente and the successful fulfilment of the Peace Programme adopted by the 24th Congress of the CPSU the United Nations has become more active in safeguarding peace, fighting colonialism and neo-colonialism and organising international co-operation.

Within less than four years many key provisions of the Peace Programme have been implemented and others are being successfully carried out. Taking this into account, the CPSU and the Soviet Government are outlining new foreign policy targets, whose gradual attainment will make it possible to ensure world peace and security more effectively and make detente irreversible.

The Soviet Union's achievements on the international scene are the result of tireless, persevering efforts not only of statesmen and diplomats. "They are the result of the labour of the entire Soviet people, for in the final count successes of foreign policy are determined by the successes in domestic policy, by the level of our economic, scientific, technical and defence potential, and by the political and moral unity of our society."*

The world public opinion is playing a growing role in the struggle for detente. This was eloquently shown by the World Congress of Peace Forces held in Moscow at the close of 1973. It was attended by representatives of 143 countries who, despite political and ideological differences, unanimously declared their support for the provisions of the Soviet Peace Programme and denounced the subversive activities of international reactionary forces.

Needless to say, every step towards consolidating detente and strengthening security costs the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries a great effort. The forces of impe-

* L. I. Brezhnev, *Our Course: Peace and Socialism*, Part Five, Moscow, 1974, p. 77.

rialist reaction would have liked to fetter the will of the peoples and paralyse their aspiration for peace and progress. The military-industrial complex in the USA and the militarist and revanchist circles in other capitalist countries are dragging the world back to the days of the cold war.

In December 1974, pressured by these forces, the US Congress passed a Trade Reform Act containing unacceptable provisions relative to the USSR and making the granting of most-favoured nation status contingent upon the acceptance of terms amounting to virtual interference in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union.

These conditions have made it impossible at the present time to bring the 1972 Soviet-US trade agreement into effect.

The Maoists are at one and, essentially speaking, in collusion with the reactionary imperialist forces. They are stepping up China's militarisation, building up a nuclear potential, using every pretext to fan international tension and kindle hostility between nations, and doing their utmost to isolate the Third World countries from the socialist community.

The Soviet Union takes these negative factors into consideration. It is unswervingly guided by the provisions of the 24th Congress of the CPSU on the need "to continue to pursue its line of resolutely resisting the imperialist policy of war and aggression, and of exposing and frustrating schemes hostile to the cause of peace and freedom".*

The Soviet Union's Leninist foreign policy is the result of the collective wisdom and actions of the CPSU, its Central Committee and the Political Bureau of the CC. An immense contribution towards defining and translating it into reality is made by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Leonid Brezhnev. This policy has incontrovertibly proved its great viability.

In the Peace Programme adopted by the 24th Congress of the CPSU it is stated that steps must be taken to ensure the convocation and success of a European Conference as a means of relaxing international tension. This part of the Programme had now been translated into reality.

The concluding phase of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe was successfully completed on August

* 24th Congress of the CPSU, pp. 216-17.

1, 1975 in Helsinki. It was an epoch-making event which rang down the curtain on the Second World War and opened up new possibilities for settling the central problem of our times, namely, the consolidation of world peace and security.

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